Virginia Begins to Worry About Voting Machines 386
nonsecurity writes "Remember the unheeded stories about possible fraud with new electronic voting machines? Well it seems that someone is finally now taking notice. The Commonwealth of Virginia has been ready to take the leap with electronic voting machines, which many experts say are wide open to potential voting fraud.
Like other jurisdictions, Virginia had been shrugging off the concerns. But the Washington Post is is now reporting that Johns Hopkins Computer Scientists have been studying the issue and have found that the machines might be easily hacked and election result tampering is a very real concern. And apparently Virginia is listening. With next year's elections promising to be full of fireworks, it's good to see that people are finally taking notice of the issue."
Solution (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:Solution (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Solution (Score:5, Informative)
There are possible ways around this, based on cryptographical methods. Take a look at this [cranor.org], for example.
Re:Solution (Score:4, Funny)
Re:Solution (Score:4, Insightful)
A voting system is both inaccurate and vulnerable if it allows corrupt officials to deny voting priviledges to those who are eligible.
Re:Solution (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Solution (Score:5, Insightful)
what are you talking about? (Score:5, Interesting)
I'm pretty sure the parent of your post meant something similar to this method: you go vote very much the way you do now (by presenting your id and signing a sheet of paper)...then you assign your vote to a number (that is not associated with your name in any record) and you make those numbers public, so that you can check against them. I think this system is also good because you can check certain numbers (for example 10,354 voters showed up at this voting location, so there should have been exactly 10,354 vote numbers assigned)
Re:what are you talking about? (Score:3, Informative)
Re:what are you talking about? (Score:5, Insightful)
I agree that a system like thisis a MUST when it comes to verifying electronic voting. My big problem with it is that because of the paper trail, the individual VOTER may trouble.
Consider, we have a secret ballot for a reason--for example, to prevent your boss from pressuring you to vote for a certain candidate at the cost of your job, or to keep the local klansmen from going after folks who dared vote for a black candidate.
Under the current system, only you know who you voted for--you can always lie if pressured by someone to know how you voted. With a public paper trail, people with leverage can demand to know your receipt number, and CONFIRM what you tell them. This is BAD.
Re:what are you talking about? (Score:3, Interesting)
One way to do this is to send everyone entitled to vote a randomly-generated private key, which they can then sign their vote with. The corresponding public keys can then be published together with the corresponding votes, which can then be verified. The keys must be hidden from whoever distributes them (e.g. using a seal
Re:what are you talking about? (Score:3, Interesting)
The problem there, of course, is that whoever is mailing out the private keys can "peek" and see who got what key.
I think the best way to do it is this: You show up at the voting place, and along with scratching your name off the list of registered voters, you pick up a private key out of a big tub of private keys (it could be stored on a USB keychain storage device or somet
What are *you* talking about? (Score:3, Informative)
I don't know where you live, but everywhere I've voted in the US, it's gone something like: Show up, tell one of the people overseeing the voting what my name and address are (no ID check). Watch to make sure they cross off the right name on the list (no signing anything). Vote (by whatever method the district uses. I've lived in districts with lever machines, paper ballots, and electronic ballot readers). Tell
Re:Solution (Score:3, Funny)
Hey! That reminds me...
:::::searching:::::: :::::cutting, pasting:::::
Which would you rather have?
An serious-minded, experienced and respected Chairman of the Armed Services Committee
An eager, qualified challenger with new ideas
Cowboy Neal
Re:Solution (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Solution (Score:2, Informative)
Another part of the problem lies in the auditing process. There really is no standard, or security regulation of any kind, except for maybe the promise of security by the vendor. No one ever really checks these things for security until it's too late.
Re:Solution (Score:4, Interesting)
I read that artical, but what the author doesn't admit to is that paper ballots are just as suspect as a computer ballot.
He does key on one aspect and that is banking vs voting. Computer banking works because transactions can be traced. Because you can't track a computer vote is why it won't work. But think of it, you can't track an anonymous vote whether it's computerized or not. So in it's current form, the voting system we have/use is broken and always was.
