Encryption Exports: Small Step Forward, Big Step Back 140
Kathleen Ellis, editor of the Privacy News Portal, attended yesterday's press briefing about a proposed loosening of export restrictions, and wrote the following feature article about the current situation. Click below for more.
Actually, let me hit you with a few links before you get started:
- EPIC's page on the proposed Cyberspace Electronic Security Act
- Proposed text of the bill
- White House analysis of the bill - really an executive summary
- Wired coverage, by Declan McCullagh
- Update: Press statements, including briefing transcript
Encryption Exports: Small Step Forward, Big Step Back
by Kathleen Ellis
September 17, 1999
Prominent U.S. Government representatives yesterday announced at a White House press briefing that the President was proposing legislation on encryption policy, and that the Department of Commerce was revising its export restrictions on some encryption products. Last year, Vice President Al Gore vowed to further loosen restrictions and propose a solution to the encryption issue, which has been the subject of contentious debate for the past decade.
The legislation, known as the Cyberspace Electronic Security Act of 1999 (CESA), has been transmitted to Congress by President Clinton. The bill purports to strike a "compromise" between the needs of law enforcement for access to data and the needs of Internet users to secure and their e-mail, web transactions, and stored data from hackers or thieves. According to the text of the bill, "society's increasing reliance on information systems in this new environment exposes U.S. citizens, institutions, and their information to unprecedented risks." Despite this acknowledgement, the bill clearly gives consideration to the needs of law enforcement and intelligence agencies first; "The failure to provide law enforcement with the necessary ability to obtain the plaintext version of the evidence makes existing authorities useless."
One of the major provisions of CESA is to allocate $80 million dollars for an FBI "Technical Support Center", which would provide assistance to federal, state, and local law enforcement officials. The bill also reinforces the confidentiality of law enforcement intelligence techniques used to gather information about suspected criminals. "The Department of Justice has developed this legislation with the assistance of agencies in government," said Attorney General Janet Reno. "Law enforcement has tools at its disposal to fight crime, but those tools are rendered useless when encryption gets involved". Reno said that CESA "balances the needs of privacy and public safety".
Perhaps most the most noteworthy provision of the bill is the resurrection of key escrow, a solution long considered insufficient, insecure and obsolete by experts. Key escrow is a technology that entails entrusting one's private keys with a trusted third party, so that theoretically, a law enforcement official would be able to present that third party with a warrant in order to gain access to the plaintext of the encrypted data. Although the bill does not require domestic users to utilize an escrowed cryptosystem, the bill provides a legal framework to protect users from disclosure of their decryption keys by their trusted third party without a court order. The bill also proposes to implement strict guidelines outlining the circumstances under which a law enforcement agent may be granted access to a decryption key held by the third party.
This mention of key escrow worries privacy activists, who have heard the use of such language by the administration before. "This raises the specter of collusion between law enforcement and industry to build back door access into encryption products," says David Sobel, General Counsel for the Electronic Privacy Information Center. According to EPIC's statement, the bill will eventually "provide a legal framework for access to decryption keys," a prospect which worries many activists and internet users alike.
Sobel would rather see the Security and Freedom through Encryption Act determine the U.S. Government's encryption policy. Authored by congressman Bob Goodlatte, SAFE would essentially force the government to reverse its stance on the encryption issue. Unfortunately, passage of the SAFE Act now seems unlikely, in light of Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre's remark during the briefing that if the SAFE Act passes the House and Senate, "the Department of Defense will ask the President to veto it".
Also announced at the press conference were revisions to the Department of Commerce's encryption export policy. According to a report released at the briefing, the export requirements will be revised to allow software exports of products of any key length, after the product is first submitted for review by the Commerce Department, and as long as the manufacturer of the product meets strict guidelines for post-export reporting of any user or distributor who obtains the software directly from the licensee. Secretary of Commerce William Daley announced that that the Bureau of Export Administration would streamline the revision and reporting process, but was unclear about specific changes to the current procedure.
Two prominent industry groups are very enthusiastic about this proposal. "Today's decision articulates a policy that is good for America, good for our nation's high-tech industry, and good for the tens of millions of Americans who use computers and want them to be secure" says a press release from Americans for Computer Privacy, a group that has lobbied for legislative reform and is funded primarily by technology companies. In a statement published by the Computer Systems Policy Project, Sun Microsystems President and CEO Scott McNealy (who made headlines on Slashdot for his remarks telling reporters that the privacy issue was a "red herring" and that "you have zero privacy anyway...get over it") said "we applaud the Administration's recognition that the universal use of strong encryption will promote the benefits of a networked world while protecting Americans' privacy, safety and security,". CSPP is comprised of eleven CEOs from major Information Technology companies, such as IBM, Dell, and Intel.
James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, opened the briefing by praising both groups for thier assistance in authoring the proposal, so it's no surprise that they're eager to ingratiate themselves to the Clinton Administration, while at the same time self-importantly emphasizing their effectiveness by declaring a victory. EPIC's David Sobel says "it appears that the FBI and large computer companies have reached an agreement on encryption, but that is not necessarily in the interest of the average computer user." Any compromise reached by these two groups could result in "less security than advertised, with hidden vulnerabilities the government can exploit".
Secretary Daley was repeatedly asked during the briefing what purpose the one-time review served, and under what circumstances an export license exception would be granted or denied; no clear answer was given. The U.S. Government may wish to allow exports only of flawed or escrowed encryption products using encryption above a certain key length, but have given up on explicitly pursuing that as a goal. Large software companies, the kind represented by ACP and CSPP, have lost a lot of business because of the export restrictions, and with each year that passes they may become less likely to object to making a few changes to their crypto modules in order to finally gain access to the foreign market.
In some ways, this proposal is good for the companies who have existed for so long without the ability to export their stronger security products at all until now, but for the rest of us, the proposal is neutral at best and abysmal at worst. As larger, wealthier proponents of crypto liberalization get what they want and contentedly back out of the debate on this issue (as American banks did when they were granted license exception to export security software to their overseas offices), further positive alterations to export policy start to seem less and less likely to happen. This is bad for American cryptographers who wish to discuss their work with their colleagues on the Internet. It's even worse for users, who may end up using insecure products without knowing it.
It's unclear what will happen at this point. The current congressional climate suggests that CESA will not pass without a significant push from the Clinton Administration. Even if the bill is defeated, however, Internet users around the world should continue to be cautious about purchasing commercial encryption products that originate inside the U.S.; you never know what may be lurking within.
One thing that should make you feel better (Score:1)
Re:Bill of Rights interpretation (Score:1)
RTM worm should serve as warning... (Score:1)
Just accept it. Wiretapping (which is what we're really talking about) is going to go away wheather you like it or not.
Who cares? (Score:1)
Re:SEND MAIL TO CONGRESS: (Score:1)
...phil
Re:Crytpo as munitions (Score:1)
I can open Emacs and write a letter to my mother. I can write a dissertation on mathematics, including the numbers to back my theories. I can write a program to look for patterns of alien life in data from a large radio telescope. I can give the source code to this software to people world-wide, so they can do cool things with their computers. I can be killed by my own government if I give them software to safely store their data because it's too effective.
