One Laptop Per Child Security Spec Released

juwiley writes "The One Laptop Per Child project has released information about its advanced security platform called Bitfrost. Could children with a $100 laptop end up with a better security infrastructure than executives using $5000 laptops powered by Vista? 'What's deeply troubling — almost unbelievable — about [Unix style permissions] is that they've remained virtually the only real control mechanism that a user has over her personal documents today...In 1971, this might have been acceptable...We have set out to create a system that is both drastically more secure and provides drastically more usable security than any mainstream system currently on the market.'"

But what about DCOM in my ActiveX?

If my OLPC applications are completely isolated, how am I going to implement this new idea I have for cross-application communication based on shared pipes among apps.

I'm thinking it would work well to implement such a feature so that the writing widget can talk to the chat widget and the spreadsheet widget. I was planning on calling it, Dynamic Communication Over Methods, or DCOM for short.

Now I'm bummed!

Re:One Treacherous computer per Child

Are you just trolling?

If you'll RTFA (yeah, I know, no one does that...), the system can be completely disabled if the user so wishes. The purpose of the PKI is not to force someone to only use certain software; it's to help ensure that security updates haven't been compromised before getting to the laptop.

As for installing another Linux distribution, would that even be possible at present? I doubt any other distro would run properly on the OLPC's custom hardware without extensive modifications. Sure, you can argue "but they should have the freedom to break it if they want" -- and they do, as the article says. All this stuff can be disabled. Overwriting the OS should disable the anti-theft daemon, since the anti-theft system is implemented entirely in software.

I think the anti-theft provisions that turn the laptop into a brick are a bit much, but the actual spec (which I'm sure you didn't read either, as you're misquoting it) notes that the lease period can be set to any value (chosen by the country manager who distributes the laptop). A lease period of 3 months is given as an example. And in extreme circumstances, a USB drive with credentials that can be used to extend the lease period without needing access to the internet.

At any rate, the spec mentions that the anti-theft system is only installed and enabled on the request of the country purchasing the laptops. So it's not like the OLPC group is forcing this on anyone. If the countries are spending the cash on these things, I think it's reasonable that they should be able to try to protect their investment.

I have a decent number of reservations about the entire OLPC program, but c'mon, at least don't make up shit about it that isn't true.

It's worse than that, it prevents app partitioning

>> how am I going to implement this new idea I have for cross-application communication based on shared pipes among apps.

Actually, it's even worse than your funny (but accurate) comment suggests:

In the Unix model, applications are often built out of multiple cooperating processes, each of which is isolated into its own address space, with strong barriers between processes enforced by the MMU hardware. This makes each separate part more robust, more comprehensible, and more secure.

In contrast, when Bitfrost throws away the ability of programs to talk to other programs, it is intrinsically encouraging a monolithic approach to program design, which is a huge step backwards both for security and for complexity management.

Bitfrost is right to deny free access by programs to a user's filestore objects as an important part of its new security framework, but if the price for that is to disallow strong application factoring and partitioning into separate but communicating processes then the cure may be worse than the disease.

Where does it say that?

"when Bitfrost throws away the ability of programs to talk to other programs"

I read the whole article but I don't remember reading that anywhere.

I read some stuff about programs not being able to look at other program's files, but that's not the same thing at all.

I'm pretty sure OLPC uses IP, and that means sockets. If you've got sockets then you've got inter-process communication.

Unless you've got proof that OLPC doesn't have named pipes, etc. then I suspect you're pulling misinformation out of somwhere the sun don't shine.

RTFA - this is not DRM or Trusted Computing

That means that in order to execute any such programs on their OLPC, those programs are going to need to be "signed" by an "authority" before they can be executed.

Umm, NO.

If you RTFA, they specifically designed the security model so that children could write their own apps which can do *anything*. But they set up some defaults (which can be overridden) to protect the system.

What they are aiming at is a way to set sensible limits per-program, at install time:

The crux of the problem lies in the assumption that any program executing on a system on the user's behalf should have the exact same abilities and permissions as any other program executing on behalf of the same user.

