Fake Plane Parts Scandal Shows Peril of Antiquated Paper System

After falsified records for spare aircraft parts set off a frantic global search for suspect pieces, the aviation industry now faces another daunting task: adapting the archaic paperwork for 100 million components to the digital age. From a report: Since the middle of the year, maintenance shops and aerospace manufacturers have found thousands of engine parts with falsified records linked to a distributor called AOG Technics. Airlines from China to the US and Europe have had to pull planes from service and extract the dubious components, leaving jets grounded and racking up millions of dollars in costs.

The episode has prodded carriers and maintenance shops to bolster scrutiny of their vendors and the parts they receive. And it's given fresh weight to an ongoing push to digitize the paper-based records still prevalent in the industry to document the lifespan of every piece of an aircraft from the time that it's made to when it lands in a scrap heap. But any structural reforms to thwart would-be copycats of the scheme of which AOG is suspected are likely years away. The industry is accustomed to following standardized methods and only making fundamental changes after a detailed and often lengthy examination of potential safety risks -- and costs.

Paper isn't the problem

[dbialac]

It seems to me that the problem is the information in the medium, not the medium itself. Electronic records are just as easily faked.

Re:Paper isn't the problem

[bferrell]

Neither the information nor the medium is the issue.

The issue is the lack of penalty

Re:

[Anonymous Coward]

There are penalties, the problem is the parts get through the system before the crime is detected.

Re:

[PPH]

Less likely if there's a laser-etched QR code pointing to an entry in a blockchain. Paperwork fails because it takes too long to dig the supporting records out of a filing cabinet. But if a mechanic can snap a picture of the code on a phone and get the background on the part, that can happen at many points in the part's lifetime. So it's more likely to be done.

Re:

[PPH]

Blockchain will say that this serial number part has already been installed on another airplane, tail number N1234X. Or installed, removed and scrapped.

This will all be in a part's history, available quickly. Sort of the same way you can't spend the same BitCoin twice.

Re:

[NoWayNoShapeNoForm]

There you go ... throwing complicated technology at a problem that could be resolved quite simply with a bullet and an optional blindfold.

Re:

[arglebargle_xiv]

For those who aren't familiar with how this is done via blockchain, there's a great educational video [youtube.com] by cryptographer Jon Callas explaining it all.

Re:

[Senshi]

This may reeks sneaky Russians https://www.youtube.com/watch?... [youtube.com]

Re:

[aaarrrgggh]

There isn't really much of a problem; you still have traceability with the paper documents, and while it is a lot of work when incidents like this happen counterfits can be found once suspicion is raised. I have a friend who is a chief engineer at an airline that said if they used any of the MRO vendors in question it is essentially a database search for any of their planes maintenance records to determine if any inspections are required.

These vendors will be blackballed, the people guilty of the scheme wi

Re:

[Local ID10T]

but... but... BLOCKCHAIN!!!!111

/sarc

Re:

[AmiMoJo]

It's not about stopping fakery. It's about being able to see where all the suspect parts are with a few clicks. Once the fraud is detected, they can find all the affected parts quickly.

Right now they have to manually go through the records to find where the parts are.

Paper Records

[Retired Chemist]

Paper records will undoubtedly make hunting down the suspect parts much more difficult, but electronic records would do nothing to avoid the issue in the first place. The problem was caused by purchasing decisions that put price first. I suspect, if you looked deeply enough you would find that people were suspicious of the parts but were told to buy the cheapest anyway.

Re: Paper Records

[guruevi]

Lots of government contracts have this mandate. Likely the paper trails have government mandates as well. I know for a fact that many healthcare stuff is paper because they donâ(TM)t allow digital signatures (by which they actually mean someoneâ(TM)s signature, but digitized).

Actual digital signature frameworks are either very complicated (requiring extensive PKI which the signer has to understand) or products like Adobe Sign or Docusign which are insanely expensive (anywhere from 2-50c per document).

Private companies have a bit more leeway with these things, but a lot of the air industry is highly regulated or outright government owned.

Re:

[echo123]

Please excuse me, since I'm merely a lay tax-payer. I cannot help but to ask, isn't this something the blockchain can fix, and if not, why not?

