Looking Back At Windows Security In 2003 327
thebatlab writes "Help Net Security has an interesting look at security in Windows during 2003, with various blurbs from related parties at Microsoft as well as security 'bigwigs' such as Russ Cooper. It's interesting to read the comments from external parties, as they tend to be very reasoned comments and don't simply attack away over recent 'indiscretions' and 'security lapses' Microsoft has had over the year."
Does anyone know... (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Does anyone know... (Score:5, Informative)
However, as per this this article [com.com], Microsoft does not intend on pushing any new security patches throughout the month of December. But then again, apparently Microsoft can even manage to NOT patch correctly [slashdot.org]...
OMG, no more for December!?!?!?! (Score:2)
well... (Score:2)
I know me on the other hand, I set up a mirror to see what's behind me and I see my ass. Then I realize what they mean by looking back... When you look back you see your ass, and what does your ass produce? Shit... Simple Geek Zen ... Microsoft Security is shit... Get it now?
Re:Does anyone know... (Score:2, Funny)
Hey, Sherlock.... (Score:3, Insightful)
Do you think that that giving your user name and password to strangers might be a bit suspect too?
Re:Hey, Sherlock.... (Score:5, Informative)
*glares at manager*
Slashdottism (Score:5, Funny)
Windows "out of the box" is as wide open as the goatse.cx guy.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:5, Funny)
This, if you don't know, is called Microsoft Security
Re:Slashdottism (Score:3, Interesting)
Isn't it funny that nevertheless Microsoft marketing has brainwashed the masses to the point that they actually believe that WinXP has become more secure than Win9x? (Fact: There never was a worm comparable to W32.Blaster on Windows9x)
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
If you've read any of the honey pot related articles around here, it's not surprising at all that you got infected that fast.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:5, Informative)
All Windows XP computers are vulerable to Blaster during bootup.
Even if you have the Windows firewall turned on.
Windows XP doesen't ahve a firewall in place while the computer is booting - only after a full boot is the firewall policy pushed down to the network interfaces.
SP2 will include a "block everything" firewall policy during bootup, and you can have a firewall policy over all network connections - including new connections that you may install.
but for now - Put your XP behind a real network operating system like OpenBSD.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
Even those that are patched for it?
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
Basically, the software firewall doesn't kick in until the software firewall starts up, which isn't the instant the network protocols start accepting network traffic.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Slashdottism (Score:4, Informative)
Re:Slashdottism (Score:5, Insightful)
Why should I be expected to know there is such a thing as a firewall and that I should install it?
To put it simply, that's unrealistic. Sure, geeks should know better, but the general public shouldn't have to.
Period.
D
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
lets say your ex-girlfriend has a copy of your key, and shit turns up missing from your house, dont you then change your locks ? this is simple logic. as is protecting your data.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2, Insightful)
Windows should do things like many linux services do. They default to listening on localhost only, a lot of little things like that could help tighten windows a little better.
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
Once I know how to drive, I expect to be able to go into any kind of car and use it successfully. For instance, I own a Mercedes, but if I get a BMW next time, I expect the accelerator, brake and door locks to be in the same position. If they aren't, I'll get a little upset.
Understanding a firewall, ports and services is pretty esoteric knowledge to expect a non-expert computer user to have.
D
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2, Troll)
Yes, a new
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
So does that make the Blaster worm and others like them a virtual suppository?
Re:Slashdottism (Score:2)
So the average Windows user doing a nice fresh install of XP, or switching on their newly purchased WinXP machine with marginally patched OEM install is almost certain to get infected by something, even if the _very first thing_ they do is start downloading the latest security patches.
Windows firewall would help, but it's switched off b
External Parties? (Score:2, Funny)
-SNIP-
Yeah, and if I poke you in the eye with a sharp stick every morning, you'll get used to it. It might even appear "reasoned".
Biggest problem with windows security (Score:5, Funny)
It has the capability to shut down applications, goes right through anti-virus software (even the latest patches!!!), and gives total control of the victim computer to the creator of the worm.
An attempt by the powers that be to shut down it's source of updates was thwarted by various government agencies and the worm itself.