I suppose you could implement the concept of a vote reciept. Say you register and you cast a vote, then you recieve a reciept with a transaction number (ie: vote record). At any point, you should be able to use that transaction number to verify your vote. That may work for individuals having a piece of mind in casting a ballot, but there would still be a void when trying to vallidate an election. The problem centers around the "anonymous" vote. No matter how a system is designed, once the ballot becomes anonymous, you loose all tracking ability and hence leaves a large hole for hacking or rigging an election. This has nothing to do with computers mind you. It's just the nature of performing an anonymous transaction. Encryption doesn't help. The flaw is in the transaction design, not it's implementation.
Re:Solution (Score:3, Interesting)
No, it's quite understandible why a voter would want to be anonymous. Just pointing out how it leaves open the possibility for a rigged election.
It's not just voting. It's any transaction where the parties are kept anonymous. The protection that being anonymous offers creates the problem of transaction accountibility. If you can't account for a transaction (ie: someone is anonymous), then there's always the risk of corruption. But becaus
Re:Solution (Score:3, Interesting)
You get into the voting booth, and you are greeted with a nice, graphical display of people to vote for. You select your canidate of choice, the machine asks you if you're sure, (etc and so on) and finally prints out a slip of paper. This slip of paper you then feed into a machine (vending machine style) which counts the votes
Re:Solution (Score:2)
Voting seems like a strange issue to track. You need accountibility for each person casting only one vote, yet you need a method to hide ones identity. I think it's the anonymous issue is what causes all the loop holes.
Even with the current voting system, sure only registered voters can vote, so that's suppose to limit multiple votes from one person. But have you ever thought that after you pulled the levers and made your choice that your choice was actually recorded? Am I the only one paranoid about
Re:Solution (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Solution (Score:3, Interesting)
Step 1. Take random number generator.
Step 2. Take name, social, etc. and tack on random number. Hash. Toss random number. Run through an algorithm with built in forward error correction or other conversion to allow machines to check the number is valid/accurate without connecting to a central server.
Step 3. Mail number to
Big Advantage (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Big Advantage (Score:3, Insightful)
Yes, yes, you are a flaming Republic. I'm sick of hearing it.
By that standard there are hardly any democracies in the world, since most of them have constitutions, laws and courts.
A total democracy, where two wolwes and a sheep votes on what to have for dinner, is bad, because everybody belongs to some kind of minority.
SlashVote (Score:3, Funny)
I don't understand the worries about electronic voting machines; they are just so convenient. I'm building one myself that uses the "poll" section of SlashCode, so that my fellow neighbors can vote (and comment) with out leaving their webTV's.
As they say in Hudson County, NJ... "Vote early, vote often".
Re:SlashVote (Score:4, Insightful)
Voting has never been about convenience, it's about doing your civic duty. American citizens have very little responsibilities in this country other than voting, paying taxes, and serving jury duty. Being lazy and not voting should result in an instant STFU award for the rest of the term. If you don't vote then I sure as hell don't want to hear you whining about the people running the government.
Re:SlashVote (Score:2)
Well how about the politicians doing their duty and genuinely representing the electorate?
When we do vote, the politicians reneigh on their election promises, they reverse their previous positions on matters (opposed to what they once were for, for what they once were against) they lie, they cheat, they use resources that are supposed to serve the public, to lie to the public; they do as they please and throw a bone or two at any
Re:SlashVote (Score:2)
*Corporate money, obviously.
In other news... (Score:5, Funny)
Actually.... (Score:5, Funny)
Stupid Question (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Stupid Question (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Stupid Question (Score:5, Interesting)
I don't know why someone is trying to invent these anyway. What is wrong with an ATM system as a template? Send every voter an ATM card that is one vote in credit. Surely we view ATMs as secure?
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Stupid Question (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Stupid Question (Score:2)
Wait a minute, I forgot, do we like him?
But, (Score:4, Funny)
the same but different ? (Score:3, Funny)
Go figure.
Re:the same but different ? (Score:2, Funny)
How do you hack it? The number 1111?
Seriously, I can't figure it out. No matter what I try (DoS, social engineering, beating it with a stapler), I can't seem to change that number so that instead it reads llll.
power to the people... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:power to the people... (Score:3, Interesting)
By that logic, wouldn't it be better to abandon electronic voting and leave system as understandable and inspectable by all instead of small technological (programmers) or byrocratical elite?
