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Shrinky Dinks As a Threat To National Security 257

Posted by timothy
from the silly-putty-now-public-enemy-No.-2 dept.
InflammatoryHeadlineGuy writes "What do Shrinky Dinks, credit cards and paperclips have in common? They can all be used to duplicate the keys to Medeco 'high-security' locks that protect the White House, the Pentagon, embassies, and many other sensitive locations. The attack was demonstrated at Defcon by Marc Weber Tobias and involves getting a picture of the key, then printing it out and cutting plastic to match — both credit cards and Shrinky Dinks plastic are recommended. The paperclip then pushes aside a slider deep in the keyway, while the plastic cut-out lifts the pins. They were able to open an example lock in about six seconds. The only solution seems to be to ensure that your security systems are layered, so that attackers are stopped by other means even if they manage to duplicate your keys."
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Shrinky Dinks As a Threat To National Security

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  • by daveime (1253762) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:03PM (#24541487)
    So now they'll not just confiscate my laptop when I arrive in the US, they'll also pinch my paperclips and credit cards ?
  • by MagdJTK (1275470) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:04PM (#24541493)

    While using credit cards and shrinky dink plastic is clever, is this story particularly surprising? The article states that a photo of the key in question is required. If I asked the average man on the street if it was possible to replicate a key from a photo of it if you were sufficiently determined, I'd imagine they would say yes.

    • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

      by Darkness404 (1287218)
      Exactly. Just as with a picture of a password I can get into anyone's account no matter if it is encrypted in a scheme that will take 1000000 computers with 1000 core CPUs running at 239243432 Ghz, 100000 years to break.
    • by Anonymous Coward on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:27PM (#24541707)

      My granddad was a blacksmith who taught his trade to young crims at a borstal in the 1950s. One of them showed how he could open a Yale lock in about 30 seconds. He needed whatever plastic was equivalent to a credit card way back then, and a cigarette. He could feel the piston movement and burn the height into the plastic. No photos needed. The young crims summary: "Locks is to keep honest people out, boss."

      In a sense, a moderately good lock that is all that is needed. I'd agree with the article that the objective is to remove a defense of accidentally straying. The next layer of entrapment is the real one.

      • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

        by BrokenHalo (565198)
        I used to be a blacksmith myself, and I never needed a credit card. My tool of choice was a ground-down .02-inch feeler-gauge (you can get one from any DIY car maintenance shop) and a screwdriver (to do the work of turning the barrel).
    • by antirelic (1030688) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @10:16PM (#24541995) Journal

      Any single defensive measure on its own is irrelevant. This was proven very clearly during the early days of WWII when the Volkesgrenadiers over ran the impressive, but unmanned defensive positions in Belgium. The same principles of security hold true today as they did 50 years ago. Any defensive mechanism that is not reinforced via a secondary defensive measure is easily defeated.

      The real story is this is story worth discussing.

    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      by Lemming Mark (849014)
      Yes, it's not entirely surprising. However, it is a little surprising since this is a rather expensive high security lock with a more complicated key. I guess you could reasonably hope you'd at least need physical access to a key to a high security lock in order to copy it successfully, rather than just seeing it long enough to snap a picture. I understood that for at least some of the locks there was a key control system that meant that simply copying the strangely-shaped teeth of the key was not enough
      • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

        by jd (1658)

        Medieval thief-proof locks could not have been beaten by simply copying the key, because you needed to know the specifics of how to use the key. (It deadlocked itself if you used the key in a "normal" fashion.) It is easy to imagine that a modern lock could be made vastly superior to a medieval one. (Doctor Who fans may be familiar with the boast that there are 600 ways to use the TARDIS key and 599 ways to cause the lock to fuse solid, a somewhat dramatic reference to the idea that you can make locks that

        • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

          by Dun Malg (230075)

          It would be trivial to extend the car key method by...adding a capacitor whose value must be matched, and so on.

          Nah, that's a dead end. GM did that already years ago with their VATS keys, only with a resistor (more reliable than a capacitor). Big pain in the ass, for very little additional security. Sealed transponder modules have completely superseded them, as they provide greater variation (unique IDs vs. only 15 resistance values), they can't be read with a $2 multi-meter, and they aren't dependent on flaky physical contacts to be read.

