Opening Diebold Source, the Hard Way 299
Doc Ruby writes to tell us about an article in the Baltimore (MD) Sun, reporting that someone sent a package to a former legislator containing what appears to be Diebold source code. From the article:
"Diebold Election Systems Inc. expressed alarm and state election officials contacted the FBI yesterday after a former legislator received an anonymous package containing what appears to be the computer code that ran Maryland's polls in 2004... The availability of the code — the written instructions that tell the machines what to do — is important because some computer scientists worry that the machines are vulnerable to malicious and virtually undetectable vote-switching software. An examination of the instructions would enable technology experts to identify flaws, but Diebold says the code is proprietary and does not allow public scrutiny of it." Read on for more of Doc Ruby's comments and questions.
Maryland's primary elections last month were ruined by procedural and tech problems. Maryland used Diebold machines, even though its Republican governor "lost faith" in them as early as February this year, with months to do something about it before Maryland relied on them in their elections.
The Diebold code was secret, and was used in 2002 even though illegally uncertified — even by private analysts under nondisclosure. Now that it's being "opened by force," the first concern from Diebold, the government, and the media is that it could be further exploited by crackers. What if the voting software were open from the beginning, so its security relied only on hard secrets (like passwords and keys), not mere obscurity, which can be destroyed by "leaks" like the one reported by the Sun? The system's reliability would be known, and probably more secure after thorough public review. How much damage does secret source code employed in public service have to cause before we require it to be opened before we buy it, before we base our government on it?
Closed source? (Score:5, Insightful)
OT: Parking garage (Score:2)
n/m answered it myself (Score:2)
Re:Closed source? (Score:4, Insightful)
How the hell is that supposed to work? If you contract me to produce some software for you, and I use open source, you still have to pay me the agreed amount or see me in court. That's no different to me using bespoke code, COTS products or magicing it all up out of fairy dust.
Any business that's truly afraid of what you suggest needs to fire the idiots it has in charge and/or hire a lawyer.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Not to mention that we're talking about the government anyway -- if it really wants to it can just seize it via Eminent Domain anyway, whether it's open source, closed source, or anything else.
Re:Closed source? (Score:4, Insightful)
How the hell is that supposed to work? If you contract me to produce some software for you, and I use open source, you still have to pay me the agreed amount or see me in court.
Any company's lawyers will understand this. If they make such an argument, they are simply lying. Their real motive is that they don't want you to see some parts of the code. This could be because they're embarrassed by the shoddy quality. More often it's because there are things there in addition to what you think you paid for.
In the case of Diebold, they made this very clear before the 2004 election, when then-CEO Wally O'Dell said - in writing - to the Ohio Republicans that he would deliver their state to George Bush. He lived up to that promise, and there are good grounds to suspect that this wasn't at all accidental. They want their code secret so that we can't find out some of the things they've got hidden there.
In the case of elections, paranoia is simply rational. History tells us that the people running an election will cheat if given the slightest opportunity. Secret code makes cheating very easy, and the assumption should always be that secrecy like this is to hide what's going on.
The only practical way to get honest elections with computerized equipment is to require that all the code be open and visible to the public. Anything less is a guarantee of dishonest elections.
(Guaranteeing that the published code is actually what's running inside the machine is another issue. We need a way to do that, too.)
Re:Closed source? (Score:4, Interesting)
From Mother Jones: [motherjones.com] "Diebold machines were used in only 2 of Ohio's 88 counties."
So how did Diebold's code 'deliver the state to George Bush'? Or are you just making stuff up?
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Source code not even needed to hack these machines (Score:5, Informative)
Here's an excerpt:
In a paper last month, "Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine," (available at http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/ [princeton.edu]) Princeton computer professor Edward W. Felten and two graduate students Ariel J. Feldman and J. Alex Halderman discussed a common Diebold machine. They showed that anyone who gets access to the machine and its memory card for literally a minute or two could easily install the group's invisible vote-stealing software on the machine. (Poll workers and others have unsupervised access for much longer periods.) Changing all logs, counters, and associated records to reflect the bogus vote count that it generates, the software installed by the infected memory card (similar to a floppy disk) would be undetectable. In fact, the software would delete itself at the end of Election Day.
