How VeriSign Could Stop Drive-By Downloads 229
emcron writes "Ben Edelman has been doing great forensic work looking at spyware, adware, and malware. His latest piece, How VeriSign Could Stop Drive-By Downloads, turns the harsh light of public scrutiny on VeriSign's grubby practices in issuing digital certificates to vendors who try to install spyware by tricking users into clicking 'yes' with low-down dirty lying dialog boxes. Now, Ben wants VeriSign to clean up its act: it should refuse to issue certificates to companies that use obviously fake names (such as "CLICK YES TO CONTINUE") or that use those certificates to deceive consumers."
Meanwhile (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
So you expect an clueless computer user, who's just learning about this interweb, to understand the importance of trust when downloading software?
Even ignoring people who've never used a computer before, a lot of people are, unfortunately, very trustworthy.
Having partly software-verifiable certificates (i.e. signed by Verisign instead of self-signed) goes a long way to helping a browser tell a user whether or not they should be able to trust this mysterious "gator.exe" (of course, people will always find ways around it).
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
A dumb users first experience of the internet... (Score:5, Insightful)
They have to.
Every site that they visit will have embedded Flash, embedded Java, embedded QuickTime, embedded Real, embedded midi (FFS!).
They are taught on their first few days to trust everyone, and that nothing that they want to achieve can be done without trusting that the site is legit in asking you to download and install stuff.
And when they speak to their geek friends (or friends of their kids), they get told dismissively and condescendingly that YES, they must install to see the site properly, to do what they want. You can bet that they won't ask a second time!
Is it really a surprise then, that we have a problem later with dumb users downloading spyware, adware, and malware in general?
The problem could be much alleviated by simply pre-installing all of the key technologies in advance.
Some Linux distros do this... my mother knew from the first moment she used Simply Mepis that she didn't need to download anything else... I told her this, and because nearly all of her sites worked (just not pogo.com) she hasn't downloaded anything else.
But you can't do this with Windows... because Windows gives you nothing, and certainly nothing from Apple, Real, Macromedia, Sun, etc... and then to compound it, Windows is an open playground for malware once downloaded.
If Windows RME were permitted to be shipped with not just alternatives and pre-configured competitor offerings for media, but also with common plugins for the web... and... maybe even Firefox to give choice... then this would do more to prevent malware spreading than Verisign being forced to change their practices.
Of course... hell would freeze over, pigs would fly, and the Bush would have an epiphany on social welfare before all of the above happened.
Re:A dumb users first experience of the internet.. (Score:5, Insightful)
> friends of their kids), they get told dismissively
> and condescendingly that YES, they must install to > see the site properly, to do what they want. You
> can bet that they won't ask a second time!
Not this geek friend. I tell people not to trust anyone on the internet and to never download any crappy plugins as 90% of them will simply be used for serving up intrusive advertising. And if the site doesn't work without their plugins them go elsewhere.
After I've removed the first load of spyware and repeated the advice they usually listen. If not they don't get a second visit from me. I just point them to the internet and say "You're not interested in my advice so you can fix things yourself".
Sorry I've gone half tilt Amish on the idiots of the internet. If you can't get your message over to me using plain old HTML and static images you can stick your message up your arse.
The internet is not digital TV.
Personally I can't wait 'til someone invents some sort of uber bandwidth media-tastic bright & shiny "Hyper Net" (now with unbrakabul DRM (tm)). Then all the drongos can go and happily consume on it whilst leaving the rest of us with our "good old" internet.
Plugins ? I spit on you all.
Re:A dumb users first experience of the internet.. (Score:2)
There are other ways to help people.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Insightful)
Thus, authentication already works the way it should. This is not a case where I should say "don't fix what already works", but rather "don't break that which works". Instead, work
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Interesting)
Unfortunately, a person can game this system by choosing any business name they like. "CLICK HERE TO INSTALL" is not a legitimate name, not even a legitimate business name... I seriously doubt it's a registered or incorporated business name, and even if it is, it's done only so they can get a certificate with the same name. How can you authenticate them with a bullshit name? Authentication means proving who they are, which this isn't doing at all. And I don't mean to be ultra-picky, but if you couldn't get a driver's license with the name, or open a bank account with it, you probably shouldn't be able to get a certificate with that name.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
That is abusing the technology in the sense of using authentication for authorization, which is, objectively speaking, wrong.
