Shrinky Dinks As a Threat To National Security 257
InflammatoryHeadlineGuy writes "What do Shrinky Dinks, credit cards and paperclips have in common? They can all be used to duplicate the keys to Medeco 'high-security' locks that protect the White House, the Pentagon, embassies, and many other sensitive locations. The attack was demonstrated at Defcon by Marc Weber Tobias and involves getting a picture of the key, then printing it out and cutting plastic to match — both credit cards and Shrinky Dinks plastic are recommended. The paperclip then pushes aside a slider deep in the keyway, while the plastic cut-out lifts the pins. They were able to open an example lock in about six seconds. The only solution seems to be to ensure that your security systems are layered, so that attackers are stopped by other means even if they manage to duplicate your keys."
More power to Homeland Security (Score:5, Funny)
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:5, Funny)
Thank you, I'll be here all week.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
I was in the pool!!!!
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:5, Informative)
Shrinky Dinks are a kids toy. You cut it out and put it in the oven and it shrinks and gets stiff. See the video [shrinkydinks.com]
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:5, Funny)
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:4, Funny)
Good call leaving out "You put it in the oven."
After all, this is /. -- people with ovens don't let the kids here play.
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:4, Funny)
Re: (Score:2, Funny)
So now they'll not just confiscate my laptop when I arrive in the US, they'll also pinch my paperclips and credit cards ?
Everyone with a credit card is now considered a potential terrorist and will be added to the "do not fly" list.
Re:More power to Homeland Security (Score:4, Funny)
And if don't use a credit card to buy your tickets, you were already considered a potential terrorist.
On the bright side, now that everyone is a potential terrorist, we can at least stop maintaining the list.
Is this surprising? (Score:5, Insightful)
While using credit cards and shrinky dink plastic is clever, is this story particularly surprising? The article states that a photo of the key in question is required. If I asked the average man on the street if it was possible to replicate a key from a photo of it if you were sufficiently determined, I'd imagine they would say yes.
Re: (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Insightful)
Fool.
Look at the keypad. The numbers will be worn down. Look to see if it's an even wear, that means there are more than a few combos that work, but usually it's only one or two that are commonly shared.
Then look for the most worn, with the most dirt-- it's the first number. Elminate the clean bright keys from the pool. Eliminate zero and one; the remaining pool has the combination. It's probably just four numbers, could be five.
Now take your Timex/Sinclair and do the math.
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:4, Interesting)
There exist keypads that are clear with LED displays behind... they scramble, and display numbers beneath the keys when activated. No patterns.
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Informative)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Many of the ones I've seen in airports, banks, NOCs, etc., still have the older ones. Much can be learned just by watching the finger movements as no one covers them up, just like few people mind using CC machines that don't hide your hand movements when entering one's PIN.
Those that randomize the layout of the keypad seem onerous. But they're not. Combos, like hand print and keypad are much tougher.
To get around them you need to take the door handle and jar it a bit, smearing it with greasy stuff just befo
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Informative)
Most modern keypad locks like what you're thinking of actually randomize the layout of the keypad. So looking for the more worn keys is an exercise in futility.
There are very few manufacturers of those kind of keypads. The vast majority of the keypads installed are fixed and suffer from the "dirty keys" exploit. The "scramble pad" keypads are 4-5 times the price, and very few people outside of defense contractors spec that sort of thing. I've only ever seen one, and I've installed and serviced hundreds of keypad entry systems.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
an excessively extravagant security system preventing unauthorized pooping.
Preventing? A lockable toilet lid would only make unauthorized pooping much, much worse.
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Funny)
Elminate the clean bright keys from the pool. Eliminate zero and one; the remaining pool has the combination. It's probably just four numbers, could be five.
Now take your Timex/Sinclair and do the math.
Let' see... *taps madly into his Timex/Sinclair*
And the result is...
12345
Dammit (Score:4, Funny)
That's the code on my luggage!
Re: (Score:2)
In retrospect, I meant to say 0 or 1 as starting numbers. Rare to do that. 456 are the most frequent starters, but not always so.
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Funny)
You, sir, just reduced the security of your PINs to 34.93% of the original value.
Have a nice day.