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Interesting)
That outcome is obviously not possible with manual election rigging.
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:4, Interesting)
I am however, not working for anyone in the US electoral system, so my information could be incorrect.
My suggestions.. (Score:5, Interesting)
Basically for some of the rest of the design, if your going to make it electronic, first look at all the ways the xbox security system, for instance could have been made much harder to hack. [I wouldn't necessarily limit it with that, but that is actually a decent start.] For simplicity I'll list some ideas, off the top of my head, and then justify them.
1) Soldered in main cpu (The cpu will be important, and as such must not be something that can be easily changed.)
2) Security seals on the case that show signs of tampering.
3) Ideally the GPU will be inside the cpu. [This prevents what is display from being easily tampered with, although the need for this can be argued, but what you see on the screen, is, of course, what you hoep you are voting for.]
4) The system on boot will be able to read from only one source for its OS. The CPU will read the OS and compute a crytographic hash on the entire system. The ROM image (or whatever) will also have a separate field which contains a public key encrypted version of that same hash. The cpu will decrypt that hash with its public key and if the two match, the system will finish booting.
5) Obviously the private key originally used to encrypt that hash must be
stored in a very safe place. [The cpu never needs to know that key, and as such, there is no way that possesion of one of the devices can alloy you to create an arbitrary rom image that check out.]
6) The bottom part of the screen should, at minimum show the cryptographic hash of the software, at all times, so that independent people can verify things.
7) Optional: Take the original hash and use say the last so many bits from it to randomly select from a stack of pictures, or perhaps several pictures. The key part here is to create a visual representation of what the cryptographic hash is, at least in part. You can show this to the voter as a series of icons on the bottom of the screen say to the right of that hash, as an additional check on security. If all of the code that does this is in hardware, this provides an additional check to verify the software has not been modified that people might remember. Of course there are lots of variations of this, including just say making the last 4 digits of the hash bold, or whatever.
8) Keep the code open source. There is no particular reason this is 8, it could as easily be (1). If the cpu is a custom chip, it might require releasing an open source emulator so people can test it. Of course, most likely you are going to use some common cpu core, even if you say put the cpu/gpu on the same chip. Just to reinterate, the key with some of this to be on the same silicon is to prevent tampering. If say the chip that verified the hash was elsewhere, then you might be able to just send a "it passes" signal for everything. Similarly if the code that computes the hash or the encryption is elsewhere, you also have a vulnerability. By having everything security related on the same silicon, you can be reasonably assured that when it checks out the election software that it truly is secure.
9) You can argue with the need to be able to update these fast, and if you agree with that, then you might have to boot from a second source, in order to update the flash, or whatever storage the device uses. All in all though, i don't buy that argument. if you say put it on a flash device that is behind a seal, then you can as easily physically change the flash module. Of course, if you are going to allow a second booting source to reprogram the device, it had better pass its own cryptographic checks to insure it comes from a trusted source.
10) Don't forget the paper trail. While, I've tried to make the previous ideas sound, I likely missed things. This is, after all, a relatively quick post, and I'm only one pe
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Interesting)
Also, you can pinpoint exactly where and when and to what advantage the Diebold hack occured. If we had such a system in place in 2004, there would have been hell to pay in Ohio. And it would prevent the upcoming hack in November, as they simply have to pinpoint individual precincts to alter -- no need to hack every machine. The pattern would be obvious if there were a paper trail.
Why else do you think Diebold has fought so hard to prevent paper trails at all costs? It makes no sense, as they would simply make more money with paper trails. Occam's razor: they know that the paper tally would not match their electronic tally, and HELL would break loose. In a rational country, this would be obvious. We aren't rational. The Republican faction in this country has a lot invested in these machines.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
For example, lets say you contract with an entity to offer a set number of widgets, and during delivery the entity demands that you provide more than the contract states without renegotiation of the contract. Would you provide it free of charge?
Neither will Diebold. Don't believe the conspiracy theorists. If Maryland and other states want a paper tal
Do you understand what "paper trail" means (Score:3, Informative)
Re: (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Informative)
With paper ballots, you have to come up with a lot of other ballots if you want to stuff the ballot. That takes time, material, and co-conspirators. If you want to destroy ballots, you have to take them out of the box and get rid of them. You might shred, burn, bury them, or throw them in a river. That takes time, and leaves evidence and possibly witnesses. If you want to destroy enough ballots to change an election, you will probably also need co-conspirators, and will need to avoid witnesses.
