WinInformant Says Windows More Secure Than Linux 935
nihilist_1137 excerpts from this WinInformant article, which reads in part: "For at least the first 8 months of 2001, open-source poster child Linux was far less secure than Windows, according to the reputable NTBugTraq, which is hosted by SecurityFocus, the leading provider of security information about the Internet. ... A look at the previous 5 years--for which the data is more complete--also shows that each year, Win2K and Windows NT had far fewer security vulnerabilities than Linux, despite the fact that Windows is deployed on a far wider basis than any version of Linux." I wonder how many sysadmins (Windows or Linux) would agree with this conclusion. Update: 02/04 16:54 GMT by T : Looks like the WinInfo site has gone down since the story was submitted, so you may have to content yourself in the meantime with the Bugtraq numbers. Update: 02/04 19:30 GMT by T :Several readers have pointed out that the conclusions WinInformant makes based on the Bugtraq data are not those of SecurityFocus; the headline has been changed accordingly.
In Other News (Score:5, Funny)
but which were more severe? (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:but which were more severe? (Score:3, Insightful)
linux probably had a multitude of minor, rarely exploited vulnerabilities, whereas win2K/NT had relatively few major holes.
holes that are still now being exploited.
id be interested to see the amount of revenue lost due to linux exploitation versus win2K (taking market share into account of course).
sounds like poor data analysis...
Re:but which were more severe? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:but which were more severe? (Score:3, Informative)
Severity of vulnerabilities (Score:4, Redundant)
Btw, I'm not a Linux cheerleader, I'm a Windows guy most of the time, and I subscribe to the "best tool for the job" philosophy.
Not only that, but... (Score:5, Insightful)
Most bugs that show up for redhat or any other linux distribution will NOT affect a well-secured machine in the first place. If you plan, for example, a standard web or database server, you're only going to permit ssh and apache or ssh and your brand of sql. How many vulnerabilities in the past year have been on those services? Practically none. Only 1 in ssh, and there was AMPLE warning to get patched before exploits were in the wild. The majority of bugs are for packages not often deployed, or not relevent to a server system where there is no user access.
Meanwhile, an enormous number of these linux bugs are irrelevent on a firewalled system, never mind the incompetency of sysadmins. A firewall will protect your X font server or your installed-by-default nfsd/statd, but Microsoft has had many high-profile, extremely-widely-abused holes in a server's primary services (IIS, MS-SQL, etc).
Anyhow, trying to say these statistics show that NT is more secure than Linux is not only irresponsible but absurd.
Re:Not only that, but... (Score:3, Insightful)
Window in the other hand comes with very few servers bundled and they are all on by default (as far as I know, I not a win expert). And even worst the security bugs are usualy in packages that are vital to the work the machine supose to be doing. I can make, and I bet many people do, a server machine without a font server, but I can't take out (or firewall) the server it self from the machine.
Its Paul Thurrot. Don't expect logic. (Score:4, Interesting)
What the fuck? According to WHAT kind of logic is DNS not mission critical? If it its not critical, let's take those DNS servers offline (both Microsoft's and WinInfo's) and see how long either MS or Thurrot last.
Define "more secure" (Score:3, Insightful)
Are they smaller holes -- that is, exposing less control of the system and less potential for damage? Probably not.
The question becomes, then: would you rather be shot by a dozen BB pellets or a single shotgun blast?
Re:Define "more secure" (Score:5, Insightful)
1) If a package has a security issue, usually all distros announce the security bug. Thus, the bug gets counted multiple times.
2) Windows security bugs are all remote compromises, either email attachments, or remote roots. Over 90% of the linux security problems are local security issues.
As another poster noted, this is a very poorly researched article.
Worse still (Score:5, Insightful)
Windows security holes typically have exploits in the field, whereas linux vulnerabilities are commonly realeased from code review- hence having no preexisting exploits (that are known and demonstrated). Some are in fact purely theoretical, and may have to use to a malicious user.
So even if you keep on top of your windows updates religiously, keep in mind that they are generally reactive. So there is always that window of vulnerability...
Re:Define "more secure" (Score:5, Insightful)
Another note from bugtraq that will really push the numbers in favor of Windows. I quote: "* There is a distinct difference in the way that vulnerabilities are counted for Microsoft Windows and other operating systems. For instance, applications for Linux and BSD are often grouped in as subcomponents with the operating systems that they are shipped with. For Windows, applications and subcomponents such as Explorer often have their own packages that are considered vulnerable or not vulnerable outside of Windows and therefore may not be included in the count. This may skew numbers." MAY?!?!? More likely WILL.
So let's see. IE vulnerabilities aren't counted. There goes the fairness in the numbers right there. Was IIS counted?
Re:Define "more secure" (Score:3, Insightful)
Less because MS doesnt tell (Score:5, Insightful)
As for MS, I only have to point to the the major bug, that they knew about for weeks, but didn't let anybody know about!
Now Im not saying that linux is more secure (as much as i would like to) but the data and report based from it, just makes no sense, if you think about how vulnerabilties are and are not reported
Thanks for reading!
Re:Less because MS doesnt tell (Score:3, Informative)
The thing about linux is that if you don't know how to set it up you can unknowingly install LOTS of services, most of which are unnecessary for a home user and many of which can be compromised. Redhat's "everything" install sounds pretty neat, but you probably don't want to run an FTP server, DNS server, SQL server, etc. if you don't absolutely need it (and know how to configure it). Mandrake (at least the older versions) has better security setup, allowing you to check off a security level during install that does a decent job of hardening the OS. Of course, not knowing that you are installing file shares on a cable modem with no firewall could be even easier to compromise :)
Re:Less because MS doesnt tell (Score:3, Interesting)
Open, maybe. Willing to change, rarely. Just look at the recent code rift between pre-release forks and the slowly growing consensus that Linux isn't up to the task. Something as simple as a paging system has to be debated endlessly (in the meantime, having different systems with different potential vulnerabilities). We may not be able to look at the MS code, but we can be pretty sure what doesn't work on one machine shouldn't work on another.
Re:Less because MS doesnt tell (Score:3, Funny)
From a technical standpoint. (Score:4, Insightful)
But when you consider Microsoft's installed user base, there's just no comparison to how widespread MS is.
It's a damn good thing there were less bugs reported for Windows, as with each one, the repercussions are far far greater.
~sigh~
Re:From a technical standpoint. (Score:3, Insightful)
It isn't, though. Even the counting method used in the article is flawed. As mentioned in several other posts, package bugs are often listed for each distro that uses that package, so a single bug could easily be counted multiple times (and, in fact, this is the case since the article is based on the Linux aggregate, which simply counts the number of bugs reported on all Linux lists and adds them tegether).
Even at the most basic level, the article is FUD. The fact that this article was published without the editors checking even basic facts (like, for example, the fact that NTBugTraq is not hosted by SecurityFocus) certainly casts WinInformant in a bad light, and I will definately take any information I get through them in the future with a large grain of salt.
Simply put, (Score:3, Insightful)
Of course, that's not the case in the server market. If you want to talk about worms, remember one thing - the ONLY reason Code Red and other such worms exist is because of the popularity if the windows platform, on desktops and servers. Don't kid yourself for a second into thinking that the reason there aren't any widespread worms for *nix systems is because it's more secure.
br -Berj
Re:Simply put, (Score:5, Informative)
Actually, there aren't SO MANY MORE windows servers on the internet than *nix boxes.
Please see this fine article http://slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=01/07/13/124025 7&mode=thread [slashdot.org] which tries to compare the number of windows systems vs unix systems on the internet.
Here are a couple of their conclusions:
Even taking the statistics most favorable to Microsoft, they had almost twice as many IPs on the public internet than Linux did in 1999. However, during that same period, there were many more than twice as many expoits, viruses, etc. that attacked windows vs unix.
Linux has far too many installations on the public internet to be dismissed as too rare to interest hackers.
Re:Simply put, (Score:5, Insightful)
Find another excuse.
