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Security IT

After 7 Years, MyDoom Worm Is Still Spreading 133

An anonymous reader writes "Researchers at Sophos have revealed that the MyDoom worm, which spread via email and launched denial-of-service attacks against websites belonging to SCO and Microsoft, is still spreading on the internet after more than seven years in existence. The firm suggests, tongue-in-cheek, that it would be nice if computer users updated their anti-virus software at least once every 5 years to combat the malware threat."
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After 7 Years, MyDoom Worm Is Still Spreading

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  • by Lord Byron II ( 671689 ) on Saturday June 18, 2011 @08:14AM (#36484490)

    Yes, because there's never a legitimate reason to send/receive executables. My university does this stripping crap and it's annoying as hell. They even yank out archive files. I eventually had to switch to Gmail from the university system, because I would send a colleague a zip file and they would email me back that I forgot to send an attachment (or vice-versa).

    A better option than blindly modifying emails is to look for virus signatures in the files. At least that way, you're only eliminating the things that are known to be harmful.

  • by jimicus ( 737525 ) on Saturday June 18, 2011 @08:34AM (#36484566)

    And your university is broadly doing the right thing. (Though it's wholly unnecessary to yank archives unless they contain executables, any self-respecting mail scanner will be able to read more-or-less any archival format).

    Scanning for "known-bad" things stopped being a good idea years ago. Frankly, unless you take a very hard line to block everything even remotely risky you are more-or-less guaranteeing a lot of clean-up work dealing with exploits. Every time something gets through, your staff can look forward to several hours of clearing up the resulting mess - and that's with a relatively small organisation.

    Google have the resources to effectively crowdsource much of this, and they don't have to deal with the fallout of anything that slips the net.

    What you should be doing is working with the system rather than against it - and the system should be set up to make it easy for you to do this. Services like yousendit.com are a rather more satisfactory solution for most endusers than an FTP server; I daresay a university should be able to put something similar together inhouse.

  • by LoudMusic ( 199347 ) on Saturday June 18, 2011 @09:28AM (#36484794)

    If you really want to get people to run virus scanners (without making the scanner a virus itself) you'll have to make it beneficial to the individual. Create some really fun game and buried in the EULA mention that the program does a virus sweep each time it launches.

    Either that or fight fire with fire.

  • Re:Oh, I see! (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Opportunist ( 166417 ) on Saturday June 18, 2011 @10:25AM (#36485062)

    Responsible for about 90 to 95% of all new infections.

    I'm not kidding here, when you look at the current threats, you'll notice that most do not target exploits. Why should they? There is a very good reason not to target exploits but target the big layer-8 exploit sitting in front of the machine.

    1. Exploits get fixed. Users don't.
    2. Exploits are sometimes hard to craft. It's way easier to create a "click here to see the pig dance" executable.
    3. It's easy to adapt social engineering to a new "exploit" (e.g. when a new catastrophe hits, "click here for gory details") rather than adapting an exploit to circumvent AV tools and patches.

    If you're trying to break into a machine, use the biggest security hole that no software maker can ever patch: The user. Since most blanket attempts at phishing don't care whether they hit Joe Random over there or you, it wouldn't even matter if 90% of the users were smart enough not to click, it still wouldn't warrant the additional expense of writing code to exploit a security hole in the system.

It is easier to write an incorrect program than understand a correct one.

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