Firefox Prepares To Mark All HTTP Sites 'Not Secure' After HTTPS Adoption Rises (bleepingcomputer.com) 244
An anonymous reader quotes a report from Bleeping Computer: The increased adoption of HTTPS among website operators will soon lead to browsers marking HTTP pages as "Not Secure" by default, and Mozilla is taking the first steps. The current Firefox Nightly Edition (version 59) includes a secret configuration option that when activated will show a visible visual indicator that the current page is not secure. In its current form, this visual indicator is a red line striking through a classic lock that's normally used to signal the presence of encrypted HTTPS pages. According to Let's Encrypt, 67% of web pages loaded by Firefox in November 2017 used HTTPS, compared to only 45% at the end of last year.
Not everything need story be encrypted (Score:4, Insightful)
Let's say I'm downloading a file that's several GB, like a disk image. When I download it, I'll verify the signature. If it's valid, the file is usable. Encrypting the entire download is a waste of resources for both the server and client. Not everything needs to be encrypted, so this is a little silly. Plus, hosting providers often charge extra fees for https, at least based on my experience.
If the signature itself is tampered with (Score:5, Insightful)
Let's say I'm downloading a file that's several GB, like a disk image. When I download it, I'll verify the signature.
How can you be sure that the SHA-256 value against which you are verifying the disk image hasn't itself been tampered with on its way to your device?
Encrypting the entire download is a waste of resources for both the server and client.
No it isn't. If you fail to encrypt, your ISP, your ISP's ISP, and any snooping government can tell conclusively what you have downloaded. If you do encrypt, the eavesdropper can see only what domain you're accessing and the sizes of what you download. You can obfuscate even the sizes by using range requests to pull the 4 GB disk image a 4 MB chunk at a time.
Plus, hosting providers often charge extra fees for https
Then take your business elsewhere. Switch from a hosting provider that charges extra for HTTPS to a competing hosting provider that does not charge extra for HTTPS.
Re:If the signature itself is tampered with (Score:4, Insightful)
How to use a private CA with BYOD? (Score:5, Insightful)
How is "make and install your own certificates" practical when users bring their own devices, such as public library patrons bringing their laptops or phones to a branch or friends or relatives bringing their laptops or phones to someone's home?
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You don't manage user's BYOD? At my company if I chose to BYOD then I have to abide by the rules among which is a management program installed on my PC which enforces security measures AND installs the company's root certificate.
If you don't do this for BYOD you have bigger security issues then SSL.
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Similarly, BYOD on the home network should be segregated to an Internet-only guest wireless connection.
That wouldn't help if you want to let guests print to your printer or view videos on your NAS.
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it's probably easier just to use Let's Encrypt.
As I wrote in my other comment [slashdot.org], Let's Encrypt requires a fully-qualified domain name, not a 192.168 or .local.
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I edited it out because nobody answered my previous question about practical methods of distributing the root certificate of "roll your own CA" to guests' devices.
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I edited it out because nobody answered my previous question about practical methods of distributing the root certificate of "roll your own CA" to guests' devices.
Put the internal CA cert on your NAS with all your videos that your guests come over to watch while printing out their taxes. quick install and done.
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Even if the main download is done using HTTP, the SHA-256 value can be requested over HTTPS.
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Even if the main download is done using HTTP, the SHA-256 value can be requested over HTTPS.
But the operator of the site hosting the SHA-256 values will still need to obtain a certificate. Is it more a matter of setting up Certbot to provision one certificate for the hash site rather than a separate certificate for each mirror site?
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Indeed.
The concern was that for large (multi-gigabyte) files, HTTPS becomes a waste of resources. I'm not going to comment one way or another on the correctness of that claim, but setting up a single server to accept both HTTP and HTTPS connections is trivial, and then
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The concern was that for large (multi-gigabyte) files, HTTPS becomes a waste of resources. I'm not going to comment one way or another on the correctness of that claim
I am, by pointing out that Netflix is able to saturate 40GigE NICs in a single machine (I think they can now saturate two of them) serving nothing but HTTPS traffic, and the bottleneck for them is usually the disk and sometimes DRAM, but never the encrypt. On a modern CPU, you're DMAing from cache and you can encrypt a lot faster than line rate (particularly with AES, where it's almost entirely in fixed-function hardware) and then the encrypted data is right next to the DMA unit ready to send to the NIC.
