Chris Roberts Is the Least Important Part of the Airplane Hacking Story 200
chicksdaddy writes: Now that the news media is in full freak-out mode about whether or not security researcher Chris Roberts did or did not hack into the engine of a plane, in flight and cause it to "fly sideways," security experts say its time to take a step back from the crazy and ask what is the real import of the plane hacking. The answer: definitely not Chris Roberts. The real story that media outlets should be chasing isn't what Roberts did or didn't do on board a United flight in April, but whether there is any truth to longtime assurances from airplane makers like Boeing and Airbus that critical avionics systems aboard their aircraft are unreachable from systems accessible to passengers, the Christian Science Monitor writes. And, on that issue, Roberts' statements and the FBI's actions raise as many questions as they answer. For one: why is the FBI suddenly focused on years-old research that has long been part of the public record.
"This has been a known issue for four or five years, where a bunch of us have been stood up and pounding our chest and saying, 'This has to be fixed,' " Roberts noted. "Is there a credible threat? Is something happening? If so, they're not going to tell us," he said. Roberts isn't the only one confused by the series of events surrounding his detention in April and the revelations about his interviews with federal agents. "I would like to see a transcript (of the interviews)," said one former federal computer crimes prosecutor, speaking on condition of anonymity. "If he did what he said he did, why is he not in jail? And if he didn't do it, why is the FBI saying he did?"
"This has been a known issue for four or five years, where a bunch of us have been stood up and pounding our chest and saying, 'This has to be fixed,' " Roberts noted. "Is there a credible threat? Is something happening? If so, they're not going to tell us," he said. Roberts isn't the only one confused by the series of events surrounding his detention in April and the revelations about his interviews with federal agents. "I would like to see a transcript (of the interviews)," said one former federal computer crimes prosecutor, speaking on condition of anonymity. "If he did what he said he did, why is he not in jail? And if he didn't do it, why is the FBI saying he did?"
not the real question (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Interesting)
I doubt what the FBI is claiming is true, but you gotta market the fear somehow.
Re:not the real question (Score:4, Insightful)
I doubt what the FBI is claiming is true
of course its true, they found hair evidence and everything!
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
The FBI isn't claiming anything. The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.
Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other. The most he'd be able to do is turn on the fasten seatbelt sign.
Re:not the real question (Score:4, Informative)
The FBI isn't claiming anything.
Exactly. They are just saying what they are investigating based on claims from Roberts himself. Roberts meanwhile has been anything but clear on what he's done.
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Insightful)
It's only bullshit if Chris Roberts was actually lying. And validating it is pretty straightforward: Did the plane yaw, as was claimed? Can Chris' software cause it to happen again?
It's a pretty simple test. And as far as Chris' treatment, if he's been trying to tell people about this vulnerability and getting the cold shoulder, he's as innocent as they get and should be compensated for time served.
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Re:not the real question (Score:5, Insightful)
And I assume there are a couple of pilots on the flight who could easily verify if this was the case.
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Planes typically yaw in flight all the time, it's called dog tailing.
You mean there is a plausible explanation that doesn't involve elite hackers controlling a plane fly-by-wire from the entertainment system? I wonder why the FBI never considered that.
Re: not the real question (Score:2)
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Insightful)
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So if Roberts was telling the truth he should be charged for hacking the avionics. If he wasn't telling the truth then he should be charged with making false statements.
Though of course the FBI will want to dig up evidence either way before doing anything. Even though it's obvious the second is the case. If a plane he had caused a plane to climb the pilots would have reported that the plane initiated a climb all by itself and the FAA would be investigating and probably grounding planes or having them disabl
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
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scare people
Best Motivation ever. Slightly ahead of Procreation.
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and the media is complicit in this as well for not doing basic journalist research
Nothing new here, lol. Status quo for the past couple decades or more. But hey remember that journalists are really HISTORIANS...
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"all Roberts is NOT claiming is that he didn't cause an actual plane to move in any direction, send commands to the plane etc."
Let's see. Parsing double negative, so "Roberts claiming he did cause an actual pl
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If he wasn't telling the truth then he should be charged with making false statements.
You're so right. But why stop there? Not only he should be charged for making false statements, everyone who writes something false on the Internet should be charged!
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Because writing something on he internet is not talking with government agents and hence does not fall under https://www.law.cornell.edu/us... [cornell.edu]
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.
