Follow Slashdot blog updates by subscribing to our blog RSS feed

 



Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
×
Security The Internet

Mass Hack Infects Tens of Thousands of Sites 259

An anonymous reader writes "Tens of thousands of Web sites have been compromised by an automated SQL injection attack, and although some have been cleaned, others continue to serve visitors a malicious script that tries to hijack their PCs using multiple exploits, security experts said this weekend. Hacked sites included both .edu and .gov domains, the SANS Institute's Internet Storm Center reported in a warning posted last Friday. The ISC also reported that several pages of security vendor CA's Web site had been infected. Roger Thompson, the chief research officer at Grisoft, pointed out that the hacked sites could be found via a simple Google search for the domain that hosts the malicious JavaScript. On Saturday, said Thompson, the number of sites that had fallen victim to the attack numbered more than 70,000. 'This was a pretty good mass hack,' said Thompson, in a post to his blog." By Sunday a second round of the same attack had infected over 90,000 servers.
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

Mass Hack Infects Tens of Thousands of Sites

Comments Filter:
  • ...those of you who thought "Awesome!"

    I am no fan of malicious hacking, but my inner geek always stirs when I read something like this, much like watching someone in the real world accomplishing an amazing but insane feat, like those guys with the squirrel suits base-jumping, or something *cough*

    Question, where any *nix or L*X machines compromised? Might be a dumb question, so bash me all you want if it was...
    • by ricebowl ( 999467 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:25AM (#21952806)

      I don't know about "awesome," my first thoughts were along the lines of "oh...for fuck's sake..." and "how do I check?"

      While I share your appreciation of feats, I'd prefer the feat achieved to be a positive application of the knowledge rather than a mass-hack.

      But hey; that's just me being a grumpy old folk I guess.

    • by slashbob22 ( 918040 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:26AM (#21952812)

      Question, where any *nix or L*X machines compromised? Might be a dumb question, so bash me all you want if it was...
      Considering it is a SQL injection attack I would assume that any system (of whatever OS) which is running a SQL database and is not scrubbing their input is vulnerable.
      • by 0100010001010011 ( 652467 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @10:43AM (#21953722)
        Yes, sounds like someone didn't Sanitize their input. [xkcd.com]

        If only they had little Bobby Tables doing the testing.
      • Except, there are no reported infections on Unix or Linux and the infections itself seems tailored to attack MS-SQL (relying on it's specific system tables to identify tables to infect).

        Also automated attacks like this usually rely on a specific injection vector (usually a common url on domains where the injection can be carried out). And although no one has explained exactly what software was exploited to do the injection, it might well be windows-only software, but that's just speculation on why it might
    • Re: (Score:2, Informative)

      by fmobus ( 831767 )
      TFA guesses the exploit is a simple SQL injection where the injected code consists of calls to MS SQL Server's sysobject calls. I imagine this would give the attacker some file system access, allowing for injection of script tags pointing to the attacking javascript, and so on. This is a clever attack, once again allowed only by MS insistence in allowing things like an SQL Server to execute stuff not related to its task. Note that, while this is convenient and useful, it should never be allowed by default.
      • Re: (Score:2, Interesting)

        by AndGodSed ( 968378 )
        Ah there you have it then.

        Cue the chorus; "Windows machines are only attacked because there are so many users..."

        Sheesh, forgetting that 70% of servers run Linux...
      • Re:Okay Hands Up... (Score:5, Informative)

        by pwilli ( 1102893 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:37AM (#21952932)
        It was even simpler than that (according to TFA):

        1. SQL-Query for all tables in the database
        2. Search for text-columns in table
        3. add script-tag to every entry in those columns
        4. hope at least some of those entries get included into the webpage without filtering (or escaping) the injected HTML

        No need for FS access or root rights (as another ./er suggested), but also not really spectacular creative.
        • by weicco ( 645927 )

          Huh. This reminds me one project where I stumbled into a huge SQL injection vulnerability. They we're creating SQL commands inside stored procedure by concatenating strings, without any input validation of course, and happily executed those. SQL Server wasn't directly connected to web but there was only a tiny ASP.NET layer which loaded every possible POST variable to the procedure. And again, no validations of any kinds, of couse. I think ASP.NET has somekind of protection against SQL injections but I, for

          • by Tim C ( 15259 )
            It does, but there's nothing forcing you to use them - you can still grab a raw connection object yourself and hand-craft SQL concatenating strings without sanity checking them if you so wish.

