New report reveals vulnerability in security 20
jgalun writes "An article on ScienceDaily reports on building machines, for $60,000, that can break 56bit keys in 10 hours. Anything under 80 bits is vulnerable. Meanwhile, most banks are using 40 bit protection and the US is restricting export of greater than 56 bit encryption software. "
This doesn't surprise me that much, remembering the "Deep Crack" machine that
conquered DES-II-2.
... (Score:1)
A note for you guys at the top:
This isn't about cracking UNIX passwords. This is about the encryption algorithms used by web browsers for ssl, among tons of other applications encryption has.
In my opinion, it has ALWAYS been well known that this could be done.
128 bits isn't even that much, however 4096 (RC5) bit is more than enough security for the general application.
Anyone who knows security knows that 40-56 bit is just nowhere near enough.
Not news to me.
What banks use 40 bit? Most use 128 bit (Score:1)
I'm in the US, and I've worked on contracts with Swiss banks to impliment 128 bit IDEA encryption. (We sell this to other banks too) Getting the permissions to export this was possibal in 1994, five years ago. You can export any encryption from the US, there is just a catch - it needs to go to orginizations that the US goverment trusts.
I don't know what all banks use of course, and there was 56 bit encryption avaiable to them (regular DES was included in the same model, maybe they use that for speed though IDEA is standard in banking) There seems to be the misconception on /. that it is impossibal to export anything more then 40 bit encryption. That is not true, you just need to get permission, something that common people probably won't get.
Not feasible (Score:1)
You'd have to more than double that number in order to fit the encrypted versions in there as well.
My calculations were very basic and quick, but the end result should be in the right ballpark.
And of course, where SALTs are used (all Unix systems) or anything that can affect the encrypted output (most systems), you will need to multiply this number by a few orders of magnitude.
Of course I might be missing something here...
The actual researchers' site (Score:1)
Looks like no new mathematical things here--just applying SIMD to cryptanalysis. Kewl idea, but no new algorithmic problems.
There goes DES - III . . . . (Score:1)
The EFF did it quite some time ago. (Score:1)
They wrote a nice-to-read book about it all. It's online somewhere on replay.com [replay.com]. An excellent read. I'm surprised that UNC guy didn't mention it.
The scary thing is that $250000 or $60000 is pocket change for the NSA guys. I don't want to know how long it takes them to break DES keys.
Selective posting for /. friends (Score:1)
Don't assume conspiracies, they're almost never true.
huh? - the computer seems to be the point (Score:1)
The 'science news' article seems to (as most journals do) completely miss the point. Following the link gets to the goals of the research which, while not particularly novel, is not what was reported.
I think it's pretty damn obvious that any computer which can crunch numbers can do good cryptanalysis, but I guess there are some people out there who think specialized hardware is the only way to go?
Who Care's if the machine can break it! (Score:1)
There are solutions. (Score:1)
Why keep reinventing the wheel? (Score:1)
Too big to be nits (Score:2)
Second, it's my understanding that most (if not all) banks now use Triple DES. This gives them an effective key length of over 100 bits; maybe someone can chime in with the _right_ number. Banks are safe for now.
But Unix passwords take a year to break (Score:1)
UNIX password bs (Score:1)
Primes lookup table... (Score:1)