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No it isn't. If you fail to encrypt, your ISP, your ISP's ISP, and any snooping government can tell conclusively what you have downloaded. If you do encrypt, the eavesdropper can see only what domain you're accessing and the sizes of what you download.
For most publically available sites this is simply not true. Counting bytes and timing analysis is more than enough to reconstruct users activities with a high degree of confidence.
You can obfuscate even the sizes by using range requests to pull the 4 GB disk image a 4 MB chunk at a time.
Is it really more difficult for an adversary to sum up a bunch of 4MB chunks?
Then take your business elsewhere. Switch from a hosting provider that charges extra for HTTPS to a competing hosting provider that does not charge extra for HTTPS.
Telling someone who doesn't see the point of HTTPS for x,y and z to get a new provider is probably not likely to result in a positive outcome.
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Is it really more difficult for an adversary to sum up a bunch of 4MB chunks?
Yes. For example, once you have the content length, you can always request the end of a roughly 4 GB file as a full 4 MB range rather than a partial chunk by seeking 4 MB before the content length. Or for an additional data cost smaller than 1 percent, you can randomly request one to ten extra chunks at various points in the file.
Telling someone who doesn't see the point of HTTPS for x,y and z to get a new provider is probably not likely to result in a positive outcome.
That was directed at people who do see the point "but...".
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Yes. For example, once you have the content length, you can always request the end of a roughly 4 GB file as a full 4 MB range rather than a partial chunk by seeking 4 MB before the content length. Or for an additional data cost smaller than 1 percent, you can randomly request one to ten extra chunks at various points in the file.
Simply chunking a 4 GB file is not the same as implementing a padding scheme. No doubt measures can be implemented to deny timing and size analysis to adversaries. This isn't really the issue.
None of this actually exists in the real world across vast majority of systems deployed today. To achieve the above you either have to write a custom http client or get explicit buy in from the operator to implement something at a higher level. This has real world consequence in that assertions simply adding SSL me
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To achieve the above you either have to write a custom http client [...] What is possible is academic if it isn't being done.
Except 90 percent of it has been done in existing download managers. I imagine the anti-analysis features that I described (always retrieve full-size final range and retrieve dummy ranges) are straightforward to add to a download manager. Do you need me personally to create a proof of concept in order for it to become no longer "academic"?
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Do you need me personally to create a proof of concept in order for it to become no longer "academic"?
Not relevant.
The point isn't "how" or "whether" something can be achieved. It's the simple fact it has not actually been achieved by any measurable percentage of users therefore any benefit arising from its existence is not being felt... in other words it's academic. Merely creating a "proof of concept" changes nothing.
Comment removed (Score:5, Insightful)
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KILL JAVASCRIPT DEAD
Have fun click-click-clicking through a server-side image map that fully reloads the page every time. Or have fun not being able to use an application at all because instead of being a web application, it was developed as a native application for an operating system other than yours.
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Makes it harder to inject malware, a favourite tactic of governments.
Also increases the cost of mass surveillance to the point where it is impractical.
The web should have been fully encrypted from the start.
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The web should have been fully encrypted from the start.
With what? 40-bit keys? At the start of the web, competent encryption was considered a munition in some economically important countries.
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The web was invented in the UK. No export restrictions on crypto at the time.
Re:If the signature itself is tampered with (Score:4, Insightful)
This is a classic example of the "we have to DO SOMETHING!" bullshit, a variation of the "think of the children!" kind of thinking...
I totally agree. I have a small personal website that hosts some stats about my server (disk usage and such) and hosts pictures I want to share with people.
Why would that site be unsafe? I use no cookies, I do not require logins. Why would my site be branded like that because some has-been company pushes their agenda?
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Because the people selling certs need some leverage to sell their over priced products. That is what it is about. Nothing to do with security.