So at install time, a package (they call it a bundle IIRC) has a list of specific rights that the program will need in order to do its job. If the bundle doesn't ask for a certain right at install time and tries to use it later (because, say, it was maliciously modified), it will be denied.

If an app *is* signed by OLPC, it can have any right that it specifically asks for at install time. Otherwise, there are some rules about what subsets of rights are allowable together (i.e. asking for certain rights will exclude certain others by default). But again, the whole thing can be overridden.

This is nothing like Trusted Computing or DRM. It's more like a wrapper around SELinux (I don't know if that's actually how they implemented it).

So everything is in a jail(8)...

I don't know if this is a good idea or an awesome idea.

Linux did clone the Plan 9 feature though

Our rfork() is called clone(), or unshare() if you don't need a new thread/process.

When you want a new namespace, you specify the CLONE_NEWNS flag. (root only, sorry, because of setuid concerns)

Once you have a new namespace, you can unmount things you don't need. You can do bind mounts, which let you graft directories onto other places. You can use a bind mount to make a read-only copy of something, then unmount the original... all without mucking up processes that aren't part of the same CLONE_NEWNS group. Portions of the filesystem tree can be shared as well, in case you really do want changes to appear to both sides of the CLONE_NEWNS. Access to things can be permanently given up within the CLONE_NEWNS group, making for a rather fine jail that generally beats jail(8) quite severely.

There are extra goodies for stuff like isolating the view of system time, the view of executing processes, etc.

chmod, chown, etc.?

What's deeply troubling -- almost unbelievable -- about [Unix style permissions] is that they've remained virtually the only real control mechanism that a user has over her personal documents today

I wonder if the author's used chmod, chown, etc.? What's the essential difference between Unix style permissions and other permission systems?

there's a drawback to his system: It limits interactions between applications.

It would be nice if we knew if this means copy/paste is broken. (I'm thinking not, but I've been wrong before.)

It isn't about ACLs.

It's the sandboxing. A program run by a given user doesn't automatically get the user's full permissions -- it only gets a small subset. For example, it can't open files from the user's home directory other than by calling a trusted system File Open dialog, which allows the user to select the file and returns an open file handle to the application (or in OLPC's case hardlinks the file into the chroot jail).

In terms of research projects, see the secure scripting language E [erights.org] and the proof of concept CapDesk [combex.com].

Interestingly, in the commercial world it only seems to turn up in safe bytecode runtimes -- there's very little out there for native code. For an example of something similar in concept look at JNLP [sun.com] or ClickOnce [microsoft.com] deployers.

Re:chmod, chown, etc.?

Once you do that, it isn't the traditional Unix model anymore -- it's something more like POSIX ACLs, which Linux *does* support, and which *does* provide the ability to give one group write while another has read.

I think the traditional UNIX model is too simple to call bolting on an List of names and permissions used for Access Control (in place of the user/group/mask approach) a "trivial tweak".

Re:chmod, chown, etc.?

I wonder if the author's used chmod, chown, etc.? What's the essential difference between Unix style permissions and other permission systems?

Well, Windows uses the ACL system of permissions it stole from VMS. It actually does provide more control (that you don't need 99.9% of the time), such as multiple groups having different levels of permissions.

Increasingly complex file-level security does come with one major drawback, however... I can look at a file under Linux and instantly tell (possibly with a quick check of the members of a single group) who has what access to it. Under Windows, good luck with that. XP actually has an advanced security tab, "Effective Permissions", solely for the purpose of testing what access a given user has to a file or directory. Short of that tool, some of the more complex possible configurations (which don't take any sort of unrealistically contrived setups to get, such as a combination of local and domain groups having both inherited and locally set permissions) would leave you feeling very uncomfortable guessing who has access to a given file. And of course, that tab only lets you check one user or group at a time, so it proves utterly useless in answering the simple question "Who can overwrite this file".

In fairness, you could write a script to test every user and group against a given set of files and directories and generate a report off the output, but seriously, would anyone really consider that "better" than "0750, yup, that looks good"?

Re:chmod, chown, etc.?