Re:Is this surprising? -- No. (Score:5, Interesting)
My granddad was a blacksmith who taught his trade to young crims at a borstal in the 1950s. One of them showed how he could open a Yale lock in about 30 seconds. He needed whatever plastic was equivalent to a credit card way back then, and a cigarette. He could feel the piston movement and burn the height into the plastic. No photos needed. The young crims summary: "Locks is to keep honest people out, boss."
In a sense, a moderately good lock that is all that is needed. I'd agree with the article that the objective is to remove a defense of accidentally straying. The next layer of entrapment is the real one.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
My wife grew up in the suburbs and I grew up in the city. One of her pet peeves is that I tend to leave the doors of our car unlocked when I park. The difference is that I grew up in a neighborhood where some people would smash your windows if they saw anything in it they might want.
Nobody in my neighborhood had fancy car stereos; they either had plain old AM/FM radios, or they had a hole in their dashboard with wires hanging out.
Some of the kids had almost a hacker's attitude towards breaking into cars.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
My elderly mom was once stuck in her apartment by a jammed deadbolt. She couldn't get the super, and there was no exit, not even a fire escape, only a third floor balcony.
Rather than call the Fire Department, she called me. I came over, and she buzzed me in, then I kicked her front door in (let's say I'm a little bigger than average). It took me two or three tries to break the hinges.
Not a single soul peeked out to see what was going on, or called the cops.
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:4, Insightful)
Any single defensive measure on its own is irrelevant. This was proven very clearly during the early days of WWII when the Volkesgrenadiers over ran the impressive, but unmanned defensive positions in Belgium. The same principles of security hold true today as they did 50 years ago. Any defensive mechanism that is not reinforced via a secondary defensive measure is easily defeated.
The real story is this is story worth discussing.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Medieval thief-proof locks could not have been beaten by simply copying the key, because you needed to know the specifics of how to use the key. (It deadlocked itself if you used the key in a "normal" fashion.) It is easy to imagine that a modern lock could be made vastly superior to a medieval one. (Doctor Who fans may be familiar with the boast that there are 600 ways to use the TARDIS key and 599 ways to cause the lock to fuse solid, a somewhat dramatic reference to the idea that you can make locks that
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
It would be trivial to extend the car key method by...adding a capacitor whose value must be matched, and so on.
Nah, that's a dead end. GM did that already years ago with their VATS keys, only with a resistor (more reliable than a capacitor). Big pain in the ass, for very little additional security. Sealed transponder modules have completely superseded them, as they provide greater variation (unique IDs vs. only 15 resistance values), they can't be read with a $2 multi-meter, and they aren't dependent on flaky physical contacts to be read.
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Is this surprising? (Score:5, Informative)
It should be noted that one of the major selling points of the Medeco locks is that, through some mixture of technological and legal means, Medeco is quite aggressive about restricting access to key duplication blanks.
Of course, their aggressive protection of their patented key blanks is about marketing more than anything else. They are the sole legal supplier of keys to their locks*, so they therefore reap profit every time someone needs another key. The only selling point of their high priced and inconvenient to procure patented keys is the natural control this restricted access creates. They've managed to sell this access with very slick marketing which conveniently glosses over many important security issues. But then again, their business is only to sell locks, and they do it very well. The mechanical quality of their stuff is high as well, so you at least get a quality product for the price.
* You can buy 3rd party blanks now for the old Sky, Air, and the newer Biaxial keyways. They're always looking for one more mechanical "kink" to add to the system to justify the next patent. Skay and Air were patented on the strength of the rotating pin concept. Biaxial was patented via making the cuts staggered either for or aft on the key. The latest M3 is patented on a step on the blank that pushes a silly little "anti pick" pin near the back. Seems to me they're running out of ideas.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
You are missing the point a little bit. The locks in question are not ordinary locks. They are very expensive, high-security locks, like you might find in a secure government installation. The keys are not cut in an ordinary way; the ridges have different angles on them in order to turn the pins to the left or right as they are raised to the correct height. The company in question is saying that this kind of bypass is not possible. And guess what? It is.
It just goes to show: you should never completel
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Personally I would say that a purely mechanical key is insufficient in a high-security building.
It would be necessary to also have electronic support in the same way as the immobilizer in cars works so that the lock refuses to open whenever an unaccepted key is used. And even if possible also sound an alarm and keep the forged key in the lock, which will then be considered evidence.
