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Is It Time For Zero-Trust Corporate Networks? ( 150

An anonymous reader quotes CSO: "The strategy around Zero Trust boils down to don't trust anyone. We're talking about, 'Let's cut off all access until the network knows who you are. Don't allow access to IP addresses, machines, etc. until you know who that user is and whether they're authorized,'" says Charlie Gero, CTO of Enterprise and Advanced Projects Group at Akamai Technologies in Cambridge, Mass... The Zero Trust model of information security basically kicks to the curb the old castle-and-moat mentality that had organizations focused on defending their perimeters while assuming everything already inside didn't pose a threat and therefore was cleared for access. Security and technology experts say the castle-and-moat approach isn't working. They point to the fact that some of the most egregious data breaches happened because hackers, once they gained access inside corporate firewalls, were able move through internal systems without much resistance...

Experts say that today's enterprise IT departments require a new way of thinking because, for the most part, the castle itself no longer exists in isolation as it once did. Companies don't have corporate data centers serving a contained network of systems but instead today typically have some applications on-premises and some in the cloud with users -- employees, partners, customers -- accessing applications from a range of devices from multiple locations and even potentially from around the globe... The Zero Trust approach relies on various existing technologies and governance processes to accomplish its mission of securing the enterprise IT environment. It calls for enterprises to leverage micro-segmentation and granular perimeter enforcement based on users, their locations and other data to determine whether to trust a user, machine or application seeking access to a particular part of the enterprise... Zero Trust draws on technologies such as multifactor authentication, Identity and Access Management (IAM), orchestration, analytics, encryption, scoring and file system permissions. Zero Trust also calls for governance policies such as giving users the least amount of access they need to accomplish a specific task.

"Most organizational IT experts have been trained, unfortunately, to implicitly trust their environments," says the chief product officer at an IAM/PIM solutions supplier.

"Everybody has been [taught] to think that the firewall is keeping the bad guys out. People need to adjust their mindset and understand that the bad actors are already in their environment."
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Is It Time For Zero-Trust Corporate Networks?

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  • by Entrope ( 68843 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:20PM (#56016727) Homepage

    Defense in depth is a very valuable concept, but "zero trust" seems like it is taking things too far. Do you not trust a printer to print your document unless you, as the end user (or executive officer) have verified its firmware is authorized by the manufacturer and has not been subverted? What if it prints your document but injects errors or sends a copy to a foreign espionage organization? How does a server decide whether to trust a request from a computer where a known user is logged in, rather than rejecting it as a web browser that got subverted by malware or a new-fangled kind of attack ad?

    • by Anonymous Coward

      Security: Not often convenient.

      • by Junta ( 36770 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @07:53PM (#56017179)

        For security to actually *work*, this is the key thing that must change.

        Security in this industry has been about security teams covering their asses, it's not *their* fault if all their efforts to make things secure are bypassed by people trying to get their job done. Security *needs* to be more about understanding the human consequences of the approach being taken.

        • by RightwingNutjob ( 1302813 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @08:22PM (#56017277)
          It depends on what your organization does. If the workflow is that (for lack of a better word) trained button-pushers sit at fixed workstations and use software that someone else has written for them, then you can go pretty far with security at next to no human cost. You can have smart card readers and short timeouts on locking screensavers and a whitelist of software with per-instance authentication tied to that 2FA token and it won't disrupt the work.

          If, on the other hand, people move around between workstations, or need to be able to run arbitrary software (for example stuff sent by a client or vendor, or stuff they wrote themselves, or the software they run is a programmable environment like MATLAB that you can do nasty stuff with if you put your mind to it), then you can't have that without incurring a real penalty on productivity and encouraging your employees to work around the security infrastructure. You pretty much guarantee the latter if any portion of your workforce does R&D work that requires moving equipment between network jacks or needing to be able to send arbitrary packets from one gizmo to another or from a gizmo in the lab to their workstation. Or if several people on the same team need to be able to unlock the screen on the same machine and get at the same instance of the user session.

          There is no silver bullet. Tiered access is good, sales clerks don't need to be able to get at the HR database or the preparatory documents for a patent filing, but there is no silver bullet.
    • by CaptainDork ( 3678879 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @07:03PM (#56016937)

      I think the zero-trust approach is all wrong.