Yeah, because right-clicking a file or folder, selecting Properties, then choosing the confusingly labeled Security tab is difficult.

Too right it was difficult. My WinXP installation decided that a "security" tab was just too confusing so it didn't display it. There was some arcane ritual I needed to perform to enable it. The help files mostly just assumed this ritual had been performed, so they said "click on the security tab and then...", flatly contradicting what I could see (a Properties window with no security tab). There was a lot of frustration before I stumbled on the ritual.

Yes, better security...

So, I bet that my cell phone has better security than a $5000 vista laptop, but you can do stuff on that laptop that you can't on my phone. (not sure what, but i'm sure there's something porn related)

Drastic?

"drastically more secure and provides drastically more usable security"

Drastic?

I'd be willing to work toward "acceptable" or "workable".

The problem with "drastic" is that it often envisions high frontier technologies when all that is needed is a really well thought out plan.

If the UNIX system worked well for nearly 40 years, and was fairly simple to implement, then another 40 years *might* be had with something equally simple.

Re:Drastic?

I'll offer my 'well thought out plan': Real security only happens when there is a button ( with a missle-launch-type cover ) on the side of my computer, so that some tracks of disk and some banks of memory cannot be written to unless that button is pushed.

Re:Drastic?

There already is, minus the cover. Its marked "Power". You can add the cover via a case mod.

At the moment

At the moment every other OS has better security than Windows, what's new?

Getting barbaric on their @$$es

So, if someone tries to break the security, does Heimtdallr come out and kick their butts?

Origin/rationale for name

From the spec [laptop.org] linked from the article, section 11:

1227 In Norse mythology, Bifrost is the bridge which keeps mortals, inhabitants of
1228 the realm of Midgard, from venturing into Asgard, the realm of the gods. In
1229 effect, Bifrost is a powerful security system designed to keep out unwanted
1230 intruders.
1231
1232 This is not why the OLPC security platform's name is a play on the name of the
1233 mythical bridge, however. What's particularly interesting about Bifrost is a
1234 story that 12th century Icelandic historian and poet Snorri Sturluson tells in
1235 the first part of his poetics manual called the Prose Edda. Here is the
1236 relevant excerpt from the 1916 translation by Arthur Gilchrist Brodeur:
1237
1238 Then said Gangleri: "What is the way to heaven from earth?"
1239
1240 Then Harr answered, and laughed aloud: "Now, that is not wisely asked; has
1241 it not been told thee, that the gods made a bridge from earth, to heaven,
1242 called Bifrost? Thou must have seen it; it may be that ye call it rainbow.'
1243 It is of three colors, and very strong, and made with cunning and with more
1244 magic art than other works of craftsmanship. But strong as it is, yet must
1245 it be broken, when the sons of Muspell shall go forth harrying and ride it,
1246 and swim their horses over great rivers; thus they shall proceed."
1247
1248 Then said Gangleri: "To my thinking the gods did not build the bridge
1249 honestly, seeing that it could be broken, and they able to make it as they
1250 would."
1251
1252 Then Harr replied: "The gods are not deserving of reproof because of this
1253 work of skill: a good bridge is Bifrost, but nothing in this world is of
1254 such nature that it may be relied on when the sons of Muspell go
1255 a-harrying."
1256
1257 This story is quite remarkable, as it amounts to a 13th century recognition of
1258 the idea that there's no such thing as a perfect security system.

Promising if they manage to follow through

This would indeed be a nice step forward in security if they manage to complete all their principles and goals. It would be nice to have a system that I can hand out to users (or famliy members) that is basically secure out of the box but with a little reading and changing of settings I can obtain full control over. The idea that it would be open is certainly a nice boost to credibility and would, if successful, push all security forward and not just their own.

Sand dunes

The idea of putting every application into a virtual machine is a good one, but the truism is that security *is* a process, not a checkbox on a feature-list. There is (and always will be) an inverse relationship between security and usability - the more of one, the less of the other. Compartmentalising the applications in such a draconian fashion would appear to be heavily leaning towards the security side, and not the usability side of the argument.

