Shape-Shifting Malware Hits the Web 179
Stony Stevenson writes to tell us that in a recent interview, Marc Henauer has revealed that security researchers are falling behind now that malware is starting to be able to change its signature every few hours. "Unfortunately the know-how and construction kits used to create this shape-shifting threat are now readily available and are unleashing a wave of malware based on social engineering techniques. [...] Sweeney believes that a non rules-based monitoring process must be set up to defend all ingress and egress points covering SMTP, DNS, HTTP(s), IM etc."
This is a GOOD thing (Score:5, Insightful)
It's just the anti-virus companies claiming that. (Score:5, Insightful)
The correct way to handle this is to set up your system so that the user cannot ACCIDENTALLY execute any external code.
There's no way to solve the issue of some idiot clicking on everything and putting in the root password whenever asked. So don't bother bringing that case up.
For everyone else, lock the OS files so that it cannot be infected and set the user writable portion to not execute any code. There, the majority of that problem is solved.
Then, ship the default installation without any open ports and you've pretty much solved the worm issue.
But that approach means that the anti-virus companies cannot keep selling you new signature files. So don't expect any of them to support it.
Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:4, Funny)
and you do that by asking cancel or allow for each app.
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The REST of the users out there are not as program/os/security savvy and would tell their PC to allow the app so they can watch that adult video or so they can have that pretty screensaver. They become so trained to just click allow that it defeats the purpose. As a sysadmin and a former helpdesker, I can tell you that the majority of computer users are a bunch of crack-tar
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Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:2)
Start->Run... "gpedit.msc" -> Windows Settings -> Security Settings -> Software Restriction Policies. If there is nothing in there create a new policy, then under Addition Rules create a path rule for your data and download folders. It then becomes impossible to execute anything in these directories.
Locking the OS files and registry is as simple as running as a normal user account instead of admin.
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As long as you can avoid every piece of software that uses IE's integrated libraries and services for its own web access and rendering. Good luck with that.
Really, "iexplore.exe" is the least of your problems. The real evil is in the half-assed DLLs and associated components.
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Good luck with that.
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What, no VM or Boot Camp?
Anyways, a clever answer, and in the final analysis, the correct one. But, violates the implied constraint of GP's question: While running Windows, how do you avoid using Internet Explorer?
My answer was "not as easily as it seems". Your answer was "mu". Very Zen.
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Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:5, Insightful)
How about giving the user more choices? You might want to let them run it in a sandbox, or run it without internet access, or chroot it.
If they had a way to express their intent, and actually control how much they give away when they click... it would go a VERY long way towards fixing things, probably 99%.
--Mike--
Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:4, Insightful)
And how many users, pray tell, do you think would understand what those options are, or which one to pick for any given program. If your answer is > 1 %, you have a much higher opinion of the average computer user's understanding of what they're doing than I do.
Re:It's just the anti-virus companies claiming tha (Score:5, Interesting)
If they had a way to express their intent, and actually control how much they give away when they click... it would go a VERY long way towards fixing things, probably 99%.
Have you ever tried Comodo's free firewall [comodo.com] or free antivirus [comodo.com]???
Both of them use whitelisting / safelists. Anything not whitelisted needs explicit permission from the user before they're able to read/write/delete/create a file or directory or access the internet. These two FREE (as in beer) products literally give you a similar level of control over what runs on your computer.
The Comodo antivirus doesn't work on Vista right now but will soon. Then again, this is Slashdot so we're all running XP right ?!?
For sandboxing, you can use VMWare Server (free as in beer) to generate an image to run in VMPlayer (also free as in beer) which you can then use within Windows. If you get VMWorkstation (not free but well worth it), you can get fine-grained control over snapshotting.
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How about giving the user more choices? You might want to let them run it in a sandbox, or run it without internet access, or chroot it.
Right idea, wrong UI. Let it run, by default, in a severely restricted environment - no access to the network (other than possibly one remote address, which is the site from which it was originally downloaded). No ability to access the filesystem outside a private, per-application component. If a process needs more than this, then pop up an irritating box asking for elevated permissions and remember the setting. Make the box look scary so the default response is to click 'no' (and if this happens let
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Trying to wikipedia your way to a +5, eh? (Score:3, Insightful)
For everyone else, lock the OS files so that it cannot be infected and set the user writable portion to not execute any code. There, the majority of that problem is solved.