So anything you do to change a paper election will take a lot of time, resources, and manpower, where as an electronic theft of an entire election is almost instantaneous, with no witness and no evidence *.
* Aside from exit polling.
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
Utter nonsense. Any "emergency" so dire that someone can't stand on a sidewalk and ask someone else on the sidewalk a question would be an emergency so serious that it would prevent voting in the first place. You're dreaming up mustache-twirling fanstasy
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Funny)
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Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Insightful)
You're right, and that's why nobody has "unrestricted and unsupervized access" to the ballot box once it contains ballots. It is kept locked and in full public view during the election, and the ballots are carefully supervised (by at least two poll workers, usually more) at all times afterwards.
The difference is, with the Diebold-style systems the "ballot box" is also a security hazard when it's empty. If you want an analogy, you'd have to imagine a ballot box that could be programmed before the election to create or destroy ballots during the election.... a device that would not be easy to implement in plastic
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
I never claimed that the non-elecronic solution was 100% foolproof... only that the electronic solution suffers from additional vulnerabilities that the current solution does not.
We can run off any "independent observers" and do what we like with the ballot boxes. We can even pretend to be representatives of the major parties. We were all appointed by the local board of elections, whose members were all hand-selected for their wi
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
It wouldn't take much to do a manual vote count, but you see, in the end, greed rules. Greed causes harrassment, frivolous lawsuits, bogus investigation by government (the whistle blowers are a menace, you see),
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Informative)
To make a long story short, she uploaded the files to an area where technologically savvy people frequent, and said, "Hey guys, take a look at this." The only people that replied were the people willing to take a stand, i.e. the programmers at Princeton.
So, for an "unimportant post", I divulged information that actually happened. You see, after government officials became aware of flaws in the software, they still kept the Diebold machines in their budgets (hundred of millions of dollars in sum, mind you). Huge amounts of money is being spent on machines that have software programmed by douchebags up in Canada. These machines can be telephoned into to be monitored (good ole' Windows RAS). Oh, and the whistle blower lady was harrassed, her house being broken into subsequently and her being monitored by a government agency, which she has had to talk with regularly.
Yep, you trust your election security to software programmed by dumbasses using Microsoft Access as a database. You trust your election security to individuals that are allowed to bring the Diebold machines home with them after elections are conducted. You trust people to count elections who are ex-convicts hired out by contracting firms.
Why? Um, well, because, um, I think they can be trusted? Oh, that sounds sooooo comforting.
Let's ignore the whole issue about suffrage that was fought so hard for.
My only logical conclusion if people can possibly ignore what I just wrote is that they are idiots. I just hope slashdot readers are a set above the curve.
You say the Diebold source code was put on an FTP (Score:4, Informative)
That's old news
Adam Stubblefield [techtarget.com], a Johns Hopkins University doctoral student, along with Yosh Kohno from the University of California, San Diego, last year produced a report detailing the security problems with Diebold Election Systems' source code after it was left on an open FTP server and eventually leaked to the Internet.
Here's another one:
FalconGary McGraw, CTO of Cigital Inc. [techtarget.com], cited the formerly proprietary code that runs Diebold Election Systems' AccuVote-TX electronic voting machines as an example. A voting activist was able to download the source code from a Diebold FTP site, which led to the exposure of a number of security flaws in the software and widespread questions about the accuracy of the machines and the integrity of votes cast with them.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
You don't need the source code to realise the machines and the procedures surrounding them are open to undetectable fraud and who can say if a copy of "secret code" is kosha anyway? Even if we assume fraud is happening, evidence like that should be saved for an indictment, but at the moment there is no court case where someone has to prove fraud. However that is all just a distraction, doubters should not have to prove fraud,
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:5, Insightful)
I have to agree--it has been proven that we, as a technologically advanced society, cannot reliably run an election using any sort of machine to count the ballots. I mean, when a machine counts more votes in a precinct than there are registered voters, that should be a big red flag lit up with a bright spotlight saying (no, SCREAMING) "Hey, something is all screwed up here, better take a look!" I wonder how many "irregularities" like this DON'T get caught.