Of course, as you say, VeriSign shouldn't grant certificates to obviously faked names.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
I remember a story on a guy who registered long distance provider company names. Names such as "I don't care", "Any", "Pick one".
These were typical responses when an operator asked which carrier, and since the name, as specified by the customer existed they were obligated to use it.
Needless to say the rates for those particular companies were some of the highest.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Funny)
Sir, I resent your libelous filth and my legal counsel will be conacting you shortly.
Aaron Firouz
CEO
CLICK HERE TO INSTALL, LLC.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:4, Funny)
Are those like the Evil Bits?
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
Moll.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
Yes well, that doesn't help Joe Sixpack who reads "CLICK YES TO CONTINUE" and does it.
At least he read it! I know plenty of people who will just click OK without even looking at what they're agreeing to.
The trouble is that lots of people don't understand what is being asked of them (so many give up reading at all). Signed certificate? While I could explain what it is, how do you teach people to be able to choose the good from the bad? Some are definately not so easy to spot.
Ol' Joe should be more distrusting of these things, but isn't.
-- Steve
Why do people just click OK? Because of the OS. (Score:4, Insightful)
Which should tell us there's a bigger problem here than whether Verisign is, in the fashion of the AKC, turning a blind eye to puppymillers who'll pay for registration papers.
If users have been conditioned to routinely say "yes" or "OK" to anything they see, it's partly because the APIs they deal with all day long encourage the writing of bad, unintelligible dialogs. Anyone who's ever waded through the "Yes No Help" dialog box when saving to a .csv file from Excel knows this problem. That one's unreal: they give us a bulleted list in the dialog that basically translates the buttons.
It's no accident that tons of the spyware pop-ups out there look like Windows dialog boxes. People are so used to clicking through horribly-written dialogs that they don't pay any attention. A better set of API default dialog types would nudge everyone, programmers and users, in the direction of actually readable dialogs that mean something.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
It's ironic that a Microsoft representative a little while ago criticising Firefox not paying for a certificate for the download. What is to stop someone registering "Firefox Browser" or "Click Yes to Download" instead? Certificates when they are so easily abused like this are only detremental - they create a fake level of trust.
You can verify source (sort of) (Score:3, Interesting)
And it has nothing to do with actual quality of software it has signed.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Informative)
it's to verify that the software is FROM the person/company on the certificate
certificates verify identification/authentication -- they are NOT an indication of trustyworthy software, nor are they supposed to be.
the problem is literacy and common sense, something that many people seem to lose the minute they touch a computer.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Insightful)
At least part of the problem is that Verisign is unwilling to make even the smallest effort to end trickery using its service.
It's about trust (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2, Insightful)
Yes, but they generate a *huge* volume of capital and this is what drives the interweb now.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Interesting)
Now controls are unarguably the bigger danger, but that does not excuse the weak security defaults that Firefox uses for extensions. A user can install any extension without a clue as to who wrote it, or even if it was tampered with. The default policy should be accept signed extensions and not accept unsigned ones at all. If people want to change that preference, that's their own business,
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
you'll click on the 'extensions' file
firefox will pop up with a notice up top that you need to add that to the allowed list, you do.
then you have to click it again to let firefox install it.
if something is 'signed' it would just pop up once, be like "Do you trust this certificate (not do you trust this site)", average joe is stupid and just says yes always, and then it installs.
seems to me firefox's method for extensions is actually harder than
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3)
It doesn't do you much good if the site in question has been hacked or is subject to a man in the middle attack. You as the user have no idea in either case if that extension has been tampered with because it has no signature.