The article talks about the picture-viewer not being able to access the web. What if I *want* the picture-viewer to access the web ?

I tihnk I take issue with 99% of applications not needing interaction. If that's true (and I doubt it to be honest), I think that's a failing of software today, not a goal to be strived for. Most of the apps I use daily require web/internet access. I think that's only going to increase over time.

Simon

Re:Sand dunes

Read more closely.

The document said that it was not possible for the application to request P_DOCUMENT_RO access and network access simultaneously during installation.

But it also said that it was perfectly OK for a user to go in and explicitly grant P_NET access via the GUI to an application with P_DOCUMENT_RO access, thereby giving you an application that is able to read your images and mass upload them to teh interweb, but only to those users who know enough to explicitly use the security interface.

Also the OLPC or local government could issue a signed XO package that offered that functionality to younger children.

More Power to Em

This really is a good idea and hopefully others will follow suit. Applications simply are not all trustworthy and the assumption that they are is a huge failing of most modern OS's. I hope they get this right. There are a lot of pieces here no one has perfected. They need restrictions, proper services between applications and to them, granular levels of trust, or ACL profiles, means of easily and accurately assigning those trust levels, and a well crafted UI for programs that want to override their trust level. Best of luck to them.

Re:More Power to Em

RTFA. This only protects "against" benign software. Intentionally malicious software has a few hurdles to jump over, but at least the app permission part requires the cooperation of the software in question. In other words: It protects against misbehaving or misappropriated software only.

Plus it's only a matter of time before the first solitaire clone ships with a "request everything available (and not conflicting with their simple limits model)" setting, because the app dev was too lazy to tie things down.

If you want a glance at that, install SELinux in non-enforcing mode and look at the log. You'll be surprised what kinds of system calls and file accesses your simple applications make that they don't really need. Much of that is just routine init stuff from some library they use, and most fails silently and with no trouble if they can't get that port or file lock they request, but still...

Umm, how's this gonna work?

We have set out to create a system that is both drastically more secure and provides drastically more usable security than any mainstream system currently on the market.'

More secure? Kind of... More usable? Ummm, no... From TFA it seems that they are securing apps by running each application in a separate VM sandbox. However, that's going to destroy usability because none of the apps will be able to talk to one another. Which sounds to me like TFA is just not digging in deep enough to what is really going on. Otherwise, they are going to be creating A LOT more work than they really need to...

Also, with such a hugely fundamental change to how applications function in the OS, what current software is going to work with it?

Say It Ain't So

Unix security and file permissions aren't enough??? Say it ain't so, Joe!

Next we'll have dogs and cats living together.

Even worse

Even the crappy POSIX-compliant NT ACL model is far superior to the standard unix WRX model. No, before you start, as it happens I loathe Microsoft in particular (and proprietary vendors in general) and use Free software wherever possible even when it's technically inferior -- as is the case with filesystem permissions, where Linux has been behind Windows since NT 3.51, 1993 IIRC. Yes I know about the various security add-ons and kernel mods, grsec, SELinux, blah blah. Doesn't change a thing.

Netware was also better in this respect whilst it was still in mainstream use, despite being more of a runtime system than a real OS.

very sceptical

Security is a lot like crypto: Designing your own system is a recipe for desaster. Security is hard, and aside from the conceptual stages, small failures in implementation can destroy the best concept.

So anyone coming up with a "new and improved" security concept is selling an untested solution. Because security is always tested in the field, never (at least never properly) in the lab.

And yes, Unix permissions are primitive. But they work, they are reliable and we know their shortcomings and limitations.

Re:very sceptical

So anyone coming up with a "new and improved" security concept is selling an untested solution.

True, but inapplicable in this case. For two reasons.

1. There are no new concepts in the XO security model.
2. The traditional security model (used by Unix and Windows) cannot work for the OLPC, so something different is required.

How can we have a new security model, but no new security model concepts? What's new is that ideas which have been reserved for high-security systems are being applied to a system that large numbers of people will actually use.