I will still support the use of some form of digital voting machine to print these paper ballots with the voter's choice marked, so that the ballots are marked in a consistent fashion and help prevent spoiled ballots (two candidates marked for the same position for example) but to count them, you need people, and only people.
A rep from each candidate's election campaign to monitor the count and an official counter are what you need. Go ahead and use a spreadsheet to total up the counts if you like, since building a spreadsheet that can add two numbers is still something we can do reliably, but the official count for a precinct is done by hand.
Re: (Score:2)
This way you don't have to worry about people not being able to figure out how to punch the ballot, but there is no way a computer can rig an election.
e-voting (Score:5, Interesting)
I agree with paper elections. I also think that digital machines can have a place in elections. You make your choices on a computer, the computer prints out the ballot. The ballot is plain english and human readable. Nothing computer readable, not even a barcode.
Actually India has a pretty good e-voting system:
Slate magazine pokes fun at America's continuing electronic voting anxiety by using India [sepiamutiny.com] as an example of how to do things right:
While we in the United States agonize over touch screens and paper trails, India managed to quietly hold an all-electronic vote. In May, 380 million Indians cast their votes on more than 1 million machines. It was the world's largest experiment in electronic voting to date and, while far from perfect, is widely considered a success. How can an impoverished nation like India, where cows roam the streets of the capital and most people's idea of high-tech is a flush toilet, succeed where we have not?
Apparently India uses an incredibly simple technology that may not be as fancy as the machines here, but does the job well.
The result is a machine that looks like a cross between a computer keyboard and a Casio music synthesizer. In fact, it's not much of a computer at all, more like a souped-up adding machine. A column of buttons runs down one side. Next to each button is the name and symbol of a candidate or party. These are written on slips of paper that can be rearranged. That means unscrupulous politicians couldn't rig the machines at the factory, since they wouldn't know which button would be assigned to which candidate. Also, the software is embedded--or hard-wired--onto a microprocessor that cannot be reprogrammed. If someone tries to pry open the machine, it automatically shuts down. After much testing, India adopted the machines for nationwide use this year.
Why do our machines suck?
American machines, by contrast, may be vulnerable to wholesale fraud. Our machines are far more complicated and expensive--$3,000 versus $200 for an Indian machine. The U.S. voting machines are loaded with Windows operating systems, encryption, touch screens, backup servers, voice-guidance systems, modems, PCMCIA storage cards, etc. They have millions of lines of code; the Indian machines hardly any at all.
FalconBecause corruption is more of a concern (Score:5, Insightful)
Because, I would presume, he is more worried about corruption than about failure. Computers may be more reliable, but they are also far more corruptible than any human.
You will never find a human that will, after a few minutes of persuasion, reliably betray its principles, never tell anyone, never come back to blackmail you, and even completely forget the whole incident even happened should you care to ask him to, let alone thousands of identical humans who will do so in lockstep without giving the slightest indication that anything is amiss.
If you want a conspiracy that won't fall apart, use computers. If you want to prevent such a conspiracy, keep the computers as far away from the process as you can.
--MarkusQ
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Source code not even needed to hack these machi (Score:4, Interesting)
Can't fill in a block without bleeding over? You just trashed your ballot. Watch it get shredded, then re-do your vote.
be cautious of a Diebold paper trail - not right! (Score:5, Informative)
I early voted on a Diebold voter verified machine - and it's NOT good enough. I even had a nice conversation with the technical election judge, and since it did print a verified trail I did have to go home and think about this before I realized how it sucked.
They totally and complete circumvented the idea of a voter verified paper trail.
The way this machine works is you vote, it prints, you can see-but-not-touch the printout. You can vote AGAIN (up to 3 times) and it voids the previous printouts. Again, without you touching them. Which means the process expects that some percentage of its paper trail will be voided. The printouts get sent into some magic compartment.
So 1) there's no way except by noise for the election monitors to know if it printed a variety of extra votes. And they were pretty quiet.
2) There's absolutely zero way to know if it went back and voided your vote, because there's plenty of precedent for voiding votes.