Unfortunately there is no patch to get rid of the W32.MS.AutoUpdateRequired worm.
Re:Biggest problem with windows security (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Biggest problem with windows security (Score:2)
Re:Biggest problem with windows security (Score:3, Informative)
Even if I got that bit wrong (and it has been a while), one thing is definitely true - the default config is to prompt you to download, then prompt you again to install updates. No Windows machine automatically downloads and installs updates unless someone configures it to do so.
Re:Biggest problem with windows security (Score:5, Funny)
Re:Biggest problem with windows security (Score:2)
The more restrictive the firewall, the safer the clueless users feel. It is a false sense of security.
You'll have much better luck if you use the firewall to protect the internet from your users.
Short look back on MS Security... (Score:5, Funny)
<bows>
Looking back... (Score:2, Funny)
Summed up in three words: (Score:2, Funny)
Rophel. (Score:2, Funny)
My security lookback... (Score:4, Funny)
A hole in Linux was announced today. Developers released a patch in 34.36 minutes flat after hearing the news. Download and update today!
Re:My security lookback... (Score:4, Insightful)
Need I say more?
Re:My security lookback... (Score:2)
Re:My security lookback... (Score:2)
Should I patch? (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:Should I patch? (Score:4, Insightful)
If you're going to discuss Windows security, for god's sake at least do it with a version of Windows designed to be at least somewhat secure (2003, XP, 2000, or even NT).
Re:Should I patch? (Score:3, Insightful)
You're missing the point.
The more secure Microsoft Windows is the old unpatched "insecure" Windows.
That says something about how effective Microsoft has (NOT) been with its security endeavors.
Re:Should I patch? (Score:4, Funny)
Don't worry, MS is working hard on coding a new exploit that works even when your PC is offline and disconnected from the net! Due Real Soon Now(tm)!
Two Words... (Score:2)
Windows Sys Admins are a BIG part of the problem (Score:4, Insightful)
It basically says it all when an exploit that had been patched for months succeeds in bringing the internet to a crawl.
Re:Windows Sys Admins are a BIG part of the proble (Score:4, Insightful)
Microsoft released a patch, yes. There are two people who wouldn't install it: those who don't have a clue about being a sysadmin (MCSE) and those who know MS's history of distributing broken patches.
The first group (mostly made of MCSE-only admins) are either too ignorant to install patches timely or are too stupid to know that your SQL server has no need to be internet-accesible. IIRC the only way to get slammer was to have your unpatched SQL server live to the world, something that anyone even slightly security concious wouldn't have done. Unfortunately, MS markets themselves as the easy delpoyment/any idiot can admin. So, they market themselves to idiots, then blame the idiots for not taking care of their servers. Umm... sure.
Secondly is the smart group who knows better than to deploy ANY MS patch without testing it. Having a patch 2 months before the worm hits is fine and good, but often times testing a patch takes that long. In the case of slammer these are the guys who know to keep their SQL servers behind the firewall. Slammer was mostly due to group #1. In the case of IIS and other internet services, however, a patch may not be deployed in a timely manner.
Combine MS's past of releasing broken patches with their careful marketing to idiots and you see how easily this crap happens.
full text of the article (Score:4, Informative)
An In-Depth look Into Windows Security in 2003
by Mirko Zorz [mailto] - Monday, 22 December 2003.
When it comes to security predictions for next year, basically everyone says it's going to be worst than this year despite the increased spending on security and some progress made when it comes to security awareness. Let's take a look at some interesting happenings that made the news during 2003 when it comes to Microsoft security and perhaps you'll be able to judge for yourself what 2004 will bring.
The experts that voice their opinion for this article are Russ Cooper (Surgeon General of TruSecure Corporation/NTBugtraq Editor), Ed Skoudis (a security geek who is focused on computer attacks and defenses, author of "Counter Hack" and "Malware: Fighting Malicious Code") and Arne Vidstrom (a security researcher and author of many security tools for Windows).
It's January and things don't look good
Just as we were getting used to writing 2003 instead of 2002 in our letters, here comes the Slammer worm [net-security.org] and all hell brakes loose as thousands of computers are infected worldwide.