--
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:1)
Anyway, the Supreme Court can be very wimpy at times.
Re: 3DES (Score:1)
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
if you didn't like what your country (like the draft) was doing you could run away to Canada. Now we can't evern run there without paying money for owning a CD, or something equally innoquous (sp?)
Re:Crytpo as munitions (Score:1)
Get ready for the revolution guys -- as much as I detest most of milita people, they are pretty much RIGHT.
what criminal in his right mind would use it? (Score:1)
"The lie, Mr. Mulder, is most convincingly hidden between two truths."
Answers (well, one, at least) (Score:1)
Kythe
(Remove "x"'s from
Criminals don't obey laws, only good people (Score:1)
Crypto isn't a distructive technology, but it is a defensive one. Offensive technologies (such as guns and other weapons) often become defensive technologies in the right hands.
One of the biggest problems here is that I sure as hell wouldn't trust the government with my keys. If they want evidence that I've encrypted de-crypted, how about slapping me with a court order to decrypt it? That way, I still know that my keys are safe. (Yes, I know there's holes in that proposal too, but it's far better than key escrow imho).
Error: WHITE HOUSE ANALYSIS, not EPIC Analysis (Score:1)
Please change this. We don't want people thinking that EPIC endorses this as much as the White House does.
Re:Pandora's box is open... (Score:1)
Re:Key escrow by definition is unsafe (Score:1)
Not that I trust any government's third parties, but... if I did, I'd only trust them if they could be trusted only to send my key to a law enforcement agency with a large enough key.
Hamish
Re:Crytpo as munitions (Score:1)
Hamish
Re:Pandora's box is open... (Score:1)
Business can force the government's hand for exactly those reasons you mentioned, because the actual location of a business is becoming less and less important in today's global markets.
Likewise, if citizens are unwilling to relocate, ways will be found of working on crypto projects stored outside the US from within it. If even this proves impossible (which I doubt), they'll still be able to download GPG from Europe. If the legislation on import of strong crypto changes, we'll make weak crypto code with strong crypto hooks available. Et cetera.
Hamish
Re:Solution... Distributed key computing... (Score:1)
The way to bypass the need for a 'product' i.e., a software package that encrypts files; is for trusted users of a network to participate in VPN with IPSec and SSH. These keys change on a daily basis.
Then the members of the VPN would utilize a distributed.net that works in the inverse; i.e., it cranks out huge keys on the fly using the power of all the processors on the network.
The internet is a public place. We need to build up the private areas and make them fortified and barracaded.
In addition, these trusted servers (that would ulimately reside at various points on the globe would have colocation for one another's encrypted data. That way data could be transferred instantly around the globe upon the trigger of some event (i.e., 5 incorrect passwd entries) or some command (i.e., paging the server with a certain numerical code). Then the data on the investigated computer would be transferred to a safe location and the investigated box would be wiped.
Finally, we can take advantage of the 'bankers' exception to this bill by keeping banking and financial information on the home server. That is all credit card transactions would be routed through the home server to the participating banking institution; thus, making the home server function as an extension of the banking institution's computer network. Alternatively, we should found an online credit-union and make all our home servers part of that enterprise.
We [ompages.com] know what to do and we are doing it.
bad anology? not entirely (Score:1)
I think if you carry your counterpoint to the conclusion, you will see more sense in the original post. Correct, guns, weed, etc. are physical objects. They can be physically stopped.
However, we haven't been able to. Drugs still wind up in penitentiaries fer cryin out loud. If we can't stop these, how the hell can we assume we can stop data?
Just give *a* key, not *the* key. (Score:1)
I'm probably being too simplistic about it, I know. Please enlighten me.
Re:Bill of Rights interpretation (Score:1)
As I read it they may read what is written, and search and take your stuff, but they cannot force you to solve a riddle for them. Although I believe people have been held in contempt of court for not producing a decrypted version of, for instance, coded ledgers, all that law enforcement can (and should) be allowed to do is seize the information. The burden of proof should be on the State to show that the information is 1) relevant to an investigation and 2) incriminating. They can take it if they prove (1), and use it against you if they prove (2), but you can't be required to aid them in proving their case, nor should your refusal be incriminating (under Amendment V).
Don't like it? Complain. Vote for someone else. Exercise your citizenship, not your feet.
Life outside US (Score:1)
I suppose our extreme lack of encryption laws partially compensates for the incoming GST...
Perhaps the USA is not the greatest 'democracy', if the politicians don't listen to the people...
Re:Contains no meaningful penalties against misuse (Score:1)
Where do you think the gub'mint gets their money anyway? Wouldn't it be the money of the people collected as taxes that they would be spending should they be fined? What might interest me is if individuals responsible be made to pay penalties out of their own pockets and receive jail sentences for said offenses.
bad anology.. (Score:1)
bad anology, really..
guns and marijuana are physical objects. they take up space, and they have to be physically transported from one place to another. You can't "copy" a gun.
If you want to transport weed into the U.S., you have to actually physically take it across a border, usually passing somewhere heavily patrolled or like at the US/Mexico border,or at least a little booth where you show a passport and may be subject to random searches.
The internet has no borders. You just click the little box saying "i am in the U.S." and they don't know if you're lying or not. I've heard that they check your IP adress, and if it's clearly from a foreign country, you're denied downloading of most encryption products. So? Is it that hard to get a shell located in the U.S.?
And if you _do_ decide to physically take it across a border, it's a hell of a lot easier. If you have 3,000 pounds of cocaine you want to get across a border, that's going to take up quite a bit of space. If you have a copy of Netscape Navigator 4 on a computer hard drive, how the hell are they going to know that? If worst comes to worst you can just burn it to a CD-R and stick it in the car stereo. And since once you've got the copy of Netscape across the border you can make as many copies as you want..
i guess what i'm trying to say here is, smuggling software from point A to point B is totally effortless. Smuggling guns or drugs is different since it actually requires some amount of effort. If you know someone 20 yards away on the other side of the border is carrying weed you can stop them from crossing the border with it, by physically blocking their path if neccicary, but if they're sitting 20 yards across the border with a computer and telnet you can't stop them from getting a copy of PGP.
-mcc-baka
uhh.. mari-ju-ana is bad, mm-'kay?
Double-keyed messages (Score:1)
Re:Questions (Score:1)
Re:Crytpo as munitions (Score:1)
Also, a friend of mine who works for a defense contractor who does, in fact, have a license to carry munitions overseas told me that once you get it, you lose many freedoms; e.g. you can no longer travel to certain countries, even personal, etc. 'Course, in his case he designs missiles so I guess the issue is a lot less academic for his case.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
The most important aspect of a firearm is that it is one of the great equalizers -- it doesn't take years of training or great physical skill to use it properly (especially at short range). In this sense, firearms help people defend themselves against aggressors they would otherwise be at a severe disadvantage against.
Guns are not used only for killing -- the primary use is as a deterrent by posing a potential lethal threat. (The difference is subtle but extremely important.) Some 97% or so of defensive handgun uses occur without a shot being fired (appx 2 million per year in the US).