It's not illegal to be "able" to hack something. A crime is an illegal act, done at a specific time and place. You can't charge someone with having killed "someone" unless you name that someone. You can't even charge them if you have a name of the murdered, unless you have a time and place named.
You can get a warrant for someone "able" to do it, and they did. If they arrested him, the charge should specify what he did that was illegal, and when and where it happened. I haven't seen a pic of the actual arrest paperwork, but the media stated it was for hacking a specific flight. This means that the media reports are that he was arrested for actually having caused a flight-path diversion mid-flight by controlling (at least part of) the flight control systems from his passenger seat.
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You can't charge someone with having killed "someone" unless you name that someone.
Eh, I'm pretty sure you can. Here's one such case [baltimoresun.com]
You can't even charge them if you have a name of the murdered, unless you have a time and place named.
Again, that seems pretty unlikely.
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Again, that seems pretty unlikely.
Sure, it seems pretty unlikely, but that's how it works. That was one of the delays with Hans Reiser. They "knew" he did it, but if they named a time, and they were wrong and he could alibi our for it, they'd never get a conviction. That's why they took so long, so they could narrow down the crime so they charged him with the right one the first time, or a murder could walk.
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Nope. She was named, as Jane Doe.
Which is not her name. Well, it might be, but it almost certainly isn't.
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You can't charge someone with having killed "someone" unless you name that someone.
Also, would not that someone have to be proven to be dead? The FBI claims that Roberts caused a plane to move in a manner that resulted from his actions. If someone can show the movement was in fact because of pilot action, or from wind, then there is no crime. Right?
Re:not the real question (Score:4, Insightful)
Hacking doesn't have to have an effect, though. It's not a crime to make a plane divert. It's illegal to try, whether or not you succeed. So that's different.
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Really? Who was he working with? Nothing about it in TFA either.
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Insightful)
Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other.
What are your qualifications to be able to say so?
The systems should be separate. There should be no way to hack into avionics. That doesn't necessarily make it so.
If you really do know, then great, I am more informed than I was previously was.
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Interesting)
The systems are completely, physically separate.
Considering that both the Avionics systems and the in flight entertainment systems are both able to reach the SATCOM radios, I'm not sure this assertion is true.
I've spent a great deal of my career working on avionics systems and did work on early Ethernet implementations in the late 90's, well before ARINC came up with AFDX/664 standards. Back then we restricted Ethernet to single point to single point dedicated channels with no switching or routing of any kind. The first vague ideas of having an in-flight entertainment network were starting to form. But at the time, it was just high level R&D.
From what I've been able to piece together is that Chris Roberts bought an under-seat device and hooked up something in his basement for proof-of-concept attacks into the avionics network. But without all of the rest of the equipment, he had to build up his system with commercial grade equipment. And that's where his "hacking the engine controls" story falls apart. Sure, he may have been able to get a specifically formatted packet through the IFE network and send it out the port that connects to the rest of the plane. And with his generic Ethernet switches, he may have been able to get that packet through to where he thought the engine control computer was. But his model is flawed.
AFDX/ARINC 664 is an entire structure built on top of the physical layer of Ethernet. While it may use Ethernet frames to pass the data, there's a ton of bandwidth management and strict routing management built on top of it. Assuming for the sake of argument that the avionics network was indeed set up correctly, there's no way an engine control packet coming from the IFE network would be routed. The filters would see that the IFE port isn't authorized to send that data and it would be dropped, perhaps with an error log of some kind. The only thing the IFE network should be able to talk to is the SATCOM radio and only within very specific parameters. There's no way a properly set up avionics network is vulnerable to an attack like this.
Of course, that begs the question. Did they set up their avionics network correctly? It's highly likely that they did, but I'm not going to say with 100% certainty that there are absolutely zero vulnerabilities. Suffice it to say, I'm extremely skeptical of Roberts' claims. But I will stop short of saying that he is, without question, full of it.
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Re:not the real question (Score:4, Informative)
I've been to Roberts' lectures. There is a piece of information that he talks about but is left out his slide deck and other documentation that is missing in the media reports. That piece is the actual vulnerability itself.
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Great post.