      The real answer is to deploy all that "machine learning" and "AI" bullshit to anticipate, and prevent, problems.

      • The real answer is to deploy all that "machine learning" and "AI" bullshit to anticipate, and prevent, problems.

        Nope. The answer is "blockchains". The whole point of blockchains is dealing with trust, by distributing "trust" among many entities. Although none of them are fully trustworthy, they also don't fully trust each other, so the blockchain system as a whole has integrity.

      • Security: 1-assume anyone could be a risk. If anyone is above suspision then that person will be targeted. 2-Need to know: limiting the scope of access to what is required, as opposed to you have a security clearance so you can see everything. Limit the damage when (not if) people fail. 3-Machine learning and AI are "mostly" reliable. When your personal security is at risk you want "Always" reliable.

        • It's a lot easier than that.

          In the old days, admin jockeys had to manually allow/disallow all kinds of access for all kinds of entities all over the network.

          I was there.

          Time to deploy ML and AI the vendors are pushing.

    • How does a server decide whether to trust a request from a computer where a known user is logged in, rather than rejecting it as a web browser that got subverted by malware or a new-fangled kind of attack ad?

      The same way you have been able to do it for a while. PGP signing. Go to a 'key signing party' and rub elbows with people you actually trust. Next time you get a letter from them verify the information is signed from them.

      If the printer can inject errors we have bigger issues.

      What shocks me in all of these e-mail leak scandals is how un verified it is. I remember being able to telnet to open port 25s and send e-mail to anyone as anyone. PGP encryption and signing should be standard by anyone at that level.

      • by Entrope ( 68843 )

        How does PGP protect against your computer getting infected by malware that impersonates you?

        The "zero trust" approach mostly guards against the same attacks that locking down ports to known/expected MAC addresses does, although hopefully using more robust methods of identification. It can also guards against subversion of idle computers, but requires secure and clearly managed delegation mechanisms. Getting the delegation wrong can open up impersonation attacks that are probably worse than idle machines

      • What shocks me in all of these e-mail leak scandals is how un verified it is. I remember being able to telnet to open port 25s and send e-mail to anyone as anyone. PGP encryption and signing should be standard by anyone at that level.

        There were DKIM [] signatures on the Hillary Clinton emails []

        This Politifact post muddles over whether the Wikileaks leaked emails have been doctored, specifically the one about Tim Kaine being picked a year ago. The post is wrong -- we can verify this email and most of the rest.

        In order to bloc spam, emails nowadays contain a form of digital signatures that verify their authenticity. This is automatic, it happens on most modern email systems, without users being aware of it.

        This means we can indeed validate most of the Wikileaks leaked DNC/Clinton/Podesta emails. There are many ways to do this, but the easiest is to install the popular Thunderbird email app along with the DKIM Verifier addon. Then go to the Wikileaks site and download the raw source of the email [].

        As you see in the screenshot below, the DKIM signature verifies as true.

        If somebody doctored the email, such as changing the date, then the signature would not verify. I try this in the email below, changing the date from 2015 to 2016. This causes the signature to fail.

      • Go to a 'key signing party' and rub elbows with people you actually trust.

        People in the same city, yes. But in the face of increasing "safety" and "security" restrictions on international travel, domestic air travel, and even getting a driver's license for the first time, how well does this scale beyond a city?

    • why are corporations having to "settle" out of court...IT budgets suck due to CEO's salaries going up because they dont understand IT security and getting hacked but that CEO will get replaced tomorrow and IT will have to again...explain.
    • by raymorris ( 2726007 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @08:43PM (#56017369) Journal

      The summary sucks, so I understand why it was unclear.

      A printer is a great example. This is about networking. The idea is to get away from the "security happens at the firewall" model, the idea if anything that has an internal IP address should automatically get access to every internal resource. In the firewall model, the printer can connect to your databases, and can send data out to the internet. Does that make sense to allow that?

      The Zero Trust model is about WHO, a logged in user, rather an IP addresses. In other words, *logging in* to the network gets you access to the stuff you have access to. It's the idea that just because you have an internal IP address doesn't mean you should have access to every internal resource. The printer is inside the network, but it doesn't get access to the databases, or HR system, or anything else. Also the printer doesn't have access to the internet. Inside the network or not, access is allowed based on who is logged in, not just anyone with a local IP.