            Of course if you do you shouldn't be writing network-aware code.
        • So question: What injection were they using to gain access to the DB to query it in the first place?

          AFAICT I shouldn't be affected because my server is Linux and none of my users have access from anything but localhost, unless they were using an injection attack through some crappy script I might have had installed.
          • by anotherone ( 132088 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @11:59AM (#21954812)
            ah ok let me just look this up on the vulnerability chart here ok, your server is Linux... very good, very good your databases are all only accessible to localhost, ok looks like you are EXACTLY as vulnerable to SQL injection as everyone else. Running Linux and preventing remote users on your database does NOT protect you. If you have a script on your server that doesn't sanitize even one input, you are just asking for trouble. you WILL get hacked sooner or later.
            • Whoop-de-fucking-doo. Read my post. I'm asking what script has the vulnerability. I'm not claiming some sort of immunity just because I'm running Linux.
              • Not to mention that the exploit attacks a feature specific to SQL Server. Unless you're suggesting I'm running some magical Linux version of SQL Server as well.
          • by misleb ( 129952 )

            So question: What injection were they using to gain access to the DB to query it in the first place?

            That was my first question. Since it is a SQL injection, it is mostly platform independent, but for a mass hack there must be some common common webapp that they exploited. I mean, i know SQL injection is fairly trivial, but you still have to intelligently poke around a little bit to find exactly where and how to do it. If they DID managed to not only automate the SQL injection attacks on a massive scale bu

        • by Durzel ( 137902 )
          This would actually work really well on a lot of websites.

          It's essential to sanitise user input, but how often do web developers assume their own data source could be tainted? Most of the code I've seen has had a strong distrust of the user but had a open floodgate as far as the already stored data was concerned. I can see why a hack like this would be successful.
      • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

        by Bert64 ( 520050 )
        Or they could have used the xp_cmdshell function of mssql to actually execute commands, often as the SYSTEM user and thus infected the servers themselves with the malware payload.
      • Re:Okay Hands Up... (Score:5, Informative)

        by Anonymous Coward on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @10:14AM (#21953320)
        Helps to understand the database, doesn't it? The "sysobject calls" are just reads to the underlying tables that store the database schema. The injection attack uses sysobjects to determine what tables exist. They did use sysobjects which is specific to MS SQL Server and Sybase, but they could have just as easily used INFORMATION_SCHEMA which are a series of ANSI compliant views that contain the same information and work on virtually all databases.

        This attack has nothing to do with system access of the database server. Other than the fact that the specific exploit looks to sysobjects, there is nothing specific about this attack to MS SQL Server at all. This same kind of attack would work just as well on any other web server with an application using any other database. The problem isn't that the web server or the database has a vulnerability, rather that the specific web application itself does. SQL injection attacks are stupidly common because the people who write web applications, on any platform, simply ignore written secure programming conventions.

        For those who don't know what SQL injection is, it is caused when the web application does something stupid like concatenate unvalidated user input directly into a SQL string that is then sent to the database. This enables the attacker to pass user input which contains portions of SQL that will be also be sent to the database and executed under the security context of the web application. More often than not the developer who made this stupid mistake also made the stupid mistake of connecting to the database using significantly higher privileges than necessary, possibly even root/admin level privileges. Thus, the attacker can do virtually anything they want, from inserting new data to dropping objects and breaking the web application entirely, if they felt like it.

        Basic rules when developing a database-driven web site:

        1. Never concat input into SQL. In fact, avoid dynamic SQL entirely. Use stored procedures with parameter binding so that user input can never be used to inject SQL statements to the database.
        2. Always validate/encode user input. Even if you stave off SQL injection it's still possible for an attacker to attempt to hide HTML or JavaScript in their input. If the web application stores and displays the information as it has been entered it would be possible for the attacker to embed malicious script into the content sent to the browser. Most frameworks have the ability to find this material in user input, or you could encode it so that it's not executed by the browser and shown as plain text.
        3. Always use a database connection with the lowest necessary priveleges. This reduces the possible attack surface by preventing a successful attack from having the leverage to compromise the data or the database server itself. Couple this with item 1 and you have a security context in which the web application can only execute a handful of stored procedures and cannot directly read/write to any of the user tables.
        • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

          by Tablizer ( 95088 )
          1. Never concat input into SQL. In fact, avoid dynamic SQL entirely. Use stored procedures with parameter binding so that user input can never be used to inject SQL statements to the database.