I apologize for getting off-topic, but the previous author's fallacy couldn't be ignored...
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
To counter:
This is one of the biggest pieces of BS used to justify gun ownership. I am no less "equal" to you if neither of us have guns than I am if both of us have guns.
You mis-represent what I said. It's a dangerous world and there are people out there who know how to use force and are unafraid to use it for their personal ends. You really think, for example, an average woman is "equal" to an average rapist when it comes to defending herself against an attack? Nonsense. (Not to mention that situation is even more skewed because the rapist typically has the luxury of choosing his target...)
And frankly, I would rather live in a society where I don't have to carry a lethal weapon in order to be safe.
So would I. It'd be real nice, wouldn't it?
Besides, what about children? Should they be packing semi-automatic weapons so that they can be "equal" to the guy who decides to shoot up their preschool? This is a strawman argument. No sensible person would advocate giving children too young to handle the responsibility tools that are that dangerous. (This is the same type of reasoning that puts minuimum ages on drivers.) But I am all in favor of having staff members at the school armed and capable of defending themselves and the students.
And what about the the blind, or people with other disabilities? Firearms hardly qualify as the great equalizer for them.
This is a good point. Firearms do not require great skill to use, but there are some minimal requirements. There will always be some people who are physically unable to use any tool.
Old Information? (Score:1)
Re:Solution (Score:1)
One-time pads are secure, but totally impractical. The definition of 'random' required for a one-time pad is much stronger than you'd think. Heck, the NSA broke Soviet 'One-time pads' which were reused as little as once, and even some which weren't reused but had been generated by secretaries hitting 'random' keys on a typewriter. That wasn't random enough.
So let's say you've got a one-time pad, and you'd like to encrypt your porn. You need, say, 22,000 random numbers. Which can't be computer generated (because they're not really random -- what you're doing is inputting a stream cipher), which can't be stored online (because then they're accessible), which probably shouldn't even be stored on magnetic media (ditto), and thus should be input by hand. And you'll have to type them in again to decrypt.
What, you missed one? Too bad, there goes your data.
Of course, if you keep it around and you get busted, that doesn't do you much good either. So it's good only to send to somebody else for a message which only has to be secure until it gets there, is a very short message, and who you have personal contact with to exchange very large sheets of random numbers on a fairly frequent basis. (OK, you could always use microfiche or something, but the basic problems remain.)
One-time pads are almost completely impractical for the real world, and are entirely impossible with people you only know virtually.
Re:Whole Argument is Moot (Score:1)
1. DES is broken. It's trivial for the government, especially with an $80mil anti-crypto group, to break it or anything of equivalent strength.
2. Making changes isn't likely to improve your security. Actually, it's quite likely to decrease your security, as DES was designed specifically to avoid certain attacks. (The S-boxes were altered to defend against differential attacks, one of the benefits of having nice NSA people look over your code before making it standard...) Any changes and cracking your new crypto may be anywhere from trivial to no-harder-than DES.
Re:Bill of Rights interpretation (Score:1)
Re:You can help support SAFE (Score:1)
My congresswoman is a co-sponsor of SAFE, so I don't think she needs too much prodding from me to vote for it. However, I really think we all would benefit if people made a lot of noise and supported this strongly.
So, yes. do send the telegram, call AND send a letter. The more noise the better.
You can help support SAFE (Score:1)
Folks in the US: Call your congresscritter. Write a letter. You can also send a free telegram by going to this site [cdt.org]. It's easy and it's FREE. This service is provided by the Center for Democracy & Technology [cdt.org]. If you have any interest in these kinds of issues, sign up for their e-mail announcements.
Re:Contains no meaningful penalties against misuse (Score:1)
Re:Error: WHITE HOUSE ANALYSIS, not EPIC Analysis (Score:1)
Good catch. Sorry, my fault - I've taken a few too many anti-histamines this morning. It's fixed now. If/when EPIC does come out with a comprehensive analysis of the bill, slashdot will know.
--
Michael Sims
Key escrow doesn't work. (Score:1)
2. Any key escrow system must be accessible.
:. any key escrow system can be hacked.
... and what a fitting target for Joe Hacker.
not exactly (Score:1)
it doesn't really (Score:1)
You might have more luck trying to locate your right to crypto in the unenumerated substantive-due-process right to privacy, although good luck trying to find some courts to agree with you. The fourth and fifth amendments are also good places to try.
wrong (Score:1)
Yes, Americans are sheep (hopefully they'll at least remain armed sheep...). But, government still can't quite dictate reality in the way it can in 1984, because we still have wars and real interactions with foreign states (both lacking in Orwell's world). It's probably the only Orwellian idea that hasn't come to pass (yet).
Re:bad anology.. (Score:1)
Most people don't own guns (I don't), but in the culture that I am immersed in, there are several guns per household, 90% are used for hunting Deer and Ducks. Big woop. They're all legal. If these guns were taken away from these people, there would be an explosion in the deer population since they have no remaining predators besides people. Bow and black powder hunting is a pain in the butt and only the most die-hard hunters will do it, like people around here where it is deeply rooted in culture and comming of age rituals. (Yes, I do live in the U.S. and there are places that have comming of age rituals such as smearing fresh blood over the youth that kills his first deer, but I digress.)
My point is that guns and weed are ubiquitous (sold on every street corner) and software, the minute it is released, often becomes ubiquitous. Guns and weed cannot be stopped, because too many people in our society including law enforcement, especially those that live in the sticks (guns), don't want them to be stopped. So the analagy is flawed on a certain level, but I don't think it's bad.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
And there are good reasons why everyone should have the right to own guns, as the formers of the US constitution understood.
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:1)
Prosecution: Yes I have found X on the computer hard drive.
Cross examination: How did you determine this?
Prosecution: I'm not going to divulge that information.
Judge: The witness will answer the question.
Prosecution: No.
What would the jury think?
Re:Pandora's box is open... (Score:1)
Escro is dead...RIP.
The world is beginning to embrace private ciphers.
Heck...a patriotic thought may prompt me to
expatriate and assist the encyption effort off
shore...
Hmmm...
by Anonymous Coward (Score:1)
--------
"I already have all the latest software."
Non-US Citizens (Score:1)
Does anyone know of a way that we (the international community) can put pressure on the US to grow up about encryption?
Also, the (U.S.) government is very good at avoiding the issue. They act like nobody is allowed to use strong encryption already, so they'll "compromise". They fact is that U.S. citizens want to export encryption devices, and this bill does absolutely nothing to address that. (You think the international community is going to send their keys to the U.S. government? I think not.)
--------
"I already have all the latest software."
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
Hmm... you're right. And similarly, by making murder illegal you're not stopping the bad people from killing the good ones, only stopping the good ones from killing the bad ones. So by that thought, we ought to make murder legal, right?
Encryption != guns.
There are many, many useful purposes for encryption. Sure, it's going to be used for some bad ones, but anything has nefarious purposes.
Guns, on the other hand, were invented and used for one thing - killing. To make sure large chunks of flesh are forcibly removed from a living creature.(No, they really didn't invent them to shoot clay disks) If you can't figure out that difference, you need to spend a little bit more time studying the two.