      Regarding a logged-in user with a malware infested PC, the network itself can't prevent ALL damage from that, but the Zero Trust model limits the damage because the malware can only access the things that specific user accesses for their job. The marketing manager can't even ping the database, so if his PC is infected only marketing material is at risk, not the database, code repos, etc.

      • by geek ( 5680 )

        In the firewall model, the printer can connect to your databases, and can send data out to the internet. Does that make sense to allow that?

        I take it you've never worked with SAP.............

      • by Entrope ( 68843 )

        So how is that different than the "defense in depth" idea that had been around for decades?

        • by ceoyoyo ( 59147 )

          It's got a cool new name.

        • That's a great question.

          Defense in depth is one part of Zero Trust. ZT has defense in depth built from the inside out, though. We start by securing the critical resource with the assumption that the attacker has control of a local computer. We then try to keep attackers out of our networks and an auxiliary measure. This is related to the principle of least privilege.*

          Most crucially, perhaps, Zero Trust is about getting rid of the idea of "trusted networks" and focusing on WHO wants access to WHICH specific

          • by Entrope ( 68843 )

            So "Zero Trust" means to finally do the things that "defense in depth" has been telling you to do for decades, except to explain it poorly? If "the attacker has control of a local computer", what stops the attacker from impersonating whoever logs into that computer? Without 2FA, what keeps the attacker from capturing the legitimate user's password and logging in later?

      • by orlanz ( 882574 )

        First, I don't think most large corporate environments these days are castle & moat systems. If it is, it usually means that the company doesn't have more than one production facility, never did an M&A, no joint ventures, has no testing or R&D labs, hasn't been around for long, etc. Fragmentation naturally happens and it takes a lot of investment to keep things standardized.

        So the largest security hole in these systems has always been the methane production units. Most corporations have all t

    • Isn't the object-capability model just this thing, taken to its extreme? It's probably Alan Kay's wet dream; any system can verify authorization to do things at any level of granularity, all the way from logging into a system as a whole to accessing a specific row in a database table. The problem is that the infrastructure we eventually ended up with is too chaotic to be retrofitted for this.
  • Zero-trust corporate networks limits exposure to risk, which can cause you to not be able to reap the rewards of taking the risk. It is important to always take calculated risks in order to progress. If a person is afraid of the sun and they do not step into it, this can cause them to also not feel the warm sunlight. People want to preserve themselves and stand in the shade, but this will not allow them to prosper. An essay writer [] will always recognize this when they are writing. A write
    • Zero-trust corporate networks limits exposure to risk, which can cause you to not be able to reap the rewards of taking the risk.

      That is an interesting take. Can you give an example of a risk that a zero-trust network would obviate that would cause the loss of some reward?

      • The sheer amount of extra setup can add to red tape and cost of running business, time saved on configuring devices and acquiring security clearances is the reward.
        • There are no lack of tools out there to help with this. Hire people that understand a certificate authority and can set up end to end encryption. It's a bit more complicated, but anyone coming out of any networking certification program who can't set up a CA and administer an IPsec network should be shown the door. And really, the hard part is just in the set up. Once you have the processes and systems in place, it's just a little bit of extra work every time you have to add new hardware. And then you can h

          • It's not "just" setup, it adds more drag whenever you do changes to hardware and network topology. Yet another thing that can fail. DMZ is better than nothing because its management can be confined to single dedicated system, and you can forget about it when you do work on internal servers. And it's good enough to deal with all but the most dedicated attackers. Saving on security will always be extremely attractive since most systems actually don't get attacked and everyone bet on not being targeted. This i
      • Dude, he's a spammer.

    • This isn't risk in the context of "If I buy a million dollars in corn futures, and there's flooding that wipes out 1/3 of this year's harvest, why I'll make shit tons of money", this is risk in the form "if I leave my doors and windows open and put out a big sign saying ROB ME". The former may be a sensible gamble, but even if it isn't sensible, at least one can identify some potential up side to it. Having your hardware p0wned, your data stolen and your network rendered useless has no upside.

    • Please die in a fire. Fire optional.

  • I never trusted corporate networks anyway in the past, so why now?

  • by eggman9713 ( 714915 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:23PM (#56016747)
    Until the network gets in the way of an executive doing something executive-y or costs too much. Then it's right back to status quo.
    • by Nutria ( 679911 )

      This -- especially "costs too much" -- is so effing true.