Re:If the signature itself is tampered with (Score:5, Informative)
Because it's open to MITM and passive snooping. There have been cases of networks inserting DDoS code into unencrypted webpages to recruit clients into attacking an unrelated site. (Or if you prefer, cases of networks inserting cryptocoin miners.) It's also possible to exploit security vulnerabilities in the client by injecting code into a plain-text connection, thus hiding the source of the exploit (and saving you the effort of tricking the client into visiting your own site).
Plain-text HTTP is just plain unsafe. That's why it should be branded as unsafe.
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How can you be sure that the SHA-256 value against which you are verifying the disk image hasn't itself been tampered with on its way to your device?
True. And doing HTTPS encryption isn't all that taxing on a modern CPU. E.g. newish CPUs can do AES with one instruction
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/... [wikipedia.org]
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How to render the SHA-256 Pre-image collision attacks effectively moot: Check the Fucking File Size.
The attack I'm concerned about doesn't involve a hash collision. The attacker who intercepts an HTTP connection can replace both the disk image with a replacement of the same size and the hash with the hash of the replacement image. And this interception (sometimes mistakenly [www.irif.fr] called "transparent proxying") is much more difficult with HTTPS than with cleartext HTTP.
This will just increase the cost of entry
Increasing the cost of interception to where only nation-states can afford it and there's evidence if they do it anyway [stackexchange.com] is the entire point of HT
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Nobody cares about any entertainment that much [...] if a finance transaction does not take place, then ssl is overkill.
Didn't "a finance transaction" set up your subscription to receive said entertainment in the first place?
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How would the person verifying the download securely obtain and verify the public key of the signer? Does it involve CAs, or does it involve long-distance travel to key signing parties?
Technically correct, in some situations (Score:3)
Let's say I'm downloading a file that's several GB, like a disk image. When I download it, I'll verify the signature. If it's valid, the file is usable. Encrypting the entire download is a waste of resources for both the server and client.
As long as the signature file was delivered over HTTPS and you didn't have any evil root certificate authorities installed on your client, you would be fine. If the insecure download was tampered with, signature verification would fail, as you say.
Encrypting downloads is not that big of a deal resource-wise these days, though. Why not let HTTPS handle MITM detection for you? ;) Most users won't check a sig file anyway.
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breaking web proxies is stupid. (Score:3)
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It seems to me that web caching of this sort is essentially the only argument for using plain old HTTP.
TheRaven has already made a strong case against the think-of-the-CPU-overhead argument, but breaking web caching is a legitimate downside of HTTPS. Ideally there'd be an automatic checksum check after downloading over plain HTTP. Fun fact: this is precisely what Steam does. [valvesoftware.com] If they used a proprietary protocol, or HTTPS, then caching (whether by ISPs or by 'local' sysadmins) wouldn't be possible, to the det
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If you are tech savvy enough to do this then you are tech savvy enough to realize that the image means you are using HTTP, not HTTPS. They aren't stopping you from using HTTP, just making sure you are aware that you are using HTTP rather than HTTPS. So what it the problem again?
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What waste? Modern processors have AES in hardware. Except for the initial TLS negotiation (and even that is hardware accelerated on most systems) it costs almost nothing to use encryption.
FFS (Score:5, Insightful)
You know what cost isn't zero?
Changing the billions of http: links on billions of web pages to billions of other web pages, that's what.
Firefox - and Google, for that matter - are damaging the very integrity of the net, ironically, while claiming to improve it. They're not improving it. This is anal-retentive nonsense. Not everything needs to be encrypted. If something does need to be encrypted, that falls into the realm of the reasonable decision of the page owner, not the web browser author or the search engine.
We've gotten along just fine without this nonsense thus far; I see no reason - other than the use of force by these bad actors - that we should have to arbitrarily change huge portions of the Internet.
You want to encrypt, go ahead. You can if you want. And of course, if you do, it'll be fine. But using force to make you do it... no. That's just evil.
And we know that browser warnings will put people off. This isn't an "otherwise-harmless" act. It'll do real damage.
Use HSTS (Score:5, Informative)
Changing the billions of http: links on billions of web pages to billions of other web pages, that's what.
If your HTTPS server sends the Strict-Transport-Security header [wikipedia.org] for one request, the browser will automatically rewrite subsequent requests to http: scheme URLs on the same domain to use the https: scheme instead. If you enable this long-term for all subdomains, you can get the header "preloaded", or included with the browser itself so that even the first request gets rewritten. The HTTPS Everywhere extension by EFF [eff.org] is an additional source of preloads.
