Secure DNS a Hard Sell 142
ebresie writes "Computer Business Review Online has an interesting article about the lack of acceptance for Secure DNS." From the article: "Speaking during a workshop on the technology, Keith Schwalm of Good Harbor Consulting, a former US Secret Service agent, said that even the financial sector, traditional security early-adopters, are not rushing DNSsec."
Hard to understand (Score:5, Insightful)
As it is now, I have my users going to their registrars and "deleting the 'A' records because: "There is no A on my website."
Same as Sony (Score:5, Insightful)
One could have said the same thing about music CD DRM (e.g. the Sony XCP RootKit) -- or the 9/11 terrorist attacks for that matter.
There's not a problem with it -- until there's a big problem with it. Then everyone asks why wasn't something done to protect us against it?
A solution looking for a problem? (Score:4, Insightful)
We already have authentication systems. Why should DNS, which every website uses, be doing something which only a tiny fraction of websites need?
Besides -- technology can't stop phishing. A combination of education, authentication and client software that can with 100% reliability inform the user whether authentication has happened is the answer. Authentication is by far the easiest problem of the three. Education is more or less impossible, and reliably informing users is next to impossible. (In a web browser, anyway. If you let websites display images and run active content, how do you stop them fooling a user, even a well educated one? How do you guarantee it's impossible to do so?)
A Modest Proposal (Score:4, Insightful)
Money talks (Score:4, Insightful)
So in the end, economics will drive SecDNS more than anything else. It seems like a good idea though for some institutions to go to a more secure DNS format. Let's face it: Fred's House of Flowers probably doesn't need as secure a domain as Citicorp or the CIA. The Internet ends up becoming a two-level affair, with the majority of sites being regular DNS sites and corporations and such using the more secure DNS setup.
Redundant (Score:4, Insightful)
The article says:
It's possible that a web surfer could think they are visiting their bank or an auction site and hand over their sensitive data, and it would be impossible to tell they were at a malicious site.
I disagree: there is a good way to tell if that is your bank you are talking to; check that they have the proper SSL certificate for their domain. Or better yet, just look at the color of the address bar in Firefox. If your bank isn't using SSL already, there are reasons far beyond DNS that they should be!
Also, even with SecDNS in place, physical man-in-the-middle or route poisoning attacks could intercept the communication at the IP level, making SecDNS marginally useful at best. In my opinion, the proper solution would be to encourage more widespread adoption of the existing SSL cert solution for services other than HTTPS. (e.g. SMTP, POP, FTP) Also, it would be good for the industry to have some additional certificate authorities with lower certification prices added to the major browsers' default trust list.
Re:dnssec and nym ala dan (Score:1, Insightful)
You can't get it. (Score:4, Insightful)
On top of that, even if you ignore the signing of the root key, by and large you can't get ad-hoc zone signing - if you want to secure a zone, everybody who's going to see it as secure needs a copy of the zone key, because your top level domain (e.g.,
On top of that, many TLD providers seem to want signed zones to be a value-added option rather than basic functionality. So as with RSA, lo those many years ago, adoption will be slow because people want to monetize it, rather than seeing it as basic functionality that has to be there.
So it's no surprise that the end user isn't interested in it yet - they can't get it even if they are interested.
Comment removed (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:A Modest Proposal (Score:3, Insightful)
The thing is that this isn't really feasable, because you have to replace all the client software to make it work - and at that point you might as well mandate IPV6 with IPSEC.
Think about it: DNS is only as secure as its weakest link, and that link is the desktop. If your suggestion is implemented without making every desktop aware of the
Re:bigger fear (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Nice, but not necessary (Score:2, Insightful)
Those are beyond salvation and I don't think that secure DNS was developed with them in mind.
I mean, someone which will accept following an hyperlink coming on a html e-mail from somebody unknown to him that says "your.bank.of.confidence" while obviously opening a browser pointing to "your.hacker.of.the.day" won't benefit any more from using secure DNS.
Re:Nice, but not necessary (Score:4, Insightful)
But starting with a corrupted computer to begin with is a bad example anyway. The malware could simply substitute the ie.exe program for a new one that show what he want.
Re:Nice, but not necessary (Score:2, Insightful)
Why?? (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Nice, but not necessary (Score:2, Insightful)