Remote Exploit Discovered for OpenBSD 338
An anonymous reader writes "OpenBSD is known for its security policies, and for its boast of "only one remote exploit in over 10 years". Well, make that two, because Core Security has found a remotely exploitable buffer overflow in the OpenBSD kernel. Upgrade your firewalls as soon as possible."
Some amusing interchanges b/t OpenBSD and CoreLabs (Score:2, Interesting)
* 2007-02-20: Acknowledgement of first notification received from the OpenBSD team.
* 2007-02-21: Core sends draft advisory and proof of concept code that demonstrates remote kernel panic.
* 2007-02-26: OpenBSD team develops a fix and commits it to the HEAD branch of source tree.
* 2007-02-26: OpenBSD team communicates that the issue is specific to OpenBSD. OpenBSD no longer uses the term "vulnerability" when referring to bugs that lead to a remote denial of service attack, as opposed to bugs that lead to remote control of vulnerable systems to avoid oversimplifying ("pablumfication") the use of the term.
* 2007-02-26: Core email sent to OpenBSD team explaining that Core considers a remote denial of service a security issue and therefore does use the term "vulnerability" to refer to it and that although remote code execution could not be proved in this specific case, the possibility should not be discarded. Core requests details about the bug and if possible an analysis of why the OpenBSD team may or may not consider the bug exploitable for remote code execution.
* 2007-02-28: OpenBSD team indicates that the bug results in corruption of mbuf chains and that only IPv6 code uses that mbuf code, there is no user data in the mbuf header fields that become corrupted and it would be surprising to be able to run arbitrary code using a bug so deep in the mbuf code. The bug simply leads to corruption of the mbuf chain.
* 2007-03-05: Core develops proof of concept code that demonstrates remote code execution in the kernel context by exploiting the mbuf overflow.
* 2007-03-05: OpenBSD team notified of PoC availability.
* 2007-03-07: OpenBSD team commits fix to OpenBSD 4.0 and 3.9 source tree branches and releases a "reliability fix" notice on the project's website.
* 2007-03-08: Core sends final draft advisory to OpenBSD requesting comments and official vendor fix/patch information.
* * 2007-03-09: OpenBSD team changes notice on the project's website to "security fix" and indicates that Core's advisory should reflect the requirement of IPv6 connectivity for a successful attack from outside of the local network.
* 2007-03-12: Advisory updates with fix and workaround information and with IPv6 connectivity comments from OpenBSD team. The "vendors contacted" section of the advisory is adjusted to reflect more accurately the nature of the communications with the OpenBSD team regarding this issue.
* 2007-03-12: Workaround recommendations revisited. It is not yet conclusive that the "scrub in inet6" directive will prevent exploitation. It effectively stops the bug from triggering according to Core's tests but OpenBSD's source code inspection does not provide a clear understanding of why that happens. It could just be that the attack traffic is malformed in some other way that is not meaningful for exploiting the vulnerability (an error in the exploit code rather than an effective workaround?). The "scrub" workaround recommendation is removed from the advisory as precaution.
* 2007-03-13: Core releases this advisory.
Got owned, OpenBSD?
Advisory Timeline (Score:4, Interesting)
I'm a bit surprised that the summary didn't mention the rather interesting timeline in the Core advisory [seclists.org], which implies an attempted cover up. I don't know all the facts, so I'll let the document speak for itself:
-Fyodor
Insecure.Org [insecure.org]
Doesn't matter how good a C programmer you are (Score:2, Interesting)
I know, those who don't understand what I'm talking about will leap in and say, "Java has to run in a JVM and what language is the JVM written in? Ha! It's in C (or assembler) so it can still have buffer overflows!" This is so naive. First, the JVM runs Java code, which has no memory access. It does not run untrusted code handed to it over the net. Second, and most important, it is a very small piece of code with a rigorous definition of what it should do. It's possible to verify a small, rarely-changing bit of C code with a rigorous specification. It's not really possible to verify correctness of a huge constantly-changing C codebase, like the OpenBSD kernel and system utilities.