This, however, was not Microsoft's fault since a patch was available several months ago before the worm was unleashed. This has put the issue of irresponsible users into the spotlight while others said the reason why some servers weren't patched is because administrators are worried about the side-effects that come with a patch.
Russ Cooper said: "Firstly, SQL patches have been notoriously difficult to install, so I would argue that despite the availability of a patch, its lack of installation was not entirely the user's fault. Further, MSDE (Microsoft SQL Desktop Engine) inclusion in 3rd party software had never been tracked by Microsoft. This resulted in many people being vulnerable to Slammer who never knew they needed a patch. The method the SQL group has used to handle the SQL vs. MSDE issue have been very poor, with KB articles typically only being found by searching for SQL rather than MSDE. Finally the SQL Server Resolution Service, the service targeted by Slammer, isn't even mentioned in the SQL 7.0 documentation either as being present, installed, or enabled by default."
Lessons learned according to Cooper: "What Slammer showed us more than anything was the need to embrace more basic controls, such as "Default Deny". There's little reason to expose the SSRS to the Internet without any restrictions. Some hosting providers have argued that their customers required access to the service and, therefore, they exposed it directly to the Internet. While this might seem reasonable, the additional cost of locking down such connection points to, at least, an identifiable IP address range surely couldn't put them out of business compared to the risks they put the entire Internet at. Of course the same holds true for businesses, but there the problem was more of a problem with the "Default Installation". We have long known that default installations are inherently insecure. Knowing what you're installing, and installing only what you know, are crucial to achieving baseline security. The habit of simply accepting the defaults and no additional steps is yet another reason problems like this occur."
"Another aspect of "Default Deny" is the enforcement of *Outbound* rules as well as inbound. Habit says that inbound is what we fear, yet outbound is left entirely untouched. Slammer demonstrated just how harshly such a policy can affect the Internet. There was no reason for those systems to initiate connections outbound on UDP 1434, even if we accept there was a need to allow the inbound connections from other infected hosts. Ergo, had such rules been in place, machine
HA! (Score:4, Funny)
Re:HA! (Score:2, Funny)
Need to look at Security Holistically (Score:5, Interesting)
In areas like the construction industry, insurance companies take a very hard-nosed attitude towards various types of risky practices-and the difference in risks between those practices are reflected in insurance premiums. It would be straightforward to apply similar techniques to organizational security-but I suspect what we have here is a case of managerial resistance. The management types just don't want their practices closely scrutinized-they like things the way they are now. What I see, is a lot of folks taking enormous risks with other people's money.
The Last Line of the Article Says... (Score:5, Insightful)
That, in a nutshell, destroys the entire article. The end user shouldn't be forced to "hope" that bad things won't happen to their computers. Any vendor that instills so much lack of confidence in their products doesn't deserve the benefit of the doubt.
Re:The Last Line of the Article Says... (Score:4, Interesting)
You've summed it up quite nicely. Back before Windows 2000, I just didn't understand why anyone put up with Windows at all. The fact that people considered daily reboots "normal" was pathetic.
Only now the situation is a bit different. 2000/XP are both very stable, and if properly patched are most always relatively secure. I still trust Linux or BSD a lot more, which is why my Windows machines are protected with a Linux/iptables firewall; but you have to admit that Windows has gotten much better. Again, though, if properly patched.
I believe (correct if wrong) that nearly all of the major exploits in the last few years were patched long before they became a problem; in many cases, months passed between the time a problem was fixed and the time it was exploited (thus giving plenty of time for testing and deployment).
Microsoft tried to remedy the problem with the "auto update" feature, which most of us didn't like. Fine. Now they're finally getting it right, and making things much better starting with SP2 (firewall enabled by default, etc). Sure, *nix has been doing it right for much longer, but you have to admit that things are getting a lot better in the Windows world...
Looking back at what? (Score:3, Insightful)
Patching only works against script kiddies (Score:2)
Finding new vulnerabilities isn't hard. Remember ntcrash? [attrition.org] Variations on that theme should discover new holes automatically over time.