The core ideas are:

• Sandboxing, aka Mandatory Access Controls. Not only have research systems built on this concept existed for years, but we also have a decade of practical experience with Java sandboxes, and several years of extensive experience with MAC on Linux (SELinux). Specialized high-security operating systems have employed MAC for decades.
• Chroot jails. Most sysadmins who are serious about security run all Internet-facing applications in jails, to limit the damage that can be done if the app is exploited. The only difference here is that the concept is being applied to all apps.
• Digital signatures as a way to authorize applications to break out of their constrained (sandboxed and jailed) environments.
• Allowing users to authorize applications to break out of their constrained environments.
• Security by default. The system is secure out of the box.

The only innovation here is in the decision to apply these known security models/tools to all applications on the OLPC. There is some good thought that has gone into determining what kinds of restrictions can be placed on apps, and the bit about constraining the permissions that apps can request during installation (e.g. either network or file access, not both -- without digital signature or explicit user authorization) is clever, but there's nothing fundamentally new.

But the issue is somewhat deeper than that, as well.

It's important to realize that the traditional security model does not work for OLPC machines. Why? Because (1) they're specifically designed as computers whose software is highly mutable and (2) they're specifically designed to live as part of a network. The traditional model works great if you can thoroughly prove the integrity of the software on the system and then lock it down -- but you can't do that on machines that are constantly connected to others and always exchanging bits of code and data.

You can try, of course. And we do. And we've seen just how well it works. Massive botnets of zombies is the result as is high-powered machines dedicating a significant portion of their processing power to defending themselves against malicious code -- and failing.

The traditional model is fundamentally broken in the networked age, and the OLPC machines are not only networked, but designed to facilitate every user becoming an at least minimally-competent programmer and to encourage widespread, free sharing of user-developed code.

New problems require new solutions. In this case, it appears that we already had all of the tools required available, they just weren't widely used.

My prediction: The XO security model will be an outstanding success story. It'll have its problems, and it'll have to be tweaked in various ways, but the basic ideas are so good, and so fundamentally simple, that it will work very well. Application authors will be able to achieve what they want, and security will be generally quite good.

I also think that the OLPC project is one of the most amazing stories in the history of computing. It's giving a bunch of brilliant people the opportunity to completely re-imagine computing, and they're doing it with a laser focus on the needs of the people who use the computers, rather than the needs of those who sell the computers and the software.

The one major difference to MS "trusted" computing

--"No lockdown. Though in their default settings, the laptop's security
  systems may impose various prohibitions on the user's actions, there
must exist a way for these security systems to be disabled. When that is
the case, the machine will grant the user complete control."

That is the one of the key differences between Bitfrost and Microsoft
"trusted computing" schemes: you as owner of the box can get around it.

YAY for Free Software

If it's good, then I'll probably see it in my Kubuntu in about a year and half (8.10 Irrepressible Iguana). See, this is what I like about free software. Borrow the good ideas from each other.

A Stink-Rose by any other name...

From TFA
"Beyond cyberthreats, the XO laptop will have an anti-theft system designed to render stolen laptops useless. Each XO is assigned a "lease," secured by cryptography, that allows it to operate for a limited period of time. The laptop connects to the internet daily and checks in with a country-specific server to see if it's been reported stolen. If not, the lease is extended another few weeks."

Congratulations, you have destroyed this projects credibility, desirability and much of the good will that the open source community was providing.

I wonder this would rule out any interaction with the GPL v3?

People pay $5,000 for laptops?

What do they imagine they're getting for that? Yeah yeah, I know, it's the status symbol of being able to blow $5,000 on a bit of $600 hardware.

 

It's not hard to do this. Just not compatible.

It's not hard to do this. Several groups had systems this tight working back in the 1980s. For that matter, Multics had it right in the late 1960s. Linux has it now, in NSA SELinux.

It breaks existing applications, of course. The OLPC people have a huge advantage - they don't care about existing applications. They can say to application developers, "these are the security constraints - design to them." That's a huge win.

Somebody should have done this by now for phones and palmtops, but, unfortunately, those things started out so underpowered they barely had an operating system. So they have their own legacy problems.