          But things such as Query-By-Example with wild-card (LIKE) potential, a very powerful technique, cannot easily be done using stored procedures. We would have to cripple the power of computers and have programmers wasting time writing trivial queries/reports for users and/or a combinatorial explosion of query forms (I'
    • by Alioth ( 221270 )
      Well, it is a dumb question - the TFA states that the attack used specific features of Microsoft SQL Server.

      I was just surprised it wasn't yet another exploit in phpbb.
  • by thechanklybore ( 1091971 ) * on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:21AM (#21952766) Homepage
    Woah, I was almost worried for a second before I read it was Microsoft specific!

    My darling Apache and PostgreSQL may you never let evildoers overflow your fair buffers.

    *wipes brow*

    • For performance and security reasons, does anyone with real developers run SQL on an externally exposed website?
      • by rho ( 6063 )

        What do you mean? Are there Web sites that have SQL in their code? Of course.

        • by daeg ( 828071 )
          He meant running a SQL server on the same server as the web server.
          • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

            by cHiphead ( 17854 )
            Almost every shared hosting and VPS out there does that... just not with MS SQL quite so often
          • I *meant* that the database of a public server, for security and performance reasons, should not be SQL. One might be forced to do so for contractual or "corporate policy" reasons, but it's generally a pretty bad idea for the sort of reason we're seeing right now.
      • Yes. But it's MySQL and none of the users have access from anything but localhost. So it's kind of a moot point unless they find a remote exploit in MySQL itself that doesn't require a valid login, and that's a long shot.
        • That's exactly the sort of approach I'd recommend. One might, *might* add a read-only client or guest for permitting access from other local servers, or for developers to download and use the database locally, or for system monitoring.. One might also sanely add a master/master server in parallel, for failover operations.
    • "It's possible that only Microsoft SQL Server databases were hacked with this particular version of the robot since the script relies on the sysobjects table that this database contains."

      Doesn't mean that the 'bot can't be tweaked. I think that someone is using this as proof of concept.

      • by upside ( 574799 )
        Of course it can be "tweaked" - if there is a vulnerability in a web application or an Internet-accessible service. Like the grandparent, for a moment I was worried there was a vulnerability in the LA[M|P]P stack or a particular CMS. Not so. In this case it was a vulnerability in Microsoft MDAC [microsoft.com]. It's pretty trivial to exploit old vulnerabilities, so the main newsworthy part here is that there are so many unpatched systems.
    • by caluml ( 551744 )
      Well, unfortunately, Apache and Postgres are not magically safe. However, mod_security [modsecurity.org] can definitely help secure Apache, by filtering suspicious requests.
    • Re: (Score:3, Funny)

      by bberens ( 965711 )
      Microsoft has saved us all once again. If Microsoft had not trained developers all across the world to use it's proprietary extensions rather than ANSI compatible SQL then something important might have been hit by this attack rather than poorly coded webapps running MSSQL. Thank you Microsoft for taking this bullet for us.

      /too thick?
  • this kind of crap ain't gonna stop until we have a fundamental change in our approach to security: and that is we use a WHITELIST to authorize execution of the programs we trust and exclude EVERYTHING else.

    trying to identify and exclude malware has fallen short of meeting our needs

    and that demonstration continues week after week after week after week as the hacking gets worse and worse

    if we are going to use the internet for business purposes this is UNACCEPTABLE. Change has to happen.

    NO SIGNATURE? NO EXEC
    • by Antique Geekmeister ( 740220 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:30AM (#21952854)
      That's right. Just make sure it has a GPL or possibly an Apache license, and your security status will improve quite a bit.
    • dumb or troll ? (Score:2, Insightful)

      by erlehmann ( 1045500 )
      the problem is nothing that has to do with signed code. signing code "only" authenticates it and does not say that there are no security holes.

      it has, however, something to do with specific precations not being taken: with selinux or apparmor for example this probably wouldn't have happended simply because they handle application privileges in a different (OMHO: better) way - through profiles.
      • Re:dumb or troll ? (Score:5, Informative)

        by Rich0 ( 548339 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @10:09AM (#21953248) Homepage
        Uh - this attack didn't involve the execution of any "code" - at least nothing that selinux/etc would recognize as such. SQL Server was hit exclusively not because of any particular vulnerability - but because the attack used syntax specific to that server only.