---
Re:it doesn't really (Score:1)
Times have changed enough that crypto is as important (if not more so) than guns in terms of reducing the threat of tyranny. Is violence the only constitutionally sanctioned method of resisting a corrupt or overbearing government? I should hope not.
-me
Privacy (Score:1)
Re:Questions (Score:1)
Re:Solution (Score:1)
--
"A mind is a horrible thing to waste. But a mime...
It feels wonderful wasting those fsckers."
Re:Solution (Score:1)
As long as we have our open source crypto tools, distributed computing is really the only hope for opening up crypto keys.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
Another point is that the US Gov. is just harming the software indus. in the US. If we can't trust the software that's developed in our own country because it may have backdoors etc. in it, people (who have a clue) will get their software elsewhere.
I did. But not because I was paranoid, but I'm starting to become paranoid. The point is we don't need encryption software that comes from THIS country anyway, so why bother trying to control it. How damn stupid can you get.
Uhhgg, politicians are all idiots.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
The possession of any of the items mentioned -- including guns -- does not deprive anyone else of life, liberty, or the pursuit of happiness. The action of murdering someone obviously deprives them of all three.
The two are fundamentally different in nature. Their possessing an item infringes on no one's rights, their using it unlawfully is a totally diferent matter.
Re:One thing that should make you feel better (Score:1)
Re:Back doors (Score:1)
Lets just call it what really is. It is not a back door, it might as well be called a second front door. They have basically looked us in the eye and said; hey, I know we work for you in theory but we dont trust you. Give us free access to your data or we'll take it. You know its funny how gaining unauthorized access to computer system is considered illeagal unless you work for the DEA, FBI, CIA, NSA, or any other group of three leters that are still classified.
These people make me sick. The bend, twist, and mold our rights like play-dough. Anyone have a baggy I think I gonna hurl.
"Suits make my neck itch!"
Re:Who cares? (Score:1)
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:1)
Under the Bill of Rights, one has the right to confront the witnesses against one.
Under more general laws against the admissibility of hearsay, one generally has the right to cross-examine statements of fact made against one.
For law enforcement to decline to state how it decrypted the file (or whatever) is to deprive one of the ability effectively to confront a witness used against one and is to constrict one's ability to cross-examine.
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:1)
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence."
According to Findlaw [findlaw.com]:
"''The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent depositions of ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross- examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief''"
This essay goes on to state that while the Confrontation Clause is not identical with the hearsay rule, it generally leads to exclusion of evidence when the defendant has no opportunity to challenge its soundness though cross-examination.
Clearly concealed decryption techniques cannot be cross-examined.
Another Sixth Amendment right is the right to compel witnesses to appear in one's defense. This might very well include those who decrypted the message, in the event their testimony might turn out to be favorable.
"''The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law,''"
Compulsory Process [findlaw.com]
The consequence of violating the confrontation clause would be exclusion of testimony. The consequence of denying compulsory process would be a reversal or a new trial.
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:1)
Criminal law demands a "chain of custody" of the evidence. How do we know that the proffered evidence is the real thing?
Unless we can know all of the links in the chain of custody - along with the right to cross examine the validity of these asserted links - then we effectively are denied the right to confront the witnesses used against us.
This would violate the Sixth Amendment.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:1)
You are right, they are two totally different things. Assuming encryption == privacy, firearms are more protected under the U.S. Constitution. Your privacy can be infriged upon by court order. The Constitution does not give the same right to the government concerning firearms.
Yet, there have been many infrigements on the right to bear arms in the United States. You better write your congressman and keep encryption out of government hands. It is obvious the Constitution won't do that.
Re:Key escrow doesn't work. (Score:1)
Bill of Rights interpretation (Score:1)
There have been several cases where evidence that was siezed that pretty much nailed the guy for doing it was rejected because the search was deemed unreasonable. This also goes for searches without warrants, like when the cops pull you over and search your person or car w/o one.
Sorry to say, but the Bill of Rights does leave that loop hole for law enforcement to get into your private life. Don't like it? Try somewhere else.
Re:How's that again? (Score:1)
Unless we think you are a drug dealer or a pornographer or a terrorist or have "strange" religious beliefs
When cryptography is outlawed, bayl bhgynjf jvyy unir cevinpl
Re:One thing that should make you feel better (Score:1)
The result is still a fucked up program.
Here's a Denial of Service attack. (Score:2)
This export control stuff can't be anything to do with stopping crooks. It's more like allowing crooks to harm law abiding US citizens one way or another.
Don't worry about us "foreigners" we can get crypto code.
And what follows an example of how a foreigner can indirectly bring down a US server, without breaking any local laws. This could be easily done on USENET as well, anyone know what would happen? Shutdown of US USENET servers?
*/
/*
* pgpIDEA.c - C source code for IDEA block cipher.
* Algorithm developed by Xuejia Lai and James L. Massey, of ETH Zurich.
*
* $Id: pgpIDEA.c,v 1.16 1997/10/14 01:48:18 heller Exp $
*
* There are two adjustments that can be made to this code to speed it
* up. Defaults may be used for PCs. Only the -DIDEA32 pays off
* significantly if selectively set or not set. Experiment to see what
* works best for your machine.
*
* Multiplication: default is inline, -DAVOID_JUMPS uses a different
* version that does not do any conditional jumps (a few percent
* worse on a SPARC, better on other machines), while
* -DSMALL_CACHE takes it out of line to stay within a small
* on-chip code cache. (Not really applicable with current L1
* cache sizes.)
* Variables: normally, 16-bit variables are used, but some machines do
* not have 16-bit registers, so they do a great deal of masking.
* -DUSE_IDEA32 uses "int" register variables and masks explicitly
* only where necessary. On a SPARC, for example, this boosts
* performance by 30%.
*
* The IDEA(tm) block cipher is covered by a patent held by ETH and a
* Swiss company called Ascom-Tech AG. The Swiss patent number is
* PCT/CH91/00117. International patents are pending. IDEA(tm) is a
* trademark of Ascom-Tech AG. There is no license fee required for
* noncommercial use. Commercial users may obtain licensing details from
* Dieter Profos, Ascom Tech AG, Solothurn Lab, Postfach 151, 4502
* Solothurn, Switzerland, Tel +41 65 242885, Fax +41 65 235761.
*
* The IDEA block cipher uses a 64-bit block size, and a 128-bit key
* size. It breaks the 64-bit cipher block into four 16-bit words
* because all of the primitive inner operations are done with 16-bit
* arithmetic. It likewise breaks the 128-bit cipher key into eight
* 16-bit words.
*
* For further information on the IDEA cipher, see these papers:
* 1) Xuejia Lai, "Detailed Description and a Software Implementation of
* the IPES Cipher", Institute for Signal and Information
* Processing, ETH-Zentrum, Zurich, Switzerland, 1991
* 2) Xuejia Lai, James L. Massey, Sean Murphy, "Markov Ciphers and
* Differential Cryptanalysis", Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT'91
*
* This code runs on arrays of bytes by taking pairs in big-endian order
* to make the 16-bit words that IDEA uses internally. This produces the
* same result regardless of the byte order of the native CPU.