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2, Funny)
For firewall we kept windows because the software we currently use performs much better on windows than Linux.
What fortune 500 company is using computer based firewalls? Let me know because I'll happily take over as "Cheif Security Officer"
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2, Funny)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:5, Funny)
As opposed to what exactly?
Firebased computer walls? (In soviet russia?)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:3, Informative)
Hail to the new troll, same as the old troll (Score:2, Insightful)
For Outlook issues alone (forget about slammer - though how could you!) Microsoft earns the big security rasberry of the year. PPHbth!!!
Re:Hail to the new troll, same as the old troll (Score:2, Interesting)
In the several years employeed at the same place I've never had an email virus at my company's headquaters nor where I'm contracted too. Nor have I heard of anyone there getting one. Both places use exchange are NT domains, everyone uses Outlook, etc.
Both places have admins that know what the hell they are doing.
I have seen one spread like wild fire at another place I do a few hours of work for here and there. And that place has $8 an hour admins that have no clue what they're doing
Don't know the details (Score:2, Interesting)
This is not a small company either, around 3000 people. Yes, we do have admins that know what the hell they are doing. Sometimes, stupid users click on links or bring in laptops and that is it.
The thing is, e
Re:Don't know the details (Score:2)
You will if there's 3000 identical (or near identical) machines (which there should be, if the admin is doing his job right) and an automated exploit gets unleased on them. The only limiting factors will be the network and machine speed.
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:5, Interesting)
Hello? What alternate universe are you living in? We spent a good chunk of our summer and fall chasing MS-BLAST infected computers. We had to detach computers from the network before upgrading them to XP, because if we didn't they'd get hit before we could patch them.
Perhaps you are playing semantic games - perhaps in absolute numbers there haven't been "that many" Windows exploits. But in terms of wasted IT time; in terms of network downtime; in terms of severity of attack there is just NO comparison. Our Linux, Solaris, and OS X boxes have required almost none of our time.
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:3, Interesting)
Linux may not be much more secure than Windows but at least my Linux boxes don't go spreading malicious code around my office faster than I can patch 'em. In fact, I don't remember ever patching in Linux box in 2003. Hrmmm, I wonder why that is..
At least with Linux I don't have to worry about security unless I put it in a production environment. Then I only need to worry about keeping up-to-date with patches.
My Linux desktop doesn't
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
If you don't sooner or later you'll be hacked, you might or might not notice it, but other people will use your machine for purposes you did not intend (such as share software or copyrighted material, or relay spam).
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:3, Informative)
Why? Because my network has a firewall. Then my machine has a firewall. And I run a virus checker. And I keep reasonably up to date with patches. And no, it's really not a big deal.
In our last audit, guess what we found. Windows 2000 servers on the audited networks were patched. Linux machines were not patched for recent holes. Why? The metality that Linux is secure out of the box. We showed how the audited network'
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:3, Insightful)
Why would anyone need exc
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
What is a good open source alternative for centralized information sharing (workgroup planning, email, address book, etc) ? Yes, email can be done by anyone... On the other hand most POP3 implementations out of the box are significantly less secure than exchange because the data -- and especially the authentication -- is transfered in cleartext.
and p.s. it does not cost you anything more than hardware to set up a windows update-like service either. We cache all QFEs on ou
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2, Interesting)
Yes, they may have. But unlike Windows, all of the linux software had patched versions out within a matter of hours. You are correct, however, in that it's up to the admins to apply the patches, but in my experience, linux admins are a lot more vigilant about this sort of thing.
Also, no linux "virus" ever filled my inbox with hundreds of huge attachments claiming that I needed to update Windows
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
Re:Its crap but just as crap as anyone else (Score:2)
no sane company with any valuable data on their intranet should use anything other than a hardware based REAL firewall with custom OS, not a consumer/server OS
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:2)
Windows, on the other hand, requires you to be an administrator to do virtually anything (I would so love to remove the admin priviliges from some of our more clueless users, but they need them to do installation testing. Gak.)
