"An engineer got curious about how his iLife A11 smart vacuum worked and monitored the network traffic coming from the device," writes Tom's Hardware.

"That's when he noticed it was constantly sending logs and telemetry data to the manufacturer — something he hadn't consented to." The user, Harishankar, decided to block the telemetry servers' IP addresses on his network, while keeping the firmware and OTA servers open. While his smart gadget worked for a while, it just refused to turn on soon after... He sent it to the service center multiple times, wherein the technicians would turn it on and see nothing wrong with the vacuum. When they returned it to him, it would work for a few days and then fail to boot again... [H]e decided to disassemble the thing to determine what killed it and to see if he could get it working again...

[He discovered] a GD32F103 microcontroller to manage its plethora of sensors, including Lidar, gyroscopes, and encoders. He created PCB connectors and wrote Python scripts to control them with a computer, presumably to test each piece individually and identify what went wrong. From there, he built a Raspberry Pi joystick to manually drive the vacuum, proving that there was nothing wrong with the hardware. From this, he looked at its software and operating system, and that's where he discovered the dark truth: his smart vacuum was a security nightmare and a black hole for his personal data.

First of all, it's Android Debug Bridge, which gives him full root access to the vacuum, wasn't protected by any kind of password or encryption. The manufacturer added a makeshift security protocol by omitting a crucial file, which caused it to disconnect soon after booting, but Harishankar easily bypassed it. He then discovered that it used Google Cartographer to build a live 3D map of his home. This isn't unusual, by far. After all, it's a smart vacuum, and it needs that data to navigate around his home. However, the concerning thing is that it was sending off all this data to the manufacturer's server. It makes sense for the device to send this data to the manufacturer, as its onboard SoC is nowhere near powerful enough to process all that data. However, it seems that iLife did not clear this with its customers.

Furthermore, the engineer made one disturbing discovery — deep in the logs of his non-functioning smart vacuum, he found a command with a timestamp that matched exactly the time the gadget stopped working. This was clearly a kill command, and after he reversed it and rebooted the appliance, it roared back to life.
Thanks to long-time Slashdot reader registrations_suck for sharing the article.

"Ubuntu's decision to switch to Rust-based coreutils in 25.10 hasn't been the smoothest ride," writes the blog OMG Ubuntu, "as the latest — albeit now resolved — bug underscores." [Coreutils] are used by a number of processes, apps and scripts, including Ubuntu's own unattended-upgrades process, which automatically checks for new software updates. Alas, the Rust-based version of date had a bug which meant Ubuntu 25.10 desktops, servers, cloud and container images were not able to automatically check for updates when configured. Unattended-upgrades hooks into the date utility to check the timestamp of a reference file of when an update check was last run and, past a certain date, checks again. But date was incorrectly showing the current date, always.

A fix has been issued so only Ubuntu 25.10 installs withrust-coreutils 0.2.2-0ubuntu2 (or earlier) are affected.

"AI isn't just a tool anymore; it's an integral part of the development experience," argues GitHub's blog. So "Agents shouldn't be bolted on. They should work the way you already work..."

So this week GitHub announced "Agent HQ," which CNBC describes as a "mission control" interface "that will allow software developers to manage coding agents from multiple vendors on a single platform." Developers have a range of new capabilities at their fingertips because of these agents, but it can require a lot of effort to keep track of them all individually, said GitHub COO Kyle Daigle. Developers will now be able to manage agents from GitHub, OpenAI, Google, Anthropic, xAI and Cognition in one place with Agent HQ. "We want to bring a little bit of order to the chaos of innovation," Daigle told CNBC in an interview. "With so many different agents, there's so many different ways of kicking off these asynchronous tasks, and so our big opportunity here is to bring this all together." Agent HQ users will be able to access a command center where they can assign, steer and monitor the work of multiple agents...

The third-party agents will begin rolling out to GitHub Copilot subscribers in the coming months, but Copilot Pro+ users will be able to access OpenAI Codex in VS Code Insiders this week, the company said.
"We're into this wave two era," GitHub's COO Mario Rodriguez told VentureBeat, an era that's "going to be multimodal, it's going to be agentic and it's going to have these new experiences that will feel AI native...."

Or, as VentureBeat sees it, GitHub "is positioning itself as the essential orchestration layer beneath them all..." Just as the company transformed Git, pull requests and CI/CD into collaborative workflows, it's now trying to do the same with a fragmented AI coding landscape...