Re:It's not hard to do this. Just not compatible.

To my knowledge SELinux implements MAC (Mandatory Access Control). That is not necessarily the same thing as a virtual machine per application. Pick up a book on the CISSP certification, which I AM going to get in April. There is a lot of information about different methods of access control. From reading the A, yes I RTFA, it doesn't sound like OLPC fits into any of the standard definitions (DAC, MAC, RBAC). It sounds closest to RBAC than the others, but it doesn't really fit that model either. I'd like to hear from other security professionals how they would categorize OLPC, but I think we would need more information first.

Re:It's not hard to do this. Just not compatible.

To my knowledge SELinux implements MAC (Mandatory Access Control). That is not necessarily the same thing as a virtual machine per application.

First, the two concepts "virtual machine" and "mandatory access control" are orthogonal. A virtual machine may choose to implement MAC (and the sandbox that Java applets are placed in is a MAC implementation), or it may choose any other security model (or none).

Mandatory Access Control is simply a set of permissions that are independent of the identity of the user who owns a process. Unix and Windows permissions are all about the process UID, every decision about what the process should or should not be allowed to do comes down to a check of user-related information.

With MAC, the permissions are associated instead with the process and/or the data it's acting on. MAC as implemented by SELinux (and the XO security model, BTW) associates a set of permissions with each program. Program A is configured as being allowed to do X or Y but not Z, while program B is allowed to do Y or Z but not X.

Note that these permissions are orthogonal to UID-based permissions. Suppose a program has permission to read files from a given region of the file system, but the user account the program is running as does not have permission to read a given file within that region. The program can't read that file while running as that user.

Second, there's nothing in the Bifrost spec about virtual machines. It's not clear, but it looks to me like the Bifrost MAC is implemented at the OS layer, in spite of the fact that the Wired article talks about VMs.

It sounds closest to RBAC than the others, but it doesn't really fit that model either.

No, it is most definitely not role-based -- role-based access is again based on user ID (via the roles associated with that UID at the moment). Actually, I think there are probably traditional user and group-based permissions as well, but the key security tools defined by Bifrost are MAC, not RBAC.

Takes Big Brother to the next level

"Manufacturing data includes two unique identifiers: SN, the serial number, and U#, the randomly-generated UUID."

"On first boot, a program is run that asks the child for their name, takes their picture, and in the background generates an ECC key pair. The key pair is initially not protected by a passphrase, and is then used to sign the child's name and picture. This information and the signature are the child's 'digital identity'. The laptop transmits the (SN, UUID, digital identity) tuple to the activation server. The mapping between a laptop and the user's identity is maintained by the country or regional authority for anti-theft purposes, but never reaches OLPC."

Remember kids, file sharing is illegal and there is a database full of mugshots for the RIAA to find you.

Two Cents

I've got two things to say.

1. Bring these security additions to public linux distributions.

2. Would you (and the rest of /.ers) be willing to purchase 1 of these laptops for $200? I say $200 so the extra $100 goes toward a laptop for a child in third world country.

"What's deeply troubling..."

"What's deeply troubling -- almost unbelievable -- about [Unix style permissions] is that they've remained virtually the only real control mechanism that a user has over her personal documents today..."

Oh, my! I feel so... so... exposed!

So let's make the default umask "077" for all UNIX- and Linux-based systems. Would that help? To a great extent. Would it decrease usability? Sure. But if that 'swhat it takes to have some semblance of system security, so be it. It seems that work on file-level security has taken steps backwards since the "do everything via a browser" mentality began taking root in UNIX/Linux. That us brings automatic execution of programs based on some file's extension (the so-called "helper" applications). Yep, that proved to be such a winner in the DOS/Windows arena that we should all start doing it. What little cool feature of the web that makes something easier to do hasn't proven to have gaping security holes in it? Every so-called "advance" in usability seems to have a detrimental effect on system security. Always has and, I'd bet, always will. Usabililty and security are playing a zero-sum game. You can't seem to have more of one without less of the other. But I digress...