From the WIKI page on afdx, it appears that AFDX expects all systems are physically connected together, but logically separated by routing tables in the switches. The logical separation seems fairly simple, so maybe it is not hackable. But 'maybe' is not a good word to have to use for this sort of thing. Without more info, it seems impossible to say. This really makes Airbus saying 'naturally' we don't discuss this stuff counterproductive.
The question is, from where he was able to connect, ca
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Perhaps he setup a test system in his basement with normal Ethernet switches and was able to do something interesting that would not have worked in the air with real AFDX switches?
That's where the uncertainty comes in. Near as I can tell, it's "very unlikely" that what he built could hack an actual plane. But I can't say with 100% certainty that he hasn't found a weakness that can be exploited. I doubt he has. But it is theoretically possible.
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If that's the case, I'd assert that it's even less likely he was able to hack in.
I've written more than my share of ARINC 429 drivers and code that uses them. Hacking into a box at one end of a 429 connection so you can pass the data you want is significantly harder, especially in older aircraft which use more primitive operating systems (if they use an operating system at all). It's not like they're running off-the-shelf Linux with everything enabled. If they have a full operating system it will be some
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Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other. The most he'd be able to do is turn on the fasten seatbelt sign.
Is the in-flight entertainmeny system able to show that world map with the cute little plane that indicates the planes position?
I doubt they have someone copying the updeted position from the avionics system to a USB-stick, unplug it from there and plug it into the entertainment system to update position data every few seconds...
There goes your "completly, physically seperate".
Heck yeah, it's trivial to make such a connection reliably one-way only, but even then, "physically seperate" would be an outright l
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The best way to do that is using an opto-isolator connecting an RS-232 Tx from the avionics to an Rx on the entertainment system and push data across with no return path.
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But surely at a major demarcation like critical network and barely secured passenger entertainment, that measure is still warranted. There is simply no reason the engine controller will ever be interested in how many people are reading buzzfeed or what the in-flight movie is.
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Giving the benefit of doubt, that has probably been done here. But then, "connected by a opto-isolator" is NOT "physically seperate". Claims like these cross the line from "dumbed down to wrong" to "obvious BS" when they go like "practically physically seperate"
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The risk would be that the little airplane icon and the ETA on the passenger monitors might be wrong. That seems like a small risk to be assured that the critical systems are safe from hacking.
Re:Two radios? (Score:4, Informative)
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If you don't have to have two separate GPS units, you're not going to have them on the plane.
You don't need four engines on a plane, and they weigh slightly more than a simple GPS receiver...
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You don't need four engines on a plane, and they weigh slightly more than a simple GPS receiver...
Which is why the current iteration of the Boeing 747 and the A380 may be the last four engined airliners.
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Weight (still an issue), size and power.
And why should they? There are more dangerous things about flying than feeding a NMEA stream from one system into the other through, let's say, a serial connection that has Rx cut.
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
According to Bruce Schneier they're not physically separated: "Newer planes such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus A350 and A380 have a single network that is used both by pilots to fly the plane and passengers for their Wi-Fi connections."
See also Figure 4 of this GAO report: http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/669627.pdf. There's a firewall protecting the command-and-control avionics from the passenger's network. Both the avionics systems and the passenger network utilize the same egress to the ground. Per the report: "Firewalls protect avionics systems located in the cockpit from intrusion by cabin system users, such as passengers who use in-flight entertainment services onboard."
Older planes had physically separate networks. Newer ones, not so much. Of course, maybe the security is bullet-proof. Doubtless there are access controls at the ethernet layer much more sophisticated than your standard network. And it'd be very surprised if Chris Roberts wasn't lying or grossly exaggerating. But regardless the systems are _not_ physically separate.
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The FBI isn't claiming anything. The affidavit simply states that Chris Roberts told the FBI agents he was able to hack the avionics of the plane.
This is the part I'm most interested in. Did Chris really say these things or did the FBI want to hear a specific narrative and perhaps twist or misunderstand his remarks about what he believes is possible into "something he did"?
Chris isn't talking and I'm disinclined to accept FBI statements at face value. I will be very interested in hearing Chris's account of what he actually said to the FBI.
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The FBI got an actual warrant. mere capability isn't enough to get one of those. They have to allege that an actual crime has actually happened or is in planning. That crime (naturally) has to be possible. Further, they must show good reason to believe that the subject of the search is involved.
Pie in the sky hypotheticals don't cut it.