    • It should be noted that one of the major selling points of the Medeco locks is that, through some mixture of technological and legal means, Medeco is quite aggressive about restricting access to key duplication blanks. It isn't a giant surprise that a sufficiently good picture can be turned into a key; but it is relevant when one of the major features of this type of lock was good key management.
      • by Dun Malg (230075) on Sunday August 10, 2008 @12:56AM (#24542901) Homepage

        It should be noted that one of the major selling points of the Medeco locks is that, through some mixture of technological and legal means, Medeco is quite aggressive about restricting access to key duplication blanks.

        Of course, their aggressive protection of their patented key blanks is about marketing more than anything else. They are the sole legal supplier of keys to their locks*, so they therefore reap profit every time someone needs another key. The only selling point of their high priced and inconvenient to procure patented keys is the natural control this restricted access creates. They've managed to sell this access with very slick marketing which conveniently glosses over many important security issues. But then again, their business is only to sell locks, and they do it very well. The mechanical quality of their stuff is high as well, so you at least get a quality product for the price.

        * You can buy 3rd party blanks now for the old Sky, Air, and the newer Biaxial keyways. They're always looking for one more mechanical "kink" to add to the system to justify the next patent. Skay and Air were patented on the strength of the rotating pin concept. Biaxial was patented via making the cuts staggered either for or aft on the key. The latest M3 is patented on a step on the blank that pushes a silly little "anti pick" pin near the back. Seems to me they're running out of ideas.

    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      by CityZen (464761)

      You are missing the point a little bit. The locks in question are not ordinary locks. They are very expensive, high-security locks, like you might find in a secure government installation. The keys are not cut in an ordinary way; the ridges have different angles on them in order to turn the pins to the left or right as they are raised to the correct height. The company in question is saying that this kind of bypass is not possible. And guess what? It is.

      It just goes to show: you should never completel

    • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

      by Z00L00K (682162)

      Personally I would say that a purely mechanical key is insufficient in a high-security building.

      It would be necessary to also have electronic support in the same way as the immobilizer in cars works so that the lock refuses to open whenever an unaccepted key is used. And even if possible also sound an alarm and keep the forged key in the lock, which will then be considered evidence.

      If I have legitimate business and the key is kept by the lock I shouldn't be worried when Secret Service shows up to resolve th

    • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

      by Kijori (897770)

      Not only that - the technique seems overly simplistic and rather optimistic.

      The M3 has three high security features:
      1) Sidebar. This means that the peaks on the key are milled at an angle and rotate the pins as well as lifting them
      2) Slider. This is like a long, horizontal pin that must be depressed.
      3) Key control.

      The third of these - key control - is not relevant to the feasability of duplicating the key.

      The slider is the weaker security measure. Its main use is in preventing M3 keys being duplicated on st

  • by narcberry (1328009) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:04PM (#24541503) Journal

    OMFG!

  • the actual threath (Score:3, Insightful)

    by fractic (1178341) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:05PM (#24541511)
    Now what is the actual threath? Shrinky dink or easily duplicated keys?
    • by Tycho (11893)

      The real threat is credit cards. And in so many more ways than you might think.

    • by cheater512 (783349) <nick@nickstallman.net> on Saturday August 09, 2008 @10:12PM (#24541971) Homepage

      Shrinky dink of course!
      It must be banned to protect national security!
      Visa cards as well.

      Hmm a idea.

      I am a Visa card confiscator from the NSA. Can I please have your card?

    • by Secrity (742221)
      Digital cameras and printers are the real threats. If they didn't have digital cameras they would have to take the film to Wall-Mart to get it developed and the photo lab techs will notify law enforcement if they see somebody with pictures of Medeco keys.
      • by Dun Malg (230075)

        Digital cameras and printers are the real threats. If they didn't have digital cameras they would have to take the film to Wall-Mart to get it developed and the photo lab techs will notify law enforcement if they see somebody with pictures of Medeco keys.

        Please. Unless the keys were being held by naked kids, the film techs at Wal-Mart couldn't give two shits.