    • by geek ( 5680 )

      I've seen entire egress security postures removed just so a C level dbag with a chip on his shoulder can hold a skype for business meeting for 2 hours and be sure he isn't disrupted.

      C stands for cocksuckers in my book

    • Not even an executive being inconvenienced is needed, in my experience. Just enough noisy whiners complaining that they can't do their job is often enough. Once the rabble gets loud enough to be heard outside the executive bathroom, it gets fixed.

      No-trust in practice is going to mean that about 100% of employees are going to not be able to do their job, or do it as they're used to doing it. I can't see retrofitting this onto any mid-sized business or larger. I think it would only work if you built it from t

  • Back To The Basics (Score:5, Informative)

    by Freshly Exhumed ( 105597 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:27PM (#56016781) Homepage

    The question "Is It Time For Zero-Trust Corporate Networks?" has been faced for decades, so how is Zero Trust any different? It seems to be based on two well known concepts: authentication (are you who you say you are?) and authorization (now that I know who you are, are allowed to do what you are trying to do?). The authentication and authorization model has been used to varying degrees for decades in Federated Naming systems, LDAP, Active Directory, NIS+. etc. etc. So, the question should be "How is Zero Trust new?" when we already understand the basics?

    • Further, one of the chief reasons that we haven't commonly used the authentication/authorization model on a widespread basis is that almost all previous attempts at scaling the solutions to very large organizations has met with physical hardware limitations that not even NIS+ on an Ultra Enterprise 10000 or batteries of Windows AD servers could tackle. If we now go back to the authentication/authorization model and write the code to operate integrally in the cloud we may have the means to actually scale it

    • by MightyMartian ( 840721 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:58PM (#56016921) Journal

      It isn't new, and has been around in one form or another for a long damned time. The problem is that a lot of networks have been set up with a lowest common denominator principle. "Oh we have that old XP box that communicates with that weird old Xerox plotter, so I guess we better leave SMBv1 enabled" or "Jeez, setting up a VPN for those machines in the annex connected by WiFi is such a pain in the ass, let's just turn off SID advertising and give it a real long password and plug the access point into the private intranet."

      I've seen these sorts of "compromises" and many more over the years, and it very often is because either the IT department is filled with idiots, or they're perfectly sensible people who have been ordered by management to keep supporting awful legacy devices, and support them in a way that does cause the management team any difficulty ("What, I have to log in to some portal so I can get access because you've segregated it off the LAN!!! I just want to click on the icon that I've always clicked on!")

      And that's where zero trust networking really runs into problems. It's not all that hard to set up systems that have that much rigor. It's having to get the users, and in particular your superiors, to accept the necessity and not push for "accommodations" that end up undermining security.

  • No, God no (Score:3, Insightful)

    by rsilvergun ( 571051 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:29PM (#56016797)
    How the hell are you going to do business like that? Do you have any idea how many companies don't have IT staff who understand TCP/IP networking but somehow are in charge of it? How much do you think it would cost when your network constantly has to be reconfigured to allow connectivity by IP and/or expiring certs rather than passwords?

    Unless highly skilled IT workers get a hell of a lot cheaper then this is pie in the sky. The cost of a breach is still less than the cost of wages needed to keep a scheme like this working _and_ have a functional network.
    • According to LinkedIn HR posts I read IT is not hard as technical skills can be learned. Managerial and leadership is not as unlike us these guys work very hard and provide a value to companies unlike IT appearrently.

      Seeing Indians who barely speak English doing any of the jobs we used to do show them anyone can learn it as the company isn't falling apart yet.

    • And as someone astutely pointed out above: legacy devices.

      Not only do you have the cost of skilled IT workers, you have the cost of having everything largely upgraded at all times, with no exceptions. No old fax/printer/copier sitting in some office somewhere, no old label printer, no headless box that hasn't been updated in 10 years that's running something critical, no cheap chinese security cameras with no firmware updates ever, no two decade old security card system, no xp machine running the envelope s

  • by ErichTheRed ( 39327 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:30PM (#56016805)

    The truth is that almost any organization that isn't heavily regulated against doing so is putting at least _some_ data outside the corporate firewall in public clouds. Even if the official IT department doesn't realize it, it's definitely happening. It's rare these days to see companies with a defined perimeter that nothing leaks out of. Anyone who's doing Office 365 is doing Azure AD and logging in from remote. The days of securing a fixed boundary and trusting everything that makes it in are numbered.