It's not all that serious (Score:4, Informative)
But, it does make for a good story.
Re:It's not all that serious (Score:3, Funny)
Simon
Why bother? (Score:2, Interesting)
High Level of Human Intervention Required (Score:5, Interesting)
Sounds alot like every other voting system.
My experience with poll workers is that they are serious and committed folks. But they are not the most savvy with computers and that may be the biggest security challenge.
Re:High Level of Human Intervention Required (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:High Level of Human Intervention Required (Score:2)
paper receipt tape (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:paper receipt tape (Score:3, Interesting)
Why keep the votes in electronic form at all? Just print them out on the receipt printer with a bar code. Take all the receipts from the election day, run them through a reader and tally the votes. It'd let people verify their vote and be in the most computer readable format without relying on electronic storage.
Re:paper receipt tape (Score:2, Interesting)
Maybe you need Indian Technology (Score:5, Informative)
years and the next general election will
be all-electronic with 800,000 electronic
voting machines.
http://sify.com/news/politics/fullstory.php?id=
Re:Maybe you need Indian Technology (Score:5, Funny)
In a stunning upset, Indian Prime Minister Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee has been unanimously elected President of The United States of America. In an interview this morning in New Delhi, President-Elect Vajpayee stated that his first order of business would be to persuade Canadian President-Elect Pervez Musharraf to stand down on his quest for weapons of mass destruction, by force if necessary.
Indian Technology - Kwik-E-Vote (Score:4, Funny)
Springfield citizen Homer Simpson was asked what he thought of the new voting system, but apparently he entered the Kwik-E-Mart to vote, and then saw the hot-dogs and forgot why he was there in the first place. "Mmmmm. 3 day old frankfurters [drool]" was his only comment.
A great open-source project! (Score:5, Insightful)
The real shortcomings of Florida system (Score:5, Insightful)
The main shortcoming of the system is that it allowed Florida State Supreme Court justices to try and change the election rules after the election occured, and it allowed lawyers to lie in court in a wasteful attempt to overturn the election.
It works. The only thing we have to accomplish is prevent the sore losers from trying to mess things up.
Re:The real shortcomings of Florida system (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:The real shortcomings of Florida system (Score:2, Interesting)
How do you determine intent? By actual votes, of course. Not stray marks on ballots, or bumped chads.
Where does it end? "I was disenfranchised. I intended to vote for Nader, but I never got out of the house on Election Day because I had to wait all day for the cable guy who missed his appointment. But I intended to vote for him!!!!"
Re:The real shortcomings of Florida system (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:The real shortcomings of Florida system (Score:3, Interesting)
I didn't bring criminal convictions up but since you asked, Bush's DUI conviction in 1976 courtesy of the Smoking Gun [thesmokinggun.com]. I don't personally think it is that big a deal but you seem sensitive on the subject.
It's ceratinly true that all major political candidates favor corpora
Good ol' encryption tech is good enough for me.. (Score:4, Interesting)
1: DB exists with basic vote rules.
2: User walks up to votebox.
3: Person hired to do polls check idetity (so that they can legitly vote)- enables 1 session for user
4: The votes are tallied by unsigned long int incrementation counter for each "Politican". Be aware, the machine knows exactly what this user votes for.
5: An MD5sum is made for the whole vote session, along with printing the md5 and votes cast on 1 small piece of paper.
6: The MD5 checksum is stored in concurrent use of the data.
Some people may think there's a security hazard in step 3-5 as the poll worker can probably see what the MD5sum might be. That could be solved by saying to the user 'press any key at random. this is NOT part of the vote"
Just an idea.
Re:Good ol' encryption tech is good enough for me. (Score:2)
What's wrong with... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:What's wrong with... (Score:2, Interesting)
When I lived in the Netherlands, I voted there for the European elections on an electronic machine. I hated it. It left me with a taste of unfinished business. In France, I voted with paper, then in the evening went back to sort and count the votes. It was fun and symbolic of democracy in action.