If I have legitimate business and the key is kept by the lock I shouldn't be worried when Secret Service shows up to resolve th
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Not only that - the technique seems overly simplistic and rather optimistic.
The M3 has three high security features:
1) Sidebar. This means that the peaks on the key are milled at an angle and rotate the pins as well as lifting them
2) Slider. This is like a long, horizontal pin that must be depressed.
3) Key control.
The third of these - key control - is not relevant to the feasability of duplicating the key.
The slider is the weaker security measure. Its main use is in preventing M3 keys being duplicated on st
Re:Funny... (Score:4, Interesting)
it's simpler than that. Each KEY has a unique (not repeated on blanks) number used once (like iButton, etc) and they're paired to the car at the dealership. The tooth pattern opens the mechanical door locks, the car doesn't start without the matching number code whether the key turns or not. Disabling the battery won't work as it happens all the time, so it's written to flash somewhere in the car computer. The various manufacture alarms all trigger off various mismatches of key versus code chip.
Re:Funny... (Score:5, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
On my car, an identical-toothed key with the wrong code (I was having a dealership make a spare, and they screwed up on it) won't even open the door.
What make of car is it? I'm not aware of any car that uses transponder interrogation to secure the doors. It seems more likely that the key is simply mis-cut, just not obviously so. The only way a dealership can actually "screw up" a key is to make the physical cuts in the metal wrong--- they don't do ANYTHING to the transponder module. The transponder is just an RFID chip that responds with a unique serial number, and this number is burned in at the factory, long before the dealer gets the key blank. The c
You can copy keys? (Score:5, Funny)
OMFG!
the actual threath (Score:3, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
The real threat is credit cards. And in so many more ways than you might think.
Re:the actual threath (Score:4, Funny)
Shrinky dink of course!
It must be banned to protect national security!
Visa cards as well.
Hmm a idea.
I am a Visa card confiscator from the NSA. Can I please have your card?
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:2)
Digital cameras and printers are the real threats. If they didn't have digital cameras they would have to take the film to Wall-Mart to get it developed and the photo lab techs will notify law enforcement if they see somebody with pictures of Medeco keys.
Please. Unless the keys were being held by naked kids, the film techs at Wal-Mart couldn't give two shits.
Re: (Score:2)
the actual threath
Now what is the actual threath?
People who don't realize when they're intoxicated?
3-d printers? (Score:5, Interesting)
I bet those new 3-D type printers could perform the same thing without using razor blades and such. In fact, you could probably make a computer program to transfer from images to the final "printout."
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
You only need a fairly good image of a Medeco key and you can then cut a blank easily.
These Medeco keys are just like normal house/car keys, except they have variable slopes and spacing between peaks and troughs. Trying to cut those with normal tools would be very hard...but having a scale image to cut with an exacto knife is simple as pie.
The hardest thing about coping t
Re:3-d printers? (Score:5, Informative)
Re: (Score:2)
No, GP's post was very interesting. If a 3D scanner-fab unit churned out a copy, the plug could be easily turned with a tension wrench.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
If that means what I think it means, it's completely worthless against a pick. A pick doesn't care about how far apart the pins are, only that they're not perfectly in a line, thus allowing them to be set one at a time, turning an exponential process into a linear one.
You've obviously never actually seen the inner workings of a Medeco lock cylinder. They're like standard lock pins, only with a chisel point and a vertical groove down the side. The pins have to be rotated such that the groove faced perpendicular to the key, allowing the "fingers" of the sidebar to drop in. There are also one or more shallower false grooves that trap the sidebar but don't allow it to open. It's not unpickable, of course, but it's not as easy as you seem to think.
Schlage's drum-shaped "high security" pins are a much better solution.
Drum shaped? Don't you mean
Is it just me (Score:2)
Or are there others seeing the humor in finding out the Whitehouse and Pentagon are protected by such easily defeated locks?
Layered security indeed! I bet that had to put shivers down the spine of some security people. I wonder what the budget is for locks at the Whitehouse?
There is nothing like a good idea that is too trusted. Ex: Where I work, the IT guys thought it smart to map a couple of drives for everyone (against my better judgment) and guess what found it's way across those drive mappings? Yep, a v
Re:Is it just me (Score:5, Insightful)
Layered security indeed!
Maybe these locks aren't all that, but it's the Secret Service agents capping you in the head that you really have to worry about.