Simply put youre dead wrong (Score:5, Insightful)
Of course, that's not the case in the server market. If you want to talk about worms, remember one thing - the ONLY reason Code Red and other such worms exist is because of the popularity if the windows platform, on desktops and servers. Don't kid yourself for a second into thinking that the reason there aren't any widespread worms for *nix systems is because it's more secure.
Dont kid yourself. The various free o/s's are simply a harder target. They are more diverse, both across O/S's and distributions, and even within a distribution there are different configurations. On top of all that any individual box can be a totally custom system built from the source pool.
There are countless email readers, multiple web browsers, all types of competing server daemons. When you take the windows monoculture you simply dont find such diversity. The competing software are simply wiped out.
Its a well known and intuitive fact that monocultures are far more vulnerable to disease and parasites than a healthy diverse population.
Re:Simply put, (Score:4, Insightful)
In a word: Bullsh*t.
Securityfocus presented the numbers without bias, without commentary even. It is the MS shills that try to draw conclusions from these numbers, and one by one they take the aggregate Linux number, because it suits their agenda.
However, that aggregate number is worthless to draw conlusions from. At most one could use the distro numbers to draw the conlcusion that the average Linux distro ships with more (potential) vulnerabilities than Windows 2000. Of course, since the average Linux distro
- ships with more server software than Windows (multiple mail servers for example),
- has a habit of reporting all vulnerabilities, from local DoS to remote root,
of course it will show more vulnerabilities.So, the numbers tell us nothing new, except that the MS apologists will grasp at any straw to discredit what little competition they have.
MartLousy research (Score:3, Interesting)
Also, the Windows announcements are for the OS itself only, while the Linux announcements cover programs that do not count as OS stuff under Windows.
Badly researched piece.
/Janne
Not True (Score:5, Insightful)
I can't connect to WinInformant, but if you look at the numbers available at SecurityFocus, you'll see that they did not simply add up the numbers. Linux is listet with 96 aggregated vulnerabilities for 2001, while e.g. Red Hat has 54, Debian got 28, and Mandrake got 36. There are more Linux distributions listed, but these numbers allone show that your claim is wrong (unless WinInformant has different numbers).
You'll also see that Red Hat had 54 vulnerabilities while Windows 2000 had only 42.
However, I'd still agree that the WinInformant article is badly researched (but please note that, as stated above, I've not read it, I only know the part that Slashdot quoted). The article claims that Windows is more secure "according to the reputable NTBugTraq," however, SecurityFocus does not make any claim concerning the security of either Windows or Linux, they just make the numbers available as a statistic. In other words, WinInformant doesn't have any source for their claims, they just found some more or less interesting numbers and made up a story.
Re:Lousy research (Score:3, Interesting)
Anyway, what I found interesting is that Redhat faires so badly - about as bad as Win2k, and about twice as bad as any other Linux distribution. If SuSE has only 21 tracked bugs, and comes with a lot of software (7 CDs now, I think) is Redhat with 54 entries doing something wrong?
Number of bugs is the wrong metric! (Score:3, Insightful)
Unfair comparison, uninformed journalist. (Score:3, Redundant)
-They only count bugs for one Microsoft OS product. I mean, there's Win95, Win95osr2, Win98, Win98SE, Win2000, WinME, WinCE, WinNT4.0...
-They count one bug for each distribution. I mean, if a bug is detected on rsync, it shows as one different bug for every distribution, that is, one but for Mandrake 7.0, one for Debian, one for Mandrake 7.1
So, this makes me wonder if the journalist is plainly uninformed or if has no idea of what he is talking about (a laid-off journmalist from the gardening section re-hired for a tech-writter position).
The conspiracy theories, black helicopters and Microsoft-payed journalists, from my point of view, do not apply here.
Well, who said the world was fair?
Re:Unfair comparison, uninformed journalist. (Score:5, Informative)
So worry for the thing on Win9x/3.x + WinNT/2000.
So they are talking of Server OSes. So Win9x/3.x do not account as such.
What you say is that, of course, they do not include duplicates of the same vulnerability. But then there's no such program as rsync-2.07-3.i386.rpm on Debian 2.2 . Can you see it?
Also, why it is strangely coincidental de number of bugs for Red Hat Linux 6.2 for Alpha and Sparc? See:
For 2001, we see:
RedHat Linux 6.2 sparc - 18
RedHat Linux 6.2 alpha - 18
Debian Linux 2.2 sparc - 18
Debian Linux 2.2 arm - 18
Debian Linux 2.2 alpha - 18
Debian Linux 2.2 68k - 18
Coincidental? See it yourselves at SecurityFocus WebSite [securityfocus.com]
Maybe is a cross-architechture bug? Will this mean that, in fact, it is the same bug?
Then the numbers for Mandrake, Red Hat and Debian are waaay too similar (2001) to be just a coincidence (Mandrake 7.1, Red Hat 7.0 and Debian 2.2 can be thought as "equal distributions" by means of timeline, packets versions and such):
RedHat Linux 7.0 - 28
MandrakeSoft Linux Mandrake 7.1 - 27
Debian Linux 2.2 - 26
Then, on 2001, we can assume that Red Hat 6.2, Mandrake 6.0 and 6.1 have the same package versions :
RedHat Linux 6.2 i386 - 20
MandrakeSoft Linux Mandrake 6.1 - 20
MandrakeSoft Linux Mandrake 6.0 - 20
And those numbers are also very very close to the ones for Red Hat Linux 6.2 on different architectures.
Maybe, just maybe... they are the same bugs?
Then, on previous years, the trend is the same.
With all the respects, I am no FUDing here. I post my comments to some piece of news that was flawled.
And I tried to explain why it was flawed. And I was vry carefull to not to blame conspiracy theories.
Then, again, I'm human. And I make mistakes. Like the Win0x/3.x and Win2000/NT of my previous post.
But this does not invalidate at all my message.
The more accurate question (Score:5, Interesting)
1. How severe is the hole if exploited.
Are we talking a DOS, a root compromise, the ability to take over a domain controller. The effect of a compromise needs to be taken into account.
2. How easy to exploit is the whole.
Is it a theoretical exploit, or are there tools floating around? Can it be easily mitigated by a good firewall, or can viewing an email cause the problem.
These questions seem to me more important than pure quantity and should be taken into account when building a threat assesment of a system.
Re:The more accurate question (Score:5, Insightful)
Oh please. This is the same Slashdot that touted 30K bugs for Windows 2000 (like every other major tech publisher) regardless of the fact that the bugs were not known and many were probably "We spelled "maximize" wrong here".
Not being a Windows apologist (Score:5, Funny)
Take this example: you have a highly competent NT/2K administrator (they do exist) and a pitiful *nix administrator. Which one is going to produce a more secure box? Any objective person would have to say the NT/2K guy would, because he knows his platform well enough to shore up vulnerabilities. Nimda, I Love You, and many other worms did not hit affect my company because we took security very seriously beforehand. Malicious attachments (.EXE,
Now, having played devil's advocate for a moment, let me say that if you have a tightly controlled *nix box with a competent admin and a focus on security, you can create a damn near impregnable system. The weaknesses then lie with the applications, not the OS, and that's something ALL vendors need to work on (you listening, Larry "Unbreakable" Ellison?)
Re:Not being a Windows apologist (Score:5, Interesting)
Contrast this with a typical RedHat install. Sure, you can elect to not install a ton of stuff, but the dependencies can and will drive you nuts if you need widget-1.12-i386.rpm, which conflicts with Perl, glibc, and about ten thousand other things you don't want to fool with. Then couple that with the overwhelmingly nonexistent or conflicting/out-of-date documentation that is (isn't?) available for some Linux modules, and you're reduced to playing Sherlock Holmes again. And what do you do when the HOWTO doesn't answer your question? Posting in a newsgroup results in about 50% of the responses being "read the HOWTO you fucking l00ser", 40% being wrong/misinformed/don't-know-either responses, and only 10% being useful and helpful.
What both Windows and Linux need is a "Secure" install option that by default has nearly everything turned OFF, and then a simple way to add/enable functionality as needed. Templates for webservers, DNS, FTP, mail servers, and such would be great, and they should keep pace with patches and updates for the OS and related applications. Why no one has bother to do this is beyond me, but I think this laziness has resulted in 90% of the exploits seen in ALL OS's on the web.