Voter apathy - Re:What's wrong with... (Score:5, Insightful)
2) I agree with your comment about getting people involved with the counting. I've thought of this myself: the more volunteers involved in the counting, the more people who are actually involved with the election. I see involvement like this as a means to help fight increasing voter apathy. In the long run, I think electronic voting will increase voter apathy, and thus decrease democracy.
Agreed (Score:3, Insightful)
All ballots are put in a securely-sealed box, which is opened up in front of officials representing the par
Computer Voting Expert Ousted From Elections Confe (Score:5, Interesting)
http://www.scoop.co.nz/mason/stories/HL0308/S00014 .htm
Computer Voting Expert Ousted From Elections Conference
Lynn Landes
freelance journalist
www.EcoTalk.org
Denver CO Aug 1 - Dr. Rebecca Mercuri, a leading expert in voting machine security, had her conference credentials revoked by the president of the International Association of Clerks, Records, Election Officials, and Treasurers (IACREOT), Marianne Rickenbach. The annual IACREOT Conference and Trade Show, which showcases election systems to elections officials, is being held at the Adam's Mark Hotel in Denver all this week.
Mercuri believes that her credentials were revoked because of her position in favor of voter-verified paper ballots for computerized election systems. "I guess in a very troubling way it makes sense that an organization like IACREOT, that supports paperless computerized voting systems, which are secret by their very design, would not want computer experts who disagree with that position at their meetings."
Dr. Mercuri said that her credentials were approved for the first three days of the conference. She attended meetings of other groups and visited the exhibitors hall. But it was only on Thursday as she sat down to attend her first meeting at the IACREOT that President Marianne Rickenbach took Mercuri out of the room and told her that her credentials were being revoked. Rickenbach said that Mercuri had not filled out the forms correctly. Mercuri protested, but was refused reinstatement.
David Chaum, the inventor of eCash and a member of Mercuri's 'voter-verified paper ballot' group, had his credentials revoked on the first day of the conference. On the second day his credentials were partially restored. Chaum was allowed to visit the exhibitors hall, but not attend the IACREOT meetings.
Rickenbach was unavailable for comment as of this report. Mercuri can be reached at the Adam's Mark Hotel through Saturday.
Vegas seems to have this problem licked.. (Score:5, Insightful)
SlashVote Part 2 (Score:2, Funny)
Then, moderate away on each candidate's post. The +5 Interesting ends up in the White House, the -1 Troll can hit the lecture circuit.
Trust the cowboy (Score:2)
shhhh. trust the cowboy.
Why don't they... (Score:4, Insightful)
That way, you vote electronically, you have your receipt, and you throw it in a box before you leave. Random audits of polling stations with those results compared to the receipts.
Just another failover idea..
I've been wondering... (Score:5, Insightful)
As for paper audits: if the perpetrators are smart, nobody would ever even suspect that we needed to audit an election...
My $.02
The Hair Club for Microsoft Executives (Score:3, Funny)
The first has happened to Ballmer. Is it only a matter of time for the company?
Only 1 way to fix this. (Score:3, Funny)
wrong focus ? (Score:4, Insightful)
Pen and paper (Score:2, Insightful)
Why so complicated (Score:5, Insightful)
Voting on paper is cheap, reliable and it's very difficult to commit fraud, (a large number of people has to be involved), if you set it up right.
Re:Why so complicated (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Why so complicated (Score:3, Interesting)
The media feeds the hype by the forcasting the winners by use of exit polls, with scores of pundits discussing the ins and outs of every race. We have come to expect this and a move to return to paper ballots might dampen everyone's 'fun'. A paper ballot that could be reliable scanned, and non-refutable could work, but putting such a system in place has to run the gauntlet of every special interest group n
Perhaps... (Score:3, Interesting)
Perhaps just dump voting for people for voting on policy. With today's tech, there is no reason we couldn't have a system of government that let's everyone have direct say in policy and lawmaking.
Basically trade a system that doen't work for one that could... for a distributed government system, where voters make policy, instead of corrupt individuals influenced only by money and power.
Re: Virginia Begins to Worry about Voting Machines (Score:3, Interesting)
1) Encrypt everything and place everything on a WAN that is not connected to the outside world.