This is what you said:
You should NEVER have to trust an application to contain itself to a set of capabilities. That's what Operating Systems are supposed to do for you.
So, he said that we should control executables at the OS level, and your response is "no, we should control executables at the OS level (plus a wikipedia link to a sort-of but not really related problem)." Hold on, your brilliance is hurting my eyes.
Come on mods, this guy didn't even read the parent! I know he has a wikipedia link, but follow the damn conversation!
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The difference is that the USER should get to pick which side effects they want to let a given random piece of code get away with, regardless if it was written in Redmond or somewhere else.
There's currently no way for a user to specify what a program can/can't do other than to create an account, set the permissions on EVERYTHING it might touch, and then hope it doesn't somehow do something bad anyway due to a bug s
Attention Mods! Parent is karma whoring (Score:2)
Seriously:
It's like structured code vs assembler.... you can do the same thing in either, in theory.
Sounds smart until you read the gp. Just throwing in the name of a couple programming languages is not insightful.
written in Redmond or somewhere else
The GP never made a comparison between any two methods. This is just pandering to the "well, I like to use the softw
Re:Attention Mods! Parent is karma whoring (Score:4, Interesting)
I'm sorry if my writing wasn't up to snuf.
A lot of people will tell you that an Object Capability System can't do anything more than one based on Access Control Lists. This argument is much like the ones posed against Structured programming when it came out... the opponents to change all said "well.. it doesn't really do anything new"... and if you picked enough nits, you could technically say they were right, in terms of the expressiveness of the program.
However, in practice it's not just about the types of computation your code you can express, but rather the programmers productivity. Structured programming made it easier to get things done. It saved programmers time.
In theory, in an ACL based system, you can run a program inside of a sandbox. You first create a new account for a program to run inside of, and then lock down the permissions of the rest of the system to make it safe. This is a non-trival task, which must be done perfectly if your program you wish to run turns out to be malicious.
A capabilities based system is designed from the start to enforce a policy of least privilege. That means that a program should given only the capabilities it requires to execute the task at hand, and nothing more. To run a program in a "sandbox" requires no more action that only giving it a sandbox to play in, the system enforces the rest. Not only that, it makes it possible for an end user to decide what rights to give a program without having to check all of the rest of the system.
The lack of awareness of the Capability Object Model severely constrains the possible futures that can be imagined by most of us, and we're making bad choices because of that ignorance.
I'm just trying to shine some light into the darkness.
--Mike--
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More like Everything Old is New Again (Score:2, Informative)
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Ah, Dark Avenger Mutation Engine. Sheesh. That brings back memories of frisk and Vesselin Bontchev holding forth on VIRUS-L. The good ol' days.
Dang. It's been at least 1 1/2 decades that experts have been warning that signature-based malware detection isn't gonna cut it. Heck, Fred Cohen warned us in 1987. [wikipedia.org] So what do we get? Nothin' but signature-based antivirus. Sucks bad to be us. Great time to be an antivirus vendor though.
Re:This is a GOOD thing (Score:5, Interesting)
Imagine having two broken hands. You would have no way to directly take the money from your wallet and manage it yourself, you'd be forced somehow give your entire wallet to someone each time you wanted to pay. It would be almost impossible to prevent them from slipping an extra $20 unless you happened to see it. You're forced to trust someone completely.
For the foreseeable future, we're all dealing with two broken hands. There's no way to pick which parts of our set of capabilities we want to hand to a program. We have no way of stopping it from taking our personal data and sending it away, holding it hostage, or subtly sabotaging it.
I want my metaphorical fingers back.
--Mike--
Re:This is a GOOD thing (Score:5, Interesting)
Of course, arms races are usually a bad thing. They waste resources yet deliver very little. We need to start thinking about building a new infrastructure that is not susceptible to such simplistic attacks. e.g. Managed languages, jailed environments, trust relationships for email servers, and other such steps to data security. Unfortunately, there is so much time and money invested in our current infrastructure that there's no chance the market would make such a change unless absolutely forced to do so. Thus we come full circle back to the GPP's point.