The technical architecture addresses a critical enterprise concern: Security. Unlike standalone agent implementations where users must grant broad repository access, GitHub's Agent HQ implements granular controls at the platform level... Agents operating through Agent HQ can only commit to designated branches. They run within sandboxed GitHub Actions environments with firewall protections. They operate under strict identity controls. [GitHub COO] Rodriguez explained that even if an agent goes rogue, the firewall prevents it from accessing external networks or exfiltrating data unless those protections are explicitly disabled.

Beyond managing third-party agents, GitHub is introducing two technical capabilities that set Agent HQ apart from alternative approaches like Cursor's standalone editor or Anthropic's Claude integration. Custom agents via AGENTS.md files: Enterprises can now create source-controlled configuration files that define specific rules, tools and guardrails for how Copilot behaves. For example, a company could specify "prefer this logger" or "use table-driven tests for all handlers." This permanently encodes organizational standards without requiring developers to re-prompt every time... Native Model Context Protocol (MCP) support: VS Code now includes a GitHub MCP Registry. Developers can discover, install and enable MCP servers with a single click. They can then create custom agents that combine these tools with specific system prompts. This positions GitHub as the integration point between the emerging MCP ecosystem and actual developer workflows. MCP, introduced by Anthropic but rapidly gaining industry support, is becoming a de facto standard for agent-to-tool communication. By supporting the full specification, GitHub can orchestrate agents that need access to external services without each agent implementing its own integration logic.

GitHub is also shipping new capabilities within VS Code itself. Plan Mode allows developers to collaborate with Copilot on building step-by-step project approaches. The AI asks clarifying questions before any code is written. Once approved, the plan can be executed either locally in VS Code or by cloud-based agents. The feature addresses a common failure mode in AI coding: Beginning implementation before requirements are fully understood. By forcing an explicit planning phase, GitHub aims to reduce wasted effort and improve output quality.

More significantly, GitHub's code review feature is becoming agentic. The new implementation will use GitHub's CodeQL engine, which previously largely focused on security vulnerabilities to identify bugs and maintainability issues. The code review agent will automatically scan agent-generated pull requests before human review. This creates a two-stage quality gate.
"Don't let this little bit of news float past you like all those self-satisfied marketing pitches we semi-hear and ignore," writes ZDNet: If it works and remains reliable, this is actually a very big deal... Tech companies, especially the giant ones, often like to talk "open" but then do their level best to engineer lock-in to their solution and their solution alone. Sure, most of them offer some sort of export tool, but the barrier to moving from one tool to another is often huge... [T]he idea that you can continue to use your favorite agent or agents in GitHub, fully integrated into the GitHub tool path, is powerful. It means there's a chance developers might not have to suffer the walled garden effect that so many companies have strived for to lock in their customers.

"It's been hard for me to understand why Atlas exists," writes MIT Technology Review. " Who is this browser for, exactly? Who is its customer? And the answer I have come to there is that Atlas is for OpenAI. The real customer, the true end user of Atlas, is not the person browsing websites, it is the company collecting data about what and how that person is browsing."

New York Magazine's "Intelligencer" column argues OpenAI wants ChatGPT in your browser because "That's where people who use computers, particularly for work, spend all their time, and through which vast quantities of valuable information flow in and out. Also, if you're a company hoping to train your models to replicate a bunch of white-collar work, millions of browser sessions would be a pretty valuable source of data."

Unfortunately, warns Fast Company, ChatGPT Atlas, Perplexity Comet, and other AI browses "include some major security, privacy, and usability trade-offs... Most of the time, I don't want to use them and am wary of doing so..." Worst of all, these browsers are security minefields. A web page that looks benign to humans can includehidden instructions for AI agents, tricking them into stealing info from other sites... "If you're signed into sensitive accounts like your bank or your email provider in your browser, simply summarizing a Reddit postcould result in an attacker being able to steal money or your private data,"Brave's security researchers wrotelast week.No one has figured out how to solve this problem.