*/
#include "pgpSDKBuildFlags.h"
#ifndef PGP_IDEA
#error you must define PGP_IDEA one way or the other
#endif
#if PGP_IDEA
#include
#include "pgpConfig.h"
#include "pgpSymmetricCipherPriv.h"
#include "pgpIDEA.h"
#include "pgpMem.h"
#include "pgpUsuals.h"
/* If IDEA32 isn't predefined as 1 or 0, make a guess. */
#ifndef USE_IDEA32
#if UINT_MAX > 0xffff
#define USE_IDEA32 1
#endif
#endif
#if USE_IDEA32
#define low16(x) ((x) & 0xFFFF)
typedef unsigned int uint16;
#else
#define low16(x) (uint16)(x)
typedef PGPUInt16 uint16;
#endif
/* A few handy definitions */
#define IDEA_ROUNDS 8
#define IDEA_KEYLEN (6*IDEA_ROUNDS+4)
#define IDEA_KEYBYTES (sizeof(PGPUInt16) * IDEA_KEYLEN)
/*
* Flags in priv array to record whether key schedule is in encrypt
* or decrypt mode
*/
#define IDEA_ENCRYPTION_MODE 0x11
#define IDEA_DECRYPTION_MODE 0x22
/* Private functions */
/* Expand a 128-bit user key to a working encryption key EK */
static void
ideaExpandKey(PGPByte const *userkey, PGPUInt16 *EK)
{
int i, j;
for (j=0; j> 7;
EK += i & 8;
i &= 7;
}
}
/*
* Compute the multiplicative inverse of x, modulo 65537, using Euclid's
* algorithm. It is unrolled twice to avoid swapping the registers each
* iteration, and some subtracts of t have been changed to adds.
*/
static uint16
mulInv(uint16 x)
{
uint16 t0, t1;
uint16 q, y;
if (x = 2, this fits into 16 bits */
y = 0x10001L % x;
if (y == 1)
return low16(1-t1);
t0 = 1;
do {
q = x / y;
x = x % y;
t0 += q * t1;
if (x == 1)
return t0;
q = y / x;
y = y % x;
t1 += q * t0;
} while (y != 1);
return low16(1-t1);
}
/*
* Compute IDEA decryption key DK from an expanded IDEA encryption key EK
* Note that the input and output may be the same. Thus, the key is
* inverted into an internal buffer, and then copied to the output.
*/
static void
ideaInvertKey(PGPUInt16 const EK[IDEA_KEYLEN], PGPUInt16 DK[IDEA_KEYLEN])
{
int i;
uint16 t1, t2, t3;
PGPUInt16 temp[IDEA_KEYLEN];
PGPUInt16 *p = temp + IDEA_KEYLEN;
t1 = mulInv(*EK++);
t2 = -*EK++;
t3 = -*EK++;
*--p = mulInv(*EK++);
*--p = t3;
*--p = t2;
*--p = t1;
for (i = 0; i >16;
return (b - a) + (b >16, \
x = (x-t16) + (x>16), \
(x-t16)+(x>8);
outbuf[1] = (PGPByte)x1;
outbuf[2] = (PGPByte)(x3>>8);
outbuf[3] = (PGPByte)x3;
outbuf[4] = (PGPByte)(x2>>8);
outbuf[5] = (PGPByte)x2;
outbuf[6] = (PGPByte)(x4>>8);
outbuf[7] = (PGPByte)x4;
}
/*
* Exported functions
*/
static void
ideaKey(void *priv, void const *key)
{
ideaExpandKey((const PGPByte *) key, (PGPUInt16 *)priv);
*((PGPByte *)priv + IDEA_KEYBYTES) = IDEA_ENCRYPTION_MODE;
}
static void
ideaEncrypt(void *priv, void const *in, void *out)
{
if (*((PGPByte *)priv + IDEA_KEYBYTES) != IDEA_ENCRYPTION_MODE) {
ideaInvertKey ((PGPUInt16 *)priv, (PGPUInt16 *)priv);
*((PGPByte *)priv + IDEA_KEYBYTES) = IDEA_ENCRYPTION_MODE;
}
ideaCipher((const PGPByte *) in, (PGPByte *) out, (PGPUInt16 *)priv);
}
static void
ideaDecrypt(void *priv, void const *in, void *out)
{
if (*((PGPByte *)priv + IDEA_KEYBYTES) != IDEA_DECRYPTION_MODE) {
ideaInvertKey ((PGPUInt16 *)priv, (PGPUInt16 *)priv);
*((PGPByte *)priv + IDEA_KEYBYTES) = IDEA_DECRYPTION_MODE;
}
ideaCipher((const PGPByte *) in, (PGPByte *) out, (PGPUInt16 *)priv);
}
/*
* Do one 64-bit step of a Tandem Davies-Meyer hash computation.
* The hash buffer is 32 bytes long and contains H (0..7), then G (8..15),
* then 16 bytes of scratch space. The buf is 8 bytes long.
* xkey is a temporary key schedule buffer.
* This and the extra data in the hash buffer are allocated by the
* caller to reduce the amount of buffer-wiping we have to do.
* (It's only called from ideaWash, so the interface can be a bit
* specialized.)
*/
static void
ideaStepTandemDM(PGPByte *hash, PGPByte const *buf, PGPUInt16 *xkey)
{
int i;
hash[2*i+1] = (PGPByte)xkey[i];
}
i = len;
while (i >= 8) {
ideaStepTandemDM(hash, buf, xkey);
buf += 8;
i -= 8;
}
* At the end, we do Damgard-Merkle strengthening, just like
* MD5 or SHA. Pad with 0x80 then 0 bytes to 6 mod 8, then
* add the length. We use a 16-bit length in bytes instead
* of a 64-bit length in bits, but that is cryptographically
* irrelevant.
*/
pgpClearMemory(hash+24+i, 8-i);
ideaStepTandemDM(hash, hash+24, xkey);
i = 0;
}
pgpClearMemory(hash+24+i, 6-i);
hash[30] = (PGPByte)(len >> 8);
hash[31] = (PGPByte)len;
ideaStepTandemDM(hash, hash+24, xkey);
ideaExpandKey(hash, xkey);
pgpClearMemory( hash, sizeof(hash));
}
/*
* Define a Cipher for the generic cipher. This is the only
* real exported thing -- everything else can be static, since everything
* is referenced through function pointers!
*/
PGPCipherVTBL const cipherIDEA = {
"IDEA",
kPGPCipherAlgorithm_IDEA,
8,
16,
IDEA_KEYBYTES + 1,
alignof(PGPUInt16),
ideaKey,
ideaEncrypt,
ideaDecrypt,
ideaWash
};
#if UNITTEST
/* Test driver proper starts here */
#include
#include
/*
* This is the number of Kbytes of test data to encrypt.
* It defaults to 1 MByte.