Anyway, trying to have a huge secure codebase in C is an exercise in futility, as OpenBSD has shown. Relative to other operating systems, OpenBSD is small and feature-poor. And their dev team must be among the best in the world for eliminating these types of bugs. And yet they still get bitten by them.
Re:Advisory Timeline (Score:5, Interesting)
Cover up? The OpenBSD team believed it was only a remote DoS vulnerability until proof of concept code was provided, and re-labeled it as such immediately.
What part seems suspicious to you?
Re:Doesn't matter how good a C programmer you are (Score:4, Interesting)
Also, it's less efficient to simply use one heap for everything. Instead, an OS kernel written in a language with automatic memory management usually maintains large blocks of memory for the various tasks to work in, like an area for packet construction, an area for I/O buffers, etc. The automatic allocator and GC are told which area to work in, and then create or delete stuff in that area as needed.
So no, it's not generally reasonable to implement the lower levels of any OS with automatic memory management. You're free to try, though.
pablumfication (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:pablumfication (Score:3, Interesting)
_In lower case, the word pablum is often used to describe anything bland, oversimplified and generally unsatisfying, especially a work of literature or speech. This usage is thought to derive from the cereal. Today, the word pablum and the original Latin word pabulum are often used interchangeably. In Canada, pablum remains as a generic reference to any instant baby cereal.
_The phrase 'pablum puking', when used in political speech, is used to describe one who seems to lack the ability to digest simple logic or common sense. For example, someone who holds forth the argument that children should be afforded the freedom to play in traffic could rightly be refered to as a 'pablum puking idiot'.
Re:Advisory Timeline (Score:1, Interesting)
Fixed in OpenBSD 4.1 (Score:3, Interesting)
Wrong... (Score:5, Interesting)
...it's roughly 5.67137278 × 10^28 IP's per person
Or, as a recent Ars article [arstechnica.com] put it (much better than I ever could):
Not enabled = not default install (Score:1, Interesting)
# 001: SECURITY FIX: March 25, 2006 All architectures
A race condition has been reported to exist in the handling by sendmail of asynchronous signals. A remote attacker may be able to execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user running sendmail, typically root. This is the second revision of this patch.
Since sendmail only listens on localhost doesn't affect slogan.
Not mention apache or bind, that must manually enabled.
Yeah, this makes the slogan a nonsense (and I use OpenBSD everyday and I really like it, every Internet faced system runs on it).
Re:WHOA WTF (Score:4, Interesting)
When was the last time a remote root exploit was found in the Linux kernel?
Re:Well done, the OpenBSD team. (Score:2, Interesting)
Other than kernel 2.0.x (10+ years ago), has Linux ever had a kernel bug that was exploitable remotely?
Re:WHOA WTF (Score:3, Interesting)
Nope. I think you meant to say: Had a local root exploit.
Re:Well done, the OpenBSD team. (Score:3, Interesting)
There (probably) was one in November 2004 (Score:4, Interesting)
OpenBSD and the security myth (Score:3, Interesting)
If you cross reference DoS attacks against OpenBSDs changelog and figure that even a small amount (say 10%) of them were remotely exploitable (which is being kind), then you have a lot of remote bugs in OpenBSD and even more in FreeBSD. The fact that the vendor doesn't call them bugs just brings images of DJB to mind, but it doesn't impact the fact that your box could get owned.
What this ultimately means is that, OpenBSD is pretty good when it comes to security, but that their party line is mostly marketing hype. I just submitted a paper to a few conferences dealing with a given bug I've found, it also affects OpenBSD (but it's not a default remote root bug for them), but what it does show is how proactively secure they are, because they copy/pasted the same section of code as everyone else and missed a very obvious bug.
Re:Advisory Timeline (Score:1, Interesting)
At least they used to. Now they are like
And in fact it may be this type of internal behavior that has led to the existance of this bug in the first place. Rather than giving them a pass, they should be crucified for this. They need to be reminded that they cannot go slack or their entire reason for being will evaporate.