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:2)
It is possible, to some degree, to kludge up a suitably complex web of groups, file ownerships/permissions and lines in /etc/sudoers to sort-maybe emulate ACLs, but it quickly becomes a management nightware. Most people just use it to temporarily grant root privileges to certain users and maybe limit them to certain commands.
Sudo is an ugly hack around the problem of a root user, not a real solution to t
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:5, Informative)
On your specific points:
Many (if not most) Windows programs get it wrong. Heck even Microsoft has been released games that can only be played if logged in as administrator.
Linux does let you do delegation, but that is mostly left as a user space implementation issue. That is the purpose of setuid/setgid, group memberships, sudo etc.
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:5, Insightful)
Maybe so, but you haven't mentioned any.
The quality of your admins has way more to do with ultimate security.
Can't argue with that.
Agreed that NT has access controls on every object. However they are not visible and not used very much by end users and administrators.
Much like *properly* setup sudoers, groups and file ownerships/permissions.
The UNIX ones are simple and very easy to understand.
That's because they're so primitive. Not to mention some of them aren't really logical - like needing read *and* execute permissions to list the contents of a directory.
Here you have the choice between complicated (you do know the difference between discretionary and inherited rights filters?) and pervasive (every object) versus simple and pretty much only on files (which almost every OS object is anyway).
Properly setting up a combination of sudo, groups and file permissions and ownerships is a monumental task and an administrative nightmare. Not saying ACLs are a walk in the park, but when you're finished with sudo & co you've got an ugly hack around a fundamentally broken design, when you're finished with ACLs you've got an elegant and maintainable solution.
The Windows acceditation is a crock. It is in a non-networked environment with no floppy disk or CD drive.
That's because, IIRC, being without a network and floppy drive were *requirements* of the accreditation - IOW, *no accredited OS* could have had them.
(And we won't even go into the ability of any process in a desktop session being able to send messages to any other process which is probably the flaw Microsoft alludes to).
This was fairly well rebutted at the time - applications can be written so that this can't occur.
In Linux you have to understand chmod.
This is ridiculously (and irresponsibly) oversimplified. You have to understand group participations, file ownerships, permissions, SUID, GID, sticky permissions and the subtly different ways some file permissions can act on different platforms. This is before worrying about things like limitations on how many groups a user can be in and other weird things that only happen on some platforms. Not to mention the inescapable fact that on most unixes, practically all important services and administrative tasks have to spend some time with the unlimited priviliges of UID 0.
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:3, Interesting)
ACLs are a powerful feature BUT really need to have very strict documentation defining whats been done in an organisation.
The Orange Book evaluated standalone systems only. I like my Internet ! This C2 stuff is generally discussed as marketing aid and ignores the fine details of the underlying c
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:5, Interesting)
Yes, someone who is NOT an expert is hardly qualified to be an administrator now are they?
"Linux only provides access controls for files and directories. In contrast, every object in Windows NT, from files to operating system data structures, has an access control list and its use can be regulated as appropriate. Linux security is all-or-nothing. Administrators cannot delegate administrative privileges: a user who needs any administrative capability must be made a full administrator, which compromises best security practices. In contrast, Windows NT allows an administrator to delegate privileges at an exceptionally fine-grained level."
Are you on crack? EVERYTHING is a file or directory on a linux system. There ISN'T a registry to hack. The most powerful and popular solutions for all tasks on linux also have built in ACL's for fine tuning access. Not to mention iptables which is a one stop kernel level firewalling and routing solution with flexibility windows never dreamed of with even 3rd party tools.
There is only ONE full administrator on a linux system, root. Any other service and it's configuration files will be owned by a group, members of said group can administrate it. Since EVERYTHING including hardware devices is a file on linux you can fine grain control access to every piece of software and/or hardware you like on the system. By setting permissions on the correct file you can even deny a user the ability to move an icon on their linux desktop.
"Linux has not supported key security accreditation standards. Every member of the Windows NT family since Windows NT 3.5 has been evaluated at either a C2 level under the U.S. Government's evaluation process or at a C2-equivalent level under the British Government's ITSEC process. In contrast, no Linux products are listed on the U.S. Government's evaluated product list."