Re:This is a GOOD thing (Score:4, Interesting)
Even worse is that most viruses today are part of a Botnet that has Command and Control capabilities. So the hiding ability of the virus can be updated on a regular basis. Version 1 selected between compression and OTP? No problem! Version 2 will add reordering of code segments!
Quite nasty, these bugs.
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One of the neatest things I've seen so far is a server which gave one-off encrypted executables based on the clients ip address, the boot strapper then had to confirm the ip address before it could decrypt it, or download another version and try again.
Maybe arms race is a good thing (Score:2)
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Anti-virus writers beat this scheme by running the decryption
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We could have had the same technology without wars a lot cheaper. In war we basicly hire some scientists to work with a problem and we use e.g. 1% of less of the resources to this. And 99% of the resources to build machines that will be destroyed very soon on purpose. And in addition we kill educated people who could instead of dieing do someting usefull.
If instead we would
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It is impossible, for arbitrary code, to even tell which parts of the code are code, and which are data. Working out which bits of the code are a morphing routine is unimaginably harder.
I love it. (Score:5, Funny)
Re:I love it. (Score:5, Funny)
Enumerating the Bad is not a good idea (Score:5, Insightful)
Will we now see true evolution of software viruses?
This is pretty much #1 and #2 in this list of The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security [ranum.com].
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I don't know how that would work in Windows, but it generally works pretty well in Ubuntu, with the advantage that you can quickly add a set of applications.
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Software becomes Read-only
Data is stored in data files
Owners machines poll for software installed, check against whitelist, everything else = BAD and has to be verified by owner
Switching verification off is a possiblity, but defeats purpose.
Whitelist gets updated nightly with verified "good" software
Donate now to DW's AV Startup w/ Paypal
Can someone explain what this means? (Score:5, Insightful)
What exactly is a "non rules-based monitoring process?" I thought I had some clue about security procedures, but I'm be hard pressed to describe what such a process might be. Even more importantly, what would it cost to implement? TFA is no help here, consisting of the usual hand-waving about the never-ending arms race between malware writers and the rest of us.
We all know what the most effective solution to this problem would be. Funny how it's never mentioned in any of these articles.
Re:Can someone explain what this means? (Score:5, Interesting)
Specifically, http outbound access should be allowed for firefox. The firefox binary is
Basically, security should be SElinux and Tripwire. Those two tools (or equivalents on alternate Operating Environments) cover most of the threats.
Malware cannot then hide as an existing program. New programs should have strict security profiles that prevent "excess" (network, disk, cpu, memory) usage.
It would be possible to create malware, but it would be worthless, in the sense that the resources that could be misappropriated would be minimal (note that Unix and Unix-like systems have had ulimit for ages -- SElinux expands on the idea). A particular malware COULD attempt escalate to root, but SElinux would prevent the attempt to escalate the "usual" way. Specifically, firefox has NO REASON to gain root, and this can be prevented.
What would the worst malware look like in this senario? A javascript in firefox because it can do almost unlimited port 80 access. Email can be limited to qmail or sendmail (and even further limited by the expected amount).
Unix-like systems (with the exception of MAC OS X, which frightens me a bit) are heading here. Intrusion alert systems coupled with execution limiting, role based security systems (apparmor and selinex).
"AppArmor is an application security tool designed to provide an easy-to-use security framework for your applications. AppArmor proactively protects the operating system and applications from external or internal threats, even zero-day attacks, by enforcing good behavior and preventing even unknown application flaws from being exploited. AppArmor security policies, called "profiles", completely define what system resources individual applications can access, and with what privileges. A number of default profiles are included with AppArmor, and using a combination of advanced static analysis and learning-based tools, AppArmor profiles for even very complex applications can be deployed successfully in a matter of hours."
Of course there is no need for malware detection with this model. Tripwire already does a better job than any "anti-malware" program could, because it snapshots the OK state of all files. *anything* that differs is then suspect. AppArmor/SElinux provides for the expected BEHAVIOR of all programs. If they differ, they are suspect.