If you can look past the security nightmares, the actual browsing features are substandard. Neither ChatGPT Atlas nor Perplexity Comet support vertical tabs — a must-have feature for me — and they have no tab search tool or way to look up recently-closed pages. Atlas also doesn't support saving sites as web apps, selecting multiple tabs (for instance, to close all at once with Cmd+W), or customizing the appearance. Compared to all the fancy new AI features, the web browsing part can feel like an afterthought. Regular web search can also be a hassle, even though you'll probably need it sometimes. When I typed "Sichuan Chili" into ChatGPT Atlas, it produced a lengthy description of the Chinese peppers, not the nearby restaurant whose website and number I was looking for.... Meanwhile, the standard AI annoyances still apply in the browser. Getting Perplexity to fill my grocery cart felt like a triumph, but on other occasions the AI has run into inexplicable walls and only ended up wasting more time.

There may be other costs to using these browsers as well. AI still has usage limits, and so all this eventually becomes a ploy to bump more people into paid tiers. Beyond that,Atlas is constantly analyzing the pages you visit to build a "memory" of who you are and what you're into. Do not be surprised if this translates to deeply targeted ads as OpenAI startslooking at ways to monetize free users. For now, I'm only using AI browsers in small doses when I think they can solve a specific problem.

Even then, I'm not going sign them into my email, bank accounts, or any other accounts for which a security breach would be catastrophic. It's too bad, because email and calendars are areas where AI agents could be truly useful, but the security risks are too great (andwell-documented).
The article notes that in August Vivaldi announced that "We're taking a stand, choosing humans over hype" with their browser: We will not use an LLM to add a chatbot, a summarization solution or a suggestion engine to fill up forms for you, until more rigorous ways to do those things are available. Vivaldi is the haven for people who still want to explore. We will continue building a browser for curious minds, power users, researchers, and anyone who values autonomy. If AI contributes to that goal without stealing intellectual property, compromising privacy or the open web, we will use it. If it turns people into passive consumers, we will not...

We're fighting for a better web.

"We've spent the last year rebuilding major components of our system," Cloudflare announced this week, "and we've just slashed the latency of traffic passing through our network for millions of our customers," (There's a 10ms cut in the median time to respond, plus a 25% performance boost as measured by CDN performance tests.) They replaced a 15-year-old system named FL (where they run security and performance features), and "At the same time, we've made our system more secure, and we've reduced the time it takes for us to build and release new products."

And yes, Rust was involved: We write a lot of Rust, and we've gotten pretty good at it... We built FL2 in Rust, on Oxy [Cloudflare's Rust-based next generation proxy framework], and built a strict module framework to structure all the logic in FL2... Built in Rust, [Oxy] eliminates entire classes of bugs that plagued our Nginx/LuaJIT-based FL1, like memory safety issues and data races, while delivering C-level performance. At Cloudflare's scale, those guarantees aren't nice-to-haves, they're essential. Every microsecond saved per request translates into tangible improvements in user experience, and every crash or edge case avoided keeps the Internet running smoothly. Rust's strict compile-time guarantees also pair perfectly with FL2's modular architecture, where we enforce clear contracts between product modules and their inputs and outputs...

It's a big enough distraction from shipping products to customers to rebuild product logic in Rust. Asking all our teams to maintain two versions of their product logic, and reimplement every change a second time until we finished our migration was too much. So, we implemented a layer in our old NGINX and OpenResty based FL which allowed the new modules to be run. Instead of maintaining a parallel implementation, teams could implement their logic in Rust, and replace their old Lua logic with that, without waiting for the full replacement of the old system.
Over 100 engineers worked on FL2 — and there was extensive testing, plus a fallback-to-FL1 procedure. But "We started running customer traffic through FL2 early in 2025, and have been progressively increasing the amount of traffic served throughout the year...." As we described at the start of this post, FL2 is substantially faster than FL1. The biggest reason for this is simply that FL2 performs less work [thanks to filters controlling whether modules need to run]... Another huge reason for better performance is that FL2 is a single codebase, implemented in a performance focussed language. In comparison, FL1 was based on NGINX (which is written in C), combined with LuaJIT (Lua, and C interface layers), and also contained plenty of Rust modules. In FL1, we spent a lot of time and memory converting data from the representation needed by one language, to the representation needed by another. As a result, our internal measures show that FL2 uses less than half the CPU of FL1, and much less than half the memory. That's a huge bonus — we can spend the CPU on delivering more and more features for our customers!