Government accredits are meaningless, microsoft had to hack minimal posix compliance into windows before they could bribe their way in. The only reason it was allowed at all was that windows was already being used widely (at least in the US, don't follow the brits) and it's VERY expensive to go through the process.
"Linux system administrators must spend huge amounts of time understanding the latest Linux bugs and determining what to do about them. This is made complex due to the fact that there isn't a central location for security issues to be reported and fixed. In contrast, Microsoft provides a single security repository for notification and fixes of security related issues."
And yet somehow with a single command line I have all the fixes for the bugs that were discovered this morning. And windows update only has the bugs that were discovered 3 months ago with a couple exceptions.
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:2)
Sounds like an administrative nighmare. Enough of a nightmare that many programs require administrator access to function.
Linux system administrators must spend huge amounts of time understanding the latest Linux bugs and determining what to do about them.
Piddle. There are a few that require a bit of understanding, but mostly the bugs are irrel
Re:Myth: Linux is more secure than Windows NT. (Score:4, Insightful)
Let me ask you this: how can you restrict privileges to the RPCSS service?
Well?
I'm still waiting for an answer.
The answer is that you cannot restrict privileges to the RPCSS service. It must run as SYSTEM, the NT equivalent of root. Although ACLs can be applied to the SYSTEM account, they can be bypassed easily as SYSTEM can insert code to run at IA32 ring zero.
Let us then see how many services run by default under the SYSTEM account in a Windows machine: well, that's all of them, isn't it?
Why don't we try a little experiment. Lets take a ridiculously trivial service, one that can be written in minutes: the Messenger service.
Now let's take Messenger and run it under a different account so we can apply access controls to it. What does it do?
Well, now what does this mean? Perhaps I did not give the Messenger service a privileged enough account? Nope. Perhaps I need to restart the computer rather than starting the service directly? Nope.
The problem is that Messenger runs as a thread under svchost.exe, as it is an RPC service "built into" the various other crap there. Is this a fine-grained security model?
Note also that when you attempt to have a service start under different credentials (should you ever attempt this as I very seldom see it), you must type the account's password. Perhaps this is a security feature so that one cannot install a service which then grants the user elevated privileges? Nope.
In order to change credentials in NT ("obtain a security token"), you must supply the account's password. When you have a service run under a different account, that password that you type in is saved somewhere as it must be supplied in order to obtain different credentials. Where is it saved? Beats me. How is it stored? Probably "encrypted" using some machine-specific information; however, it must be decrypted upon launch of the service, so the password must be recoverable (without undue computation, eg, it is not hashed).
Linux system administrators must spend huge amounts of time understanding the latest Linux bugs and determining what to do about them.
...
Configuring Linux security requires an administrator to be an expert in the intricacies of the operating system and how components interact.
Again, let me pose a question to you, as I assume you see yourself as a competent NT administrator:
How do you disable DCOM without restricting RPC? You cannot consult google, but must discover the answer on your own.
Obvious response: firewall.
Well, a firewall isn't the answer. Say box X needs to talk to box Y using DCE RPC. You cannot insert any firewall I know of between X and Y which stops DCOM but allows through other RPC programs as no firewall I know of works at this level of the stack. You could perhaps put something like a snort box in between X and Y that allows for user-programmable packet inspection, but please don't tell me that's "easy to set up and administer".
Correct response is documented here [microsoft.com]. But a competent NT administrator such as you knew that, of course.
Let's tackle the equivalent problem on a Unix machine: we have an RPC service that we want to disable. Well, which one do we want to disable? NFS? Stop nfsd from launching. YP? Stop ypbind from launching. Mountd? Stop mountd from launching. You get the idea.
How do you stop a daemon from launching? Tru
Re:2003 was a wormy year. (Score:4, Insightful)
Linux isn't quite the easy target that Windows is. Almost every Linux box is completely different when compared to another. Not everyone is using the same mail client, there are several different browsers that may or may not be used, and several different daemons that may or may not be available or exploitable.
You just can't easily write a virus that will infect a massive number of Linux machines.
Note that I'm not saying Linux machines are impervious to viruses; just that I'd be shocked if there was any Linux virus that infects more than a handful of machines.