Neither domain trust work well when the domain in question hosts hundreds of controls. For example, once you've trusted the Mozilla extensions website, the domain check is not going to protect you from downloading something
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3)
By default Firefox automatically checks for updates for itself and its extensions. Therefore on any one day there could potentially be a million browsers calling home for updates. If a hacker could crack the site, or redirect DNS lookups to their own bogus updates.mozilla.org, they could compromise tens of thousands of machines if not more before anyone not
Re:Meanwhile (Score:2)
Without the signature, you haven't the faintest idea who wrote that XPI or if its been tampered with.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Interesting)
The point is... (Score:5, Informative)
So somebody seems to have registered a company name "Click YES to continue" in some state. It's probably a legal company name. I agree with the author that this is obviously deceptive practice, and Verisign should revoke the certificate revoked. In addition, we should be able to complain to Verisign about other companies violating the Verisign agreement.
I don't know what they do if the company name is a duplicate of another previously registered name.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:4, Interesting)
"Well, that certificate thing popped up so I thought it was safe..."
So every couple weeks I go in and do the electronic enema for them.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Funny)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Insightful)
Right. This is one of the things that the article was complaining about. Unfortunately, there is no easy way to prevent that kind of scams: Verisign could check for obvious stuff such as "CLICK YES..." but it would be had for them or for anyone else to check
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:5, Insightful)
If Versign is making certain claims about their trust worthiness, and that of the people they certify, they should be held accountable when those claims are demonstratibly false. They're lying for money. No it might not be the end users money, but it's their time that's being stolen, and Verisign is doing it for money. And while there certainly is some wisdom in being a wary buyer, I think their is something to be said for forcing people to keep their promises to the larger marketplace. "Oh, they're rich, it's good for their business.", doesn't exactly put me in a benefit of the doubt kind of mood.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Meanwhile (Score:4, Interesting)
There's a copy of their public certificate on your machine - that's how IE can tell if it really was Verisign that signed it.
Re:Meanwhile (Score:3, Informative)
Verisign is recognized as an authorized certificate authority because Windows has a central certificate store that can be used for a wide variety of applications (much more than just browsing the web). This sort of seems like a logical, good design way of doing it (rather than each app having an island of certificates).
The root certificates that you are speaking of, which you can find in the MMC snap-in Certificates, have specific uses that they are allow
Re:Meanwhile, back in reality (Score:3, Interesting)
Indeed.
Basically a certificate signed by Verisign is just that and only that. It's a certificate signed by Verisign. It doesn't say anything about the person or company presenting the certificate, their partners, business practices, history, ethics or ANYTHING EL
Yes, but (Score:3, Insightful)
Heck, what if they start using a thesarus to pick complicated sound names that sound cool?
Re:Yes, but (Score:3, Insightful)
After all, if there's no real verification done then what good are these? It seems like they're more $200 - $600 licenses to trick users into donwloading your spyware.
That would slow things down (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:That would slow things down (Score:2, Insightful)
I would assume, since they're one of the bigger companies out there, that they think it will make them look good. If they don't crack down on the fraudsters, there's a risk that people will stop trusting Verisign. In which case, no more profits for them.
Re:That would slow things down (Score:2)
I mean, if they issue a certificate to a company named "CLECK YES TO CONTINUE", then they're not even making a token effort to provide the services they claim.
Sounds logical but... (Score:5, Insightful)
The real problem is the fact that nobody bothers to read the window that has just popped up in front of them. I'm guilty of this myself, there have been times I've not even recognized a problem with certs on my own servers the first few times clicking through.
My saving grace is that I never ever click an OK or YES button unless I'm expecting one. That simple rule has kept me from ever having anything installed using this method. The problem is that not everyone understands that they should not agree to every popup window they see. It's not going to matter if it claims to be authorized by God himself; if it has a YES/NO/CANCEL option and the user is not security-aware the person will probably say yes. I think educating people would be more effetive than trying to get the CAs to revoke the certificates.
I'm sure there will be plenty of the "Use FireFox, Problem Solved!" comments as well. I have experienced, rarely, where a drive-by site is impossible to say "no" to when under Firefox and eventually crashed the browser but IE under SP2 handled itself very well on the same page.
Re:Sounds logical but... (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Sounds logical but... (Score:2, Interesting)
Fortunatly enough my AV caught them and kept them from spreading, but firefox died and had to be restarted.
Re:Sounds logical but... (Score:5, Informative)
My own saving grace (I think) was that I got in the habit of always going down to the taskbar and doing the "right-click, close" bit.