*/
#ifndef BLOCKS
#ifndef KBYTES
#define KBYTES 1024
#endif
#define BLOCKS (64*KBYTES)
#endif
int
main(void)
{
int i, j, k;
PGPByte userkey[16];
PGPByte priv[IDEA_KEYBYTES+1];
PGPByte XX[8], YY[8], ZZ[8];
clock_t start, end;
long l;
for(i=0; i16; i++)
userkey[i] = i+1;
ideaKey(priv, userkey);
#if 0
ideaExpandKey(userkey, EK);
printf("\nEncryption key subblocks: ");
for (j=0; jIDEA_ROUNDS+1; j++) {
printf("\nround %d: ", j+1);
if (j IDEA_ROUNDS)
for(i=0; i6; i++)
printf(" %6u", EK[j*6+i]);
else
for(i=0; i4; i++)
printf(" %6u", EK[j*6+i]);
}
ideaInvertKey(EK, DK);
printf("\nDecryption key subblocks: ");
for (j=0; jIDEA_ROUNDS+1; j++) {
printf("\nround %d: ", j+1);
if (j IDEA_ROUNDS)
for(i=0; i6; i++)
printf(" %6u", DK[j*6+i]);
else
for(i=0; i4; i++)
printf(" %6u", DK[j*6+i]);
}
#endif
for (k=0; k8; k++)
XX[k] = k;
printf("\n Encrypting %d bytes (%ld blocks)...", BLOCKS*16, BLOCKS);
fflush(stdout);
start = clock();
memcpy(YY, XX, 8);
for (l = 0; l BLOCKS; l++)
ideaEncrypt(priv, YY, YY);
memcpy(ZZ, YY, 8);
for (l = 0; l BLOCKS; l++)
ideaDecrypt(priv, ZZ, ZZ);
end = clock() - start;
l = end * 1000 / CLOCKS_PER_SEC + 1;
i = l/1000;
j = l%1000;
l = BLOCKS * 16 * CLOCKS_PER_SEC / end;
printf("%d.%03d seconds = %ld bytes per second\n", i, j, l);
printf("\nX %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u \n",
XX[0], XX[1], XX[2], XX[3], XX[4], XX[5], XX[6], XX[7]);
printf("\nY %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u \n",
YY[0], YY[1], YY[2], YY[3], YY[4], YY[5], YY[6], YY[7]);
printf("\nZ %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u %3u \n",
ZZ[0], ZZ[1], ZZ[2], ZZ[3], ZZ[4], ZZ[5], ZZ[6], ZZ[7]);
for (k=0; k8; k++)
if (XX[k] != ZZ[k]) {
printf("\n\07Error! Noninvertable encryption.\n");
exit(-1);
}
printf("\nNormal exit.\n");
return 0;
}
#endif
#endif
/*__Editor_settings____
Local Variables:
tab-width: 4
End:
vi: ts=4 sw=4
vim: si
_____________________*/
Re:Bill of Rights interpretation (Score:2)
"and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."
I realize that probable cause has been watered down to some ridiculous levels in this country, but I would also point out that attitudes like yours have allowed it to happen.
So what we have here is law enforcement (and you, apparently) telling us that I don't have the right to be secure in my belongings unless there is evidence that I have committed a crime, at which point law enforcement can try to obtain permission to access the things they believe were involved.
Instead, I only have the right to be as secure as they decide I need to be, and furthermore I need to give them a copy of the key to my front door so they can get in more easily, without my realizing they've done so, and fish around until they find something.
Does this really make sense to you? Perhaps a class in critical thinking can help.
As far as trying somewhere else, if you would like a police state to live in, there are plenty to choose from; somehow, though, I feel safe in assuming you won't be leaving anytime soon.
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:2)
I wonder if that part would stand up to Supreme Court review?
...phil
Re:PGP is junk (Score:2)
Re:Dialog: (Score:2)
If law enforcement gains probable cause that I have illegal items, or evidence of illegal activity, in my lockbox, they can get a subpoena to force me to open the box. As you pointed out, if I refuse, I go to jail, and I can be kept in jail while the box is being forcibly opened.
Alternatively, with a search warrant the box can be seized as evidence and the law enforcement agency can break open the box without my cooperation. This breaking job would be a forensic activity, and I as the defendant, should the evidence within the box cause me to come to trial, have the right to question the officer who opened the box. The methods used to open the box are perfectly germane to discuss in court; many cases are sunk by reasonable doubt brought on by evidence mishandling.
The fact that my box is strongly or weakly locked should not matter, from a legal standpoint. It could be a massive, bank-quality safe, or an unlocked file cabinet; in either case, law enforcement must leave it alone unless they go through the proper channels to gain the right to sieze the evidence within the box. They certainly don't have the right to tell me how strongly I may lock my private documents - because, again, if it's beyond their capacity to open, they just get a judge to order me to, under penalty of prison.
Applying these principles to crypto, this means that a search warrant (or the equivalent, a wiretap approval from a judge) should be necessary to collect my information, either covertly or by direct siezure of the media on which the information lies. The two activities should be legally equivalent. Once the information has been legally siezed, the law enforcement agency may use its computational or cryptanalytical resources to crack my message, without needing another warrant to do so. (These attacks should only be allowed against data collected legally, of course.)
If it's beyond law enforcement's capacity to crack the crypto in question, or such a crack attack would take unreasonably long (hence denying me my right to a speedy trial), an order should be obtainable from a judge which forces me to decrypt.
If law enforcement took the first option, a cryptanalytic attack, when they bring the evidence gathered by that attack against me at trial, I should have the right to inquire, and get truthful answers, as to how the information was intercepted and how the decryption attack was performed. This goes back to questioning the methods of law enforcement, and it's perfectly valid for me to have this right. To have evidence thrown before me, and me not to have the right to question its source, is a gross infringement on my basic rights of due process.
I think this approach solves several problems with crypto law. The "decrypt it for us or go to jail" provision may seem heavy-handed, but remember that by the time I'm told that, a judge has been informed and has decided on probable cause. And I'm not just rotting in jail - presumably, my lawyer is appealing the order.
At the same time, accountability for law enforcement is maintained; evidence-gathering is subject to public scrutiny, and illegal wiretaps and decrypts of those wiretaps remain illegal, unusable at trial..
Dialog: (Score:2)
Government Authorities [Eyeing my big-ass, uncrackable safe]: Open that safe! We need the bad stuff you keep in there for evidence.
Me: No. Go to hell, pig.
G.A.: Ok, then, you go to jail for contempt of court until you open that safe!
----------------------
Scenario 2:
G.A. [Eyeing my encrypted HDD]: Decrypt that email! We need it for evidence.
Me: No. Go to hell, pig.
G.A.: Drat! We're useless without key escrow! Whinge whinge whinge... Me: Ha! Ha! I have won again...
Does this make any sense? Don't we already have laws for this? Hello?
----
We all take pink lemonade for granted.
Re:Solution (Score:2)
Don't take my work for it; see D.R. Stinson, Cryptography: Theory and Practice [amazon.com], in which the information-theoretical underpinnings of unconditionally secure cryptography are explained in a way that anyone with a basic knowledge of probability can understand.