2) Generate a unique/random PIN for each voter at the moment they walk into the polling station. Lock out that name/SSN from any further votes once a vote has been cast.
3) Utilize a small in-station camera that can be matched against a vote in case of alledged fraud.
While I know that item #3 will cause some privacy concerns, all image data could would be removed once the polling station closes.
Tux
Check out the great Linux PC I'm selling! [safferconsulting.com]
Re: Virginia Begins to Worry about Voting Machines (Score:3, Insightful)
The Johns Hopkins study isn't the worst of it (Score:5, Informative)
http://www.equalccw.com/voteprar.html [equalccw.com] has links that go into more detail on this subject.
Cheers,
Coward 132-213
You gotta have the paper... (Score:5, Insightful)
One has to ask, what is the problem that we are trying to solve with electronic voting? Is it cost? I don't think so. Elections only happen once a year and the results are far too important to cut costs while lowering quality.
What we want to do is increase the quality of the elections by assisting the voters in filling out the ballot correctly. With the automated UI the voting results can be checked against business rules... that is, if you're only allowed to vote for two judges then you can only check off two on the ballot, etc. It provides instant instructions and instant feedback.
But regardless, you need a paper backup to do audits on the election. And most importantly, as we learned in Florida, that ballot must be in a human readable form which can not be easily damaged through normal handling.
The best solution I've seen suggested is to have an automated UI which queries the voter for responses, but the end result is then printed on a laser printer to a ballot sheet. The ballot sheet lists the names, with markers that are filled in(or line drawn between two arrows) to clearly identify the selections.
The voter may then review their ballot to insure it is marked as they wished it to be, and if so take it to a secure optical scan machine just like we use today.
One benefit of this system is that it provides a backup mechanism in the event of failure. That is, if the machines are not working the voter can still cast their ballot with the good old fashioned pencil. The automated UI system is there only as a convenience item.
Any system which only records results in an electronic manner is subject to corruption. The results have to be on paper for auditing and verification purposes.
Cost shouldn't be an issue, this is far to important to the stability of our democracy.
Re:You gotta have the paper... (Score:5, Interesting)
I agree with you though that paper's the only way to persist the voter's choice. If speed is so important, we can create a preliminary election result from electronic data. We can even do an automated machine count of the paper ballots. But we still need at least the ability to do a proper hand count of the paper ballots, at least until the technology for pure electronic voting is much more proven than it currently is.
Re:You gotta have the paper... (Score:3, Insightful)
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. Electronically, we can present a much better User Interface than the black-and-white paper ballots that have been used for years.
Apply business rules, e.g. "vote for not more than two"
Show summary to voter at end of session
Unlike punchcards, mistakes can be revised without obta
Momma always said 'Stupid is as Stupid does' (Score:5, Interesting)
Cathy asked that I pass on her message to you. Please do not hesitate to call if I or Cathy can be of any service.
Ann Rosenthal
Campaign Director
404-728-NNNN
Mx. Xxxxx,
Thank you for your e-mail regarding proposed H.R. 2239.
The passage of this legislation would be extremely damaging,
both to Georgia?s new electronic voting system and to those
which other states around the country are putting into
place. The legislation is based on a lack of understanding
of the operation of our machines and the software which
supports them. In fact, in discussing this legislation with
Congresswoman Denise Majette, I suggested that it should
more accurately be called the Voter Delay and Loss of
Integrity act.
After you touch the names of all candidates you wish to vote
for, the computer itself gives you a summary of your choices
and enables you to change those choices before you leave the
voting booth. That summary screen is the opportunity for
voters to verify their votes, and adding a paper receipt,
which presumably would be printed out while the voter waits,
would add delay (as printers are very susceptible to
breakdowns, paper and ink shortages, and other problems).
Additionally, after a paper receipt is printed, the voter
would have no ability to make further changes to their vote
without a very complicated adjustment to the voting machine,
which most poll workers would not be well-equipped to
accomplish. Additionally, placing a paper receipt into a
voting box or other instrument would add tremendous
potential for fraud, as pieces of paper have been known to
disappear from voting boxes in overnight and can otherwise
be very easily manipulated. Such ease of manipulation does
not exist with the new voting machines.