I don't know what the ultimate solution will be but I'm thinking that liberal use of "umask 077", RBAC (especially on root) and ACLs, and a default policy of "drop" on one's firewalls will go a long way in protecting system(s). All of those have been available on UNIX/Linux for quite a while. So much for permission bits being "virtually the only real control mechanism that a user has over her personal documents today".

The creator of this "BitFrost" cryptographic security scheme says:

"I fear there is something I missed."

Frankly, I kept having the same feeling as I read the Wired article. I think what it was that he was missing was "simplicity". Dongles for laptops in rural villages? Local license servers for villages that have no internet access? Jeebus!

Sigh. Hidden DRM plan.

FTFA:

Beyond cyberthreats, the XO laptop will have an anti-theft system designed to render stolen laptops useless. Each XO is assigned a "lease," secured by cryptography, that allows it to operate for a limited period of time. The laptop connects to the internet daily and checks in with a country-specific server to see if it's been reported stolen. If not, the lease is extended another few weeks.

If the lease expires, the XO's internet connectivity is turned off, and shortly thereafter the whole computer becomes a brick. In the case of an area without internet connectivity, a local school can extend the lease from its own server by Wi-Fi or with a USB dongle.

I've been hearing that they were going to do this for a while, and I think it's a terrible idea that will kill a lot of the potential of this wonderful project. What happens if these kids go to another area for a month or two and want to take the thing with them? Tough, it's a brick. Not to mention if they want to keep it and take it out of area after they graduate.

There's also this deeply worrying gem:

Users can manually assign more power to a particular program through the security control panel, but even there, they are limited.

"You cannot request a set of permissions that let you do bad things," Krstic said.

So much for a computer that students will have complete control over, can take everything apart and put it back together, etc. For a project so focussed on empowering kids as users, these two parts of an otherwise promising security plan sound an awful lot like the computer having control over the user, not the other way around.

I hope I've got this wrong, I hope that we aren't actually introducing third world kids to the world of DRM and Treacherous Computing, where "their" machines do things they can't control, where they "lease", not own. If so, it's really too bad. Yet another missed opportunity...

There are things in the spec I object to...

Wow, I read the whole FA. I must be new here.

Seriously, I agree with most their findings and strategies to mitigate the risks of theft, lost privacy, etc. I also find it noteworthy that the Mic and Cam both have a direct wired LED to indicate activation of said components, where the LED can not be turned on/off by software at all. Thus eavesdropping becomes evident. The spec is a nice read and most points Ivan makes are (from my standpoint) well thought through and sensible for the environment in which the XO is to be deployed.

What I object against though, is point 8.12 (P_X) [laptop.org] of the spec. As I understand it, as long as you happen to be in possession of a "trusted" key to the machine (which will certainly be OLPC and the government of the child in posession of the XO) you may eavesdrop on any resource of the X window system as you see fit? Correct me if I am wrong, but AFAIK the X protocol was never designed with security in mind. So sending commands to another program might also impicitly mean the ability to check the state of that program.

Would any X expert please confirm or dismiss this, as I can't becase I'm no X expert myself.

Hey Microsoft

This $5000 laptop that came preloaded with Windows Vista, still isn't as secure as those $100 laptops used by poor third world children.

SELinux

So, they implemented SELinux/grsecurity/RSBAC policy. As in, not the system, but a policy file.

Who holds the keys?

As with any sufficiently strong security system, the weakest link I foresee will be the people. In this case, not the people who *use* the XO, but the people who control various points along the keychain: developer keys, activation keys, etc.

The people who hold these keys are plenty vulnerable to corruption, intimidation and good old-fashioned trickery. This doesn't invalidate the security model, but I'd be interested to know how they mean to preserve the integrity of the keychain in case of theft, misuse, disaster, going-out-of-business and aliens.

L

One Lease Per Child

TFA:
"Beyond cyberthreats, the XO laptop will have an anti-theft system designed to render stolen laptops useless. Each XO is assigned a "lease," secured by cryptography, that allows it to operate for a limited period of time. The lapto