Using our own tools and independent benchmarks like CDNPerf, we measured the impact of FL2 as we rolled it out across the network. The results are clear: websites are responding 10 ms faster at the median, a 25% performance boost. FL2 is also more secure by design than FL1. No software system is perfect, but the Rust language brings us huge benefits over LuaJIT. Rust has strong compile-time memory checks and a type system that avoids large classes of errors. Combine that with our rigid module system, and we can make most changes with high confidence...

We have long followed a policy that any unexplained crash of our systems needs to be investigated as a high priority. We won't be relaxing that policy, though the main cause of novel crashes in FL2 so far has been due to hardware failure. The massively reduced rates of such crashes will give us time to do a good job of such investigations. We're spending the rest of 2025 completing the migration from FL1 to FL2, and will turn off FL1 in early 2026. We're already seeing the benefits in terms of customer performance and speed of development, and we're looking forward to giving these to all our customers.

After that, when everything is modular, in Rust and tested and scaled, we can really start to optimize...!
Thanks to long-time Slashdot reader Beeftopia for sharing the article.

Slashdot reader BrianFagioli writes: Password manager 1Password's 2025 Annual Report: The Access-Trust Gap exposes how everyday employees are becoming accidental hackers in the AI era. The company's data shows that 73% of workers are encouraged to use AI tools, yet more than a third admit they do not always follow corporate policies. Many employees are feeding sensitive information into large language models or using unapproved AI apps to get work done, creating what 1Password calls "Shadow AI." At the same time, traditional defenses like single sign-on (SSO) and mobile device management (MDM) are failing to keep pace, leaving gaps in visibility and control.

The report warns that corporate security is being undermined from within. More than half of employees have installed software without IT approval, two-thirds still use weak passwords, and 38% have accessed accounts at previous employers. Despite rising enthusiasm for passkeys and passwordless authentication, 1Password says most organizations still depend on outdated systems that were never built for cloud-native, AI-driven work. The result is a growing "Access-Trust Gap" that could allow AI chaos and employee shortcuts to dismantle enterprise security from the inside.

The address bar/ChatGPT input window in OpenAI's browser ChatGPT Atlas "could be targeted for prompt injection using malicious instructions disguised as links," reports SC World, citing a report from AI/agent security platform NeuralTrust: NeuralTrust found that a malformed URL could be crafted to include a prompt that is treated as plain text by the browser, passing the prompt on to the LLM. A malformation, such as an extra space after the first slash following "https:" prevents the browser from recognizing the link as a website to visit. Rather than triggering a web search, as is common when plain text is submitted to a browser's address bar, ChatGPT Atlas treats plain text as ChatGPT prompts by default.

An unsuspecting user could potentially be tricked into copying and pasting a malformed link, believing they will be sent to a legitimate webpage. An attacker could plant the link behind a "copy link" button so that the user might not notice the suspicious text at the end of the link until after it is pasted and submitted. These prompt injections could potentially be used to instruct ChatGPT to open a new tab to a malicious website such as a phishing site, or to tell ChatGPT to take harmful actions in the user's integrated applications or logged-in sites like Google Drive, NeuralTrust said.
Last month browser security platform LayerX also described how malicious prompts could be hidden in URLs (as a parameter) for Perplexity's browser Comet. And last week SquareX Labs demonstrated that a malicious browser extension could spoof Comet's AI sidebar feature and have since replicated the proof-of-concept (PoC) attack on Atlas.

But another new vulnerability in ChatGPT Atlas "could allow malicious actors to inject nefarious instructions into the artificial intelligence (AI)-powered assistant's memory and run arbitrary code," reports The Hacker News, citing a report from browser security platform LayerX: "This exploit can allow attackers to infect systems with malicious code, grant themselves access privileges, or deploy malware," LayerX Security Co-Founder and CEO, Or Eshed, said in a report shared with The Hacker News. The attack, at its core, leverages a cross-site request forgery (CSRF) flaw that could be exploited to inject malicious instructions into ChatGPT's persistent memory. The corrupted memory can then persist across devices and sessions, permitting an attacker to conduct various actions, including seizing control of a user's account, browser, or connected systems, when a logged-in user attempts to use ChatGPT for legitimate purposes....

"What makes this exploit uniquely dangerous is that it targets the AI's persistent memory, not just the browser session," Michelle Levy, head of security research at LayerX Security, said. "By chaining a standard CSRF to a memory write, an attacker can invisibly plant instructions that survive across devices, sessions, and even different browsers. In our tests, once ChatGPT's memory was tainted, subsequent 'normal' prompts could trigger code fetches, privilege escalations, or data exfiltration without tripping meaningful safeguards...."