That doesn't mean it is actually possible, but it means either the FBI sincerely believes it is or that they are knowingly abusing their authority harassing an innocent citiz
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Frankly, it's complete bullshit. The systems are completely, physically separate. There is no way to hack the thrust from the in-flight entertainment system because they are not connected to each other.
Let's go to the actual claim he made which was recorded by the tech media, long before he was arrested for his tweet.
He claims he was able to hack the simulator of a plane to access the thrust (not a real plane mind you, the simulator of a plane). Is the simulator as good and as realistic as he claims it to be? or not?
Since you seem to be an expert yourself on this subject, please tell us. Are the electronics of the simulator he used a good replica of the electronics found on an actual plane? Or did the guy
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That's the sane thing, but then again the sane thing would be to not have a single Automatic Teller Machine connected to the internet.
Are you certain that the systems are on networks with an air gap? Are you certain that stupid shortcuts (such as I've seen in POS machines and other stuff that should never be so vunerable as they are) have not been taken? While it should be the case that the systems are completely, physically s
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Other than the 777, the avionics of a plane do not use TCP/IP and therefore cannot communicate with a PC without a special adapter plugged directly into the avionics.
Awesome seminar, but the speaker did bring up the potential in the future if airplane builders were not careful.
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For Troubleshooting (Semi sarcastic)
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Funny)
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No. It's the hero's geeky friend who hacks into the system which buys time for the well muscled hero to overpower the generic olive skinned hijackers (who are armed with machine guns that they somehow smuggled on board) with his bare hands and whatever he finds lying around.
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Interesting)
Name 1 reason an active port under an uncontrollable passengers seat needs to have access to avionics or any critical system?
History. As was pointed our to me in an earlier discussion on this topic, bean counters might have played a role in consolidating ALL electronic systems in an aircraft, thus tying its avionics with its in-flight entertainment systems.
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Name 1 reason an active port under an uncontrollable passengers seat needs to have access to avionics or any critical system?
History. As was pointed our to me in an earlier discussion on this topic, bean counters might have played a role in consolidating ALL electronic systems in an aircraft, thus tying its avionics with its in-flight entertainment systems.
There's no way any designer would mix a Safety Critical System with a Non-Safety Critical System, no matter what the cost "benefits" might appear to be...
DO-254 requires an astronomical (ha!) amount of verification and hence effort/cost. The physical segregation of Safety Critical Systems from Non-Safety Critical Systems is essential to reduce complexity, improve predictability and decrease verification costs. Keep in mind that the verification of these systems costs 100x what it does to design and implemen
Re:not the real question (Score:4, Informative)
This, right here.
Seriously - entertainment and flight controls on subnets that are reachable from each other? What the hell was the engineering team drinking/snorting/smoking/shooting that day?
I'm thinking that due to the lack of an emergency TCTO* , and lack of any corroborating evidence (seriously, you'd think a pilot would notify *somebody* if his airplane did something way out of the ordinary like that, even if to report bad wind turbulence/shear/whatever as a warning to ATC and other pilots in the same path)?
Yeah... not so sure the FBI's assertion holds that much water. Awaiting more evidence and/or corroboration on that one.
* Time Compliance Technical Order - at least that's what the USAF used to call it. Dunno what they call it nowadays in the civilian world.
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* Time Compliance Technical Order - at least that's what the USAF used to call it. Dunno what they call it nowadays in the civilian world.
The FAA calls them ADs, or Airworthiness Directives... You must comply with them for the aircraft's Airworthiness Certificate to remain valid.
An Emergency AD can be issued that takes effect right away, which is how the FAA often will "ground planes until they are fixed".
Re:not the real question (Score:5, Informative)
The corresponding FAA term is "Airworthiness Directive" (AD). An AD is a very big deal.
The in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems receive navigation data from the flight deck computers so they can display the moving maps and other stuff on the entertainment displays, for those passengers who want to know "where am I", "are we there yet", "is it time to reset my watch because we've crossed a time zone and I'm trying to adjust my body clock".
I would be shocked to learn that Boeing allowed the IFE to put ANY kind of data into the flight deck computers. I'd actually expect Boeing to use a one-way interface, one that transmits but does not receive: think RS-232 with one of the pins removed. I'd be almost as shocked to learn that Airbus did something like that. However, Airbus's comment about "firewalls" does not exactly inspire me to confidence in their airplanes.