The second primary objection to the proposed legislation in
H.R. 2239 is that all software used in the voting machines
would be disclosed and available on the internet, which
would open up the integrity of our voting systems to every
interested hacker around the world. Once it is disclosed,
any hacker, any person interested in manipulating the
machines, would have access to all of the security built
into the software code and could then with ease manipulate a
state or county?s system if they could gain access to the
equipment. We have the source code available in a secure
escrow account, and our office can access it any time we
need to check the integrity of our systems. And each and
every unit used for voting in Georgia -- more than 22,000
individual units -- is individually submitted to logic and
accuracy testing before every election.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can answer any
additional questions on HR 2239
Cathy
This will be fixed (Score:4, Insightful)
The article talks about one problem that was their 5 years ago and was still there when reviewed. This was claimed to be fixed years and in fact was never fixed. Without open source voting machines, there is no way to gain the absolute confidence of the public, and a hacker somewhere is going to prove my point. You may think the newest version of an operating system is a big target, but it's nothing compared to the vote that decides who runs the worlds lone superpower. The only question is who will get the most votes in 2004, mickey mouse or daffy duck?
I still think the lever machines beat anything (Score:4, Insightful)
Wisconsin has already decertified touchscreens (Score:5, Interesting)
In January, 2002 the State Elections Board approved two closed source touch screen voting systems, the ES&S Votronic DRE and the GBS Accu-Touch EBS 100 DRE.
This spring I raised the system integrity issues with the Board, and persuaded them to revoke [state.wi.us] the certifications.
Hysterical decisions (Score:3, Insightful)
Punch card voting machines are very reliable and secure, but because of some whipped up hysteria and misinformation, we're scrapping a perfectly good system for a nightmare boondoggle.
how much to fund an open system? (Score:3, Interesting)
I assume that the Help America Vote law leaves it up to the states to procure their machines how they see fit.
How much could it possibly cost for university researchers (like the ones at John's Hopkins) to write an open source system for voting that could run on commodity hardware?
Perhaps the government should take $10 million of that $3.9 billion, fund the research, and GPL the result. Let the code be vetted in public.
Am I missing something?
I want a receipt (Score:3, Insightful)
There's lots of technicalities about signatures and timestamps and encryption and such, but the point is that if they're going to take away the property that my vote has a *visible* path through the system and can be *visually* verified and audited at each step in the process, then that's not OK and I want a way to make them prove that the vote tallied for me is the one I cast.
Re:I want a receipt (Score:3, Interesting)
I don't want to generate paper for the vote counters. That'd be a step backward from our mechanical registers. I want *something* -- scribble it on a diskette, store it in a smart card, print an encrypted packet on paper, whatever -- that *I take away with me*, independent of how the machine reports votes to the tally office. Something that can be compared, unambiguously and as many times as necessary, with the official records so that disputes can be resolved.
It won't do much for the
Experiences from the Inside... (Score:3, Informative)
For those who don't vote in Fairfax county, the machines we have been using in most precincts is the Shouptronic 1242, which was phased out last recently due to new voting regulations that stipulated minimum accessibility requirements (for the visually impaired) that the Shouptronic couldn't meet as well as maintenance issues for the aging machines.
I am certainly wary of the new machines we have coming down for the next election in November, which use the WinVote software and appear physically as large laptops.
The initial checking in of voters won't change the next time around. They will still have to state their name and current address, be assigned a number (for counting purposes, not associative purposes) and be issued a colored state sealed "machine enterance index card" which is relinquished to the officer supervising the machines themselves before they are allowed access to the machine.
The new machines use a phone line (modem) to remit results to the registrar and are portable enough to allow us to physically move the machine to the curb to assist physically-challenged voters (curbside voting law).
The number of conditional paper ballots we'll have to use will be lessened -- a good thing and I see that for the most part it will help in accuracy.
I see problems in a couple of areas however. Most people vote maybe once every one or two years, so their familiarity with the machines wanes over time. Completely change the machine and there will be a lot of people with a bunch of questions and uncertainty, which will initially present an appearance of confusion (and may be enough to get some lawyers on the case if they see an opportinuity). Secondly, with untested technology, it will be difficult to gauge the number of problems with the machine -- misaligned touch screens, software crashes, static discharge, space aliens, seasoned citizens, ingenious fools, etc.