LayerX said the problem is exacerbated by ChatGPT Atlas' lack of robust anti-phishing controls, the browser security company said, adding it leaves users up to 90% more exposed than traditional browsers like Google Chrome or Microsoft Edge. In tests against over 100 in-the-wild web vulnerabilities and phishing attacks, Edge managed to stop 53% of them, followed by Google Chrome at 47% and Dia at 46%. In contrast, Perplexity's Comet and ChatGPT Atlas stopped only 7% and 5.8% of malicious web pages.
From The Conversation: Sandboxing is a security approach designed to keep websites isolated and prevent malicious code from accessing data from other tabs. The modern web depends on this separation. But in Atlas, the AI agent isn't malicious code — it's a trusted user with permission to see and act across all sites. This undermines the core principle of browser isolation.
Thanks to Slashdot reader spatwei for suggesting the topic.

According to the Wall Street Journal, SpaceX is reportedly poised to secure a $2 billion Pentagon contract to develop hundreds of missile-tracking satellites for President Trump's ambitious Golden Dome defense system. The Independent reports: The planned "air moving target indicator" system in question could ultimately feature as many as 600 satellites once it is fully operational, The Wall Street Journal reports. Musk's company has also been linked to two more satellite ventures, which are concerned with relaying sensitive communications and tracing vehicles, respectively.

Golden Dome, inspired by Israel's "Iron Dome," was announced by Trump and Secretary of War Pete Hegseth at the White House in May and will amount to a complex system of satellites and weaponry capable of destroying incoming missiles before they hit American targets. The president promised it would be "fully operational" before he leaves office in January 2029, capable of intercepting rockets, "even if they are launched from space," with an overall price tag of $175 billion.

OpenAI has introduced Aardvark, a GPT-5-powered autonomous agent that scans, reasons about, and patches code like a human security researcher. "By embedding itself directly into the development pipeline, Aardvark aims to turn security from a post-development concern into a continuous safeguard that evolves with the software itself," reports InfoWorld. From the report: What makes Aardvark unique, OpenAI noted, is its combination of reasoning, automation, and verification. Rather than simply highlighting potential vulnerabilities, the agent promises multi-stage analysis -- starting by mapping an entire repository and building a contextual threat model around it. From there, it continuously monitors new commits, checking whether each change introduces risk or violates existing security patterns.

Additionally, upon identifying a potential issue, Aardvark attempts to validate the exploitability of the finding in a sandboxed environment before flagging it. This validation step could prove transformative. Traditional static analysis tools often overwhelm developers with false alarms -- issues that may look risky but aren't truly exploitable. "The biggest advantage is that it will reduce false positives significantly," noted Jain. "It's helpful in open source codes and as part of the development pipeline."

Once a vulnerability is confirmed, Aardvark integrates with Codex to propose a patch, then re-analyzes the fix to ensure it doesn't introduce new problems. OpenAI claims that in benchmark tests, the system identified 92 percent of known and synthetically introduced vulnerabilities across test repositories, a promising indication that AI may soon shoulder part of the burden of modern code auditing.

The FCC plans to repeal a Biden-era ruling that required ISPs to secure their networks under the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, instead relying on voluntary cybersecurity commitments from telecom providers. FCC Chairman Brendan Carr said the ruling "exceeded the agency's authority and did not present an effective or agile response to the relevant cybersecurity threats." Carr said the vote scheduled for November 20 comes after "extensive FCC engagement with carriers" who have taken "substantial steps... to strengthen their cybersecurity defenses." Ars Technica reports: The FCC's January 2025 declaratory ruling came in response to attacks by China, including the Salt Typhoon infiltration of major telecom providers such as Verizon and AT&T. The Biden-era FCC found that the Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA), a 1994 law, "affirmatively requires telecommunications carriers to secure their networks from unlawful access or interception of communications."

"The Commission has previously found that section 105 of CALEA creates an affirmative obligation for a telecommunications carrier to avoid the risk that suppliers of untrusted equipment will "illegally activate interceptions or other forms of surveillance within the carrier's switching premises without its knowledge,'" the January order said. "With this Declaratory Ruling, we clarify that telecommunications carriers' duties under section 105 of CALEA extend not only to the equipment they choose to use in their networks, but also to how they manage their networks." A draft of the order that will be voted on in November can be found here (PDF).