Re:

[witherstaff]

Yup, a perfect use for it. Walmart uses blockchain to track fresh produce, manufactured parts would be easy. But it's new, would incur some costs, so expect lots of foot dragging and delays.

Re: Paper Records

[Asgard]

Blockchain is roughly just a database. There's no blockchain mechanism that enforces that data put on the blockchain matches the physical reality. The blockchain can say 'the bolt that showed up was from X' when in reality it'd been switched with a cheaper one along the way. You get a little farther if the individual parts have serial numbers (essentially turning each part into a NFT), but its not like fakes can't reproduce serial numbers. Plus you also run into the scenario that if the current owner of the parts is defunct there may not be anybody able to sign the NFT over, so now you have orphan parts that still have economic value -- so you're back to the drawing board again as physical reality and the NFT state won't match.

Maybe if parts all had a nfc chip embedded in them that had a certificate signed by the manufacturer with the id of the part and its manufacturing location/date/batch etc... but that isn't likely feasible for small parts due to cost and the physics of how bolts and rivets work.

Re: Paper Records

[HammerOn1024]

You ask a valid question. Since I work in this industry, let me put to rest some of the comments here: 1) It's not always about the price. We do not go by that most of the time when looking at new/used parts. 2) Digital signatures, a blockchain, is not as secure or uniquely defensible as other forms of evidence; What one person makes, another can modify or destroy. 3) Relationships and pedegree count for a lot in this business. Companies go to great lengths to verify part pettigree. When a counterfit is fou

Re:

[whoever57]

Please excuse me, since I'm merely a lay tax-payer. I cannot help but to ask, isn't this something the blockchain can fix, and if not, why not?

Nicholas Weaver's iron law of blockchain:
"When somebody says you can solve problem X with blockchain, they donâ(TM)t understand X, and you can ignore them."

Re:

[guruevi]

Rhetorical question: how do you go back and change a document after it has already been signed in the blockchain. One of the primary questions we get when something is signed with Docusign or Adobe Sign (which locks the document from changes) especially from accounting, from auditing etc: How do I make changes to this. Which I then tell them about PDF print and everyone up and down the government food chain, including judges, accepts this as a 'signed' document.

Re:

[Anonymous Coward]

There is nothing wrong with being price conscious. The problem is they fake everything including the FAA approval slips.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... [wikipedia.org]

Re:

[tlhIngan]

Paper records will undoubtedly make hunting down the suspect parts much more difficult, but electronic records would do nothing to avoid the issue in the first place. The problem was caused by purchasing decisions that put price first. I suspect, if you looked deeply enough you would find that people were suspicious of the parts but were told to buy the cheapest anyway.

Well, the problem is actually the records themselves - there is no difference between a 1 cent screw and an aviation grade screw costing $1,

Digital stuff is faked all the time

[Arnonyrnous Covvard]

Digital fakery can be perfect. At least with analog documents, there's evidence, because there is no perfect analog thing.

Amazon of the Air

[crunchy_one]

Perhaps the problem has more to do with the proliferation of crappy vendors in the spare parts marketplace than it does with inventory tracking methods. The electrical and electronics parts marketplace is chock full of bad actors hawking utter crap at bargain prices, so why shouldn't the aerospace parts marketplace be buried in crap as well? Wouldn't it be more effective to go after the AOG Technics, i.e., Amazons of the Air, with the full force an fury of the criminal justice system? I don't think that conspiracy to commit murder charges for those involved would be out of line.

Re:

[93 Escort Wagon]

It's funny how after reading TFS my mind - like that of many others here, I'm sure - immediately went to amazon.com .

Lack of audits

[ArchieBunker]

When companies buy from suppliers like this they are supposed to conduct an on site audit of the supplier. You know tour the company, dig through records, talk to employees, read through their procedures. I had to do this because my old job supplied equipment to nuclear plants and to the Navy. Seems like laziness from the customers.

Yes ditch paper so that faking it is easier.

[Fly Swatter]

The problem isn't that paper is less secure the problem it is just harder to do a search. Wait that makes it more secure. Paper is too secure so they have to digitize it to make it easier for everyone to access.