Then start doing your part to render the NSA irrelevant: Write Code.
Re:Solution (Score:2)
Re:This is going to be just as expensive (Score:2)
The upshot? My (uninformed) prediction is this: There will still be 40-bit non-escrowed versions of the product going out the door. These will be shipped primarily to other countries and to paranoid individuals like slashdotters. Everyone else will run 128, but it will be a compromised breed of 128.
More likely, the rest of the world and the paranoid Slashdotters will use products developed outside the US, or products like Mozilla where we can bolt whatever crypto we want into the source and chuck any escrow that tries to creep in. The politicians seem to think the whole matter is a question of they can put the holes in they want. It isn't.
Re:Questions (Score:2)
Maybe I'm dense but... (Score:2)
Perhaps I don't understand. Free software ALREADY exists to do as good an unbreakable encryption as you want. If you are breaking the law already, what's to stop you from breaking it again, and simply, oh.. not giving away your private key to the escrow service? Hmmm? What the heck would law enforcement do then? Not a damn thing, because the evidence is encrypted! hah!
Key escrow is one of those things that can only hurt those who are honest enough to put their keys in escrow. Criminals wouldn't give away the key to their protected info to the law, just in case the law needed it to bust them! It simply makes no sense.
Silly politicians, privacy is for everyone!
---
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:2)
This is one of the biggest pieces of BS used to justify gun ownership. I am no less "equal" to you if neither of us have guns than I am if both of us have guns. And frankly, I would rather live in a society where I don't have to carry a lethal weapon in order to be safe.
Besides, what about children? Should they be packing semi-automatic weapons so that they can be "equal" to the guy who decides to shoot up their preschool? And what about the the blind, or people with other disabilities? Firearms hardly qualify as the great equalizer for them.
For 95% of the US, firearms are an anachronism, but I'm afraid it'll take us another 100 years to realize it, if ever...
This is really bad for free software. (Score:2)
As the author said, the fight for looser encryption regulation is currently being led (and funded) by the commercial software industry lobby. If these guys become satisfied and drop out, there's no hope of ever getting US developers to be able to participate in GPG or other free encryption development projects.
JMC
Re:Pandora's box is open... (Score:2)
When the US Govt get a grasp on this fact, then things might start to happen. Market and mind share is important, but not in quite the way that you percieve. No company really wants to be strong-armed into doing something because the government forces them to. So, if they incorporate offshore, then they don't have to be subject to US export restrictions, and they can do pretty much what they like. I think we will see companies who care doing something like this.
Re:Stupid Laws (Score:2)
This is both a good AND a bad thing.
Learning a martial art gives you the ability to kill people, but along with it the discipline and understanding to keep you from using it in a moment of anger. A gun just gives you the ability to kill. And makes it easier to harm someone when you're upset.
Guns are not used only for killing -- the primary use is as a deterrent by posing a potential lethal threat. (The difference is subtle but extremely important.)
Nuclear weapons are not used only for killing -- the primary use is as a deterrent by posing a potential annihilatory threat. Doesn't make me change my mind about them. "Oh, it's ok that we have the potential to destroy all human life at the push of a button because we're not really going to use it." That doesn't cut it for me. The problem with having the threat is that it might be used. Especially that the threat might be used improperly.
And to bring it back around. You're still wrong. Guns are NOT the same as Encryption. You don't have to worry about someone stealing your encryption from you and harming people with it. You don't have to worry about your kids accidentally a hold of your encryption and killing themselves.
I'm not getting into this to talk about gun control. I'm just trying to say they are two TOTALLY different things.
---
Re: More answers... (info on SAFE) (Score:2)
For information about SAFE (HR 850) [cdt.org], as well as information about contacting members of Congress, check out the
Center for Democracy & Technology [cdt.org]. If you put in your zip code, it will return information about your Rep. and how
to contact him/ her. Hope this helps!
Questions (Score:2)
Also, does anyone know anything about this SAFE bill? It sounds like something we should be telling our reps in Congress to support. Not that they ever really listen to us, but it can't hurt. It seems to me that with the readership that
Solution (Score:2)
Oh - wait. That's pretty much the status quo, isn't it?
Anyway, don't real criminals have access to more secure methods of encrypting evidence, anyway? Like gasoline fires? I just don't see any reason for a backdoor that doesn't imply overly broad use.
Back doors (Score:3)
Re:How's that again? (Score:3)
If anybody finds a backdoor in any commercial product, then commercial crypto from the US is d-e-a-d. Nobody anywhere in the world will ever trust any crypto software emerging from the US ever ever again. Then, there will only be open source software from the community and there will be untrustoworthy crap.
another slap in the face to U.S. citizens (Score:3)
However, we keep running into the situation where powerful people in Washington D.C. decide that widespread strong cryptography is not in their best interest. Often these people are not even ELECTED officials (e.g. Louis Freeh). Yet their voice manages to drown out the little guy.
Worse yet, they wrap it in a nice little story about protecting YOU from terrorists. We are your officials, and we know (better than you) what is in your best interest.
What's scary is that these people know damn well that a key escrow system would be swiftly denounced by foreign nations. They aren't concerned about protecting Americans from terrorists. They are concerned about protecting their ability to eavesdrop on Americans.
The kicker here is that the White House says one thing and does another. Gore vows to reduce crypto restrictions, and yet everytime something remotely similar to SAFE is discussed, Clinton vows to veto it. I'm pretty sure he would too. Clinton isn't running for office...
What can I say. Yeah I'm a bit cynical. But all the newsgroup heckling and grumbling isn't going to do a bit of good. I hope everyone who reads this will consider focusing their energy by:
- writing or calling your senator or representative. Explain how important this is to you.
- joining/helping an organization that works to support your view, such as the EFF.
Just don't be silent.
Thanks,
SEAL
Re:Solution (Score:3)
The review process boils down to the ability of the government to hold a companies software for ransom until they deliver a product insecure enough to please the government but secure enough not to raise too many eyebrows among users.
Consumers will feel secure because they'll see "128 bit encryption" on the box and think "128 bits, thats pretty strong stuff" not realizing that it has somehow been compromised. It's a bit like allowing PGP for export without key length restrictions so long as any digits in the key beyond 128 are 0.
The other problem is that it will probably result in the weakening of security we already have. Right now for online banking you can use 128 bit encryption because browsers with that level of encryption are not allowed to be exported. Under the new legislation browsers will be allowed to be exported after the review process. If part of the review process is sufficiently weakening the encryption so that it isn't 'too difficult' to break then there will be a browser with the strength of 56 bits of encryption masquerading as 128 bits. Having two identical products both supporting 128 bit encryption wouldn't work (one with the real deal, one with the watered down version) since interoperability is required and something that crude could be easily discerned. Either the companies won't release '128 bit' encryption to foreign countries and lose potential revenue or they'll weaken the encryption and release the weakened version in both the US and overseas. Loyalty to stock holders implies that the ultimate decision won't be favorable for privacy.