3) It can absolutely tell via paper alone who voted in which order; it's on a spool. Which could be easily tracked by anyone who watched what order people voted at that machine. Your votes are even less anonymous.
*sigh*
Hopefully (Score:3, Interesting)
Sounds unlikely though, since this is all illegal.
Re: (Score:2, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Hopefully (Score:5, Insightful)
What we need is legal access to the actual code (+source, compiler, bootstrap process) running on the machines, not an illegal access to a piece of code someone chose to 'leak'.
And more importantly, we need voter-verified paper trail.
e-voting (Score:4, Informative)
What we need is legal access to the actual code (+source, compiler, bootstrap process) running on the machines, not an illegal access to a piece of code someone chose to 'leak'.
And more importantly, we need voter-verified paper trail.
India's e-voting seems to be a pretty good system: Learning from India's Electronic Voting System [sepiamutiny.com]
FalconOpen source & Availability (Score:4, Interesting)
If not, it is more secure in a way, since malicious users can't test exploits on it before the election, and then they have limited timeframe to do that during the election. If it's open source, and up for review, someone could find the exploit and not tell anyone, right?
This is just my initial reaction to the idea, so I might be way off. Any thoughts?
Re:Open source & Availability (Score:2)
Re:Open source & Availability (Score:5, Insightful)
I might also be way off in this analysis, but I think having the code open to public scrutiny and the hardware securely locked down (any potential tampering should be evident) would be the way to go if computers are used at all.
Re:Open source & Availability (Score:2)
Of course it is available before the election, they don't just code it up on the spot.
Just because it is not widely available does not mean it is not available to a sufficiently motivated organization. When you consider the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on campaigning, it is not hard at all to envision a situation in which an insider is offered a couple of million dollars to provide "early a
Re:Open source & Availability (Score:5, Interesting)
That's what's so screwed up about all this, even Diebold employees weren't following their own companies rules and election offical rules (remember they are the customer). Several Diebold run elections have had outcomes highly suspect... and Diebold is answering concerns with contept for the customers and citizens instead of openness and cooperation.
Re:Open source & Availability (Score:5, Insightful)
f not, it is more secure in a way, since malicious users can't test exploits on it before the election, and then they have limited timeframe to do that during the election.
That is the crux of Diebold's argument for keeping the source closed. TFA reveals the flaw in that reasoning. Whoever that anonymous someone is, he sent the source to someone who is not supposed to have it at all. How many other anonymous somebodies have done the same thing in exchange for wads of cash? It's hard to say, but I'm not willing to bet democracy in the U.S. that the number is 0.
It's the worst of both worlds. The bad guys see the code, but the good guys don't worry about little problems since "nobody but them will even know". Releases tend to happen when it's convieniant for sales rather than when it's done.
Meanwhile in the open source world, we know everyone and his dog will see the code, so it had better be good. Of course, that is no golden guarantee of perfection. Security flaws happen in open source too.
A much bigger factor is the ratio of good guys vs. bad guys reviewing the code. With proprietary code, reviews are limited to the dev team and an unknown (probably non-zero) number of bad guys. Open source has more bad guys looking at it, but a LOT more good guys with no vested interest in sweeping flaws under the rug.
Re:Unusual scenario (Score:5, Insightful)
Keeping the source code hidden doesn't stop people from finding exploits, but allowing the source code to be open allows the public to see how their vote will be tallied (well, those who have programming knowledge, but I would be more likely to trust it several groups did a code audit and signed off on it).
Nuanced distinction (Score:5, Insightful)
Due diligence (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Not necessarily. The state also does things like approve commercial use of things like scales and compertized gasoline pumps. The look at the results (yes, it actually pumped 100 gallons of gas, and that's what the meter is showing), but probably do not have the chops to review the source code in the pumps, the register systems, and so on. And yet, we all assume that the machines, and people using them, are not lying. Getting
Re:Due diligence (Score:4, Insightful)
Or even the summary?
Maryland was doing its due diligence by having the source code test at two independant software labs... which is, of course, where the source code leak came from.
Diebold's "it was stolen" explanation strikes me as not being plausible, as the package contained discs from both testing labs. Diebold is claiming that either (A) someone worked at one lab & stole the discs, then broke into the other lab & stole discs, or that (B) someone broke into both labs & got their hands on these discs.