        This is an SQL injection attack. That is when a poorly-written application does not sanitize its input, and passes it onto a database server as part of a SQL script. The malicious input terminates the command the application was running and starts some other command running. It has no access to anything in the system other than the data in the database - which is all this attack compromised. However, that data in tht database was then used by the application to render html output, which then passed the exploit scripts onto web clients.

        This is analogous to a trojan that wipes out all of a user's files in ~ in unix. Simply running as non-root will do nothing to prevent it from working - the user has access to delete their own files already.

        The attack merely used the applications write-access to its own database to modify the database contents - something that is nearly impossible to automatically protect against at the database server level. However, almost all database servers (including SQL Server I'm sure) does offer a semi-manual form of protection - a parametized query. If you prepare a query and put parameters in it, and then pass on user-input data in the parameters, the server will refuse to use the user-input data as anything other than data. Application authors just need to use this feature...
        • Re:dumb or troll ? (Score:4, Informative)

          by lrohrer ( 147725 ) <.moc.derauqsl. .ta. .rerhorl.> on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @10:36AM (#21953624) Homepage
          Not at all impossible to prevent!

          Webserver user should only have read access to only the tables required. Writes should always go through stored procedures. The SP has write access but not the user. The SP must also do a second (or third) scrubbing of the data.

          It can also make sense to have to databases. One that serves the web pages and another that handles updates.
        • Application authors should sanitize not only user input, but also the data they get from the database. This would go a long way towards making the web server resistant against web application vulnerabilities: if you exploit a vulnerability, you get the UID of the webserver. This UID actually does not need to own anything, or have write permissions on anything, except log files and application databases. I.e. with proper file permissions, you could do not much more than writing to the database, circumventing
        • > This is an SQL injection attack.

          So, am I correct in thinking a simple AddSlashes() addition to the server side script will prevent this? Other posts imply (heavily) that it's not as simple as that, but when I read "SQL injection attack" I think "AddSlashes()".
        • 'Uh - this attack didn't involve the execution of any "code"'

          "Tens of thousands of websites belonging to Fortune 500 corporations, state government agencies and schools have been infected with malicious code that attempts to engage in click fraud and steal online game credentials [theregister.co.uk] from people who visit the destinations"

          "The injections included javascript that redirected end users to the rogue site, which then attempted to exploit multiple vulnerabilities to install key-logging software that stole passw
    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by Anonymous Coward
      Hypothetical signed program checklist:

      * SQL server: SIGNED
      * Web server: SIGNED

      Well, in this case you are still vulnerable to an SQL injection attack...
    • The average person is not going to be able to tell the difference between "benware" and malware, especially if they are tired of clicking through dialog boxes to approve programs. They'll just ignore it like they ignore clickwraps.

      There's not nearly enough digital signing, even from reputable sources, to make "No signatrue? No execute" work. You can't get the things you want by applying this policy, and because people don't apply the policy, nobody bothers to go through the effort of signing. You would n
      • Re: (Score:2, Funny)

        by John Hasler ( 414242 )
        > There's not nearly enough digital signing, even from reputable sources, to make "No
        > signatrue? No execute" work. You can't get the things you want by applying this policy,
        > and because people don't apply the policy, nobody bothers to go through the effort of
        > signing.

        I install only signed code and I get everything I want. I use Debian.
    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by lhorn ( 528432 )
      A whitelist wouldn't stop this, MsSQL would run, being on it...
      If the whitelist specified that MsSQL was not allowed to load and execute code from links in data, perhaps that will do it.
      Separation of code and data would fix the situation. I for one would be able to live with the reduced functionality.
    • NO SIGNATURE? NO EXECUTE.
      NO GO.

      Who is going to sign these apps that are "legit"? Microsoft? The goobermint? Another godsawful clusterfuck a la Verisign?