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Sure, because http can't redirect to https at all.
Re:FFS (Score:4, Informative)
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The absence of a green lock should be more than enough
Re: FFS (Score:2)
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Can you even trust HTTPS anymore? I thought the feds had all the master keys.
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No, we haven't. You mention "other than the use of force by these bad actors" -- yes, exactly, that is the sole and complete reason for us having to secure the Web. If you can find a way to force people to stop attacking the integrity of the network, we can avoid this change. But otherwise, help out by grepping
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Changing the billions of http: links on billions of web pages to billions of other web pages, that's what.
Err do you know how the internet even works? This problem is very easily solved on the server side.
Stupid (Score:2, Informative)
This is completely retarded. Not every site needs https.
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But it's apparently very important to educate users to ignore yet another legitimate warning indication.
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But it's apparently very important to educate users to ignore yet another legitimate warning indication.
What's worse is the implication that if it isn't telling you that it is not secure, it must be secure, because it's using https.
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This is completely retarded. Not every site needs https.
That's for the users to determine so telling them which sites are secure and which are not makes perfect sense.
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The percentage covers only the subset of users who have opted into Firefox telemetry [mozilla.org]. If you want to make your votes not count, that choice is yours. Just don't whine when Mozilla cuts your pet feature for lack of usage share justifying the maintenance cost.
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Haha... you think they actually give a hoot about that telemetry data? Management makes their decisions and then interprets the telemetry to justify their posisions, no the other way around.
Remember, Microsoft collected huge amounts of telemetry with Windows7. The result was Windows 8.
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This is true, but "Not Needing HTTPS" =/= "Secure". Firefox will still be correct in identifying the connection as not being secure.
But HTTPS does not imply secure either. It's lulling users into a false sense of and understanding of security.
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No, you have it backwards. By never marking HTTP is insecure before we created the false sense of security folks now mistakenly have.
Nonsense. Failing to indicate a disposition is NOT misleading and contributes to no false sense of anything.
In the real world without near universal buy-in for HTTPS exclusively people will browse somewhere... Not secure... oh noes neither is this...or this... too bad I'm going to go here and do that anyway... pretty soon it devolves into a joke about everything causing cancer followed by this scary message AND every other remotely similar scary message no matter what it says being filtered out on a subcons
Servers on your LAN are probably Not Secure (Score:5, Informative)
HTTPS requires a certificate, and a certificate that requires a fully qualified domain name. The CA/Browser Forum's Baseline Requirements forbid issuing certificates in RFC 1918 private networks (such as 10/8 and 192.168/16) or the mDNS reserved domain (.local). This means everything on the average user's local area network will end up marked "Not Secure", such as the administration interface of the user's router, printer, or network attached storage (NAS) device.
The document "Deprecating Non-Secure HTTP" [mozilla.org] states that Mozilla is aware of this problem but fails to offer a solution:
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What's even worse, is that many of these devices use HTTPS with an unverifiable certificate (either self-signed, missing an FQDN due to being local, etc). This is extremely annoying (and likely confusing to many) when trying to access such devices, to the point where they probably seem outright broken to an "average" user.
I wish one of these organizations would come up with some solution to that problem, which everyone can adopt.
For my own purposes, I set myself up an "internal CA" and loaded its certs on a
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> I set myself up an "internal CA" and loaded its certs on all my browsers/devices.
This is the usual solution for big companies and capable users.
However the flaw is in the certificate specs. Certificates and crypto library auth policies do not have the semantics defined to declare "This cert is for this specific local domain and address space with this unique identifier" so it can be distinguished from all other such places with an identical domain and address space. It's a solvable problem. The browser
Domain-validated vs. Extended Validation (Score:4, Insightful)
It's why a CA can charge hundreds of dollars to perform 50ms of compute effort.
The "50 ms of compute effort" certificates are domain-validated, with just CRL and OCSP as ancillary services. Those typically cost $15 for three years (ssls.com) or nothing for 90 days (letsencrypt.org). The certificates that cost hundreds of dollars are Extended Validation, which ensure not only a connection between the certificate and the domain owner but also that a vandal isn't typosquatting the domain itself. These often come with greater insurance guarantees.