Actually, to be fair... (Score:4, Informative)
I can't get to the article right now, so I'm not sure exactly what their argument is, but while I can remember hearing about quite a few major security holes in the unixes (I think everyone was bitten at least once by ptrace race conditions) I can't think of any similar issues in win2k.
XP, on the other hand... but we're not talking about XP here.
Re:Actually, to be fair... (Score:5, Interesting)
There are FAR fewer holes in W2K than people would like to admit. IE may have some problems but not the base OS. Even IIS has been tighted up a great deal.
People need to understand something, we know MS almost never get's it right the first time (see version 1.00 bug) and may not the second but eventually they do. OK, they sucked at security to begin but with all those resources and the pressure from the top and from outside - did you really think they'd sit still or get worse? Nope - ask Netscape what happens when you become their focus of attention. Tux comes out and smokes IIS 5 and everyone laughs... according to the results of my beta tests with IIS6, we'll see who's laughing when it's publically benched.
Your lesson is: MS learns. It's almost never right the first time but... it learns.
Re:Actually, to be fair... (Score:3, Interesting)
EXACTLY!!!!!! Sorry you cant count any BIND holes on linux. Or any sendmail, ssh,telnet,ftp,etc...
so after removing all holes that are for software that runs on the OS, linux has what 1 maybe 2?
This is why I pitch a royal bitch about most certification and security analyses... they are testing things that are not a part of the CORE OS. and therefore are meking everything a mess.
Let't take NT4.0 and a slackware linux with packages A and N installed. no software other than what the base os allows. (no ftp, not BIND, no sendmail, no servers of any kind.)
then let's look at the holes... the number of problems on both sides will dwindle to almost nothing. with NT losing because of the silly run all services as the system account bungle.
if you were to apply a daemon mindset to Nt, and able to run most of the services as a almost-no-access user, over 1/2 the trouble would evaporate.
Quality vs Quantity (Score:3, Insightful)
I mean, an exploit that requires the malicious party to have physical access to a machine and then only gives him access to one specific folder on a system is hardly as big a deal as one that gives a script kiddie sitting in his bedroom complete remote control of your corporate servers, allowing him to copy, overwrite and delete files, folders and hard drives at the click of a button?
Let's try to compare apples and oranges here. Just because McDonalds has more restaurants than Michelin-stared ones it doesn't make the Big Mac a better meal.
Linux as a whole, or just MY Linux? (Score:3, Insightful)
When you break it down, however, Windows has been about equal to Red Hat and well above all the othe Linuxes and Unixes in the chart.
As a willing participant in the capitalist scheme, I don't care how secure everyone else's servers are -- just the one securing my stuff. The only thing this chart tells me is that if I want a secure server OS out of the box, I should start with Mandrake or Debian instead of Red Hat or Windows.
Break it down.. (Score:3, Interesting)
2. Activeness - The common issues reported for Windows deployments are almost universally in use and actively being exploited BEFORE the report. Most *ix vulnerabilities are not being actively exploited (and definitely at a lower level of activity), and are generally patched to resolve the issue FAR quicker.
3. Openness - "Linux" has no control over the release of bug reports. Microsoft on the other hand, does, to a degree. They can actively "persue" the matter and encourage the bug reporter to remain quiet about it until they can respond. In some cases for MONTHS even for well established bug hunters like eEye, on very large vulnerabilities like UPNP.
In closing, there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. Sure, you can put whatever spin you want on it, and I think I have in this posting.
ONE thing needs to be clear, there are alot of bugs, and having many eyes isnt preventing them from happening on Linux.
No matter where you sit, its justification to yet again work diligently to reduce the number of potential bugs by secure programming techniques.
Much harder to compare "Linux" versus Windows (Score:3, Troll)
Unlike Windows, there are many independent distributions of Linux that may or may not be vulnerable to a security hole. Also unlike Windows, each distribution has shorter release cycles. Futhermore, many Linux distributions come with lots of bundled software that not all sys admins install.
This means that security holes discovered against Windows could be far more devastating because of the uniformity of the installed systems. Code Red/Nimda, etc. would've been much harder to pull off against all variants/distributions of Linux. There's much more paydirt in developing good Windows exploits, since they're likely to work against ALL Windows systems, which means the exploits are likely to be very refined and well tested. Compare to Linux exploits which are usually very hard to get working the first time.
It's also harder to find security holes in Windows since it's closed source (which doesn't make them any less severe). Many security analysts won't even bother since it mostly involves using a debugger to poke at a task for hours, rather than simply grepping source trees for unsafe functions.
But yeah, it is pretty disgusting that Linux in general has this many security holes.
I have read this before... (Score:3)
For one, in total vulnerabilities Windows come in second only to aggregate linux, which, as far as I can tell is a compilation of vulnerabilities across the board for linux distributions and therefore includes mostly duplicates, so that figure is best thrown out the window completely. So numerically the argument doesn't hold up. Additionally, within a distribution a widespread vulnerability may impact several packages. For example, say a widespread vulnerability in FTP servers was found. In Windows, that means one vulnarability, IIS. For a linux distribution, it could be several (wu-ftpd, proftpd, etc...) So in another way Linux figures are inflated by duplicates.
Second, no matter how the numbers add up, it still proves nothing for either side. The numbers state simply that X # of vulnerabilities are known for platform. Nothing is said of severity or exploitability. Very minor or virtually non-exploitable vulnerabilities count as much as serious, wide-open delete data vulnerabilities in these stats. Also, no consideration is given for what would be considered a vulnerability on each platform. Windows tends to by design allow users to do more without Admin privs. So, a theoretical bug that allowed change of color depth in XFree86 might be considered a vulnerablity (since root privs are typically required for that operation), while in Windows it is a normal, harmless feature. This example has all sorts of problems with it, but I think it illustrates the point that some things normal in Windows would be considered vulnerabilities in a Linux environment (and vice-versa to some extent).
In short, no simple chart can show one platform to be more secure than another....
Open source nature of Linux (Score:5, Insightful)
In the long term Linux will have progressively fewer bugs/vulnerabilities due to its open source nature. Look at the numbers on the same chart for NetBSD. There were 9 vulnerabilities found in 2001, and 42 found in Win 2K. 54 for RedHat and only 2 for TurboLinux.
Obviously everyone should switch to Turbo Linux.
Does Open Source favor evil deep magic hackers? (Score:3, Insightful)
With closed source, mr. evil hacker will need to spend more time discovering the inner workings of the software than he will with open source.
So - will he then produce more exploits running through open source software grepping for common starting points for exploits than he will when dissecting closed source programs?
Remember - at any moments, the black hat community knows about exploits the rest of us don't know about. No computer has yet been classified as formally secure (to the best of my knowledge). We could all be at risk.
A Treatise on Fishing (Score:5, Insightful)
The jury is still out.
The SecurityFocus statistics broke in August, 2001, per their web page, so one has to extrapolate the partial 2001 total to get the projected total for the year.
In that extrapolation, one sees that the expected number of bugs (assuming the 96 reported bugs cover through the end of August) would be 144. There were 153 the year prior, which is likely well within the margin of error. In addition, many of the black hats have STOPPED REVEALING their exploits, so in fact there may be many more than what we see.
Now, it's worth pointing out that this is not necessarily a good measurement of security. We may be measuring the wrong thing.
An example of bad measurement is the one the government used to determine how many cod were left out in the ocean, to prevent overfishing. Year after year, the catches were about the same, so the government assumed that the fish stocks were constant. But suddenly there were no more fish -- the industry collapsed.
Why? Because they were measuring the wrong thing. They weren't measuring the total number of fish, they were measuring the fish that were caught. They didn't realize, as the fish stocks dwindled rapidly, that the fishers were getting newer and better technology to fish with. The total number of fish coming out of the water was constant -- but as a fraction of the total fish in the water, was going up very quickly. Eventually the fish were all but wiped out.