    • the actual threath
      Now what is the actual threath?

      People who don't realize when they're intoxicated?

  • 3-d printers? (Score:5, Interesting)

    by LM741N (258038) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:05PM (#24541513)

    I bet those new 3-D type printers could perform the same thing without using razor blades and such. In fact, you could probably make a computer program to transfer from images to the final "printout."

    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by tshetter (854143)
      The interesting part is that you dont need very high quality scans or multiple images of an object to replicate the object in 3D.

      You only need a fairly good image of a Medeco key and you can then cut a blank easily.

      These Medeco keys are just like normal house/car keys, except they have variable slopes and spacing between peaks and troughs. Trying to cut those with normal tools would be very hard...but having a scale image to cut with an exacto knife is simple as pie.

      The hardest thing about coping t
    • Re:3-d printers? (Score:5, Informative)

      by pimpimpim (811140) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:42PM (#24541815)
      3D printers create by default quite brittle objects, as it is lots of little dots of plastic glued together. To get a resistant plastic copy you should make a mold and then compress plastic inside of it. The forces on a key when turning can be quite high, that's why also thin sheet metal doesn't work here. Credit cards however can resist bending forces quite well. I've never seen a shrinky dink but I guess it's the same story.
      • by Legion303 (97901)

        No, GP's post was very interesting. If a 3D scanner-fab unit churned out a copy, the plug could be easily turned with a tension wrench.

      • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

        by icegreentea (974342)
        The credit card just raises the tumblers. You still need a torsion wrench (a screw driver will do) to turn the lock.
  • Or are there others seeing the humor in finding out the Whitehouse and Pentagon are protected by such easily defeated locks?

    Layered security indeed! I bet that had to put shivers down the spine of some security people. I wonder what the budget is for locks at the Whitehouse?

    There is nothing like a good idea that is too trusted. Ex: Where I work, the IT guys thought it smart to map a couple of drives for everyone (against my better judgment) and guess what found it's way across those drive mappings? Yep, a v

    • Re:Is it just me (Score:5, Insightful)

      by Dachannien (617929) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:23PM (#24541667)

      Layered security indeed!

      Maybe these locks aren't all that, but it's the Secret Service agents capping you in the head that you really have to worry about.

      • You see it with virtual security all the time: People around here (and other sites) seem to think that perfect security is achievable. They believe you can make a system that is perfectly unbreakable, no matter what. Now maybe in the virtual world that is a theoretical possibility, though a practical impossibility, but those of us who deal with physical security know it is impossible, even in theory. I mean I've never seen a lock, no matter what kind, that will stand up to a sufficiently large shaped charge

    • by Macrat (638047)

      Virus?

      You mean you allow Windows?

      Who does that anymore?

  • by Nymz (905908) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:06PM (#24541523) Journal
    I suppose if I had a picture of someone's login and password, I might be able to deftly hack into their computer.
    • by Anonymous Coward on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:16PM (#24541599)

      Sure, if their password is *******.

      • Re: (Score:3, Funny)

        by D Ninja (825055)

        Sure, if their password is lesbian.

        Good thing none of us can see your password [bash.org]. Only you can. As long as you type in your Slashdot password into Slashdot, it will hide it from us.

        (This would have worked so much better if you weren't posting as an Anonymous Coward.)

    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      by Minwee (522556)

      And, if you had been sold an $18 billion login system that was absolutely guaranteed to be unbreakable to anyone who wasn't directly issued the original login and password, then you might be a little surprised at how easy that was.

      Which brings us back to the FA. We're not talking about a $10 lock from the hardware store here, these are "high security" locks that are supposed to have keys that cannot ever be copied unless you have the original key codes that were used to key the lock.

      • by Firehed (942385)

        Well FFS, a lot of cars these days have a little RFID tag embedded in the key's handle bit so that an unofficial copy will trip the alarm. You think Washington, DC of all places could figure out how to implement that kind of system. Maybe they don't have the budget to spend $40 and three days on a replacement key :/

      • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

        by rcw-home (122017)

        And, if you had been sold an $18 billion login system that was absolutely guaranteed to be unbreakable to anyone who wasn't directly issued the original login and password, then...