Just typical Slashdot mentality (Score:3, Interesting)
You see it with virtual security all the time: People around here (and other sites) seem to think that perfect security is achievable. They believe you can make a system that is perfectly unbreakable, no matter what. Now maybe in the virtual world that is a theoretical possibility, though a practical impossibility, but those of us who deal with physical security know it is impossible, even in theory. I mean I've never seen a lock, no matter what kind, that will stand up to a sufficiently large shaped charge
Re: (Score:2)
Virus?
You mean you allow Windows?
Who does that anymore?
Getting the key picture, is the key to success (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Getting the key picture, is the key to success (Score:5, Funny)
Sure, if their password is *******.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Sure, if their password is lesbian.
Good thing none of us can see your password [bash.org]. Only you can. As long as you type in your Slashdot password into Slashdot, it will hide it from us.
(This would have worked so much better if you weren't posting as an Anonymous Coward.)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
And, if you had been sold an $18 billion login system that was absolutely guaranteed to be unbreakable to anyone who wasn't directly issued the original login and password, then you might be a little surprised at how easy that was.
Which brings us back to the FA. We're not talking about a $10 lock from the hardware store here, these are "high security" locks that are supposed to have keys that cannot ever be copied unless you have the original key codes that were used to key the lock.
Re: (Score:2)
Well FFS, a lot of cars these days have a little RFID tag embedded in the key's handle bit so that an unofficial copy will trip the alarm. You think Washington, DC of all places could figure out how to implement that kind of system. Maybe they don't have the budget to spend $40 and three days on a replacement key :/
Re: (Score:2, Informative)
Re: (Score:2)
What makes you think that they have no backup security? Even the Slashdot article did not imply that Medeco locks were all that protected the Whitehouse and the Pentagon.
Re:Getting the key picture, is the key to success (Score:4, Funny)
Yep. Those little RFID tags are really good since you cant copy them. .....SHIT!!!!
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
I'd eventually be asking for my $18 billion back.
Security professionals (and Slashdot readers) should be very familiar with two truisms: it can always be broken and it can always be copied. If you claim otherwise, you are selling something.
I know locksmith friends who can stare at a key and read the pinning combination off of i
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
In Estonia criminals had "keys" made of titanium. With them and using just force (pins in the lock would break) they could open any car door and start the engine.
The car manufacturers did nothing to improve the locks until there were law requiring an immobiliser.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
What's wrong with Abloy locks? Why don't they just use Abloy?
Abloy disc tumbler locks are great, but they have a serious ease-of-use problem. Since the discs have no return springs keeping them in the "ready" position, they can be inadvertently turned or even just vibrate out of alignment. This requires the user to insert the key and twist it back and forth to "capture", one layer at a time, all the discs before being able to turn the key and open the lock. It's not a hard trick to learn, but it is one more trick than is required for a standard pin tumbler lock, and
There goes (Score:2)
my cheap microfluidics [rsc.org] project...
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Screw your cheap microfludics! ... There goes my etsy store!
This just like how the mythbusters got past other. (Score:2)
This just like how the mythbusters got past other high tech locks.
Re:This just like how the mythbusters got past oth (Score:4, Insightful)
They also had Kari wander around in a giant fluffy bird suit to get past those ultrasonic sensors, IIRC. It's not exactly practical, but it makes for great TV. I'm sure the trial of whoever tries that in DC will be equally amusing.
Re: (Score:2)
Actually it was a fluffy rug that was converted in to a bird suit. ;)
Re: (Score:2, Informative)
IIRC, the fluffy bird suit didn't work.
A simple sheet held up in front of her did.
Not news... (Score:4, Informative)
Re: (Score:2)
In other news, TWH and other places of national security are underprotected because they've not bothered to back their keys up with a secondary system, yes?
Makes sense.
Re: (Score:2)
Where did you read that?
Re: (Score:2)
Didn't, but I think we can safely assume that if we're talking about how easy it is to hack into the place because of a single key, we're talking something that needs a secondary system of authentication (RFID in the keys? A second key? A dongle?) to secure itself.
Here's what I don't get... (Score:5, Interesting)
20 years ago, my house used to have a 3D-key - in other words, it had teeth all-around its central axis. Why? Because it is much harder to manipulate the tumblers that way. Not to mention that just photocopying the key won't work - or won't work as easily.