There's something else. If Mr. Roberts did in fact do what the FBI claimed he said he did, I would have expected the air up in the cockpit to have turned very blue, as the pilots said (screamed, actually) something along the lines of what the Apollo 8 crew said (screamed, actually) when their CSM did an uncommanded thruster burn. I would further expected them to take manual control immediately, get on the radio immediately, declare an emergency because of the uncommanded engine power setting change, and land at the nearest airstrip that could handle the airplane. I would further expect maintenance crews to pull the flight data recorders to find out WTF just happened.
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The in-flight entertainment (IFE) systems receive navigation data from the flight deck computers so they can display the moving maps and other stuff on the entertainment displays, for those passengers who want to know "where am I", "are we there yet", "is it time to reset my watch because we've crossed a time zone and I'm trying to adjust my body clock".
I would be shocked to learn that Boeing allowed the IFE to put ANY kind of data into the flight deck computers. I'd actually expect Boeing to use a one-way interface, one that transmits but does not receive: think RS-232 with one of the pins removed. I'd be almost as shocked to learn that Airbus did something like that. However, Airbus's comment about "firewalls" does not exactly inspire me to confidence in their airplanes.
That is the concerning part.
Are the systems accessible in the cabin physically and electrically isolated from all other systems from the plane? I don't think so. I think they are connected. And I think they are more connected that the companies prefer to admit.
First, are the systems physically connected? My money is on 'yes', because of the very reasons you listed. The IFEs are able to get data from SOMEWHERE, the question is where that is coming from. In computer hardware it is extremely rare to make
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Maybe a stupid question, but can't you modify the port driver/settings to broadcast data on the RX pin for most systems?
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if what the FBI is claiming is true
It's not. They stopped bothering to pretend.
Federal Equivelent... (Score:2)
It's the Federal equivalent of, "I smell marijuana, I need to search your car."
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Hmmm... (Score:5, Insightful)
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I wonder how this will affect SC? (Score:4, Funny)
Boeing Engineers... (Score:3, Informative)
I have talked to Boeing Engineers about this in the past. They say that (both with present systems and new all IP based systems) there is a total physical and logical separation between the three types of networks on a plane (basically, pilot command and control, airplane maintenance networking, and passenger facing networking). They were pretty firm on this separation being inviolable, due to the obvious safety aspects. Either Chris Roberts is blowing smoke, or some pretty smart people made some pretty basic mistakes.
Re:Boeing Engineers... (Score:5, Informative)
Logical? Yes. Physical? No.
Speaking as someone who worked for a Boeing subcontractor who designed their on board computers, I can tell you that there is a physical connection. There's only one set of SATCOM radios on board. The avionics systems use it for some of their communications and have for a long time. The airlines wanted to monetize the extra bandwidth by selling access to the passengers for a price. I am told they didn't add a second set of radios to provide bandwidth to the passengers.
So at the very least, there is a switch that connects the avionics network, the in flight entertainment network, and the SATCOM radios. And while this is a physical connection, there is a fair amount of confidence that it's still a logical separation. The AFDX/ARINC 664 standard is pretty extensive and allows for very strict connection management. While Roberts may have been able to get a packet out of the IFE network and have it look like an engine control message, there's very little chance that packet would make it anywhere close to the engine control computer. Of course, that assumes that the avionics network was set up correctly. And that's a pretty good assumption given the safety requirements in place for avionics design. Still, there's that one in a million shot that there is an exploitable flaw. It's probably less chance than that, but it's not guaranteed to be zero.
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I suspect the truth is the following: he was able to hack flight control from the passenger connection in the simulation, because the security wasn't there or wasn't setup the same in the simulation. He says he hacked a simulation, not a real plane, so this seems like the most likely explanation - though as you say, it's always possible there's an exploitable flaw.
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Specifically, I suspect he set up his basement simulator with a regular commercial ethernet router standing in for a real ARINC 664 / AFDX router. An ethernet router will route AFDX packets just fine, since they look the same, but it will also pass malformed packets, packets that are not in the ICD, and packets that are sent at the wrong time. A real AFDX router has a table of every packet that's allowed on the network, along with the specific times when these packets are to be sent, and it drops any nonc
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Still, there's that one in a million shot that there is an exploitable flaw.