Measuring security by bugs reported is very similar. It may or may not reflect the number of bugs in the 'ocean'. It is an indirect measurement at best.
We need to differentiate between fish 'caught' and fish 'available'. From a security perspective, I think we are talking about TRUE security (the number of fish in the water) versus FUNCTIONAL security (the number of fish actually being caught).
Now, as security people, our goal is to reduce the fish catch as much as possible. There's two ways to do this; we can reduce the number of fish, or we can somehow control, limit, or damage the profession of fishing.
The real professonals are trying to reduce the number of fish in the water. That's the true long-term solution. But from a short-term perspective, what I care about personally is how many fish are CAUGHT. Every time they come up with a new exploit, I have to run around like a maniac patching systems.
However, the fishing analogy starts to break down, as most do eventually. Truly secure systems are still run by people, and people make mistakes. Even if the OS is perfect, the attack will often come against the weakest link, the employees. Thus, even though I would prefer to have true security, I have to argue that it isn't really necessary. The OS just has to be stronger than the other avenues of attack. ("Why are you putting on tennis shoes? You can't outrun a bear!" "I don't have to. I just have to outrun you.")
Security through obscurity, in other words, may be adequate for most uses. It slows down the rate of fish catching. If nobody discovers the bug until the next version of the OS is out, the bug is less important. The longer it takes to discover the bug, in general, the less damage it will do -- at least as long as we're on the upgrade treadmill.
But, a counter-argument to that just occurred to me: Security through obscurity may be long-term counter-productive -- making it hard to catch fish may have the effect of increasing the fish supply. Every time a fish is caught, it can't breed, and reduces the total population by that much. Likewise, in code, once a vulnerability is discovered, many related vulnerabilities may also be patched. Thus, security through obscurity may work well for a long time, but may actually be making the fundamental problem worse.
Another observation I have to add is that programmers like to create new programs. Very few of them like to audit code. New projects and programs are being added to the Open Source world at an amazing speed, and I don't think they're being stringently audited. In other words, they're adding to the fish stocks every day. There is no QA department in Open Source, and the code is getting more complex than individual people can understand anymore. I think, unless we come up with a better development method, Microsoft's ability to fund a billion dollar a year QA department is likely to reduce their fish count below that of Open Source.
So I think I will need to expand on my original hypothesis. I now believe that Open Source will probably lag behind closed source in terms of FUNCTIONAL security. In terms of TRUE security (absolute number of exploitable bugs, known or unknown) -- there's no easy way to tell. If catching fish reduces the fish supply, and if the programmers don't add too many new fish, eventually Open Source will start winning. But if Microsoft's QA department does a good job with their nets and lures, their fish supply may drop just as fast or faster. Money is definitely a good way to motivate people, and Microsoft has a lot of it.
It's also worth pointing out that even if things are getting more secure, the catch rates may be roughly constant, because presumably the crackers will get better and better, catching a higher and higher percentage of the fish. If the analogy holds, and I suspect it may, then eventually the fish stocks will be exhausted and the black hats will be very suddenly unable to crack machines anymore.
It's going to take at least five more years to know -- and twenty might be a more reaonable time frame. It took a long time to wipe out all those billions of cod. It may take just as long to wipe out the pool of security flaws.
<<RON>>
Some explanations??? (Score:5, Interesting)
I wonder how they decided what is "more secure", but my guess is that it's based on the number of reported exploits/bugs.
Does anyone know if they used any weighting on the types of exploits/bugs. I would consider a remotely exploitable bug to be much worse than a locally exploitable bug as you can't control people that aren't on your box as well as the people that are. I would consider a root/administrator access bug to be worse than a denial of service type bug.
So, given a weighting scheme of
Remote Root = 4
Remote Denial of Service = 3
Local Root = 2
Local Denial of Service = 1
How would the different OSes stack up?
My guess is that without even taking number of installations into account you would find that Microsoft was at least as bad as the various Linux/Unix versions. I'm not going to say that they were worse.
Anyone want to do some analysis on the same information given a weighting scheme and see what the differences are?
Z.
Wait a sec... (Score:5, Interesting)
2. Sheer number of vulnerabilities mean nothing - are they counting the severity of the vulnerabilities?
3. Are they counting the time it took before A) someone discovered the vulnerability and B) a patch was issued?
4. If there are comparable numbers of linux vs. win2k servers out there, which actually had more break-ins? (This question not valid if there is a wide gap in numbers since then the lower of the two probably benefits from that "security through obscurity").
5. I think having full source code availability leads to people actually FINDING the bugs, whereas Windows could have way more, but we don't know about them unless people are actually TRYING to crack the system (as opposed to finding them working on source or whatever).
Bogus statistics (Score:3, Interesting)
I'm sure it was an honest mistake that most Linux bugs were counted multiple times.
But I don't buy into the "bug count" argument anyway. It's a lot like that controversy over the "most decorated US veteran" (Hacksworth?) - a lot of people think that you can have a warehouse full of bronze stars and distinguished service medals and it's all scrap metal next to a single Congressional Medal of Honor (post.).
What was the last remote root exploit for a widely used Unix service? What about local exploit for a widely used Unix application?
Now ask the same thing about Microsoft.
Finally, "NTBugTraq" may be respected but that doesn't mean it never publishes crap -- sometimes for the purpose of shooting it down. I've seen this happen on comp.risks and elsewhere.
What about the last half of 2001? (Score:3, Insightful)
Also, most linux vendor security announcements posted to Bugtraq are for add-on software not enabled by default. They are also announced by each vendor individually, and the author of the package. Most Windows announcements are about vulnerabilities in the OS (IE) or widely deployed packages (IIS, Outlook) from the author of the exploit (after secure@microsoft.com has ignored them).
The entire article needs to be modded -1 flamebait.
It is an interesting question - and a proposal (Score:3, Insightful)
So, how about we do a serious analysis? I'll put up a system that lets people rate the various bugs by severity along a couple of continuums. (Like theoretical impact and actual impact.) Then people can use this data to draw more accurate conclusions. If at least 10 people respond to this post, and two thirds of them think it is a good idea, I'll put one up and link it here.
Wow, talk about your slashdot fodder... (Score:5, Insightful)
Well, duh. Linux is full of holes. But that's not winformant's problem. You see, each of those holes was cleared up in a matter of days and a patch was freely available. There were no egos and press releases claiming there are no holes. There were no programmers waiting around while Marketing decided the best colour for the patch's installation wizard. There was no downtime as millions of machines had to get the file from a single MS server because the patch's license didn't allow redistribution. There were no hours of wringing hands as sysadmins watched hackers pick off their boxes one by one because there's no workaround while the patch was built. There was no possibility for diving into the code and fixing it yourself; and if there was there'd be no way to release the patched dll. Oh, and if a linux machine was compromised, there was little chance of it polluting the entire network...because the bug affected less than 1% of the install base of that particular OS, and not 100%.
Not to mention the reason that so many Linux patches were "found" rather than "discovered" is that bored sysadmins can sit around with sheets of source code, hoping to find a hole and make a name for themselves on BugTraq. With windows...well, you'd better be good with BlackIC and ASM, because it's the only way you're finding the hole.
There is No Science Here. (Score:5, Informative)
However, the conclusion being drawn here is invalid. The SecurityFocus vulnerability survey is interesting, but it is not itself a reasonable methodology to generate security metrics between operating systems.
I could pick nits at this ad hoc study for hours, but the biggest problems are also the most obvious:
First: the study associates third-party software with the operating system, and aggregates all the distributions together into a meaningless "Linux" category. This study is literally just pattern matching against advisories.
Second: there is no notion of "severity" or "impact" in the study. This is a shame, because SecurityFocus has actually put some real effort into deriving a taxonomy of vulnerabilities from their (enormous) vulnerability database. There is no way to determine whether the N Linux vulnerabilities were equivalent to the K NT vulnerabilities.
Third: the study compares a kit of open-source software, which has received extensive peer review, to a closed-source product. It should surprise nobody that Linux has more documented problems than Windows: it's actually possible to go find vulnerabilities on Linux. Finding Windows vulnerabilities requires black-box reverse engineering.