Re:2003 was a wormy year. (Score:2)
Microsoft didn't start thinking about that, what 13 or 14 years later, when Code Red and the lot started to hit. It wasn't rocket science, it was just a matter of time. I think it was just the beginning...
You know what scares me the most? Chin
Re:2003 was a wormy year. (Score:2)
I do agree that China-only access to MS source could be a major issue. If MS allows at least the government of any country to look at source, this would help fortify government systems, if not prevent civilian computers from getting hit.
Re:My guess. (Score:2)
Sendmail is for the most part replaced by Postfix and other varients. Apache... well, although quite a large portion of web servers run apache, a very small portion of linux systems are web servers.
Re:My guess. (Score:2)
While I personally don't use SendMail (I love Qmail [qmail.org]), I believe the vast majority of Linux (and other Unix) machines offering mail services are using Sendmail. Just think of how many Cobalt RAQ machines administered by idiots are out there...
Apache has always had a pretty strong focus on security, though every
Re:My guess. (Score:3, Informative)
according to that link, quite a few cobalts out there. And since i work for sun i can attest that most people running them are fairly clueless. and they arent exactly up-to-date either.
Re:My guess. (Score:2)
My guess is that when such a worm comes about, it will be done in the same manner as most Outlook worms - tricking the end user into executing malicious code from an email attachment.
Does anyone *seriously* believe someone naive enough to run those "Naked Kournikova pictures" attachments won't be similarly naive and type "chm
Re:My guess. (Score:5, Interesting)
I agree with everything you stated. It's the diversity that makes Linux (and other operating systems) less vulnerable to such massive attacks. But everyone learns from their mistakes, even Microsoft (albeit slowly sometimes).
Currently, if you purchase a copy of XP and install it with neworking capabilities (even dialup), there is a good chance you won't get as far as Windows Update before you're rooted. I went through that a couple of months ago -- got the "Windows is Shutting Down" dialog before the Windows Update page could load. I knew how to abort the shutdown and patch the problem, and I really should have enabled the firewall first -- but joe average doesn't (and shouldn't have to) know this.
However, I also recall the Honeypot project having similar experiences with RedHat 6.2; because of a remote-root exploit (I think), the machine was hardly online a few minutes before being rooted. If I remember correctly (it was a long time ago), 6.2 was the latest retail RedHat release at the time.
Jump to now: RedHat now enables less services by default (but still has a record number of suid-root binaries...), and really pushes you to enable iptables at install time before any network interface is brought up. Likewise, SP2 for XP will be doing some things right, and I'm sure this will carry over to Longhorn and future versions.
I say: bravo on both sides. Firewalls enabled by default (like "opt-in" instead of "opt-out"), and taking security into consideration with every decision (as RedHat and Microsoft both are learning to do, though many others *cough*OpenBSD*cough* have known this for a while)...
Re:2003 was a wormy year. (Score:2)
Hardly. The vast majority of worms and viruses neither require, nor spread through these. Realistically speaking, being root or being a regular user makes little difference.
There's just far fewer root services running on your typical Linux box than there is Administrator services under Windows.
I'd argue with that. Both the
Re:2003 was a wormy year. (Score:3, Interesting)
If you somehow manage to penetrate *without* an account, you'll still have to deal with system accounts having a home directory of /dev/null, and some creative usage of things like chattr [1], chmod, and tripwire. Oh, and check out "man last[1]".
Thus your machine is rea
Re:Slashdot (Score:5, Funny)
Hello, new sig.
Re:you know (Score:5, Interesting)
okay AC, there is a plethora of reasons that windows is on 90% of all desktops.
Re:you know (Score:2)
Good points, but I have to point out the VHS vs Betamax thing isn't all that clear cut... Betamax suffered from short tape lengths, which may well be what killed it.
Re:you know (Score:2)
Neat plane anyways.
Re:you know (Score:2)
But they also became security experts qualified to evaluate whether or not their operating system is safe to be unleashing on public networks.
Re:Looking Back At Windows Security In 2003 (Score:2)
Cliche'd or Lame or Boring would be much better was to moderate such posts!!!