        I'd eventually be asking for my $18 billion back.

        Security professionals (and Slashdot readers) should be very familiar with two truisms: it can always be broken and it can always be copied. If you claim otherwise, you are selling something.

        I know locksmith friends who can stare at a key and read the pinning combination off of i

        • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

          by jhol13 (1087781)

          In Estonia criminals had "keys" made of titanium. With them and using just force (pins in the lock would break) they could open any car door and start the engine.

          The car manufacturers did nothing to improve the locks until there were law requiring an immobiliser.

  • my cheap microfluidics [rsc.org] project...

  • This just like how the mythbusters got past other high tech locks.

  • Not news... (Score:4, Informative)

    by russotto (537200) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:18PM (#24541623) Journal
    If you have a picture of a key, you can generally duplicate it well enough to work in metal (easier if you have a blank, but not necessary). It's not the shrinky-dink that matters. Cutting a key by sight based on a key sitting on the seat of an car is apparently a useful skill for locksmiths.
    • In other news, TWH and other places of national security are underprotected because they've not bothered to back their keys up with a secondary system, yes?

      Makes sense.

      • Where did you read that?

        • Didn't, but I think we can safely assume that if we're talking about how easy it is to hack into the place because of a single key, we're talking something that needs a secondary system of authentication (RFID in the keys? A second key? A dongle?) to secure itself.

    • by NeutronCowboy (896098) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:48PM (#24541847)

      20 years ago, my house used to have a 3D-key - in other words, it had teeth all-around its central axis. Why? Because it is much harder to manipulate the tumblers that way. Not to mention that just photocopying the key won't work - or won't work as easily.

      I'm surprised a high-security key has its teeth still on a line.

    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by iceyone (123598)

      It *is* the shrinky dink that matters. You can't cut a duplicate Medeco key in metal. Medeco key teeth have an angular component. They are 3 dimensional keys, whereas your usual kwikset or schlage lock are 2 dimensional.

      The tumblers in a Medeco lock require some rotation to unlock, as well as vertical lift. That's why this hack is so clever - the shrinky dink or plastic can twist as you jam them into the lock and push up with the backing spline.

      Until this, Medeco locks were considered to be uncrackable.

      • Re:Not news... (Score:5, Insightful)

        by russotto (537200) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @10:01PM (#24541915) Journal

        Of course you can duplicate a Medeco key in metal; Medeco keys are made of metal in the first place. Key control means you can't get the proper blanks from any legitimate source, but it's still a fairly simple hunk of metal.

        Medeco locks were never considered "uncrackable". Medeco has claimed they're unpickable, but I think only the Biaxial remains unpicked. But picking is an attack that doesn't require knowledge of the key.

  • Silly me, I thought that men with guns protect the White House.
  • by mikesd81 (518581) <mikesd1&verizon,net> on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:34PM (#24541745) Homepage
    Brad Blog has this story [bradblog.com] from when Diebold had a picture of their key on their corporate website back in January 2007. Diebold's since replaced the picture. There's a video of the key in action @ the link I just posted.
  • if they are so easy to break, then the threat is the security people that choose it for so critical places.
  • BFD (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Dun Malg (230075) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:51PM (#24541869) Homepage
    Shrinky dinks? Paper clips? Gimme a break. I can duplicate a Medeco key blank with a piece of brass stock and a dremel tool, then cut a perfect key from a photocopy using my HPC Blitz [hpcworld.com]. There's nothing amazing about what this guy's done. Given the appropriate information (cut depths and angles) any medeco key can be duplicated without serious difficulty. Heck, that's the case with all mechanical key locks. I once showed the Medeco rep who came to my lock shop how I could duplicate a standard G3 Biaxial key using a slightly modified commonly available Rolls Royce key blank. He was understandably dismayed, but not surprised. There are two kinds of locksmiths in this world: 1) the kind like the guy quoted in the article who said "Your locksmith will tell you this is impossible", and 2) guys like me who will tell you "yeah, someone could make a key to that--- I've done it myself". Point is, you want to use a locksmith more like 2) than 1). The first guy will feed you the standard Medeco marketing bullshit about how "only we can make your keys" and convince you that equals security. The second guy will tell you key control is useful, but it's not relevant beyond its obvious purpose. There are really only two kinds of common break-ins: inside jobs and random burglaries. In the case of inside jobs, all the key control in the world won't matter because the perp has a key already. This key could have been given to them, taken out of a desk drawer, or otherwise acquired via lax internal key management. This makes up 99% of all break ins. The other 1% is burglaries by random opportunist perps taking advantage of a weakness, usually on the spur of the moment. Back doors propped open by people out for a smoke, simply walking in during business hours wearing a suit, etc. All this spy crap people have in their heads about about burglars picking locks and James Bonding into their houses is fantasy bullshit. Real burglars wait till you're not home and throw a brick through the window, or let themselves in with the key you gave the cleaning service. All this hoo-hah over making a medeco key with a credit card is total yawnsville, and if anyone thinks they can get into the white house with a shrinky dink key, they're totally on crack. The whit House has things like SECRET SERVICE AGENTS, and ALARM SYSTEMS because they know keys alone are not enough.
    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Legion303 (97901)