Re:Due diligence--some places practiced it (Score:5, Informative)
My county (Franklin County, Ohio) expressed a "strong preference" for their voting machine vendor to provide the source code to a 3rd party elections systems assessor.
It was not a requirement, but the fact that Diebold wouldn't, but ES&S [essvote.com] would was one of the reason why Franklin County chose the ES&S system.
Keep in mind, there was no directive from the Ohio Secretary of State on this issue, nor a law from the General Assembly requiring it. Franklin County probably has the most concerned and intelligent leadership running its board of elections, and in that regard, establishes great precedence for the other 87 counties, but they are certainly not under obligation to follow its lead.
What is the specific "problem"? (Score:5, Insightful)
#2. Trade Secrets would be revealed. So Diebold has some ingenious work in the system that it does not want revealed.
#3. Stolen code would be revealed. So Diebold illegally incorporated code from someone else in their product and doesn't want anyone to see it.
#4. Legal code re-use. So Diebold uses the same code on their ATM's as their voting machines and they worry that anyone with access to the voting code could POSSIBLY find a flaw in the ATM systems.
Anyone have any other possibilities?
Re:What is the specific "problem"? (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
So I could withdraw $200 from my account when I go to vote? Or perhaps $party could buy my vote right at the voting booth.
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WTF? My blood started boiling when I read that! **Access**?????
Well, actually,,, (Score:2)
what is good for the good is good for the gander (Score:4, Insightful)
Program complexity (Score:5, Insightful)
(Clear all variables)
Enter selections
Hit accept/enter
Accumulate values for all selections
Clear screen
(Repeat)
Export at end of election
Why the hell does something of this level of incomplexity even need to be closed source?
Re:Program complexity (Score:5, Insightful)
Enter selections
Hit accept/enter
Accumulate values for all selections
Clear screen
(Repeat)
Export at end of election"
You forgot the most important steps, and the reason these machines are a scam:
- ??? [Elect who corporation pays for]
- Profit!
Re: (Score:2)
This software was developed with resources from government contacts. By that definition alone, it must not be simple software.
If the hardware and software were open source, the public could discover that the hardware/software allows the altering of votes. Thus, to ensure government contracts, granted by people/parties that wish to stay
Hey, if you can't beat them... (Score:5, Funny)
Guaranteed only copy... (Score:3, Funny)
Re: (Score:2)
Re:Guaranteed only copy... (Score:4, Insightful)
"A spokesman for Diebold
I see. So all the authorities have to do is recover the copy of the code that was "stole", and once again the American public can sleep sound in the knowledge that this security breach has been rectified.
Now isn't this a fine illustration of how applying the term "stolen" to information is wrong-headed?
My question is this: what could Diebold possibly expect to gain from recovering this "stolen" code? Do they expect to ever be able to use it again in their voting machines? Of course they do, and I'll bet they get away with it too, though why they should be able to, I'll never understand.
Cracker or insider? (Score:5, Interesting)
On a related note (Score:5, Interesting)
What's in the code? (Score:5, Interesting)
Or maybe they're worried that the code contains evidence of tampering with election results? Otherwise it's just code. Just because it's public doesn't mean Diebold loses their copyright.
But if that code contains evidence of treason...which is what tampering with election results would be...then anyone involved deserves to be stood up against the nearest wall and shot. Then leave the bodies as a permanent reminder to anyone else thinking about ballot stuffing.
The real question is if the results were rigged, what's that do to the Bush presidency? It would seem to invalidate the '04 election. That means anything he's done while in office should be voided and Kerry should be allowed to serve out the rest of his term. It gets really interesting to consider that the deciding vote on the Supreme Court would be one of those invalidated actions.
Re: (Score:2)
Maybe fraud and a felony.
Re:What's in the code? (Score:5, Interesting)
My favorite conspiracy theory at this point is this:
If you were in a position to tamper with election results by manipulating the code of voting machines, what would be the most obvious cover-up?
Exactly. You would make sure that a clean version of the code "leaks", which shows no evidence of any tampering whatsoever.