Finally, both Linux and Windows do a reasonable job of locking down server configurations out of the box. What IT people need to know is vulnerability breakdown by operating system and by deployed configuration. This study does nothing to inform us of whether a Linux web server is at more risk than a Windows web server, or whether it's safer to expose a Linux print server or a Windows print server. Organizations that deploy homogenous Apache+NFS+ssh server farms don't care about XFree vulnerabilities or Samba problems.
I don't think SecurityFocus is actually trying to make claims about the relative security of Linux and Windows. I think they've been a bit careless with this report though; it's a reasonable thing to try to generate from their database, but more thought should have gone into presentation.
SecurityFocus has the on-staff expertise to publish some real conclusions about the distribution of vulnerabilities between Linux and Windows. Before this database report is misconstrued by the trade press, it would be enormously helpful if they could publish a statement about the conclusions that can be legitimately drawn from it. It'd be good press for them, too.
Why is this automatically false? (Score:4, Insightful)
Again, I find it disturbing how easily everyone shrugs this off as propaganda or something.
Listen, everyone: Times are changing. Linux has gotten big and complicated, and is no longer automatically secure. Long gone are the Slackware days where you'd download a minimal kernel/utilities package and then compile only the apps you need, by yourself, and understand everything. Complex software has security problems, and the linux community has done little but use the "lots of eyeballs" method to counter that. Microsoft software is also quite complex, and they have fewer eyeballs (I hope, though I am not sure), but they have publicly recognized the problem and are at least pretending to try to fix it. Microsoft also has a bunch of research into technologies for producing machine-checked code so that they don't even need lots of eyeballs. (I really wish that linux had this too; see a related rant http://slashdot.org/comments.pl?sid=26315&cid=2851 880 [slashdot.org] ).
My linux box has been rooted twice. I keep up to date on patches, I read bugtraq. My windows box, also connected to the internet all the time (and getting a lot more use), has never been compromised through 95, 98, 2000, and XP.(I have been Winnuked, that's the worst thing that's happened.)
I guess my point is: this is not something to laugh at. Some day soon, people will not think of Microsoft operating systems as crashy (already happening to an extent) and insecure (...), and then linux will have a much tougher sell to the average guy who doesn't care about Free Software. Instead of laughing smugly about an article like this, maybe we should be worrying?
Re:Why is this automatically false? (Score:3, Interesting)
Linux DOES have this - there are various and sundry programs which will scan your code for you - even kernel code. And if you don't want to rely on the programmer, there are libraries available for Linux which prevent a number of these holes - automatically.
My linux box has been rooted twice. I keep up to date on patches, I read bugtraq. My windows box, also connected to the internet all the time (and getting a lot more use), has never been compromised through 95, 98, 2000, and XP
Of all the boxes I've had to monitor, only a disused Windows box has ever been compromised. I am constantly bombarded with virii and worm attacks from compromised Windows boxes; most of the Linux boxes "attacking" my network are owned by the hackers.
I'd stand by my Linux install just as soon as I'd stand by any Windows box I've had a hand in hardening.
Re:Why is this automatically false? (Score:4, Informative)
Long gone are the Slackware days where you'd download a minimal kernel/utilities package and then compile only the apps you need, by yourself, and understand everything.
Wrong. I entered those days quite recently, with Linux From Scratch [linuxfromscratch.org]. LFS isn't exactly a "security solution," but it's hard to break into a machine when there's nothing running on any port except ssh.
Case of bad statistics (Score:3, Insightful)
Now, how many people do you know that install redhat, then add to it all the security bugs in caldera, Connectiva, Mandrake, Slackeware, Suse, and Turbo Linux?? None, that would be extremely difficult. This is akin to saying the Ford Taurus has fewer bugs than all of the Nissans put together, therefore it is a better product.
Also, we are assuming that all bugs are created equal. Guess what, not so. Windows bugs have superpowers, faster than a speeding packet, stronger than a firewall, able to leap entire networks in a single bound! Linux security bugs take down processes, sometimes servers. Windows bugs take down Networks, or internets!!!
But I'm sure they'll never get called on it, because their readership is windows users. They are preaching to the choir, and they will ignore us and our quest for accuracy.
Inexperienced Programmers? (Score:3, Insightful)
I would like to see a comparison in bugcounts (say, per line of source code) between open-source projects supported by professionals (i.e. people trying to make money off of it, i.e. mySQL) and projects supported by weekend programmers.
I just had an ironic thought. Since most open-source business plans revolve around providing support, would that make those companies want to introduce MORE bugs?
This just in ... (Score:3, Funny)
Warning: Connectiva does not support vulnerabilities and all calls will be redirected to the nearest OS distributor.
Calibration of Counting (Score:4, Interesting)
For any measurement to be meaningful, a mechanism of calibration must exist. In the context of counting software defects of any type, some questions immediately arise:
1. Severity: is there a threshold for including a bug in the count. Is it the same across systems? EG: do each count "privacy bugs"?
2. Scope of measurement: are the measurements made for comparable functionality of code. EG: If "MS Backoffice" is tallied separately to WinNT is this an apples-to-apples comparison to a linux disto?
3. Timing: does each measurement count vulnerabilities at the same point in the identification process? EG: Do "theoretical" bugs with no known exploit count? Do bugs in beta versions of particular applications count?
4. Completeness: are all vulnerabilities reported? are separable vulnerabilities reported separately? EG: if MS internally ID's a bug and fixes it, does it remain secret or will it make its way into the tally? Can three separate bugs be counted as only 1 because the details are kept hidden?
I believe that linux distros include a lot more functionality, have a higher standard on what constitutes a bug, report bugs early and visibly, and fix bugs much earlier in the vulnerability lifecycle. Every one of these traits would penalize a linux distro on a defect count metric.
Reported defect counts are generally a lousy measure of quality, because they drive bad behavior: they can be decreased by lowering the quality of identification process instead of improving the quality of the product. Moreover, to draw conclusions about overall system security, I would be more interested in the aggregate lifetime-until-patch of known working exploits.
This ignores so much... (Score:4, Interesting)
Now consider exploitability. Let's take Mandrake for example -- although their figures are already way lower than NT's (or, no doubt, 95/98/ME's), a default install includes 'libsafe', which means that none of the buffer overflows or format bug exploits will work. There go 3/4 of the theoretical vulnerabilities, including the ones which haven't been discovered yet. And a libsafe rpm could be installed on almost any Linux system in a matter of seconds without breaking anything, making the whole raw tally concept very questionable.
The only way to secure an MS system that broadly and quickly is to cut the Ethernet cable.
I leave my Linux box on the Internet without worry, and my investment in security has been maybe an hour and $0.00. I can and do take my time on patches because I know that almost none of the bugs have any chance of being exploited on my system. That is a realistic measure of Linux security, and I will delightedly compare it to Windows any day of the week. Securityfocus' figures, taken by themselves, don't mean anything.
More interesting statistics... (Score:4, Informative)
Microsoft security bulletins released in 2002:
MS02-001
Redhat security bulletins released in 2002:
2002-018
2002-015
2002-014
2002-012
2002-011
2002-009
2002-007
2002-004
2002-005
2002-003
2002-002
2001-171
2001-168
2001-165
And if you look at 2001 results you'll see a somewhat similar trend, although not near as pronounced. Somethink like 80 versus 60.
Are these statistics meaningful? Of course not. If you have read Paul's columns you would know he reported this tongue and cheek. It was a slow news day, he noticed this, had to make fun of it.
What makes this story interesting, and why Paul reported it is because if the numbers had been reversed you would be assured that would be the headline of the day on slashdot, and if anybody questioned it they would be called Microsoftie apologists.
And look at the responses you see here. They're almost comical. Reminds me of the responses to the Mindcraft benchmark. Fear, Uncertainty and Denial.
Glass half full... (Score:5, Interesting)
A more scientific aproach (Score:3, Interesting)
1- let's stablish what's a windows OS and what's a Linux OS (and the nots too)
1.1 Windows 3.1 is NOT an operational system. is a graphic user interface (GUI) for DOS. let's assume win 95/98/me and NT 3.5/4.0/2000/XP are OSes.
