No Backdoor in Vista 269
mytrip wrote to mention a C|Net article stating that Vista will not have a security backdoor after all. From the article: "'The suggestion is that we are working with governments to create a back door so that they can always access BitLocker-encrypted data,' Niels Ferguson, a developer and cryptographer at Microsoft, wrote Thursday on a corporate blog. 'Over my dead body,' he wrote in his post titled Back-door nonsense."
is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:5, Funny)
Re:is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:5, Funny)
Re:is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:5, Funny)
People didn't get it ... he said it would happen ...
We're talking Bush administration here. Talk about painting a target on your back! They'd WANT to get rid of anyone who can point a finger. Disposing of the body is no big deal.
Heck, they don't even have to "terminate with extreme sanction" any more. Just drop a hint to Balmer that he's going to work for google, and let a random chair take him out.
Speaking of which, if google wanted to throw up a few roadblocks, they could "hint/spread rumours/FUD" that a few critical microsoft developers have accepted/will accept/are in secret talks to accept to jump switch, and watch the body count in Redmond rise like the kill score in Alien 2, from the "pre-emptive kills".
Re:is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:2)
Re:is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:2)
Re:is Niels Ferguson.. (Score:5, Funny)
Balmer Says... (Score:5, Funny)
He'll give him 'The Chair'... (Score:4, Funny)
Right. (Score:5, Insightful)
I suspect the NSA, (who I seem to recall left a few stray tags lying around in a previous version of Windows' code), would look at you dead-pan and agree.
-FL
Re:Right. (Score:5, Insightful)
NSA surely is well aware of the way that trust can, unintentionally, propagate. Everybody trusts something; if somebody doesn't want to cooperate, you obtain his unwitting cooperating by coopting something he trusts. Does he personally supervise the building of every release and patch? Certainly not. He trusts the release process to carry out his intentions. Even if the individuals involved are not cooptable, they trust their compilers to generate object code that is perfectly isomorphic to their source code. Those who do not trust compilers trust their debuggers, disassemblers and operating system utilities.
Those who do not trust their operating system utilities, and live-boot from randomly chosen operating systems or remove their hard disks and examine them using a hand coded manchine language program on a custom built computer lacking a bios or operating system to be subverted, still trust the network to transfer their object code to the mastering facility, or their optical disk burning software to burn the image accurately. Or they trust the facility to read that data correctly, and to press it as they intended to the distribution media.
Those who trusted none of this and checked the hard disks by hand coded machine code on a hand wired computer without BIOS or operating system probably deserve assasination, but even so this is hardly necessary, since everyone gets patches over the Internet. A simple black bag job to retrieve the signing keys, and nobody can trust anything anymore.
Re:Right. (Score:2)
Re:Right. (Score:3, Insightful)
What you left out is you need a separate computer that you trust. But how do you know you can trust it?
Until we evolve to be able to read magnetic domains directly off the platter, everything boils down to believing what your software tells you to be so.
Re:Right. (Score:3, Funny)
"REAL programmers use COPY CON PROGRAM.ZIP"
Re:Right. (Score:2)
Disconnecting a computer from the net, makes it possible to elliminate this need.
Re:Right. (Score:2)
Re:Right. (Score:2)
You can also just take it apart and look for the wireless transmitter. You can also detect wireless transmission with this [tscmtech.com].
Re:Right. (Score:5, Interesting)
Yes and no.
True, there was a tag in one version of Windows NT 4 that had the name "_NSAKEY". However, it has never been linked to the NSA in any way whatsoever, except by conspiracy theorists.
You might as well claim that USER32.DLL is proof of a conspiracy to turn American back into a British colony (U.S. obviously stands for United States, and E.R. = Elizabeth Regina = the queen of England! OMG BILL GATES HATES AMERICA!)
Here [schneier.com] is Bruce Schneier's take on the matter.
Details (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Right. (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Right. (Score:2)
If the original employee is valuable to the company (other than their obstanancy on this particular issue), they get to keep their job. Otherwise it's "Joe, you're not being a team player" time.
Chip H.