It doesn't make sense (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
Silly boy. It's not imcompetence.
They know full well how 'useful' these voting machines are to the entrenched PTB, and they're busy working on their own code exploits for the next election.
Disappointed! Period. (Score:4, Interesting)
What about the integrity of the elections?
Isn't this kind of stuff the kind of thing that a typical American would not be surprised if it were reported as having happened in the so called 3rd world countries?
What troubles me also is the fact that after all this, our government goes on preaching democracy. I am disappointed! Period
Re:Disappointed! Period. (Score:5, Informative)
Re: (Score:2, Insightful)
As a citizen of a third world country: are you really, honestly surprised?
Re: Disappointed! Period. (Score:2)
Trumped by "what about the profitability of the company".
Re:Disappointed! Period. (Score:5, Insightful)
The problem in American is, everybody is so sure that we're the best democracy ever, that nobody bothers to check to see if that's the really case. People are able to overlook a lot, if seeing it would mean seeing their beloved country in a less-than-positive light.
Elected officials are teh suck (Score:4, Informative)
What he's really saying is, "please, please, please believe that I didn't screw up as badly as it appears I screwed up. Just pretend that the machines are secure, and that democracy as we know it is not in danger."
Wave your rights.. (Score:5, Insightful)
There are lots of things that you should be able to keep secret, but not how my voting system works. We might as well do away with it altogether.
Torrent? (Score:2)
Voting computers in The Netherlands (Score:4, Informative)
They even posted a security analysis (in English) of the voting computer used in the netherlands http://www.wijvertrouwenstemcomputersniet.nl/othe
Just Plain Dumb... (Score:3, Insightful)
I hope some states get the balls to review the code or implement their own system.
Count em' by hand (Score:3, Informative)
PenGun
Do What Now ???
Re:Count em' by hand (Score:4, Insightful)
See, the problem with your antiquated Canadian 'system' is that you often end up electing officials based on the will of the voters. That's no way to run the most powerful country in the world -- leave it up to those yahoos? They'd probably just go and do something stupid, like electing the wrong guy. Who would save us from terrists, gays, and health care then? Hmmm? Hmmm??
EXCUSE ME? (Score:4, Insightful)
Diebold says the code is proprietary and does not allow public scrutiny of it.
Where did the government drop the ball on this one? IANAL, but it seems to me that the moment something enters into the arena of figuring our elections, it ought, by the very nature of things, enter into public scrutiny. Are we suppose to just bend over and accept anything the see fit to inflict upon us? The contracts in the first place should have been drawn to allow for a public audit of the code.
Here's one thing I want to know (Score:5, Interesting)
I think that when we can publically identify who these people are, we can either have a proper public debate on the topic or we can put the matter to rest by exposing the corruption that has been going on.
Life imitating art or vice versa? (Score:5, Informative)
Source code or just executables? (Score:2)
That's a "I don't know what code is or I'm writing for people that don't know" sen
As a Maryland Election Judge... (Score:5, Informative)
So the deal is, concerned citizens now have to come and babysit elections. We train on all the fine points of who can access the machines and are basically there to watch the Diebold personnel to ensure they don't "patch" the machines at the last minute. It's fucking insane. As you can probably tell, I'm highly suspect of America's status as a democracy anymore, but I'm doing my best to help us recover. I'll give it a few more years, but the state of affairs is pathetic. We seem set to turn our elections over to the corporations that are running our country (and, as a consequence, our foreign and domestic policy). If Americans don't start giving a shit, this country is over.
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Re:emmm.... (Score:4, Insightful)
If that's not suspect action then what is? Isn't that the very method of vote tampering we're all discussing?
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Is this the link?
http://www.alternet.org/blogs/video/40755 [alternet.org]
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Re: Why did they send it to him? (Score:2)
She received it because she is now a prominent critic of the use of electronic voting systems. The "donor" apparently thought she would D
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Nah, they don't get mad at you. They just sort of shake their heads piteously, and send you off into the corner to hang out with the "9/11 Truth Movement" gang.
In any case: the American Democratic-Republic is certainly in bad shape -- it may be in the worst shape it's ever been -- but it's not clear to me that it's dead. It is possible, for example, that the Republican vote-rigging system can shave 5 points,