Of course, it's certainly much better odds than that if you're running a network simulation and have several ?'s on the topo for things running proprietary protocols you likely know not much about.
Is there a logical separation at the switch? Sounds likely. What about the switch, does it have an admin login/password? If that switch is crackable, then the logical separation of the network is hosed.
There's still the matter of crafting those packets so they are heard, and while I have little idea how to do it
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Re:Boeing Engineers... (Score:5, Insightful)
Except that Boeing asked the FAA for a Special Condition [cryptome.info] to allow just such an interconnection.
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Except that Boeing asked the FAA for a Special Condition [cryptome.info] to allow just such an interconnection.
Which was granted: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/granu... [gpo.gov]
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They implemented filtering on the evil bit.
Sounds like a bad translation (Score:5, Funny)
"Stop: Fly sideways!" [tntmagazine.com]
More to the point... (Score:2)
"If he did what he said he did, why is he not in jail?
Because, contrary to some opinions, America is not yet a police state, and they still like to have silly things like trials.
And if he didn't do it, why is the FBI saying he did?"
A better question would be "why isn't he saying he didn't?"
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So you advocate for that police state where anyone arrested is obviously guilty unless they prove otherwise.
It doesn't matter why Roberts said what he said because he's not guilty of anything until he's convicted of it. He could be a blow hard, he could be a braggart, or quite simply the FBI could be taking statements out of context as Roberts has already claimed. None of it is relevant until he's charged and tried for the crime and I don't see him
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So you advocate for that police state where anyone arrested is obviously guilty unless they prove otherwise.
No, I don't, and I've never said he's obviously guilty. I'm not in a court of law. I'm not going to be on the jury. I'm allowed to express my opinion that it's a little bit suspicious that he's taken the opportunity to state it's "out of context" without stating "I didn't do it."
And they are a people with the knowledge, not the FBI and not Roberts.
Blowhard or not, I'm pretty sure Roberts is the one who knows better than anyone else whether or not he did this.
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A better question would be "why isn't he saying he didn't?"
Because the best thing you can do after being arrested is to shut the fuck up and not say anything else.
There is absolutely no upside to saying *anything* else at that point.
Besides, what would be the point of releasing a statement saying "I didn't do it."? Unlikely to sway the FBI and if you elaborate they may find something else to tag you with.
Cost vs Time vs Profit (Score:2)
I would not be surprise that entertainment systems retrofitted onto older aircraft share subnets. Likely for battery BMS, fire safety, electrical shorts, etc.... Funny--it's actually the safety stuff!
Sure the designers would never (even a practical person wouldn't do it) tie avionics to entertainment networks, that's logical and likely easier to do to keep them separate when designing an aircraft.
But when you retro fit a 25-30yr old plane, it's possible nets cross lines due to time (i.e. competition w/newer
Proofreading (Score:2)
...take a step back from the crazy and ask what is the real import of the plane hacking.
I d'know... bears??
(In addition, that statement is actually a question.)
Never underestimate... (Score:2)
Unforeseen consequences (Score:3)
When doing security testing of any system, one must consider the possibility of unforeseen consequences. That is, while you think that your test may be harmless, you'll really never know this for sure until you perform the test. And even then, you might not know of all possible damage that was done to the system.
Just as system architects and developers make certain assumptions that may introduce vulnerabilities, a security tester may make assumptions about the consequences of their actions. The problems happen when these assumptions don't map up to reality 100%.
Yes, airplanes' computer systems should receive security testing. But to perform any sort of testing without authorization and when there are potential safety (human life) consequences is inconceivably irresponsible. Regardless of whether or not the tester suspects any damage will occur.
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Lifetime ban from commercial flights (Score:2)
Anyone who knows avionics knows he's full of shit. (Score:2)
If you see the explaination and think TL;DR read the xkcd it will explain too. But this below is why everyone is ignoring him.
Once again this is nothing more than fud. its FUD because there isn't a way for him to alter them.
He says he hacked into the actual flight controls via the onboard entertainment system. So I am going to explain how this is not on any plane outside a 787 or Airbus a-380 (both use an ethernet bus for the main connections between suites so a pers
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Just for talking about it after playing with some rig at home? That's a bit harsh.
Disapointing error (Score:2)
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I demand the immediate release of the good security guy Dread Pirate Chris Roberts!
He's not that good. He let himself get caught.
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