Re:Right. (Score:5, Insightful)
I know Niels, he certainly would not have any difficulty getting another job. He was pretty well known before he went to Microsoft. He was the cryptographer who worked on Two-Fish with Bruce Schneier. Microsoft has been hiring pretty much all the top security talent they can over the past five years.
Cryptography and data security is pretty much a guild craft. If Niels made such a categoric statement and it turned out to be untrue his personal reputation would be severely damaged. Microsoft can't force him to lie for them and since he works in the Netherlands trying to would be most inadvisable.
Re:Right. (Score:4, Insightful)
Microsoft is large enough and the codebase complicated enough that such a back door could be added without Niels being aware of it.
Why do you think the Netherlands are going to affect Microsoft's behavior? They're convicted criminals in the most powerful nation on Earth. I very much doubt that the Netherlands are going to make them clean up their act. Most of the news I see about European software patents seems to support the idea that MS is operating "business as usual" in Europe.
Re:Right. (Score:2)
Ah, no.
Being a monopoly is not a crime. And having a monopoly and continuing to act as if you weren't is a violation of commerce rules, not a "crime" in the way that "criminal" implies.
Yes, MS is a greedy corporate behemoth -- but being a GCB is not a crime in the USA, and it probably will never, in and of itself, be a crime.
Re:Right. (Score:2)
You're full of it. Monopoly abuse is a felony. [usdoj.gov]
Re:Right. (Score:2)
Re:Right. (Score:3, Funny)
Re:So trusting, so naive. (Score:2)
You'll forgive me that I take the word of a respected professional over that of some random Slashdotter.
Re:So trusting, so naive. (Score:2)
Ah George W. Bush is a liar and a fool therefore everyone must be a liar and a fool.
The fact that there are so many anti-Bush partisans about makes it even less likely that this type of conspiracy could be sustained. If Bush can't stop the NSA from leaking, he sure as he
What else would he say? (Score:5, Insightful)
I think we would be reading about his dead body if he came out and admitted that there were backdoors being put into Vista.
Re:What else would he say? (Score:2)
"Yes, we are placing some backdoors, so all your private life will be avaible to your government to do what they want".
Next frame: a firous horde invading Redmond. ;)
No one is insane enought to admit it, everbody knows about Echelon, but USA still lies it dosen't exists
Re:What else would he say? (Score:3, Informative)
Do you even know what BitLocker is? It's full drive encryption - basically they encrypt all the data on the hard disk using a key in the TPM.
It's not about DRM, and can't be used for DRM.
DRM's about ensuring that you can't INTENTIONALLY give your data to someone else. BitLocker is about ensuring that you can't ACCIDENTALLY give your data to someone else.
On a BitLocker encrypted system, if you can boot the system, you can access your hard disk without any
Re:What else would he say? (Score:2)
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/windowsvista/libr ary/c61f2a12-8ae6-4957-b031-97b4d762cf31.mspx [microsoft.com]
First off, it doesn't need a TPM, it can work off a flash drive.
There's nothing in the documentation that says it has anything to do with DRM.
It's possible that the TPM can be used for DRM, but BitLocker isn't about DRM, and can't be used for DRM.
"Trust me," he said (Score:5, Insightful)
The problem with closed software is that we have to take his word for it.
Re:"Trust me," he said (Score:3, Insightful)
Credibility (Score:2)
Right words should be: "I will resign if...", "I'll put all my influence behind...",
Re:Credibility (Score:4, Informative)
Here's what he actually wrote:
Re:Credibility (Score:2)
It is clear message and I cannot imagine better marketing message for customers... But if I know that this is not question of life
Re:Credibility (Score:2)
Of course, some hacker will discover th[is|ese] backdoor[s] sooner or later if they exist. Which they will do. I'm certain.
However (Score:3, Interesting)
But then we'd have to take the word of some un1337 student haxer at some institution, who just locked down access to their precious copied jewels because some un1337 student haxer at some instituion proved some M$ guy wrong.