    Almost every corporate environment I've been in assumes that once something is behind the firewall, either VPNed in or connecting directly, it's trusted. That's a very bad assumption, and I think that's where "zero trust" networks come in. Even if it's degrees, like "I'm not going to implicitly trust every device that plugs into an internal switchport," it's better than nothing. Doing it right is hard though...and there are a lot of companies that just don't want to re-architect their networks to accomodate a posture of limited trust.

  • by Ungrounded Lightning ( 62228 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @06:36PM (#56016823) Journal

    Don't allow access to IP addresses, machines, etc. until you know who that user is and whether they're authorized,'" says Charlie Gero, ...

    How about: "Treat your internal wiring like it's the wild-and-wooly Internet. Have both the the boxes and the applications/services - encrypt everything and authenticate each other before exchanging information."? (Apps authenticate both the other app and the box it runs on because a corrupted box can get into the app.)

    Then you don't have to trust all the other boxes or the wiring between them.

    It also means that it's not such a big deal if somebody manages to hang an extra box on your net or inserts it in a cable. The most it can do is use your bandwidth to talk to the outside rather than use its own radio, listen to its surroundings with its own sensors, or DoS what ever is going through the cable into which it's inserted. That means you can let your employees bring in their own equipment without compromising your firewall (or compromise your operation more than a tape recorder, camera, or box with sensors would do without the netk access).

    • In other words, treat the net like electrical wiring and just deal with what's plugged into it.

    • by GrahamJ ( 241784 )

      Came here to say the same. I wouldn’t stand up a server on the internet that didn’t require authentication and authorization so why would I do so on an enterprise network? Even then trust must be limited since malware happens.

  • I can't believe that nobody ever had this idea before, especially since it would obviously be incredibly easy to do and has no downsides or consequences on productivity!
  • Trustless (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward

    and no mention of Blockchain. waaaaa???!!

  • by Junta ( 36770 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @07:00PM (#56016925)

    However, security must also acknowledge reality. The reality is that so long as you empower your employees to do, well, much of anything, they will become potential vectors of an attack. Lock them down to be harmless, they will often also be unable to be productive.

    It is worth noting that many of these attacks that happen still do happen because someone dangled part of the information outside the defenses. An improperly set up cloud storage or service has become a frequent source of compromise. These attacks would be rarer in the 'castle and moat' because they happened inside a more protected network. Sure, they shouldn't have been configured that way even internally, but reality is *someone* is going to do something like this, and better for it to be mitigated than in the open.

    So the lesson is sure, be as vigiliant as you already *should* have been, but also that going out of the moat is part of the problem, not that the moat is losing efficacy compared to before.

  • It's time for Zero Trust Operating Systems. Gone are the days when one could assume that a program would work as designed, and tolerate the odd bug. Until the software that defines our computing experience grows up and stops trusting everything put into it, we're going to be deep in shit.

  • by gweihir ( 88907 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @08:06PM (#56017223)

    The only reason I can see for this (old, bad) idea to be pushed again is that some people need to create the next hype to keep their own business-model alive.

    On the actual subject, if you really want every system to be individually administrated and fully secured, then go ahead and run this model. For a small network, with, say, less than ten computers this may even work. But even there it can be excessively expensive. In actual reality, any network where people think about a perimeter does need that perimeter. It needs to be implemented right, of course. For example, the only network access must be via that trusted network (enforced VPN if you are not on-site) and software must come from that trusted network as well. Also, any user active anywhere must be identified reliably (password _plus_ chipcard, e.g.) and the trusted network must, of course, be divided into zones with effective firewalling between them. Data import must go via secured channels, no just plugging in an USB stick. So not only do you need that perimeter urgently, it is by far not enough. It is just one element.

    Now, this is very expensive to run and maintain. I know that. But unless you have no secrets and no IT-based business processes to protect, this is your only chance to avoid a hugely expensive disaster in the long run.

    • by GrahamJ ( 241784 )

      Having a perimeter to protect the machines within suggests that they need protecting. Either they do and resources should be focused on fixing them, or they don’t and no perimiter is needed - like servers on the open internet.