I'm surprised a high-security key has its teeth still on a line.
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
It *is* the shrinky dink that matters. You can't cut a duplicate Medeco key in metal. Medeco key teeth have an angular component. They are 3 dimensional keys, whereas your usual kwikset or schlage lock are 2 dimensional.
The tumblers in a Medeco lock require some rotation to unlock, as well as vertical lift. That's why this hack is so clever - the shrinky dink or plastic can twist as you jam them into the lock and push up with the backing spline.
Until this, Medeco locks were considered to be uncrackable.
Re:Not news... (Score:5, Insightful)
Of course you can duplicate a Medeco key in metal; Medeco keys are made of metal in the first place. Key control means you can't get the proper blanks from any legitimate source, but it's still a fairly simple hunk of metal.
Medeco locks were never considered "uncrackable". Medeco has claimed they're unpickable, but I think only the Biaxial remains unpicked. But picking is an attack that doesn't require knowledge of the key.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
>Cutting a key by sight based on a key sitting on the seat of an car is apparently a useful skill for locksmiths...
Sigh. My locksmith can't get a working copy 1 times in 3 even when I give him the original to make copies.
If you're just going in and having the key duplicated, there's a pretty good chance your original is crap. Garbage in, garbage out. A key duplicator is like a xerox machine. It makes a copy, but the copy is never going to be quite as good as the original. I keep my duplicator adjusted to within one thousandth of an inch after 10 generations, but even that is sometimes too much for a crappy key. A few "generations" removed from the factory original key by dodos with badly adjusted duplicators, and you'll hav
They protect the White House? (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:They protect the White House? (Score:4, Funny)
Wrong again, Dave. It's sharks with lasers. Everyone knows that.
Wasn't this done w/ Diebold? (Score:5, Interesting)
Put the threat where really is (Score:2, Insightful)
BFD (Score:5, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
"I can duplicate a Medeco key blank with a piece of brass stock and a dremel tool, then cut a perfect key from a photocopy using my HPC Blitz."
So?
Joe Crook can cut a Medeco bitting key out of an old grocery store coupon card and bypass the sidebar and slider in a few seconds without any need for a key machine or any particular skill. That's what the exploit is all about.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Joe Crook can cut a Medeco bitting key out of an old grocery store coupon card and bypass the sidebar and slider in a few seconds without any need for a key machine or any particular skill. That's what the exploit is all about.
It requires skill, just not much. Did I say dremeling a brass blank and cutting with a Blitz requires much skill? If you don't know the operating principles of a Medeco lock, you can't do it, but that's not saying much. The only difference is that it can be done with an X-acto knife instead of an expensive key machine.
p.s. the sidebar isn't "bypassed", the key is cut to pass it in the normal way. The slider is a silly gimmick to give them something to patent, as the patent on Biaxial blanks has run out an
Re:BFD (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
Agreed. The fact that they used a photograph of a key means that security already failed. How do you obtain a picture (to scale) of the key? You have access to the key. So the lock isn't the failure security and key control are the failures.
I wish Abloy PROTEC locks made it to the US sooner (Score:5, Interesting)
I don't know about Medeco 3, but one lock mechanism that was out in other countries for almost four years before making it to the US which is quite pick resistant is Abloy's PROTEC cylinder.
It uses no pins or springs, so bumping is useless. Vibrating the key isn't going to magically move the detainer disks into position. Picking it requires a different technique altogether than pin tumbler locks.
So far, if I recall right, the best picking record for PROTEC cylinders took over 10-11 hours.
Of course, if you want the best in anti pick protection, purchase either an Abloy or Mul-T-Lock Cliq lock. It has a pick resistant mechanical key, as well as a small chip and solenoid with a challenge/response system. If someone does make a key impression, it won't help much. However, for $500 a cylinder, its pricy.
Re:I wish Abloy PROTEC locks made it to the US soo (Score:5, Insightful)
I don't know about Medeco 3, but one lock mechanism that was out in other countries for almost four years before making it to the US which is quite pick resistant is Abloy's PROTEC cylinder.
Trouble with those is that they're ONLY pick resistant. I can drill the face of an Abloy disc-tumbler lock, remove the sidebar, and fill the drilled hole such that no one will notice--- all in a matter of minutes. After that, the old key will still work... and so will a screwdriver. The laundry machines at the apartment I lived in years ago had Abloy PROTEC locks. I never paid for laundry, and no one ever knew the difference.