Anyway, aren't there multiple reports of backdoors in PGP from various stages of its life? Of course, since its
Re:However (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:However (Score:2)
Skunk team? (Score:3, Interesting)
(emphasis mine)
Re:You're right! (Score:2)
Without a conflict of interests.
Re:You're right! (Score:4, Insightful)
Are you trolling?
Obviously, if you had the necessary skills you could audit the code yourself.
Alternatively you could pay someone to audit it for you; or just wait for someone else to blow the whistle.
The point is that it is much harder to hide malicious code when the source is available.
Re:You're right! (Score:2, Insightful)
My point is that it's beyond unrealistic to think that an average person has any way of auditing code, whether it's going through millions of lines themselves, or hiring an extremely expensive hacker to do the same thing. The end result is the same: it's impossible to know what's in either closed or open source code for 99.999% of the population. So, it comes down to a question of who do you trust: college kids who
Re:You're right! (Score:2, Insightful)
So, it comes down to a question of who do you trust: college kids who have nothing at stake, or companies that have everything at stake?
I find those with nothing at stake to be a little less biased and easier to trust. The company with everything at stake will do what it takes to protect their interests.
Re:You're right! (Score:5, Insightful)
2) You're wrong to state that open source is just about college students and not companies. There are many many companies with an interest in Linux being secure.
3) Why do you assume a company would be trustworthy? Having something to lose makes them vulnerable to government pressure. Look how fast all the search engines caved in to China.
Re:You're right! (Score:3, Informative)
Or in the case of OSS you can take the word of the hundreds of developers who want to audit the code themselves (and for something this important, there'll be hundreds of them), where it only takes one person to throw a red flag on bugtraq, and suddenly there's thousands if not tens of thousands of them looking over this code.
Also you could, if you had an especially vested interest, hire some developers to look over it. Say, perhaps, seve
Re:You're right! (Score:2)
"a developer", as opposed to "the developer." In the minute difference between these two phrases lies a vast gulf of difference.
Re:FUSE? (Score:2)
Ballmer to his secretary: (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Ballmer to his secretary: (Score:4, Funny)
Dead Body? (Score:5, Funny)
"Your terms are acceptable" reply the NSA.
AHA! (Score:5, Insightful)
and in other news... (Score:2)
Dear Niels I hate to break it to you but... (Score:5, Interesting)
A quick look at the "Crypto AG" fiasco makes it plain how very much governments want backdoors. "For decades, the US has routinely intercepted and deciphered top secret encrypted messages of 120 countries." Imagine the power some entity would have if it could peek into any Windows system at will - the temptation must be making their toes curl.
Whether or not there is a top-level agreement with top-level spooks it is still unlikely that local lawmen will be allowed to know about it. So what exactly IS Microsoft planning to do when they inevitably get a request to "help" with an encrypted drive?
And remember: (Score:2)
There Is also No Cabal.
(Minor detail: shouldn't the article title read "No Deliberate Backdoor in Vista"?)
Damn straight! (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Damn straight! (Score:2)
No backdoor in Vista (Score:4, Funny)
Well it least Vista isn't (Score:2)
The whole story should be posted as flamebait. (pun intended)
Would they admit it? (Score:3, Insightful)
... that he knows of. (Score:5, Insightful)
Aside from the obvious "what about buffer overruns?" questions, aimed at the usually poor competence Microsoft shows in writing code, there's also "what about cryptographic strength?" question -- maybe the NSA already has a simple and fast way to break whatever encryption BitLocker will end up using.
And, of course, there may well be several people working at Microsoft who actually work for the NSA or MI-6 or the FSB. (I'd be astonished if there weren't at least a few such people on the Microsoft payroll.) Those people may well do things as described in Reflections on Trusting Trust [acm.org], without letting their superiors know.
Re:... that he knows of. (Score:2)
That's a really interesting line of thought. What are the ethical ramifications of that? Is it ok to pretend that you're for Microsoft when in reality you may be a cryptographer for the NSA? What about modifying Microsoft's products for the good of some other entity? Could the person who does this be sued by Microsoft if they were discovered or would the NSA tell them that they can't because of national secu
Re:... that he knows of. (Score:4, Interesting)
There's no reason you couldn't be for Microsoft and also be for some other entity too. The deception would pretending to be for Microsoft alone. But if you work for the NSA, and you get a job at Microsoft, you may well write good code, and fix security holes, and otherwise help them succeed even while ensuring NSA access to things secured using Microsoft products. Very few things in life are completely either/or.