An anonymous reader quotes a report from ZDNet: Even before Azure had a global failure this week, Austria's Ministry of Economy had taken a decisive step toward digital sovereignty. The Ministry achieved this status by migrating 1,200 employees to a Nextcloud-based cloud and collaboration platform hosted on Austrian-based infrastructure. This shift away from proprietary, foreign-owned cloud services, such as Microsoft 365, to an open-source, European-based cloud service aligns with a growing trend among European governments and agencies. They want control over sensitive data and to declare their independence from US-based tech providers.

European companies are encouraging this trend. Many of them have joined forces in the newly created non-profit foundation, the EuroStack Initiative. This foundation's goal is " to organize action, not just talk, around the pillars of the initiative: Buy European, Sell European, Fund European." What's the motive behind these moves away from proprietary tech? Well, in Austria's case, Florian Zinnagl, CISO of the Ministry of Economy, Energy, and Tourism (BMWET), explained, "We carry responsibility for a large amount of sensitive data -- from employees, companies, and citizens. As a public institution, we take this responsibility very seriously. That's why we view it critically to rely on cloud solutions from non-European corporations for processing this information."

Austria's move and motivation echo similar efforts in Germany, Denmark, and other EU states and agencies. The organizations include the German state of Schleswig-Holstein, which abandoned Exchange and Outlook for open-source programs. Other agencies that have taken the same path away from Microsoft include the Austrian military, Danish government organizations, and the French city of Lyon. All of these organizations aim to keep data storage and processing within national or European borders to enhance security, comply with privacy laws such as the EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and mitigate risks from potential commercial and foreign government surveillance.

An anonymous reader shares a report: Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) does not let people decline to be scanned by its new facial recognition app, which the agency uses to verify a person's identity and their immigration status, according to an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) document obtained by 404 Media. The document also says any face photos taken by the app, called Mobile Fortify, will be stored for 15 years, including those of U.S. citizens.

The document provides new details about the technology behind Mobile Fortify, how the data it collects is processed and stored, and DHS's rationale for using it. On Wednesday 404 Media reported that both ICE and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) are scanning peoples' faces in the streets to verify citizenship.

"ICE does not provide the opportunity for individuals to decline or consent to the collection and use of biometric data/photograph collection," the document, called a Privacy Threshold Analysis (PTA), says. A PTA is a document that DHS creates in the process of deploying new technology or updating existing capabilities. It is supposed to be used by DHS's internal privacy offices to determine and describe the privacy risks of a certain piece of tech. "CBP and ICE Privacy are jointly submitting this new mobile app PTA for the ICE Mobile Fortify Mobile App (Mobile Fortify app), a mobile application developed by CBP and made accessible to ICE agents and officers operating in the field," the document, dated February, reads. 404 Media obtained the document (which you can see here) via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request with CBP.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from 404 Media: Someone recently managed to get on a Microsoft Teams call with representatives from phone hacking company Cellebrite, and then leaked a screenshot of the company's capabilities against many Google Pixel phones, according to a forum post about the leak and 404 Media's review of the material. The leak follows others obtained and verified by 404 Media over the last 18 months. Those leaks impacted both Cellebrite and its competitor Grayshift, now owned by Magnet Forensics. Both companies constantly hunt for techniques to unlock phones law enforcement have physical access to.

"You can Teams meeting with them. They tell everything. Still cannot extract esim on Pixel. Ask anything," a user called rogueFed wrote on the GrapheneOS forum on Wednesday, speaking about what they learned about Cellebrite capabilities. GrapheneOS is a security- and privacy-focused Android-based operating system. rogueFed then posted two screenshots of the Microsoft Teams call. The first was a Cellebrite Support Matrix, which lays out whether the company's tech can, or can't, unlock certain phones and under what conditions. The second screenshot was of a Cellebrite employee. According to another of rogueFed's posts, the meeting took place in October. The meeting appears to have been a sales call. The employee is a "pre sales expert," according to a profile available online.