In a month or two I'm going to be going back for training on the new equipment. I also believe for those citizens voting in Fairfax county, the Government Center has a sample machine available for those who want to become familiar with it.
A system for securly transmitting certified results to the county should work well, but I am really concerned with any kind of Internet voting. That's where I believe the greatest potential for fraud exists.
-Crolis
P.S. I got a heck of a lot of comments after 2000, since my first name is "Chad".
Easier to read Re:Complete Text of Article (Score:5, Informative)
Report's Security Warning Shakes Some States' Trust
By Brigid Schulte
Washington Post Staff Writer
Monday, August 11, 2003; Page A01
The Virginia State Board of Elections had a seemingly simple task before it: Certify an upgrade to the state's electronic voting machines. But with a recent report by Johns Hopkins University computer scientists warning that the system's software could easily be hacked into and election results tampered with, the once perfunctory vote now seemed to carry the weight of democracy and the people's trust along with it.
An outside consultant assured the three-member panel recently that the report was nonsense.
"I hope you're right," Chairman Michael G. Brown said, taking a leap of faith and approving Diebold Election System's upgrades. "Because when they get ready to hang the three of us in effigy, you won't be here."
Since being released two weeks ago, the Hopkins report has sent shock waves across the country. Some states have backed away from purchasing any kind of electronic voting machine, despite a new federal law that has created a gold rush by allocating billions to buy the machines and requiring all states, as well as the District of Columbia, to replace antiquated voting equipment by 2006.
"The rush to buy equipment this year or next year just doesn't make sense to us anymore," said Cory Fong, North Dakota's deputy secretary of state.
Maryland officials, who signed a $55.6 million agreement with Diebold for 11,000 touch-screen voting machines just days before the Hopkins report came out, have asked an international computer security firm to review the system's security. If they don't like what they find, officials have said, the sale will be off.
The report has brought square into the mainstream an obscure but increasingly nasty debate between about 900 computer scientists, who warn that these machines are untrustworthy, and state and local election officials and machine manufacturers, who insist that they are reliable.
"The computer scientists are saying, 'The machinery you vote on is inaccurate and could be threatened; therefore, don't go. Your vote doesn't mean anything,' " said Penelope Bonsall, director of the Office of Election Administration at the Federal Election Commission. "That negative perception takes years to turn around."
Still, even some advocates of the new system are thinking twice. The Leadership Conference on Civil Rights, which pushed for electronic machines to help visually impaired and disabled voters, says the Hopkins report has given them pause. They're calling on President Bush and members of Congress to convene a forum of experts to hash it out. "We have become concerned about these questions of ballot security," said Deputy Director Nancy Zirkin.
Her group and others supported passage of the $3.9 billion Help America Vote Act in November. Of the $1.5 billion appropriated so far to replace old machines, rewrite outdated equipment standards, encourage research to improve technology, train poll workers and update registration lists, about half has been released. And that has all gone toward buying electronic machines, which cost as much as $4,000 a piece.
"These vendors are everywhere," said David Blount, spokesman for Mississippi Secretary of State Eric Clark. "They're besieging everyone."
The remaining money is to be released once an Election Assistance Commission is appointed. By law, the board was to have begun work in February. But the names of the four commissioners, two from each major party, have yet to go to the Senate for confirmation.
The stakes are high. The 2000 Florida presidential election showed the shortcomings of the current system.
A subsequent Cal Tech/MIT report found that of more than 100 million votes cast nationwide, as many as 6 million weren't counted because of registration errors or problems with punch-card and lever machines. One study found that of 800 lever machines tested,
Re:Voting (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Voting (Score:2)
Re:Voters elected Bush (Score:3, Informative)
That prior to the last election, this list was generated for about $80,000 or so, and each county had to individually remove people from the list after verbally affirming they were the right people? i.e. names were only removed after verification?
That the firm hired to remove names this last time was paid over $
All the Republican whining in the world ... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:All the Republican whining in the world ... (Score:3, Informative)