Of course, if you want the best in anti pick protection, purchase either an Abloy or Mul-T-Lock Cliq lock. It has a pick resistant mechanical key, as well as a small chip and solenoid with a challenge/response system. If someone does make a key impression, it won't help much. However, for $500 a cylinder, its pricy.
That's just electronic access control shrunk down to fit the size of standard key access components and hybridized with mechanical keys. Great if you want to retrofit existing mortise and rim lock installations, but then you're just trading labor cost for material cost. I'd personally go for a keyless prox card system before I'd field a system powered by batteries in the key. It's bad enough dealing with your average dodo trying to use normal locks. Can you imagine the service calls from those dodos who break their keys off because the battery in the key head is dead? Locksmith's dream (service call = money in your pocket), businessman's nightmare (service call = money down the rathole).
I don't understand why people fixate on "pickability". Criminals just don't pick locks. I've been a locksmith since 1995 (minus a couple years when the Army decided I should be in Afghanistan), and I have never seen a case of intrusion that wasn't either a) forced entry, or b) an inside job.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
The reason why pickability (or lack therof) is important is because insurance companies will, in general, cover theft if windows are broken, doors are crowbared, or there is obvious signs of forced entry. Of course, if the person breaking in is caught, its easy to tag them with breaking and entering charges.
If a lock is picked, other than maybe some scratches, there is no evidence, so its harder to get insurance companies to cover losses if someone picks a door or padlock. Its also a lot harder to charge
Picking locks with Shrinky Dinks? (Score:3, Funny)
Errrm...
The places guys insert their shrinky dinks... crazy stuff.
Door security key cards (Score:2, Interesting)
Most All door security keys cards drive a solenoid door strike .
The pro crooks or intruders don't bother with magnetic stripe cards , electronics, , encryption etc,they buy the system and drill a hole in the right place and operate the door strike Directly with a narrow screwdriver or fashioned shorting stripe or wad of tin foil , bypassing all of the electronics and all of the security.
Ironically , The better electronics is more precise making the drill and popping of the door solenoi
Not a huge threat (Score:2, Informative)
This isn't the huge threat to national security that the article would have you believe. The government does not use key based lock systems to secure anything of real high priority. They use digital combination (X-09) locks to secure any information that is classified at secret level or higher. These keys are used in the white house and pentagon, but they are office keys not keys to places where someone could do dire harm to our nation.
Secret Service... (Score:5, Funny)
Yeah, Yeah -- The REAL Threat Is... (Score:2)
Technology is rarely the true threat to security. Likewise, security is rarely the key way to keep things secure.
The real threat is people using the toys, guns, or other tools. Yes, this is basically the "People kill people!" argument but it's true. If other nasty humans didn't want to hurt other humans security wouldn't exist.
Am I the only one? (Score:3, Funny)
The real news I got out of this is: they still make shrinkydinks!?!
Who knew?
I woulda thought they woulda been classified as toxic by now...
I love this stuff (Score:5, Funny)
Kids didn't have credit cards when I was in high school but every lock in our school except the outside doors (which we could sometimes tape or the like) and the principal's office were simple spring locks. Take seconds to open any of them with a piece of plastic. We got so fluid at it we were observed once from a distance and just lied, "Hey, what do you mean? It was unlocked. We were just snooping around." and he didn't push it. Did stupid stuff like swapping teachers' home room desks on different floors or laying out chairs in the auditorium to spell out expletives. A separate group we taught unfortunately got into more hardcore vandalism.
Sensationalist... (Score:3, Insightful)
OK, so the locks have a weakness. What was the point of the statement that they're used in the White House, Pentagon, etc.? You would need access to the lock and Joe Blow ain't gettin' there. Ergo, the statement attempts to create importance where there is none.
Try just walking up to any of the places mentioned in the OP. Can't be done. Layered security? T'ain't kiddin.!
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
These keys have been around for a long time now:
http://www.assaabloy.com/Global/News/Image bank/Products/High res/Abloy_Key2_2649x841.jpg
.
Abloy disc tumbler locks? The trouble with those is that the discs are not spring loaded and occasionally require repeated twisting of the key to get it to seat all the way before opening. Not a good feature when dealing with large numbers of dodos, which most large installations do.