      "I can duplicate a Medeco key blank with a piece of brass stock and a dremel tool, then cut a perfect key from a photocopy using my HPC Blitz."

      So?

      Joe Crook can cut a Medeco bitting key out of an old grocery store coupon card and bypass the sidebar and slider in a few seconds without any need for a key machine or any particular skill. That's what the exploit is all about.

      • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

        by Dun Malg (230075)

        Joe Crook can cut a Medeco bitting key out of an old grocery store coupon card and bypass the sidebar and slider in a few seconds without any need for a key machine or any particular skill. That's what the exploit is all about.

        It requires skill, just not much. Did I say dremeling a brass blank and cutting with a Blitz requires much skill? If you don't know the operating principles of a Medeco lock, you can't do it, but that's not saying much. The only difference is that it can be done with an X-acto knife instead of an expensive key machine.

        p.s. the sidebar isn't "bypassed", the key is cut to pass it in the normal way. The slider is a silly gimmick to give them something to patent, as the patent on Biaxial blanks has run out an

    • Re:BFD (Score:5, Insightful)

      by Jeffrey Baker (6191) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @10:37PM (#24542115)
      Yeah I found it funny that the lamers in the write-up think the Pentagon is protected by Medeco locks. Sorry, no. The Pentagon is protected by men with rifles and grenades.
    • Agreed. The fact that they used a photograph of a key means that security already failed. How do you obtain a picture (to scale) of the key? You have access to the key. So the lock isn't the failure security and key control are the failures.

  • by mlts (1038732) * on Saturday August 09, 2008 @09:56PM (#24541895)

    I don't know about Medeco 3, but one lock mechanism that was out in other countries for almost four years before making it to the US which is quite pick resistant is Abloy's PROTEC cylinder.

    It uses no pins or springs, so bumping is useless. Vibrating the key isn't going to magically move the detainer disks into position. Picking it requires a different technique altogether than pin tumbler locks.

    So far, if I recall right, the best picking record for PROTEC cylinders took over 10-11 hours.

    Of course, if you want the best in anti pick protection, purchase either an Abloy or Mul-T-Lock Cliq lock. It has a pick resistant mechanical key, as well as a small chip and solenoid with a challenge/response system. If someone does make a key impression, it won't help much. However, for $500 a cylinder, its pricy.

    • by Dun Malg (230075) on Sunday August 10, 2008 @12:10AM (#24542657) Homepage

      I don't know about Medeco 3, but one lock mechanism that was out in other countries for almost four years before making it to the US which is quite pick resistant is Abloy's PROTEC cylinder.

      Trouble with those is that they're ONLY pick resistant. I can drill the face of an Abloy disc-tumbler lock, remove the sidebar, and fill the drilled hole such that no one will notice--- all in a matter of minutes. After that, the old key will still work... and so will a screwdriver. The laundry machines at the apartment I lived in years ago had Abloy PROTEC locks. I never paid for laundry, and no one ever knew the difference.

      Of course, if you want the best in anti pick protection, purchase either an Abloy or Mul-T-Lock Cliq lock. It has a pick resistant mechanical key, as well as a small chip and solenoid with a challenge/response system. If someone does make a key impression, it won't help much. However, for $500 a cylinder, its pricy.