Education is the ticket but man, I question whether or not some of these people can be educated. I've been at this for over a decade in the same job, supporting the same people and the people I've been trying to teach continue to step on the landmines. Sure from time to time there's a success story or two with my users but for the most part the ones who are going to screw up continue to screw up.
Re:Sounds logical but... (Score:4, Informative)
Keep on dreaming (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Keep on dreaming (Score:2, Interesting)
VeriSign doesn't love us. (Score:3, Insightful)
Remember the DNS hijack? They wouldn't back down untill they were sued and threatned repeatedly.
New Times? (Score:5, Funny)
A time in which east-side nerds could live side by side with west-side nerds.
I have a dream...
Re:New Times? (Score:2)
But hopefully not before Bill Gates is shot dead by Larry Ellison (a la Tupac Shakur), because Steve Ballmer dissed Oracle.
Or maybe it was meant to be a 'West Side Story' reference, which suggests that the solution to the problem of bogus Verisign certificates is....
Dance!
I have a dream...
Is that a quote from Martin Luther King, or ABBA?!
Why was this allowed before? (Score:4, Insightful)
It's so basic that it's sad that they now issue this press release trying to make them look like good guys, even though it's so obvious and should have been looked into much earlier.
An idea but in practice... (Score:2, Insightful)
Look at the mess known as the domain registry and how much junk information is found in there. I'm sure the license for the SSL has the same requirements (and no teeth) just like the DNS registry does.
Re:An idea but in practice... (Score:2)
but my company name really is (Score:5, Funny)
we were also considering
CLICK YES YOU MORON
OMG, WERE YOU SERIOUSLY GOING TO CLICK NO
and
THIS IS SO COOL, YOU GOTTA SEE WHAT HAPPENS WHEN YOU CLICK YES
Re:but my company name really is (Score:3, Funny)
"Click No to install XXX toolbar"
Perhaps Verisign should obey (Score:2, Interesting)
best thing to do (Score:2, Funny)
Re:best thing to do (Score:2, Funny)
Here's solution: (Score:3, Funny)
Wanna get rid of spyware, adware and malware?
CLICK YES TO CONTINUE [apple.com]
Trust is an easily broken thing (Score:3, Insightful)
The very cheek of it all, is that the main marketing technique on their website is to talk about security. I think if they were going to clean up their act, they would have done it a long time ago. No hope for some people.
Click yes to continue (Score:5, Funny)
It was proposed to change one's name to None Of The Above and run for presidency.
Verisign is not at fault. (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:5, Insightful)
My Sister-in-law runs redhat 9 (because I installed the system)
She tells me that she often goes to sites which offer games which she (or her son) would like to run. Most of the time they don't work either because they need java or activex, or because they are just broken
Either way it is my fault for giving her a PC which doesn't do all these things
You and I have reasonable expectations about technology. The person in the street has different expectations and they drive the market
Java or Shockwave? (Score:2)
Most of the time they don't work either because they need java or activex, or because they are just broken.
Both ActiveX and Shockwave won't run, short of running WINE, but Java? All you have to do is download the RPMs from here [java.com].
Re: Java? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:5, Informative)
Unchecking it prevents IE from offering to download IE language packs when you visit a website you cannot view with currently installed languages. Nothing more. If you have all the languages you can read installed already, then you probably won't want this checked.
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:3, Funny)
1) the word "language" does not appear in the label,
2) or the header of the section it's in,
3) or the help that comes up with [?].
Not having a go at you there, by the way. Unless you're a usability specialist at MS.
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:2)
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:2)
So people learn that in order to get thier computer thing to work, they have to constantly be installing the latest flasholio plugin 5000(TM). How is such a person going to know trustworthy from not?
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:2)
The same people wouldn't go out and randomly buy a car, or a cooker, or a washing machine, without going to Which, Consumer Reports and so on check on the reputation of the company that makes the goods.
Ok, some would. But they get what they deserve.
Re:Verisign is not at fault. (Score:2)
"Extended warranty, how could I lose!!"- H. Simpson
Wants and Gets (Score:2)
And of course VeriSign will immediately go "Sir, yes Sir, we will Sir! We've already started bending over backwards, Sir !"