Re:Domain-validated vs. Extended Validation (Score:4, Insightful)
It's why a CA can charge hundreds of dollars to perform 50ms of compute effort.
The "50 ms of compute effort" certificates are domain-validated, with just CRL and OCSP as ancillary services. Those typically cost $15 for three years (ssls.com) or nothing for 90 days (letsencrypt.org). The certificates that cost hundreds of dollars are Extended Validation, which ensure not only a connection between the certificate and the domain owner but also that a vandal isn't typosquatting the domain itself. These often come with greater insurance guarantees.
And all those services and fees have nothing to do with my options for securing my own stuff. In fact they just make things worse.
As I wrote on another thread, I ran Let's Encrypt's scripts and they crashed. It's a joke built with shoddy code.
I built a CA once, with bespoke software, a screened room, air gaps, man traps and the whole malarky. All to certify communication devices, because all the cert vendors were not interested in selling certs for a few cents each for millions of devices.
The more I have dealt with the cert industry, the more I hate it.
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As I wrote on another thread, I ran Let's Encrypt's scripts and they crashed. It's a joke built with shoddy code.
Did you file a bug report? There's millions of people who had no problem running the scripts on wide variety of hardware and software.
The more I have dealt with the cert industry, the more I hate it.
So you should be on board with what Lets Encrypt is trying to do, which is removing the unnecessary garbage from the CAs for what is handled by a simple automated domain ownership check.
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So you should be on board with what Lets Encrypt is trying to do, which is removing the unnecessary garbage from the CAs for what is handled by a simple automated domain ownership check.
Lets Encrypt is probably a great option if you're trying to secure a general purpose Linux server somewhere.
But if you're trying to secure something their scripts won't run on, then its a PITA that isn't really helping.
Most of what we're complaining about is stuff their scripts won't run on.
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And the solution is really simple:
firefox, chrome etc should have different rules when accessing devices on 10.x.x.x and 192.168.x.x etc.
Especially if localhost is on the same subnet. Or a tracert to the device never crosses a public internet address. With equivalent rules for IPV6.
For me at least the VAST majority of the time I'm accessing these devices I'm on the same private subnet. There's a couple scenarios at work where things are separated, and I might be accessing 10.1.1.x from 10.5.5.x etc,
It can s
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The LAN FQDN problem in a previous AMA (Score:3)
I mentioned the same planned obsolescence concern in my question to Jacob at Let's Encrypt [reddit.com] in an AMA on reddit a year ago.
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Q. What about my home router? Or my printer?
The challenge here is not that these machines canâ(TM)t do HTTPS, itâ(TM)s that theyâ(TM)re not provisioned with a certificate. A lot of times, this is because the device doesnâ(TM)t have a globally unique name, so it canâ(TM)t be issued a certificate in the same way that a web site can. There is a legitimate need for better technology in this space, and weâ(TM)re talking to some device vendors about how to improve the situation.
It should also be noted, though, that the gradual nature of our plan means that we have some time to work on this. As noted above, everything that works today will continue to work for a while, so we have some time to solve this problem
The solution is logging into the device using TLS-SRP but this doesn't enrich the CAs so no chance in hell.
When your friends BYOD (Score:2)
Forge a cert for yourself, it's not hard.
It's a bit harder to get the devices of friends and relatives visiting your home to trust the certificate of your private CA so that they can (say) view the videos on your NAS or print to your printer. In addition, Android displays a persistent warning about "Network monitoring" [howtogeek.com] if a private CA certificate is installed.
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Forge a cert for yourself, it's not hard.
It's a bit harder to get the devices of friends and relatives visiting your home to trust the certificate of your private CA so that they can (say) view the videos on your NAS or print to your printer. In addition, Android displays a persistent warning about "Network monitoring" [howtogeek.com] if a private CA certificate is installed.
Allowing friends or relatives on a private network is even more reason to do https. There's no polite way on how to screen whether they are running ARP poisoning to sniff traffics.