If Microsoft caught you and you got sued, the last thing that would happen is the NSA saying a word. I suspect the following, in decreasing order of probability:
In any case, before placing an asset in such a position, the NSA would probably train such a person with the right lies to tell if something goes wrong. If I were going to do something like that, I'd make up a fake history for the person before Microsoft hired him, and if he got caught then the FBI could investigate and tell Microsoft he was actually a spy for the Mossad. It wasn't even his real name or anything! But for sure the NSA would keep their name out of it. There's a reason they're known as the "No Such Agency".
I love the backdoor in MacOS X - it has its use (Score:5, Informative)
Dw.
Ad *) Or manually
Re:I love the backdoor in MacOS X - it has its use (Score:2)
The only question is, WHO has access to said backdoor. If it's only accessable to other people in your company, who are next in line to handle said data, great, that's as it should be. If it's 1337 Hacker or Secret Agent Man,
Re:I love the backdoor in MacOS X - it has its use (Score:3, Informative)
http://www.apple.com/macosx/features/filevault/ [apple.com]
No Backdoor in Vista (Score:5, Funny)
Neils Ferguson - seems to know his stuff (Score:2, Interesting)
I sent Neils an invitation to respond to this thread. Don't know if he'll get it, but I found his website on Google (put down that chair Steve....take deep breaths) [macfergus.com]
Anyhow - he seems quite smart enough to do what the BBC article mentions, but after reading his site a bit, I think the guy would have a real problem if asked to code a backdoor. He seems to be ethical.
Tin hat conspiracy weavers would say that unbeknownst to Neils, who is a front, that there is yet another team coding the backdoor.
And yet
Part of the quote is missing! (Score:4, Funny)
But they left out the rest of his quote.
Been in his shoes (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Been in his shoes (Score:3, Interesting)
Get Your Deflector Benie Here (Score:2)
It will have a lot of security portals though (Score:3, Funny)
How NSA access was built into Windows (Score:3, Interesting)
NSA and secret keys added to windows. [heise.de]
Thanks for the link, truthsearch.
-FL
"Over my dead body" (Score:3, Funny)
Correction (Score:3, Funny)
I mean, why should it be different in Vista than it was 'til now?
does his statement even matter? (Score:2)
So we will have to rely on independent auditors - those people like DVD John that will ignore all the silly "no reverse engineering allowed" rules and tear it apart anyway. Then we will know for sur
Read carefully! (Score:2)
The backdoor may be in the hardware (Score:5, Insightful)
IPMI is very powerful. An IPMI session starts with a Presence ping Any machine with IPMI hardware should answer a "presence ping" on UDP port 663. This identifies an IPMI-capable machine, and returns some vendor info. Anyone can send this. This should work even if the machine is "turned off", as long as it has standby power and is on a LAN.
Then, there's a challenge-response authentication sequence. More on this later.
Once you're in, here are some of the things you can do:
There's more. Much more. Basically, you can remotely take over the machine, turn it on, inventory the hardware, load an operating system, boot it up, and talk to it.
IPMI's back channel can do more than this. With some help from the operating system (and yes, it's supported in Windows) you can do more remote administration functions. This is great for administering your data center remotely. But it has darker implications.
Supposedly, most machines are shipped with IPMI mostly turned off, unavailable until a program is run on the machine to load in the keys that enable it. Supposedly.
Thus, all it takes for IPMI to be a "backdoor" is for a set of secret challenge/response keys to be preloaded into the IPMI chip. There's no way to read those keys. Short of taking the chip apart, gate by gate, there's no way to tell if there's a backdoor in there. Or a set of keys might be loaded by the system integrator before shipping the system. You can't tell. So that's where to put a backdoor, where no one can find it.