1.2 Linux is NOT an OS. Is a KERNEL. the combination between Linux and GNU OS makes the operational system we know as GNU/Linux
2 Let's determine the minimum instalation of each one that's capable of doing usefull work, including user tasks such as reading e-mail and browsing the web and server tasks such as serving web pages, sharing files, routing e-mail, et al.
2.1 Both in Windows and GNU/Linux you'll have to select all the packages neccessary to the proposed tasks using the minimum ofered by the standard install CD. If the CD doesn't ofer some of the functionalities they must be downloaded from the manufacturer's site.
2.2.1 for windows you'll keep only:
- networking drivers;
- the standard MS file sharing;
- Internet Explorer;
- Outlook express/MS mail;
- IIS/personal web server
- Exchange server;
2.2.1 For GNU/Linux:
- Network modules and associated tools;
- NFS or Samba;
- Mutt os pine (remember, in GNU/Linux you can read e-mail/browse from command line, so XFree is not installed);
- Lynx or Links
- Apache;
- Sendmail;
3 count the number of security holes in the test systems, including:
- vulnerabilities to e-mail virii;
- vulnerabilities to malicious web-pages;
- remote exploits that grant root/administrator access;
- local exploits that grant root/administrator access;
- holes that allows an atacker to succesfully launch a DoS atack, freezing the machine;
- unauthorized read and/or write access to files;
- any other vulnerability you can think of;
In a test like this who do you think'll win ? please post your comments.
Oh yeah. (Score:3, Interesting)
Why not try this.
With any of the following IPs, type 'smbclient -L 207.88.220.61'
If you're more of a cracker than I am, you might then try smbclient
and just hit return when prompted for a password.
this also works with:
203.228.232.188
203.231.119.70
203.231.166.49
203.233.20.86
203.231.216.208
203.199.54.26
203.231.217.5
203.231.122.227
203.244.13.72
and countless others.
These machines (all Win2K) have their entire filesystems exposed over the internet, and are promiscuously advertising their presence because they are infected by a virus that leaves a clear trail in the logs of any web server they attempt to infect.
These machines are engaged in abuse of my web services, and I hold Microsoft at least partly responsible for this situation.
Presumably the virus itself is responsible for opening their shares with guest access, but maybe it's M$'s lame out-of-the-box security.
If your machine's IP is on this (small fragment of my) list of machines banned from accessing my web server due to virus infection, then i suggest you replace your hopelessly insecure OS with a decent one.
I was incredulous when i analysed my web-servers logfiles and found the sheer number of virus-infected hosts, all Windows NT and 2000, and most of which were sharing the entire contents of their hard-drives over the public internet.
I know Windows can be secure as the admin is competent, but the ease with which it's security is breached through Outlook/IE is breathtaking.
The idea that Windows is somehow more secure than Linux/UNIX is laughable to me.
This is a sham. Relevant snippits: (Score:3, Informative)
Excellent satire.
One only needs to look at the SecurityFocus stats referenced to find holes in most (if not all) statements made by Paul's article. An example:
"A look at the previous 5 years [there were only four previous years reported on - tsmith]--for which the data is more complete--also shows that each year, Win2K and Windows NT had far fewer security vulnerabilities than Linux..."
Lets take a look at the previous "five" years, starting with 2000. Redhat Linux 6.2 i386, listed as the most vulnerable of the linux flavors with 65 vulns, is bested outright by MS Windows NT with a whopping 71 vulnerabilities. To compare apples to apples requires adding in MS IIS 4.0, with 29 reported vulns, for a total of 100 vulns, or over %50 more vulnerabilities than the _buggiest_ distribution of linux. Even the combination of the lowly, four-years-on-the-market, mature Windows95 with IIS (if such a combination were possible - it matters not, because if not then W95 cannot honestly be compared to RHL) results in 64 vulns. Note that Win95 had the least vulns reported (at 35) of all the Wins. Also not that despite it being out a solid 3 years longer than RHL, it can only best the mark by 1 vuln. Not quite what I'd describe as "far fewer".
Paul's statement is even more humorous in light of the data from 1999. In that year, Microsoft's products fill the top of the list almost exclusively, with the exception of Solaris 7.0 having slightly more vulnerabilities than IIS and NT4.0SP5. That's right folks, IIS _alone_ had more vulns than any flavor of Linux and most of the Solari. NT4.0 without a service pack? 75 vulns.
1998 is the only year during which Paul may have a contention regarding NT besting Linux. 8 vulns vs RHL's 10. Note, however, that this is not including bugs from IIS, and is akin to comparing apples to oranges. In any case a difference of two is not what I would consider "far fewer". The comparison of RHL to Win95 is laughable in this case - what does a count of security vulnerabilities show in a system which has virtually no security?
Once again in 1997, RHL's 6 bests WinNT's 10.
Paul, how exactly are we to interpret the phrases "five", "each year", and "far fewer"? Perhaps as "four", "maybe one year", and "a little bit"? I suppose your wording was close enough though - I mean, it _is_ just your journalistic integrity on the line, right?
"Win2K had fewer vulnerabilities than RedHat Linux 7.0 or MandrakeSoft Mandrake Linux 7.2"
Note that niether BO nor IIS are reported on in the 2001 tables, thus no conclusion may be drawn.
"...despite the fact that Windows is deployed on a far wider basis than any version of Linux"
Excellent heresay. Well un-supported by reliable references. After reading the prior claims in your article, I'll be sure to give this little tidbit all the credit it deserves (incidentally, none).
Thanks again for the good laugh Paul! What's next week? "WinXP Embedded Has Smaller Footprint Than vxWork? Yepppp!" I can almost imagine you shaking your pom-poms in the air.
Apples anyone, or how about some tasty Oranges? (Score:4, Informative)
The trouble with comparing Linux distros to Windows lies in the fact that Linux distros include so many different applications. I just did a count of installed packages on a RedHat box I am using, and I got 780 installed packages. I'd like to see a comparison of the number of exploits between the RedHat distro and Windows installed with 700 of the most common applications for it. That might be a more useful comparison. Also, I will readily acknowledge the weakness and lack of true usefulness of the numbers below, so no need to flame me for the lack of usability...I'm only posting the info I found, so no need to stone the messenger.
Windows
4336 Windows NT
1070 Windows 2000
2 Windows 95
5408 Windows total
All UNIX and Like
1185 Linux Red Hat
999 Linux unknown distributions
36 Linux Connectiva
23 Linux Debian
17 Linux Cobalt
17 Linux SuSE
13 Linux ALZZA
12 Linux Mandrake
1 Linux Slackware
2304 Linux total
485 Solaris & Sun OS (1)
267 IRIX
163 FreeBSD
121 BSDI
44 SCO
28 Generic UNIX
18 Compaq Tru64 UNIX
9 AIX
7 HPUX HP
4 Digital UNIX DG
3 OpenBSD
2 NetBSD
1 PowerBSD
1 Digital OSF1
1153 UNIX & Like total
3457 UNIXs & Linux
8865 Total Windows and all UNIX
Other
2 Mac OS
1 Netware
63 unidentified
bias (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:bias (Score:3, Insightful)
If you look at the SF numbers for any given distribution of GNU/Linux, they are smaller than the Windows numbers. Also, the numbers don't take into account things like severity, remote vs. local, whether the package affected is a core component of a functional server, package redundancy (one bug in four different FTP servers on GNU/Linux vs. four bugs in IIS is not delineated), popularity of the package to the platform is not discussed, etc etc.
And yes, I'm using IE to post this because Netscape seems to have proxy issues here at work, not because I want to.
Bias works both ways(Re:bias) (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:4, Insightful)
Open source haven't proven more secure than closed, as the theory about "given enough eyes all bugs are shallow" says.
The one thing it gives though, is choice. For instance, i dont run rsync(se recent security exploit) and i'll probably never do. Neither will mdk/rh pr. default (Allthough a lot is certainly run by default). Even though rsync comes with mdk/rh.