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You mean a self signed certificate? Browsers hate these even more than plain http.
If you mean creating your own root of trust, it is not easy for the layman. And you can't make it too easy, otherwise, it will be exploited.
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We don't care.
What we care about is the interstitial page the browser throws up that prevents us from reaching the device until we click agree twice, add an exception, click advanced, click yes, we really mean it, click settings click enable user to view insecure sites... just to get it done. Its not this bad yet, but its getting there.
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Does Firefox still matter? (Score:2)
I guess it depends; but when your rival has about 5 times your market share, you do not matter that much...or do you?
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Troll!?
So I suppose that Tesla doesn't matter much, since it is a very small fraction of cars sold by any of the major manufacturers. The band you might like doesn't matter because there are so many bigger ones. Linux (and MacOS) doesn't matter, since MS-Windows dwarfs desktop market share. Wind power doesn't matter much, since natural gas is a zillion times more market share. Yeesh.
How to Disable it (Score:4)
Outstanding. Now how will I disable this problem?
Re:How to Disable it (Score:5, Insightful)
The rest of us can simply disable "security.insecure_connection_icon.enabled" in about:config.
Oh?
Just like Firefox's extensions fiasco where some similar about:hack "allowed" your unapproved extensions to continue running if it wasn't publicly vetted by the mozilla version of an app store? That respite, like many Firefox moves was killed on v48 a year ago and blew away a Firefox extension that was developed in-house and had no business being available to the world. And just a year earlier? the Chrome and Safari side grenade exploded with a different "security" feature that cost us man hours, training and bug stabilization time. Browserwise, there is nowhere safe of these whims.
When Mozilla is saying the http sites will work "for a while" for local printers / routers, they're taking the haughty tone appropriate for someone saying we'll be allowed to be beggars at their house until they tire of taking pity on us... as if browser makers were paying US for using THEIR products. One reason open source projects aren't taken seriously, mind you, is present in that vacuous statement: unlike closed source companies like MS and Oracle, the statement of EOL comes with no hard dates. That's a red flag right there, considering Firefox has more or less had "courage" in announcing pulling the plug on other features or forcing unwanted garbage as well.
I'm tired after seeing the bleakness of all the bug threads with complaints of business burdens produced by these changes that just keep falling on deaf ears: All browsers do this deprecation game on a whim without any standards emporium behind the stupidity (though sometimes the W3C is part of the problem.) The only winning move is NOT to upgrade, because freedoms imaginaryly lost n% of the time to some unseen enemy in a potential hack are less concrete than the freedom lost right now for 100% of the time in the form of loss of value and features.
Security fatigue (Score:2)
Thanks for pouring napalm on the fire.
Visual Indicator (Score:2)
"...when activated will show a visible visual indicator..."
In my 35 years in the computer industry, I have always found that visual indicators that were visible were much more effective than ones that weren't. But then, I'm kind of old-school...
I'm more concerned about (Score:2)
ftp;//
telnet:// [telnet]
smb://
I got a nice Let's Encrypt certificate than auto-renewed, and I've pushed any external HTTP requests to HTTPS on my router.
And I have a pretty big list of CIDR ranges and URL strings that result in blocked transactions.
Seems OK (Score:2)
>"a red line striking through a classic lock that's normally used to signal the presence of encrypted HTTPS pages"
Really, that sounds OK to me. it is a reasonable warning "for the masses." But ONLY if it stops there. No pop-ups, no dialogs, no animation, no nagging, no striking through the URL, etc.
Not everything needs to be https, and things that aren't are not necessarily any problem. Mozilla can have bonus points by keeping the about:config that allows the user to en/disable the insecure http icon
Idiotic (Score:4, Insightful)
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Someone sarcastically mentioned the answer is 'cloud base admin pages' so you can be tracked - and sold an 'admin' service with a monthly fee and I'm afraid they're right... dammit.
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$100? Shit mine was free. You overpaid.
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that's bullshit, requires software they may not work with a given web server or stack. 90 days expiration and auto-renewal may not work with your stack/gear.....
https is totally unecessary for many sites
the way https is now is a money making scam for a certain cartel, the real solution has to involve disposing the current tech of those parasites
And yet firefox hides http:// by default.. (Score:3, Interesting)
The geniuses at Mozilla decided to hide the http: prefix from the user some time ago, so instead of http://www.cnn.com/ [cnn.com] the user sees www.cnn.com
The http: prefix indicates that THERE IS NO ENCRYPTION.