The Support Matrix is focused on modern Google Pixel devices, including the Pixel 9 series. The screenshot does not include details on the Pixel 10, which is Google's latest device. It discusses Cellebrite's capabilities regarding 'before first unlock', or BFU, when a piece of phone unlocking tech tries to open a device before someone has typed in the phone's passcode for the first time since being turned on. It also shows Cellebrite's capabilities against after first unlock, or AFU, devices. The Support Matrix also shows Cellebrite's capabilities against Pixel devices running GrapheneOS, with some differences between phones running that operating system and stock Android. Cellebrite does support, for example, Pixel 9 devices BFU. Meanwhile the screenshot indicates Cellebrite cannot unlock Pixel 9 devices running GrapheneOS BFU. In their forum post, rogueFed wrote that the "meeting focused specific on GrapheneOS bypass capability." They added "very fresh info more coming."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from the Guardian: When Google and Amazon negotiated a major $1.2 billion cloud-computing deal in 2021, their customer -- the Israeli government -- had an unusual demand: agree to use a secret code as part of an arrangement that would become known as the "winking mechanism." The demand, which would require Google and Amazon to effectively sidestep legal obligations in countries around the world, was born out of Israel's concerns that data it moves into the global corporations' cloud platforms could end up in the hands of foreign law enforcement authorities.

Like other big tech companies, Google and Amazon's cloud businesses routinely comply with requests from police, prosecutors and security services to hand over customer data to assist investigations. This process is often cloaked in secrecy. The companies are frequently gagged from alerting the affected customer their information has been turned over. This is either because the law enforcement agency has the power to demand this or a court has ordered them to stay silent. For Israel, losing control of its data to authorities overseas was a significant concern. So to deal with the threat, officials created a secret warning system: the companies must send signals hidden in payments to the Israeli government, tipping it off when it has disclosed Israeli data to foreign courts or investigators.

To clinch the lucrative contract, Google and Amazon agreed to the so-called winking mechanism, according to leaked documents seen by the Guardian, as part of a joint investigation with Israeli-Palestinian publication +972 Magazine and Hebrew-language outlet Local Call. Based on the documents and descriptions of the contract by Israeli officials, the investigation reveals how the companies bowed to a series of stringent and unorthodox "controls" contained within the 2021 deal, known as Project Nimbus. Both Google and Amazon's cloud businesses have denied evading any legal obligations.

Universal Music Group has settled its copyright lawsuit with AI music startup Udio and struck a licensing deal to launch a new AI-powered music platform next year. The Verge reports: The deal includes some form of compensation and "will provide further revenue opportunities for UMG artists and songwriters," Universal says. Udio, the company behind "BBL Drizzy," will launch the platform as a subscription service next year. Universal, alongside other industry giants Sony and Warner, sued Udio and another startup Suno for "en masse" copyright infringement last year.

Universal -- whose roster includes some of the world's biggest performers like Taylor Swift, Bad Bunny, and Ariana Grande -- says the new tool will "transform the user engagement experience" and let creators customize, stream, and share music. There's no indication of how much it will cost yet. Udio's existing music maker, which lets you create new songs with a few words, will remain available during the transition, though content will be held "within a walled garden" and security measures like fingerprinting will be added.

A critical security flaw in Chromium's Blink rendering engine can crash billions of browsers within seconds. Security researcher Jose Pino discovered the vulnerability and created a proof-of-concept exploit called Brash to demonstrate the bug affecting Chrome, Edge, OpenAI's ChatGPT Atlas, Brave, Vivaldi, Arc, Dia, Opera and Perplexity Comet.

The flaw, reports The Register, exploits the absence of rate limiting on document.title API updates in Chromium versions 143.0.7483.0 and later. The attack injects millions of DOM mutations per second and saturates the main thread. When The Register tested the code on Edge, the browser crashed and the Windows machine locked up after about 30 seconds while consuming 18GB of RAM in one tab. Pino disclosed the bug to the Chromium security team on August 28 and followed up on August 30 but received no response. Google said it is looking into the issue.

More than a half dozen federal departments and agencies have backed a proposal to ban future sales of the most popular home routers in the United States on the grounds that the vendor's ties to mainland China make them a national security risk, Washington Post reported Thursday, citing people briefed on the matter. From the report: The proposal, which arose from a months-long risk assessment, calls for blocking sales of networking devices from TP-Link Systems of Irvine, California, which was spun off from a China-based company, TP-Link Technologies, but owns some of that company's former assets in China.

The ban was proposed by the Commerce Department and supported this summer by an interagency process that includes the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice and Defense, the people said. "TP-Link vigorously disputes any allegation that its products present national security risks to the United States," Ricca Silverio, a spokeswoman for TP-Link Systems, said in a statement. "TP-Link is a U.S. company committed to supplying high-quality and secure products to the U.S. market and beyond."