Frej Rasmussen.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Insightful)
The security of any OS lies... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:The security of any OS lies... (Score:3, Insightful)
Look at it this way, when you say "linux exploits" you are not only talking about kernel issues and quality packages but every half-baked bit of code to come out of a college dormatory. If you include all the windows shovelware in with those exploit numbers I venture to say that you would see a very different picture.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:5, Informative)
I can't read the original article, It's been Slashdotted to death. But I think I can make a pretty good guess as to what happened.
First off, we host Bugtraq, not NTBugtraq, which is Russ Cooper's list. (Any chance we can get that fixed in the story intro? Anyone know if the same mistake is in the original article?)
Secondly, I'm constantly amazed at how people mis-read our stats page. The Linux aggregate stats are the total of all unique bugs across all the various distributions we track. It's supposed to answer the question "How many Linux-related bugs were there that year." It's based on things like which distro ships a particular package, and when that package is found to have a hole, it also gets attached to the distro. This is so you can look up your distro, and see what bugs you might need to patch.
Take a look at the top of the page, our script hasn't been running since August, when we switched from Roxen to Apache. So, we're missing the whole last quarter of 2001 stats.
Regardless of anything else, using these number to declare that one thing is more secure than another is a mistake. Based on our numbers, why didn't they declare that everyone should run MacOS for security? Or that if you want to be more secure, run Debian instead of Win2K?
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Interesting)
I'm still a little unclear on what you mean by "unique bugs." So if there's a glibc vulnerability in all distributions, it gets counted only once in the aggregate?
If so, I'll consider the numbers a little less suspect.
Thanks in advance.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Informative)
If I recall from earlier today, the aggregate number was around 90. If you take all of the Linux distros on the page, and just add the numbers, you get 178.
Exactly (it deserves to be rediculed and ignored) (Score:3, Insightful)
These numbers only reflect that GNU/Linux is more open and public in reporting its bugs than Windows, which is not surprising given Bill Gates & Co.'s efforts to suppress information about existing bugs in their operating system (the rightly rediculed notion of achieving security through obscurity).
There is absolutely no correlation between number of bugs reported and number of bugs existing, be they security related or not. This is doubly true when one party (Microsoft) is actively working to suppress such information about their own products.
The incompetence of the author writing this story, and of the Security Focus editorial staff for letting it through, is staggering. With this kind of security "expertise" is it any wonder at all that Nimda worms and the like run rampent across the net?
Indeed, if one wants to draw correlations (always a risky endeavor without corraborating evidence) it would make far more sense to correlate the percentage (vs. installed base) of demonstrably compromized systems running one operating system vs. another. As Code Red, Nimda, etc. have demonstrated, Microsoft's products win this one hands down. Indeed, in this case there is massive corraborating evidence to back up the conclusions of such a correlation
Re:Exactly (it deserves to be rediculed and ignore (Score:5, Informative)
We didn't write the article in question, nor are we hosting, nor did we have any opportunity to see it ahead of time. (Or now... still can't see it.) Sadly, we have very little editorial control over other people's websites.
Perhaps you could put that on the stats page? (Score:3, Insightful)
I thought this was probably true, but I could not confirm it until I manually added up the bugs for a given year. Maybe you could explain the terms a little better on the page itselft?
Regardless of anything else, using these number to declare that one thing is more secure than another is a mistake.
That sounds like another piece of advice that should be on the stats page, not buried in a slashdot comment. Its unfortunate that someone misinterprets your statistics and publishes a misleading article every 6 months, but I can't help but wonder why you don't take proactive steps to help people understand the meaning of your web page.
-Mike
Re:Perhaps you could put that on the stats page? (Score:3, Informative)
Similar wording has been re-added, and the aggregate number has been pulled (to help keep people from jumping to conclusions.)
Own up to it. (Score:3, Informative)
Easy.
Because you didn't say so.
We know who SecurityFocus is. It's Alfred Huger and Oliver Friedrichs and Art Wong, the Secure Networks, Inc. crew.
Secure Networks dealt with exactly the same problem we're talking about now: the trade press doesn't know a damn thing about technology and software engineering. Everything in the trade press is based off of newswire press releases and superficial articles. Alf and Art and Oli had to deal with this problem constantly as their competitors made bogus claims about SNI and their products.
Towards the end of their work on the Ballista product, Alf had gotten pretty good about educating the trade press about the issues, or at least at swaying them towards his way of thinking.
Alf and Oli and Elias are scrupulous guys, and they know how the world works. It is simply an embarassing oversight that there aren't loud disclaimers on the vulnerability report at your site explaining how to interpret the results. You all know how the page is going to be interpreted. You just saw Slashdot interpret it the wrong way. Slashdot is dumb, but InfoWorld is a million times dumber.
You could fix this problem right away, and pre-empt unethical use of your data, by releasing a statement explaining that the numbers on the page aren't a legitimate security metric. It won't cost you anything and it will help (us, and you!),
Or you could act like Russ Cooper and try to use the polarizing effect of the unexplained numbers to generate controversy, page hits, and press.
It's all a question of how much your credibility means to you.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:5, Insightful)
Deciding which OS is more secure just by looking at the number of bugs is not the right way to decide things. As usual, there's an easy way, and then there's the right way.
First, lets assume the numbers are honest, and not double counted, as has been done before. (One reporter in the past took the numbers for linux in general, then took the numbers for a distribution, then ADDED them together to get his final number of bugs. Too bad most were double counted.) Not all bugs are the same. First, how severe is it? A bug that allows complete takeover of your system just by connecting to the internet (Universal Plug and Play anyone!) is not the same as an exploit in some little program nobody runs and those who do run it don't run it as root and run it in a chroot environment.
Second, how quickly is the bug patched? If you can't patch the hole for months because the vendor doesn't put out a patch, that's a different level of security than if you can patch the hole the next day. Third, does the patch fix problems or create them (NT SP2 anyone!).
Finally, are we comparing apples to apples. Most linux distributions come with much more software than a Windows CD. Not all of that software gets installed. Are we comparing a linux system with just the equivalent software a Windows CD comes with? That can make a big difference in the bug numbers.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:4, Insightful)
This kind of study don't see what is Linux, and what is agregated software. They say Linux and Windows, but I'm sure they don't include IIS.
In any case, impact and severity must also be taken into account. Most Windows bugs are remotely exploitable, and give full control of the machine. Most linux bugs are only localy exploitable, or only leak information.
It's very easy to say that car acidents happen more often then plain crashes. Anyone cares to count the casualities ? Well, I'm not sure this is a good example, once car acidents casuality numbers are, AFAIK, higher, but I think you get what I mean.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Interesting)
while Windows is generally limited to relatively standard installations
I once got my hands on the oem installation kit and read through the licensing and instructions. Although I didn't understand everything, one thing I did understand is the OEMs, with a few very minor exceptions, must do a default install. They are prohibited, for instance, from removing or disabling IIS. I bet that'll make a big difference in the exploitablity of any bug and hence security.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Informative)
That is a consequence of the C2 standard which was written by the military for the US govt in the days before networking.
C2 was obsolete before the Web existed. Back in 1993 when I was asked to do a security audit of the Web standards against the Orange book I concluded that the standard was no help at all.
The other reason that C2 is not very useful is that the main concern in Orange book is partitioning multiple users data on the same machine. These days each user has their own machine, a one person computer that does not meet C2 mandatory access control requirements can be perfectly secure - look at a Palm or Pocket PC or a smartcard.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:5, Informative)
You mean, like this? The NTBugTraq site itself says (emphasis mine):
So, while there may be a stack of Outlook vulnerabilities, those won't get lumped in with Windows. But sendmail vulnerabilities might get lumped in with RedHat. They go on to say (emphasis theirs):
Further, the numbers themselves do not support the conjecture that Windows 2000/NT had fewer reported vulnerabilities reported over the 5-year period. Let's compare RedHat (the Linux distro for which the largest number of vulnerabilities was reported) vs. Windows 2000/NT from their data:
So even though the numbers are potentially skewed against Linux, the totals still come up less for RedHat than for Win2000/NT.