Why hide it from the user and then add a non-standard indicator that there is no encryption?
So many UI designers should be shot...
Who cares? (Score:2)
Unintended Consequences (Score:3)
This added to what is going on with the destruction of network neutrality in the US is almost like pouring salt on the wound. The number of users being able to reasonably access your site may very well drop, but Mozilla decided that web admins need to add another layer of security that come with fees in the process.
Let's Encrypt is gratis (Score:3, Informative)
The only "certification company" to which you'd need to "pony up cash" is the domain registrar, which you need anyway for a public website. Once you have a domain, you can automate provisioning of certificates issued without charge by Let's Encrypt using an ACME client such as Certbot.
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I tried running Let's Encrypt's scripts and they crashed.
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I tried running Let's Encrypt's scripts and they crashed.
Then you're not so 'techy' as your name implies. My 6 year old is capable of running them on her VM.
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I tried running Let's Encrypt's scripts and they crashed.
Then you're not so 'techy' as your name implies. My 6 year old is capable of running them on her VM.
Oh I can get them running all right. But they're as fragile as heck and don't work with any specific flavour of linux on any of my servers.
Who has 192.168.123.45 in your coffee shop? (Score:3)
http (IP on private network) = secure
How so? When your laptop or phone is on restaurant or public library Wi-Fi, you don't know who has 192.168.123.45. This is why the definition of a "potentially trustworthy origin" in the W3C candidate recommendation "Secure Contexts" [w3.org] includes localhost but not RFC 1918 private IP addresses.
Re:why does my site need to be secure (Score:5, Interesting)
I can't answer that question, but this..
.. is easy. You don't want ISPs altering the flier. And people may recall, one of the big calls to arms for the whole Network Neutrality thing everyone has been talking about, is that ISPs were altering web replies to insert ads. I've heard Comcast users even say that Comcast still communicates some kinds of things to their customers by just barging into whatever web page a user happens to have loaded, and changing it to include a message from Comcast. (Because apparently email is too hard.)
MitM can't only snoop; they can also change things.
Examples involving intranets, though, I can't possibly get into Firefox's head. I am pretty sure whatever reason they come up with, will be bullshit. But I guess I ought to hear 'em, first...
Re: (Score:2)
Collect it all was easy without encryption.
Now encryption is a set standard global collection by the security services will not be so easy?
A more realistic thought would be to save ads. Ads now know they have a direct link into a browsers from a site. The browser trusts the site and now has to trust the sites ads.
Encryption keeps 3rd party ads out and paying site ads di
Re: (Score:2)
I am generally curious why someone would need EVERY site to be secured by https.
Because without https, you have no assurance that the data that arrived at your web browser was the data sent by the server you wanted to reach. https is usually thought of as a data secrecy mechanism, but it's also a data integrity mechanism, and while secrecy doesn't matter everywhere, integrity does.
Note that this is true even when you don't particularly care about whether the cat video you got was the cat video you wanted, because your browser and your computer are not secure. For the same reason you
Re: (Score:2)
Whether your site needs to be secure or not is not for you to decide. It's up to the person potentially being persecuted for viewing it.
Fake domain registrars too (Score:2)
all sites will start using the fake CA let's encrypt that issues certs to anyone for anything
By the same criteria under which Let's Encrypt is a "fake CA", the vast majority of domain registrars are "fake registrars". They'll issue domains such as bankofarnerica.com to typosquatters and phishers and then not do anything until someone brings action pursuant to UDRP.
Re: (Score:2)
Every Wifi captive portal now wont work as the redirect will fail, coffee shops, guest wifi, all broken, great.
I don't know the details by default Firefox transmits some kind of captive portal probe to determine this. You can see it go over the network if you run a capture when starting Firefox.
Re: (Score:2)
Theoretically, guest Wi-Fi should be presenting the terms in a RADIUS access challenge [wikipedia.org] instead of HTTP interception anyway.