As you have probably noted, this protection does not accomodate "rootkits". However, a rootkit cannot be "defended" against, or even detected when running under it (at least if it is a reasonably well done rootkit). But this simple approach will eliminate all, or almost all, malware seen in the wild. With no need for anti-malware updates, or subscriptions, etc.
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Apple realizes that OS X has, as a significant share of its market, this thing called "normal people." "Normal people," in case you've never encountered one before, have no clue how to use any of the stuff you just outlined above.
The real issue at hand here is the following:
1) The OS has to ask the user whet
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Doing this on the Windows side of the world is, of course, impossible, because you can't patch the kernel there, and there's no equivalent of Linux Security Modules.
I guess the closest we could get would be to run apps in Wine with an AppArmor profile for each one. 8)
No, it's not freakin' Unix (Score:3, Insightful)
As the article states, this malware is all based on social engineering. If you can convince somebody to run a program because it will show them the latest celebrity sex tape, it doesn't matter what OS they're running. Right now it only works on Windows because the malware authors know that they can get 90% of the market by doing only 10% of t
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I'm sorry, but this is Slashdot. I'll need an automobile analogy, please.
Computer Immune Systems (Score:3, Interesting)
He's talking about computer immune systems. Here's a link to an IBM research paper from the top of the Google results for "virus immune system c
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However aren't you both really talking about a solution whose implementation, if if ever happens, is decades into the future? We have hundreds of millions of computers in the world running operating systems and applications that represent the current state of technology. Wouldn't these approaches literally require all those computers switch to entirely new operating systems and applications than are installed today?
If so, I don't see this as a r
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I'd also wonder what the user interface would look like. Popups that say "application X has tried to use port Z
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The fact that the global computing infrastructure is so homogeneously based an operating system as vulnerable as Windows just never gets discussed in these sorts of articles. Most Windows users I know just accept that virus protection, spyware protection, and the occasional reinstallation of the OS, are all the normal state of affairs in computing
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Any idea where I can get something like that? I haven't seen a copy of KeyKos, CapROS, or Eros sitting on the shelves at Best Buy lately.
--Mike--
How about a ring security model? ala Intel ISA? (Score:3, Insightful)
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You are just wrong, stud. (Score:2, Interesting)
Linux and Mac to some extent are a solution because they're not targeted as much. Because they don't have the market share.
Bullshit. Bullshit. This argument has been fully debunked and it is utter bullshit. I can't believe I still see it on /. of all places.
Malware writers go for botnets of puny windows desktop machines because that is low hanging fruit. One decent server with an always-on fiber connection to the net is worth thousands of times more than your dinky little ADSL gaming machine for just about anything that you would a botnet for. You know what the market share looks like on the server side? Most of the bi
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You must be new here.
It won't end until there is extreme violence (Score:3, Insightful)
These assholes call themselves "marketers." They have gotten away with it for so long, they often call a great portion of this "legitimate business." It's not enough to criminalize this stuff... especially when law enforcement generally has no idea how to prosecute or make a case against any of it.
There should be a series of web sites built that creates a "hit list" of people responsible for this crap. That's where the end of this should begin.
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Look how well playing wack-a-mole has worked for drug enforcement. Rather, look how it hasn't worked at all.
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Is I told you so a meme? (Score:5, Interesting)
It's possibly in your router's flash by now, or your motherboard's flash, or sitting on a CD or CE player's flash, or an MP3 player. It only has to wait till it needs to start spreading, and be dormant there too, then one day you notice missing files, or there is an outbreak of serious malware globally. Yes, tinfoil hat stuff, but it is possible, and as time ticks on it is becoming more probable.
Nobody wants to believe it, but it is possible. If it is possible, it will only be a matter of time...
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Work Uniform (Score:4, Funny)
I thought shape-shifting malware was the official business attire of geeks everywhere.
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A Blast from the Past.... (Score:5, Insightful)
Tequila is the first widespread polymorphic virus found in the wild. Polymorphic viruses make detection difficult for virus scanners by changing their appearance with each new infection.