Why should Verisign oblige? (Score:5, Insightful)
Come on! Verisign's whole business model is to sell as many certificates as it can - it's simply not in their interests to show scruples like that. Verisign have the MicroSoft seal of approval, so for the average desktop user that makes their reputation beyond suspicion, so they have nothing to lose.
That's far too short-sighted (Score:2)
Clicking Yes to continue... (Score:4, Funny)
The answer (Score:5, Informative)
Obviously, nothing happened afterwards.
Obviously (Score:4, Informative)
It took me nearly two weeks to track down all the paperwork to get my code signing certificate (authenticode). The process includes designating two contacts, faxing over several forms (including a valid county business license for the company name on the application) and a notorized agreement of indemification because they weren't able to do 3rd party identity validation on my company (they look your company name up in the white pages and call the number to make sure it exists and that you do indeed work there. My company wasn't in the phone book.) They also try to look you up in D&B. This all came after giving them the $500 for the certificate.
That being said, I don't see how anyone could get away with purchasing a certificate such as described in the article from Verisign--maybe Thawte or another. IMO Verisign is taking some flak here due to
Re:Obviously (Score:3, Informative)
Read the posting directly above yours [slashdot.org]. Verisign did indeed approve this certificate. So much for your near certainty.
The company exists, under that name. The fact that the name was obviously chosen with fraudulent intent doesn't seem to concern Verisign too much.
Re:Obviously (Score:2)
A friend of mine forwarded me a link to a site last year containing one such dodgy plug-in (a dialer app) which did this. The site has since been taken down, though.
Re:Obviously (Score:2, Interesting)
I'm amazed anyone can get through all that with bogus information. You'd think that someone with that kind of determination could be doing something better with their skills
brilliantly myopic (Score:3, Insightful)
Teaching individual users to be more informed and responsible about whom they trust may be difficult, but it's better than entrusting a private, unaccountable, quasi-monopoly (let alone one with a history of un-trust-worthy behaviour) with that decision.
Why oh why hasn't Verisign been given the arse? (Score:2, Interesting)
Time and time again it gets busted doing crap like the SiteFinder fiasco and still they get away with it.
Comment removed (Score:3, Interesting)
Use OpenCA and build-in trust levels in Firefox (Score:3, Interesting)
This could be changed by the end user, though.
When the user gets presented with a dialog box, Firefox would suggest the user to not trust VeriSign-signed sites.
The "VeriSign penalty" could be adjusted in each new release based on their willingness to ge their shit together. Fuckos.
Quit treating certificates as indications of trust (Score:5, Insightful)
A certificate doesn't tell you anything about whether a web site is secure, trustable, or anything else. It simply provides a slightly better verification of identity.
Real use of certificates... (Score:3, Informative)
The trust-worthiness of that company is still in debate... you just now know who it is you're dealing with.
MadCow.
Re:Real use of certificates... (Score:2)
It doesn't really even tell you that much. All it does is authenticate the DNS name in the URL. In a few cases it might be possible for the certificate issuer to do more than a cursory investigation of the company name, but not routinely at the prices they have to charge to actually sell certificates.
I'm tired of protecting the stupid (Score:3, Interesting)
Ben just had massive DDoS on his site ... (Score:3)
Read my Technocrat article for more info [technocrat.net] and I also submitted to Slashdot, but it got rejected - oh well.
Um, how could "Click Yes To Continue" fool anyone? (Score:2, Interesting)
CLICK YES TO CONTINUE
Publisher authenticity verified by VeriSign Class 3 Code Signing 2001 CA Caution: CLICK YES TO CONTINUE asserts that this content is safe. You should only install/view this content if you trust CLICK YES TO CONTINUE to make that assertion.
[] Always trust content from CLICK YES TO CONTINUE.
Remember Drive By Long Distance Phone Service? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Stupid User Factor... (Score:3, Insightful)
Right. And until that time we will have to deal with a few million zompies that spam us? Not really a good option.
We should try to educate the users that are unaware to these problems. Just like I am constantly helping my parents and friends. They would never OK such a certificate because I tolled them that it could be spyware, etc.
Verisign certificate worthless (Score:2, Interesting)
Its possible to have your Internet Explorer set to accept properly certified code, so in some cases the user doesn't even look.