      No thank you. Better that moronic admins get thier charges hacked up than we can't run our *NIX boxen because one of the above collection of scumbags won't sign source-built copies of Apache. (Sometimes the defaults aren't good enough)
    • by Bert64 ( 520050 )
      People should be browsing the web from appliances anyway, not full blown computers...
      If you build a small unix box where the only areas the user can write to are mounted noexec, and all executable areas are read only it becomes much harder to get malware on the system, even with a clueless user.
      The only way you could execute something is by exploiting one of the client apps, and that would still have to further acquire root privileges in order to do any major damage or make itself survive a restart.
      For upda
    • by geekoid ( 135745 )
      This specific kind of attack can only be prevented with proper coding techniques. It's 1 or two simple lines of code somebody didn't put in. Not just an amateur mistake, but sloppy as well.

  • by Yaztromo ( 655250 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:24AM (#21952790) Homepage Journal

    Add this simple rule:

    http://*.uc8010.com/*

    Yaz.

    • by martyb ( 196687 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:47AM (#21953040)

      Another approach is to just block it in your HOSTS file:

      127.0.0.1 uc8010.com

      Or, even better, use an updated HOSTS file which has entries to block malicious sites: (on last check, this blocked over 16,000 addresses!): http://www.mvps.org/winhelp2002/hosts.zip [mvps.org]

      Description and explanation is here [mvps.org].

      • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

        by Yaztromo ( 655250 )

        Another approach is to just block it in your HOSTS file:

        127.0.0.1 uc8010.com

        Just FYI, doing my own quick Google search, it appears that the hosts used by the bulk of these attacks is actually c.uc8010.com and n.uc8010.com. Indeed, it looks like all one-letter hostnames are used for this domain. So modification of your HOSTS should be made accordingly to ensure all hosts from this domain are indeed re-routed.

        Yaz.

        • by martyb ( 196687 )

          Another approach is to just block it in your HOSTS file: 127.0.0.1 uc8010.com

          Just FYI, doing my own quick Google search, it appears that the hosts used by the bulk of these attacks is actually c.uc8010.com and n.uc8010.com. Indeed, it looks like all one-letter hostnames are used for this domain. So modification of your HOSTS should be made accordingly to ensure all hosts from this domain are indeed re-routed. Yaz.

          Yup. You're right. I took a look at the latest HOSTS file I downloaded and it does the right thing:

          127.0.0.1 c.uc8010.com #[Javascript.Exploit]
          127.0.0.1 n.uc8010.com

      • Another approach is to just block it in your HOSTS file:

        A filtered DNS server goes a long way and often is already blocking the content before you learn about it. A filtered DNS server isn't just for NSFW sites. It's a good idea. Common phishing sites, malware, and porn are filtered cross platform. I use it all the time now.

        http://www.scrubit.com/ [scrubit.com]

        It is community supported so when a new malware site pops up, anyone can report it so it can be quickly re-routed to the warning page instead of the bad page.
      • Or, even better, use an updated HOSTS file which has entries to block malicious sites: (on last check, this blocked over 16,000 addresses!): http://www.mvps.org/winhelp2002/hosts.zip [mvps.org]

        Yes, that HOSTS file totally rocks. But be sure to review the readme file. The massive size of the file makes it sometimes necessary to disable the "DNS Client" service on Windows 2000, XP, and newer.

        • by sootman ( 158191 )
          Funny. I've been using that hosts file for years.... on my 800 MHz G3 iBook. :-) No problems there!
      • "Another approach is to just block it in your HOSTS file:

        Privoxy [privoxy.org] is a much for efficient solution .. blocks adverts too ...

        was Re:Protect yourself with HOSTS
  • Does anybody know the aim of the hack? Starting last saturday we saw a huge surge in incoming spam, with a peak yesterday (monday) at about 25 to 30% more spam than ever before. Today we see a lot less spam, almost at normal levels (normal being around 80-90% of all mail is spam :-S )
  • Shame about this:

    The fourth interesting point is that the only exploit we were able to coax out of them was the venerable MS06-014 (MDAC) patched in September 2006. What this means is that they went to the trouble of preparing a good website exploit, and a good mass-hack, but then used a mouldy old client exploit. It's almost a dichotomy.

    The only thing I can figure is that either

    • a) this was only a test
    • b) they are hoping to catch unpatched systems.
    • ...which is at least as likely as the other two theories you postulated:

      c) This was a pimple-faced little script-monkey who came across a stale old "toolkit" and was just clever enough to automate the deployment of the SQL injection attack.