    • On the actual subject, if you really want every system to be individually administrated and fully secured, then go ahead and run this model. For a small network, with, say, less than ten computers this may even work.

      FWIW, Google does this with a very large and complex network (100K+ employees). Google has taken the next step beyond this, actually, and recognized that once you have ensured you don't extend any trust to your internal networks, there's no reason to treat external networks as less secure. (See []).

      The solution to the problem you mention is standardization. Specifically, standardize all of your internal applications on web interfaces. Once everything is a web site, then you can st

      • by gweihir ( 88907 )

        Google can do it because they are atypical. It is no indicator that, say, a bank or a hospital can do the same.

        • Google can do it because they are atypical. It is no indicator that, say, a bank or a hospital can do the same.

          Google can do it from scratch because they are atypical. I agree that a bank or hospital absolutely could not build all of the necessary infrastructure to do it, but that's no longer necessary. Google's BeyondCorp program is one of several "vendors" (I believe Google's stuff is all open source) that provide the necessary proxy software and related bits, and it will get easier over time.

    • by swb ( 14022 )

      A lot of this is getting rolled into software defined networking and used to create specific fine-grained rules and management of east/west network traffic inside a network.

      I think the concept is reasonable to some degree and not entirely different from older ideas that treat the network more like concentric circles, with security increasing as you enter the circle and less and less traffic accepted from rings more than 1 ring above.

      The problem with the present iteration of these concepts is that the vendor

  • by manu0601 ( 2221348 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @10:16PM (#56017703)
    Zero trust is an obvious BOYD consequence. The only unexpected point is how long it took between the two concepts landing in corporate networks.
  • Every program has to run in separate container.
  • by CODiNE ( 27417 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @11:14PM (#56017935) Homepage

    Once you get into a user's system you can do Active Directory attacks and legitimately escalate all the way to Domain Admin using tools such as BloodHound. There's also Kerberoasting and of course hash cracking once you've escalated on a system and run Mimikatz on it. Often you can just pass the hash and not even bother cracking them. All of this using legitimate credentials and "allowed" accesses within the scope of the users.

    Sure this will keep a guy from plugging into an open ethernet jack and running all over the place, useful as part of defense in depth, but it's not a magic bullet.

    • by coulbc ( 149394 )

      At my organization we have deployed NAC to block unauthorized devices, Vmware NSX, for micro segmentation, web and email content filters, DLP detection, email encryption and MS ATA.
      No one has a Domain admin account and Administrators must grant themselves access to systems they need to work on every day and those permissions are reset when they leave for the day.
      Our goal is to make sure any attacks are so noisy because of the restrictions so they will be detected.

  • by rnturn ( 11092 ) on Saturday January 27, 2018 @11:37PM (#56018029)

    ``Everybody has been [taught] to think that the firewall is keeping the bad guys out. People need to adjust their mindset and understand that the bad actors are already in their environment.''

    I can't remember how many times I heard people sit in staff meetings and argue against employing simple security practices when developing application using this excuse. You know what changed their minds? The time when some admin powered up a WinNT box sitting in an unused cubicle--inside the firewall--not realizing that it had been infected with Code Red and it DoSed several critical servers during month-end processing. Now their application design would likely have not had anything to do with protecting against Code Red, when they saw first-hand what can happen when the attacker is on the (supposedly) "clean" side of the firewall they finally figured it out.

  • []

    But it's hard to bolt onto an existing infrastructure without restricting it.

  • I've ran all my networks as zero trust systems, usually because the castle and moat system they call is managed by absolute morons.

    Zero trust models were proposed decades ago. About 15 years ago the NSA/DoD security recommendations (When they started releasing SELinux) were all about securing your hosts from whatever was already running on it.

  • 802.1x is not new, and corporate NAC's / Radius / etc. are I thought pretty standard operating procedure to make sure some moron with a home PC doesn't wonder in and introduce crytolocker to the environment.
  • Betteredge be damned.

  • Zero Trust already exists out among the peers on many corporate networks. Unless you trust the motherfuckers who run the IT in your organization, in which case you are making a grave mistake, you make efforts to secure your group's workspace against the IT goons.

"Just think of a computer as hardware you can program." -- Nigel de la Tierre