There's an open source, OpenIPMI [sourceforge.net], for sending IPMI commands on Sourceforge. Send "Presence pings" to the machines you have and see if they answer.
Vista will ALWAYS have a backdoor. (Score:3, Insightful)
This is the way that the world works. MS will always deny that there is a backdoor. But it will always be there. If you don't believe it, go to China or any other crypto-fascist dictatorship with advanced technology. Start sending e-mails to foreign websites about subjects like democracy and freedom in general. Request information about local massacres of protesters in freedom demonstrations. Be sure to use encoded with Microsoft's bundled encryption. See how long it takes for the local secret police to arrest you. A week, a month?
Don't gamble your life and freedom on a sucker's bet. Microsoft will always cooperate with local authorities to ensure that Vista will not shield political dissidents. The only people who can be assured that their correspondence actually is private will be Microsoft employees. This is a trade-off that giant monopolistic global corporations always make with the totaltarian governments in the countries that they operate. Regardless of how much they deny it, Microsoft will act no differently.
Count on it.
Re:Vista will ALWAYS have a backdoor. (Score:2)
Re:Prove it. (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Prove it. (Score:4, Insightful)
I'd be willing to bet that even Microsoft would not be willing to go so far as to create intentional "backdoors" in their encryption to facilitate government (Law Enforcement) access. First off I don't think the government (at least those in the UK and the US) have the power to legally force them into doing it, and secondly if they did it voluntarily one would think the public outcry would be deafening and severly damaging to Microsoft (and it seems that "keeping it quiet" would be nearly impossible).
I generally don't trust the government as far as I can throw them, and I don't trust Microsoft much farther than that, but I think the suggestion that they are colluding in something as nefarious as this is a bit in the Tin Foil Hat realm.
Besides how would they "prove" they aren't doing it? release the source? as if
They've done it before (Score:2)
Re:Prove it. (Score:4, Insightful)
Nice government contract you have there. Shame if anything were to happen to it.
Main problem still remains,the lack of transpareny (Score:4, Insightful)
Would you stake your business or for that matter, you life (as is the case in some regions of the world) on this assumption? Since there is no transparency in Microsoft products, you simply have to take their word for it.
I thought the golden rule of security was that any viable security mechanism should tolerate public scrutiny. Knowing how the software works should not work against the devised scheme itself.
Source Code (Score:2)
Re:Prove it. (Score:2, Interesting)
So, who would you trust more.
Someone in an electoral system that you cannot even bring yourself to take part in.
A company whos product you purchased and used/use.
Re:Prove it. (Score:2)
Re:Prove it. (Score:2, Funny)
Failure to give me one million dollars will be considered
an explicit admission by you that you rape babies.
Re:is it possible to have no backdoors? (Score:2, Informative)
Wikipedia agrees, apparently. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Backdoor [wikipedia.org]
Re:Famous last words (Score:3, Insightful)
He's crazy if thinks big corporations would even think twice of doing something over the dead body of one of their workers.
Corporations might think twice, but governments wouldn't.
Re:The Unofficial Back Doors into Vista (Score:2, Insightful)
*rolls on the floor, laughing and scaring the cat*
Jeez, thanks for a good laugh on a Saturday morning. This really ought to be nominated for a Slashdot stupidity hall of fame award.
Re:Why would they wait? (Score:2)
The success of a keylogger depends upon the user being clueless. Of course, if he's running Microsoft...
Re:Why would they wait? (Score:2, Informative)
How often do you check that keyboard cable of yours, by the way?
Re:asdf (Score:2)
You're new here, aren't you?
Re:honesty, from a legal standpoint (Score:2)
Source code is no panacea here (Score:3, Informative)
Gnupg is open source, so you can verify there are no backdoors
Yes, absolutely. If you're going to use encryption semi-seriously or even professionally, you have no choice but to use open source crypto libraries and apps!
But source code alone is no panacea here: you (or anyone skilled enough -- a.k.a. the community) could discover obvious backdoors, but what about backdoors in some crypto algorithms themselves? Having the source code for this won't help you much. Nothing could really prevent the NSA [nsa.gov] fr