If imposed, the ban would be among the largest in consumer history and a possible sign that the East-West divide over tech independence is still deepening amid reports of accelerated Chinese government-supported hacking. Only the legislated ban of Chinese-owned TikTok, which President Donald Trump has averted with executive orders and a pending sale, would impact more U.S. consumers.

An anonymous reader shares a report: The transition to the more-secure HTTPS web protocol has plateaued, according to Google. As of 2020, 95 to 99 percent of navigations in Chrome use HTTPS. To help make it safer for users to click on links, Chrome will enable a setting called Always Use Secure Connections for public sites for all users by default. This will happen in October 2026 with the release of Chrome 154.

The change will happen earlier for those who have switched on Enhanced Safe Browsing protections in Chrome. Google will enable Always Use Secure Connections by default in April when Chrome 147 drops. When this setting is on, Chrome will ask for your permission before it first accesses a public website that doesn't use HTTPS.

The Python Software Foundation rejected a $1.5 million U.S. government grant because it required them to renounce all diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives. "The non-profit would've used the funding to help prevent supply chain attacks; create a new automated, proactive review process for new PyPI packages; and make the project's work easily transferable to other open-source package managers," reports The Register. From the report: The programming non-profit's deputy executive director Loren Crary said in a blog post today that the National Science Founation (NSF) had offered $1.5 million to address structural vulnerabilities in Python and the Python Package Index (PyPI), but the Foundation quickly became dispirited with the terms (PDF) of the grant it would have to follow. "These terms included affirming the statement that we 'do not, and will not during the term of this financial assistance award, operate any programs that advance or promote DEI [diversity, equity, and inclusion], or discriminatory equity ideology in violation of Federal anti-discrimination laws,'" Crary noted. "This restriction would apply not only to the security work directly funded by the grant, but to any and all activity of the PSF as a whole."

To make matters worse, the terms included a provision that if the PSF was found to have voilated that anti-DEI diktat, the NSF reserved the right to claw back any previously disbursed funds, Crary explained. "This would create a situation where money we'd already spent could be taken back, which would be an enormous, open-ended financial risk," the PSF director added. The PSF's mission statement enshrines a commitment to supporting and growing "a diverse and international community of Python programmers," and the Foundation ultimately decided it wasn't willing to compromise on that position, even for what would have been a solid financial boost for the organization. "The PSF is a relatively small organization, operating with an annual budget of around $5 million per year, with a staff of just 14," Crary added, noting that the $1.5 million would have been the largest grant the Foundation had ever received - but it wasn't worth it if the conditions were undermining the PSF's mission. The PSF board voted unanimously to withdraw its grant application.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from BleepingComputer: The number of victims paying ransomware threat actors has reached a new low, with just 23% of the breached companies giving in to attackers' demands. With some exceptions, the decline in payment resolution rates continues the trend that Coveware has observed for the past six years. In the first quarter of 2024, the payment percentage was 28%. Although it increased over the next period, it continued to drop, reaching an all-time low in the third quarter of 2025.

One explanation for this is that organizations implemented stronger and more targeted protections against ransomware, and authorities increasing pressure for victims not to pay the hackers. [...] Over the years, ransomware groups moved from pure encryption attacks to double extortion that came with data theft and the threat of a public leak. Coveware reports that more than 76% of the attacks it observed in Q3 2025 involved data exfiltration, which is now the primary objective for most ransomware groups. The company says that when it isolates the attacks that do not encrypt the data and only steal it, the payment rate plummets to 19%, which is also a record for that sub-category.

The average and median ransomware payments fell in Q3 compared to the previous quarter, reaching $377,000 and $140,000, respectively, according to Coveware. The shift may reflect large enterprises revising their ransom payment policies and recognizing that those funds are better spent on strengthening defenses against future attacks. The researchers also note that threat groups like Akira and Qilin, which accounted for 44% of all recorded attacks in Q3 2025, have switched focus to medium-sized firms that are currently more likely to pay a ransom. "Cyber defenders, law enforcement, and legal specialists should view this as validation of collective progress," Coveware says. "The work that gets put in to prevent attacks, minimize the impact of attacks, and successfully navigate a cyber extortion -- each avoided payment constricts cyber attackers of oxygen."