Pandora's box is open... (Score:3)
To paraphrase a well-known comment:
"You have no access to our private communications anyway... get over it"
Hamish
Stupid Laws (Score:3)
This is the same with modern gun control legislation. Making guns illegal doesn't stop criminals from getting guns, only law-abiding citizens. There are now more guns in the US than their are people, and there is no stoping anyone from getting one. The same with weed, Same with computers, powerful microprocessors, and strong encryption. They can't be stopped!
Some are more equal than others (Score:3)
This country seems to be falling into a dangerous mindset, optimizing law for corporations rather than individuals. Corporations need privacy. Individuals can't be allowed privacy (for their own good.)
Unfortunately, corporations are focused on making money in the short term no matter how expensive it proves to be for everyone else in the long term. Very little fundamental research is occurring in corporations as it once did at Bell Labs. Corporation mergers, acquisitions, and outsourcing have degraded our quality of life. A society organized for the sole benefit of the balance sheets of its corporations is not an optimal solution for individuals.
We should fight for equal rights for all under the law, individuals and corporations alike. One entity, one vote.
The true failure... (Score:3)
That the US government's muddled encryption policy has made US encryption products something to be wary of is the true failure of that policy.
Re:WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:4)
The average cop on the beat (J. Random Officer), on the other hand, is not a math PhD. He probably has some college courses, possibly an undergraduate degree, limited classical education, and quite a bit of continuing education as a cop. The smart ones tend to move up -- the average cop has an IQ of 100-115, the average detective 130+, so most cops, generally, aren't too dumb, at leas these days, in larger departments, in larger cities. That does not, however, include cops who have been cops for twenty years, cops in many large cities who were hired for reasons other than competence (the old boy network, racial quotas, sex quotas, or the fact that the department needed people when they were out of work as a fry cook), cops in small town who never passed any formal screening, county/sherrif/constanble personnel, and that is still a lot of cops who will be in the system for years. That load of people for whom concepts like encryption are foreign will be much more of an issue because that, coupled with the fact that cops tend not to spend a lot of time learning (they are trying not to get killed or sued) and that they deeply mistrust anything new and complex due to years of experience with a liberal legal system screwing cops every chance it gets means that you are highly likely to run into someone who considers an encrypted partition to be prima facia evidence of wrongdoing should you ever run afoul of the law. I see this as a far greater issue than Ft. Mead listening to you talking to your love-muffin on your cell phone. The local PD and prosecutor are still easily able to out-spend most people, and defending your rights into bankruptcy is a real problem -- you should be able to, but suing people who have ruined you is hard if they work for the government is pretty tough. And most hackers aren't rich.
It will be interesting to see how this plays out. I would encourage all of you civic-minded hackers to offer to help your local police department. I have offered to help mine and give regular lectures on handling computers that are evidence, how not to handle hackers, and so on. It definitely has changed the attitude of a lot of the more senior and mossybacked cops who now see computers as less of a menace, and that is a good thing. Spread the information widely and offer to take the time to help and you will do a lot more good than if you complain bitterly and use 500000 bit keys, because the more people using encryption then the more chaff to sift, the more messages to log and batch, the more stuff to worry about -- and I can assure you that every cop I have lectured to is using PGP right now. Spread a little sunshine, like Linus did a few years back. It can only help.
Contains no meaningful penalties against misuse (Score:4)
See how the Administration likes the bill then. As it stands, do you really expect the DOJ to slap its own hand when it breaks the law on this point?
WTF? Confidentiality of method of decryption? (Score:4)
Testimony: "Your honor, as you can plainly see, the {kiddie porn, bombmaking instructions, drugmaking instructions, nuclear secrets} is on the client's hard drive. We just can't tell you how we decrypted it."
Reality: "Hey, Officer Crypto-Dude, can you XOR the suspect's scramdisk file of random noise with some {kiddie porn, bombmaking instructions, drugmaking instructions, nuclear secrets}? I really need a conviction, man!"
Hell, why bother creating a bogus one-time pad if you don't have to reveal the method? How about "Hey, Officer Crypto-Dude, gimme the files off the hard drive from the other guy we convicted last month."
If the prosecution doesn't have to disclose how it decrypted your files, the only defence you have against fabricated evidence is to give up your keys and divulge what was really on your hard drive. Damned if you do, damned if you don't.
As I wrote yesterday [slashdot.org], I'm far more worried about corrupt cops than corrupt spooks. NSA knows it has better things to do with its time than invade your privacy. I'm not so convinced the same is true of Ms. Reno and Mr. Freeh.
Crytpo as munitions (Score:4)
How's that again? (Score:5)
"Law enforcement has tools at its disposal to fight crime, but those tools are rendered useless when encryption gets involved"
What bothers me most about comments like these is that they are based on the assumption that 'law enforcement' has an implicit right to have access to your information, as long as they feel the need. This is not so. A relevant passage:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated"
Since when does building a back door into all communications qualify as secure? And a promise from law enforcement not to use it improperly is not security, even if they could make such a promise honestly; what happens when someone else figures out how to use the back door (and someone will)?
Another thing that I don't see being brought up much when statements like the above are being thrown about is history. People have been using various types of codes to encrypt sensitive communications for hundreds of years. Has law enforcement been 'useless' for all this time?
I find it (almost) amusing that one of the agencies screaming loudest about their need for this (the FBI) touts as their greatest victory the incarceration of a man who was convicted based on evidence they couldn't decipher. So what did they do? They offered the guy who knew what it meant a deal, and he did it for them. Is there some reason this doesn't work anymore?
This is going to be just as expensive (Score:5)
We used to say, "If only some bolt of light would strike Clinton upside the head and get him to liberate export policies!" Our premise was that the cost and difficulty of testing would drop, and we would be better situated to promote our client overseas.
NOPE. Even if this law passes, the labor of testing may just go up. Implementing a "backdoor" or a key escrow mechanism necessitates cracking the CSP's (oops - gave away which company) and re-writing practically the entire code structure that selects and manages algorithms. Easy? No. In addition, what foreign company would be interested in purchasing a product they know the US Government can abuse like a bitch at its will? I certainly wouldn't tolerate it.
The upshot? My (uninformed) prediction is this: There will still be 40-bit non-escrowed versions of the product going out the door. These will be shipped primarily to other countries and to paranoid individuals like slashdotters. Everyone else will run 128, but it will be a compromised breed of 128.
In other words, this will accomplish nothing other than weakening crypto for US citizens.
This bill is bullshit! Call or email your congressional office today. I'm about to do that very thing.
-konstant
Key escrow by definition is unsafe (Score:5)
Yet another lovely step back in time by the Clinton administration. I wonder if any of the candidates for the next presidential election have gone on record for crypto policy.
The primary reason that the concept key escrow absolutely petrifies me is that the to be useful, the keys need to travel in one form or another from their central repository (which I would hope would be as tightly locked up as the NSA) to the law enforcement agency responsible for unlocking the message. With the repeated demonstrations by the U.S. Government that they don't understand crypto, what's even going to guarantee the safety of my key (and therefore my data) in transit?
Don't make me hand over my keys. I have them because they protect me. And you can bet that if key escrow becomes a requirement, I will not surrender my stock of open-source crypto software, but only begin to use it more.