What the other article must be doing (I haven't read it yet, since I wasn't able load it) is totalling across all distributions, which is wrong. One FTPD vulnerability would get multiplied by all the vendors that ship that FTPD, which isn't quite fair.
--JoeRe:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3)
There is a distinct difference in the way that vulnerabilities are counted for Microsoft
This context was just added to the SecurityFocus page. It rules that they added the disclaimer, but don't pretend like it was there before and WinFormant simply ignored it.
Re:This, of course, will be ignored and ridiculed (Score:3, Informative)
I think it is important to note that 99% of "linux vulnerabilities" are not linux vulnerabilities, but actually non-essential, third party programs. These programs have nothing to do with linux, but do run on the OS. DNS, sendmail, rsync etc are not a part of the OS but have vulnerabilites. We should say that any os that these utilities/services run on has the vulnerability.
So, by that theory, we shouldn't include any IIS vulnerabilities in the NT exploits either. Because, of course, "IIS has nothing to do with NT, but it runs on the OS." After all, it's an optional component.
Bullshit.
Why are you not including BIND and sendmail? Hello? Most Linux servers are either web, DNS, or mail servers... NT, Novell, and Sun far outnumber them as file servers. So, if we can't include BIND, nor sendmail, then we can't include IIS or Exchange/Outlook. Cause, after all, they are "nonessential third-party programs." Oh wait, heh, they were written by "M$" (using obligatory dollar sign so the author of the parent post can understand who I'm talking about) so I guess they're not thrid-party. But then again, it's not Linux either, it's GNU/Linux. So I guess we can only count kernel exploits. Hmmm. Maybe that means we can only count NT kernel exploits (go ahead, count them.)
I dare you to root an NT file/print server that isn't running any other services. You can't (or at least, not on any easier level than you could root a Linux or Sun box... heh Sun and their automountd... heheheheh). Anyway, I hope you understand where I'm coming from. Your thinking is flawed.
But then again, what should I expect? This is Slashdot. It's kind of like going to the Democratic convention and shouting "Gore sucks! Dubya forever!" I didn't really expect too many pro-Microsoft replies here.
Re:What?!? (Score:3, Insightful)
The fact that you can cite flaws in Windows security proves that Windows security is imperfect, not that Windows is less secure than Linux.
Re:sircam, code red, nimda (Score:3, Insightful)
But are installed by default.
No-one had to take any extra steps to install the indexing DLL to make themselves vulnerable to code red.
It may not be part of the core webserver, but the indexing DLL is, to all intents and purposes, part of IIS.
Re:sircam, code red, nimda (Score:3)
Re:You mean KNOWN vulnerabilities, right? (Score:4, Insightful)
While I have many bones to pick with MS, disclosure of bugs is a tentative one. On one hand, if they find a bug, don't tell anyone, fix it, then tell everyone, all in a short period of time, I'll all for it. If nobody (or very few people) knows about the exploit, the chances of me being hit by it are very small. The closed source prevents hackers from climbing all through the code and pre-emptively looking for bugs to exploit. This can be a Good Thing(tm), but it can also be a Bad Thing(tm) if MS finds an exploit, does nothing about it, and then a wily hacker exploits it.
The ability to see the Linux source does me and my dev team little or no good. We are software developers and don't have the time to run through hundreds of thousands of lines of code looking for vulnerabilities. We don't have the time to try and understand poor documentation, conflicting requirements, and other pitfalls that can strike open source. I would go out on a limb and say that the vast majority of LInux users don't climb around in the code. Who has the time?
Re:You mean KNOWN vulnerabilities, right? (Score:3)
It is not important that YOU personally do not go through the source. There are enough people who can and do that you are covered. NO ONE gets to go through M$ code except M$ people, and then, only a subset of them likely see the whole beast.
With windoze you have a bunch of blackhats looking for exploits and going for it because Windoze is 1) pervasive...one vulnerability on one windoze box is virtually assured of being useful against ALL windoze boxes, and 2) a blackhat after linux is competing against a much larger number of whitehats looking at the same code, finding the same bugs - with the whitehats releasing patches as soon as the problem is found. You could wait months to years before M$ "accepts" that a problem exists, realises that it really is their responsibility to fix it (instead of simply blaming the attacker), and releases a patch on two servers from which the whole world gets to compete to download.
Lucky for you that you do not HAVE to look at the code to search for problems...but you COULD if you wanted.
Worst Distribution has Less than W2k (Score:3, Interesting)
What is the Linux (aggr.) anyway? The individual distribution numbers don't add up to that aggregate total. Does bugtraq not even know the Linux distros?
Re:Statistics.... count the bugs in fixpacks too (Score:3, Interesting)
>
> This is not an issue of who has more issues, but whose issues get reported and publicized more.
>
Well said. The best defense to this FUD I've seen so far. Be sure that there are 100's of Microsoft employees who's only job is to figure out holes in the Linux model such that it makes Windows look better. There was the re-surgence of communism and the GPL cracks the foundation of our economy to name 2 off the top of my head.
The Microsoft model is to hide the bugs because it makes the product "look" more flawed. Having flown the BSOD flag over Redmond for the last few years shows they NEED to hide the bugs because perception is that the product IS FLAWED. Now the flag is SECURITY and they need to hide the bugs again.... Linux and opensource on the other hand, project reliability and security through openness. So like always, Microsoft uses manipulated statistics to ATTEMPT to show Windows is better. Remember in 1995 when NT sould 100% explosive growth of NT?....
Your one-liner blows the thousands of dollars spent on that report right out of the water. IMHO.
LoB
Re:Statistics.... (Score:4, Insightful)
Good point, but it would be better if you took it out of the context of the "users" and put it in the context of the developers. It works out more like this:
Open Source Project X Developer (who may well be on someone's payroll) finds a previously unknown security bug. He patches the bug and informs RedHat and other distro vendors, who then issue a security bulletin. One strike against Linux in the security count.
Meanwhile Microsoft Product Y Developer finds 100 unknown security security bugs in his big Feburary cleanup period. They are all rolled in to service pack 3. Microsoft issues a bulletin recommending all customers upgrade immediately. Zero strikes against Microsoft.
So you are counting ALL security bugs on the Linux side verus only publically reported security bugs on the Windows/Solaris/whoever side.
(Furthermore, it seems nobody considers local root exploits on Windows to be that big of a deal. I remember when RedHat put out multiple advisories for vi, joe, ed, and a bunch of other editors for a temp file vulnerability. [You'd think that "ed" would be rock solid by now...] Would that sort of thing even be considered a bug on the Windows side?)
Re:Oh, boy. Just another example... (Score:3, Informative)
No, that's not what I said.
Let's look at the methodology behind these statistics - and why it 'skews' the results.
1. Each 'bug' is treated as the same, whatever the severity.
2. The individual reports from the distros are combined to form a 'linux' category that doesn't exist in real life.
3. 'Linux' actually refers to a kernel, not the entirety of the programs included in a distribution.
4. The 'Windows' category does not include programs by MS that would need to be included to make the comparison valid vis-a-vis the programs included in the Linux distros.
5. The comparison includes 'reported' bugs. So, we're comparing reports from a host of people who do this for linux, versus a 'closed' company like MS who seems to believe in 'security through obscurity'.
As a result, even though this may not have been intentionally skewed in Microsoft's favor, it certainly gives the appearance of same.
This is why the adages about statistics exist. You can collect your numbers and publish them, but if you compare apples to oranges, your numbers are invalid by definition.
This has nothing to do with whether I use MS or Linux. In fact, I use Opera instead of IE, but if you look inside my house, you won't find an installed distro of Linux anywhere.
So you thought you saw bias and assumed it was fact. Therefore it was. Get a life yourself.
Re:wininformant.com eats its own dog food ... (Score:3, Insightful)
It has nothing to do with it being IIS or Tux or Apache or anything.
But you already knew this, and just got lucky that some zealot with moderation points fell for the Typical Windows Slam. Don't think I'm slamming you. Its not like you modded yourself up, so my beef isn't with you. It's with the Fanatics.