Sprinkle with Blockchain

[bill_mcgonigle]

I know a guy who developed a blockchain cryptosystem to prevent this problem. Laser-etched codes and stuff generated from keys.

The industry said it was too complex to retrofit their existing systems and that it would be cheaper to settle any lawsuits resulting from fake parts.

Corporate liability is a real bitch with a huge body count.

Paperwork has long been a problem.

[RitchCraft]

During the last 6 months of my service in the Marine Corps I was reassigned to the tool room of my squadron since they were transitioning from A6E Intruders to F18 hornets and I was not reenlisting. The paper work in the tool room was overwhelming. Over the course of 5 months I wrote a computer program that tracked all tooling and parts which made inventory analysis much, much easier. I still had to enter the paperwork info from supply into my system but it made our squadron's tool room run much smoother. "

Finally...

[Patrick May]

A problem that can be solved by a blockchain!

AOG means Aircraft On Ground

[gavron]

Missing from all these retellings is that the company's name is AOG, which has an actual meaning.

AOG means "Aircraft On Ground" so when you want expedited handling of aircraft parts, materielle, etc. labeling it "AOG" means super-ASAP highest priority.

Clever little fellows to use that to sell parts that aren't up to standards.

E
FAA Commercial Helicopter Pilot
Tucson, Arizona, USA

Years away?

[PPH]

But any structural reforms to thwart would-be copycats of the scheme of which AOG is suspected are likely years away.

So say the people in the industry who will need years to divest themselves from the fake part businesses they have built on the side.

I've been in that industry. And change can happen fairly rapidly. If all the stakeholders want it to. Just put out the order, wait to see who whines and investigate their finances.

Death Penalty

[JustAnotherOldGuy]

It should be a death penalty for faking aircraft parts, and I mean any part.

From the brake linings to the latch that holds the tray table in place, counterfeiting aviation parts should merit the death penalty.

As a pilot and aircraft owner I can speak to this.

[runner_one]

There are many reasons for fake parts, The screwed up tort system affects aircraft parts a lot, but there are other issues, and the FAA is partially to blame. Let me give you just one example, every two years I have to buy a new battery for my ELT (Emergency Locater Transmitter). Online price is nearly $300 with shipping. But What do I get for that? Well I get 6 Eveready alkaline C batteries spot welded together and wrapped in shrink wrap with a generic two prong plug on a pigtail and a FAA approved sticker. That is $12 of batteries, a 99 cent plug, 2 inches of wire, and a few cents of shrink wrap, and a stick on label. Maybe $15 of materials total, and that is being generous. The exact same batteries can be bought at any number of stores for about $2 each, retail. But if I was to go down and buy these exact same batteries at WalMart and install them I am violating the law. I am basically paying $285 for a sticker from the FAA. This insane mark up and thusly counterfeit parts is at least partially driven by the FAAs archaic rule making and inflexibility. If the FAA would streamline the PMA (Parts Manufacturer Approval) process to make it less costly to manufacture FAA approved parts, and if we could reform the tort system there would be a lot less demand for counterfeit parts.

Anyone going to Jail (AGJ)

[Mirnotoriety]

Anyone going to Jail (AGJ)

Trusting the system

[spaceyhackerlady]

It doesn't matter how the information is stored, on paper or in a computer. People need to trust the system. If they don't trust the system it's game over.

I've seen lots of FAA 8130-3 and Transport Canada Form One maintenance releases. A human actually signed the form and accepted legal responsibility for the parts or work on them being done right. I'm trusting my life to them.

...laura

2030 news item

[groobly]

In aviation news, an unexplained cascading computer system crash has led to data on all Boeing airplane parts provenance being unrecoverable, so Boeing no longer can track down fake parts.

Chain of custody is the solution

[sinkskinkshrieks]

Chain of custody solves the paperwork vulnerability by buying from good suppliers. Although it would be nice to have provable, electronic traceability in addition to paperwork so that the supplier isn't as important. The problem though of losing the chain of custody is the condition and quality of parts can become suspect, especially if they're used/overstressed or allowed to deteriorate with improper storage.