Sweeney believes that a non rules-based monitoring process must be set up to defend all ingress and egress points covering SMTP, DNS, HTTP(s), IM etc."
Its called heuristics and its been in use for a while.
Enjoy,
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a possible solution (Score:4, Interesting)
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System updates would be allowed pretty much any side effect (but not the user folders).
Web browsers could only connect to the net, and their local folder, but nothing else.
etc, etc.
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Sounds a lot like Konqueror to me. Having the ability to treat local and remote files equivalently seems like a good thing to me. In fact, one of the features I like best about Konqueror is its ability to handle all sorts of URLs like smb:// and fish://. I don't use it routinely to brows
Shellcode polymorphism (Score:2)
Any AV vendor who isn't prepared for it by now has grossly failed their customers.
This is news? (Score:3, Funny)
It's beginning to look like... (Score:2)
SELinux
Firefox
???
Security for a while
Profit!
Repeat as necessary.
Windows is so blown up, security is pointless.
Better website design/security doesn't help. The nasties will create their own malware sites quicker than you can say 'globals off'. And detection in Windows is pretty much like your oil light on the car dash - 'you are hosed, just letting you know it's bad.'
I'm thinking my wife's next machine is running Kubuntu. Mine at home too. All I need is a wa
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I wuz huked.
It was a couple of years later when I was down to the Novell branch that one of the guys shows me a web server running on his lab NetWare server. It was something he called NAMP.
I waz huked agin. Nobody else believed me. Then, they didn't care. Feh. Of course, I gave up on NetWare.
Funny the stuff we think is cool, new, or just plain fun.
Not to sound like a dick (Score:2)
Nothing about our industry makes sense any more (Score:2)
We need per-app permissions. This doesn't have to be obvious, but when you install an app, the system needs to pop up a box before a single line of code is run giving options that the software is asking for.
Net access, write to own directory, write to system directories, use
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We need per-app permissions.
Agreed. We (sort of) have them. Vista, OS X, and Linux are all shipping with Application level access control frameworks, by default, these days. The problem is getting it applied and getting a workable UI and workflow.
This doesn't have to be obvious, but when you install an app, the system needs to pop up a box before a single line of code is run giving options that the software is asking for.
I think this is too cumbersome and too complex for the average user. Rather, I think we need to go further. Apps should ship with an ACL that specifies what it should need. Anti-malware companies and organizations should verify these and provide white lists and checksums. That way pre-in
AV is so dead to me (Score:2)
I never run it. I've only been hacked a few times, and knew it almost right away. It's the ones you don't see that worry me; but if you can't see them, what makes you think the AV companies can see them? Before the AV companies will write signatures for them, somebody has to notice them, and if "noticing them" is automated, then that implies that polymorphism is not a problem--but it's common knowledge that it IS a problem for AV vendors. Besides, you have to *pay* for AV, and it slows your machine down
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Something you are doing isn't working
The first time was nimdA. It was an exploit that affected Outlook Express. AFAIK, it was one of those rare occasions when you didn't have to be looking at HTML mail, or execute an attachment. I don't use OE anymore. The other times have been before I got agressive with the Internet Explorer security settings. Now that I've clamped down, so far so good. So. It's a learning process, true; but I like it better than learning which AV products are good and bad.
Po
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Until we get to the point where you can assign permissions to every single program for every single role you expect that program to fulfill, it's not going to get much better.
--Mike--
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It's true! Just a few minutes ago I was sorely tempted to type "sudo apt-get install shapeshiftvirus". If Linux gets more popular, it's just a matter of time until shapeshiftvirus gets ported to it. Then, assuming the virus is GPLed, Debian will enthusiastically put it into their repository. It'll trickle down to Ubuntu. When that happens, users all over the world are going to choose to install it, type in t
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It might make us feel better, but it's not a solution.
--Mike--
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Funny thing, most people say "that won't work", but are unwilling to even try. I'm sorry, but I guarantee you that if we get a couple of dozen hackers hacked up, machete style, it will be a deterrent.
Guaranteed!
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