      It's really easy to patch the RDS activeX control, and not so easy to manually correct old custom-written web apps. Just a sad commentary on how shipshod web development standards has been in the past, and the lasting legacy it has created. Sanitising user input is (or
  • NoScript (Score:3, Interesting)

    by j.sanchez1 ( 1030764 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:31AM (#21952868)
    Wouldn't NoScript [mozilla.org] protect the Firefox users out there?
    • "Wouldn't NoScript protect the Firefox users out there?"

      It's not clear from the article but the exploit seems to require Microsoft SQL Server, and on the client Internet Explorer and Windows to function. For instance would Firefox on Unbuntu be safe.

      "tries to hijack their PCs using multiple exploits, security experts said this weekend"
  • by MosesJones ( 55544 ) on Tuesday January 08, 2008 @09:31AM (#21952876) Homepage
    Reading the referenced article it seems to almost applaud the success of the attack. This isn't a "good" attack its a very bad attack in that it has been successful and could potentially inflict damage on thousands or even millions of users. Its like claiming that something was a very "good" fraud because it robbed thousands of old folks of their life savings.

    Its a bad attack, its bad that its been successful and the people who did it are scum. These aren't some rebels fighting against the system they are criminal scum who are aiming to inflict damage on large numbers of people. Remember all those times when you have to clean up your parents/in-law/friends computers because they get compromised by this crap? Well the scum behind this have just given you a whole lot more time doing crappy boring work.
    • Re: (Score:2, Insightful)

      by AdrocK ( 107367 )
      I think everyone agrees that this sort of thing is "bad". I wouldn't call it violence, but criminal nonetheless.

      But I also think slashdotters are amused at the continued running-amok of MS products. When the school bully gets beat up, you tend to not feel as sorry for him as you do for your friend.

      Besides, cleaning up the spyware keeps the fly-by-night pc repair geeks in business

      • When the school bully gets beat up, you tend to not feel as sorry for him as you do for your friend.
        I don't think it's the school bully getting much of a black eye, but those that trust him to protect them when they use his services, even if 'Friends don't let friends use M$ products'.
    • Remember all those times when you have to clean up your parents/in-law/friends computers because they get compromised by this crap?

      Yeah. See, that makes us part of the problem. We are facilitating it by cleaning up after it.

      Instead, it's time to do a mass computer intervention. The next time your parents/gf/bf/in-laws/friends call you to clean up their computer, tell them they are on their own. Suggest they purchase a Mac next time. Or, tell them you'll help them install Linux or your favorite BSD flavor, o
      • by mabu ( 178417 )
        You don't need to have people switch OSes. You just need to remove IE from their system and install Firefox+NoScript. I don't even run antivirus software any more since I dumped Outlook (and use text-only e-mail) and switched to Firefox.
  • If you search for "uc8010.com" in Google then click on the omit link at the bottom it shows about 94,000 "PAGES". Not Servers! One server had most of the pages infected. BTW, this is NOT a compromised 'SERVER'. The SQL database got injected with content but the actual server isn't compromised. This isn't news.
    • I was able to see the script http://c.uc8010.com/0.js [uc8010.com] referenced in the Google search descriptions. I do a wget and inspect it, it sets a cookie, and includes another script through document.write, which in turn does some funky JS, and includes another script.

      The moral of this story: This probably isn't a web site defacement attempt, but probably a browser hijack attempt. I don't follow IE security patches close enough to match anything with a knowledge base article, but some of the JS looked like buffer

      • by Mr 44 ( 180750 )
        From the article:

        Grisoft's Thompson said that his research had identified a 15-month-old vulnerability as one of those exploited by the attack code. The exploit, he said, targeted the MDAC (Microsoft Data Access Components) bug patched in April 2006 with the MS06-014 security update. "They went to the trouble of preparing a good Web site exploit, and a good mass hack but then used a moldy old client exploit. It's almost a dichotomy," said Thompson.
  • Thats funny, I recently complained to a US based, MidPhase about some Chinese scam site, uer168(dot)com. I noticed some similarity in the domain with the uc8010(dot)com domain from the article. The whois data is also much alike, at least the registrar is Xin Net Technology Corp. for both.

    So far Midphase has refused to take the scam site off line, even though it's seems these Chinese crackers are affiliated.

"Protozoa are small, and bacteria are small, but viruses are smaller than the both put together."

Working...