      That's just electronic access control shrunk down to fit the size of standard key access components and hybridized with mechanical keys. Great if you want to retrofit existing mortise and rim lock installations, but then you're just trading labor cost for material cost. I'd personally go for a keyless prox card system before I'd field a system powered by batteries in the key. It's bad enough dealing with your average dodo trying to use normal locks. Can you imagine the service calls from those dodos who break their keys off because the battery in the key head is dead? Locksmith's dream (service call = money in your pocket), businessman's nightmare (service call = money down the rathole).

      I don't understand why people fixate on "pickability". Criminals just don't pick locks. I've been a locksmith since 1995 (minus a couple years when the Army decided I should be in Afghanistan), and I have never seen a case of intrusion that wasn't either a) forced entry, or b) an inside job.

      • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

        by mlts (1038732) *

        The reason why pickability (or lack therof) is important is because insurance companies will, in general, cover theft if windows are broken, doors are crowbared, or there is obvious signs of forced entry. Of course, if the person breaking in is caught, its easy to tag them with breaking and entering charges.

        If a lock is picked, other than maybe some scratches, there is no evidence, so its harder to get insurance companies to cover losses if someone picks a door or padlock. Its also a lot harder to charge

  • by lena_10326 (1100441) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @10:19PM (#24542011) Homepage

    Errrm...

    The places guys insert their shrinky dinks... crazy stuff.

  • by Anonymous Coward

    Most All door security keys cards drive a solenoid door strike .
    The pro crooks or intruders don't bother with magnetic stripe cards , electronics, , encryption etc,they buy the system and drill a hole in the right place and operate the door strike Directly with a narrow screwdriver or fashioned shorting stripe or wad of tin foil , bypassing all of the electronics and all of the security.
    Ironically , The better electronics is more precise making the drill and popping of the door solenoi

  • Not a huge threat (Score:2, Informative)

    by Sniper98G (1078397)

    This isn't the huge threat to national security that the article would have you believe. The government does not use key based lock systems to secure anything of real high priority. They use digital combination (X-09) locks to secure any information that is classified at secret level or higher. These keys are used in the white house and pentagon, but they are office keys not keys to places where someone could do dire harm to our nation.

  • by db32 (862117) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @11:17PM (#24542329) Journal
    I would hate to be the Secret Service guy that has to tell the President he can't have his Shrinky Dinks anymore.
  • Technology is rarely the true threat to security. Likewise, security is rarely the key way to keep things secure.

    The real threat is people using the toys, guns, or other tools. Yes, this is basically the "People kill people!" argument but it's true. If other nasty humans didn't want to hurt other humans security wouldn't exist.

  • by Toe, The (545098) on Saturday August 09, 2008 @11:25PM (#24542393)

    The real news I got out of this is: they still make shrinkydinks!?!

    Who knew?

    I woulda thought they woulda been classified as toxic by now...

  • by smchris (464899) on Sunday August 10, 2008 @12:54AM (#24542893)

    Kids didn't have credit cards when I was in high school but every lock in our school except the outside doors (which we could sometimes tape or the like) and the principal's office were simple spring locks. Take seconds to open any of them with a piece of plastic. We got so fluid at it we were observed once from a distance and just lied, "Hey, what do you mean? It was unlocked. We were just snooping around." and he didn't push it. Did stupid stuff like swapping teachers' home room desks on different floors or laying out chairs in the auditorium to spell out expletives. A separate group we taught unfortunately got into more hardcore vandalism.

  • Sensationalist... (Score:3, Insightful)

    by FredThompson (183335) <<moc.gnirpsdnim> <ta> <nospmohtderf>> on Sunday August 10, 2008 @09:45AM (#24545033)

    OK, so the locks have a weakness. What was the point of the statement that they're used in the White House, Pentagon, etc.? You would need access to the lock and Joe Blow ain't gettin' there. Ergo, the statement attempts to create importance where there is none.

    Try just walking up to any of the places mentioned in the OP. Can't be done. Layered security? T'ain't kiddin.!

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