Last week, Senior Advisor on AI Governance at the Center for Democracy & Technology, Kevin Bankston, took to X to report that Google's Gemini AI was caught summarizing his private tax return on Google Drive without his permission. "Despite attempts to disable the feature, Bankston found that Gemini's continued to operate in Google Drive, raising questions about Google's handling of user data and privacy settings," writes TechRadar's Craig Hale. From the report: After failing to find the right controls to disable Gemini's integration, the Advisor asked Google's ChatGPT-rivalling AI chatbot on two occasions to pinpoint the settings. A second, more detailed response still brought no joy: "Gemini is *not* in Apps and services on my dashboard (1st option), and I didn't have a profile pic in the upper right of the Gemini page (2nd)."

With help from another X user, Bankston found the control, which was already disabled, highlighting either a malfunctioning control or indicating that further settings are hidden elsewhere. However, previous Google documentation has confirmed that the company will not use Google Workspace data to train or improve its generative AI services or to feed targeted ads. Bankston theorizes that his previous participation in Google Workspace Labs might have influenced Gemini's behavior. The Gemini side panel in Google Drive for PDFs can be closed if a user no longer wishes to access generative AI summaries.

In a perplexing turn of events that has raised concerns about the vulnerability of critical undersea infrastructure, Norway's Institute of Marine Research is reconfiguring its sophisticated underwater observatory after a mysterious incident left a section of its seafloor cable cleanly severed. The Lofoten-Vesteralen Ocean Observatory (LoVe), an advanced array of sensors designed to monitor marine life and environmental conditions off Norway's rugged coastline, unexpectedly went silent in April 2021, prompting an investigation that would uncover more questions than answers.

As the institute's acoustic engineer Guosong Zhang delved into the mystery, he meticulously traced ship movements in the area, uncovering a curious pattern: a Russian trawler had repeatedly crossed the cable's location at the precise time the outage occurred, a coincidence that seemed too striking to ignore. Despite this compelling lead, subsequent police investigations proved inconclusive, leaving the institute grappling with the unsettling possibility of deliberate sabotage.

The incident, compounded by similar damage to a communications cable serving the remote Svalbard archipelago, has cast a spotlight on the potential vulnerabilities of submarine assets in an era of heightened geopolitical tensions, with some experts pointing to the possibility of Russian intelligence activities targeting Norway's undersea infrastructure. In response to these challenges and the unresolved nature of the cable damage, the Institute of Marine Research has made the difficult decision to adapt its approach, opting to replace the compromised cable section with wireless modules -- a solution that, while sacrificing some data transmission capacity, aims to enhance the security and resilience of this vital scientific installation in the face of evolving threats beneath the waves.

At least a dozen organizations with domain names at domain registrar Squarespace saw their websites hijacked last week. Krebs on Security: Squarespace bought all assets of Google Domains a year ago, but many customers still haven't set up their new accounts. Experts say malicious hackers learned they could commandeer any migrated Squarespace accounts that hadn't yet been registered, merely by supplying an email address tied to an existing domain. The Squarespace domain hijacks, which took place between July 9 and July 12, appear to have mostly targeted cryptocurrency businesses, including Celer Network, Compound Finance, Pendle Finance, and Unstoppable Domains. In some cases, the attackers were able to redirect the hijacked domains to phishing sites set up to steal visitors' cryptocurrency funds.

New York City-based Squarespace purchased roughly 10 million domain names from Google Domains in June 2023, and it has been gradually migrating those domains to its service ever since. Squarespace has not responded to a request for comment, nor has it issued a statement about the attacks. But an analysis released by security experts at Metamask and Paradigm finds the most likely explanation for what happened is that Squarespace assumed all users migrating from Google Domains would select the social login options -- such "Continue with Google" or "Continue with Apple" -- as opposed to the "Continue with email" choice.

Russian cybersecurity firm, Kaspersky Lab, has told workers in its U.S.-based division that they are being laid off this week and that it is closing its U.S. business, Zero Day reported Monday, citing sources. From a report: The sudden move comes after the U.S. Commerce Department announced last month that it was banning the sale of Kaspersky software in the U.S. beginning July 20. The company has been selling its software here since 2005. Kaspersky confirmed the news to Zero Day, saying that beginning July 20 it will "gradually wind down" its U.S. operations and eliminate U.S.-based positions as a result of the new ban, despite initially vowing to fight the ban in court.

Cybercriminals are using Facebook business pages and advertisements to promote fake Windows themes that infect unsuspecting users with the SYS01 password-stealing malware. From a report: Trustwave researchers who observed the campaigns said the threat actors also promote fake downloads for pirated games and software, Sora AI, 3D image creator, and One Click Active. While using Facebook advertisements to push information-stealing malware is not new, the social media platform's massive reach makes these campaigns a significant threat.

The threat actors take out advertisements that promote Windows themes, free game downloads, and software activation cracks for popular applications, like Photoshop, Microsoft Office, and Windows. These advertisements are promoted through newly created Facebook business pages or by hijacking existing ones. When using hijacked Facebook pages, the threat actors rename them to suit the theme of their advertisement and to promote the downloads to the existing page members.

Alphabet, Google's parent company, is reportedly in advanced negotiations to acquire cloud security startup Wiz for approximately $23 billion, Wall Street Journal reported on Sunday. The potential deal, which would value Wiz at nearly double its most recent private valuation of $12 billion, underscores the growing importance of cybersecurity in Alphabet's enterprise strategy as it seeks to narrow the gap with cloud computing rivals such as Microsoft, Morgan Stanley said in a note.

Founded in January 2020, Wiz has quickly established itself as a leading player in the Cloud-Native Application Protection Platform (CNAPP) space, utilizing an agentless approach to secure cloud application deployments throughout their lifecycle. The company's platform continuously assesses and prioritizes critical risks across various security domains, providing customers with a comprehensive view of their cloud security posture. Wiz has experienced rapid growth since its inception, with annual recurring revenue (ARR) exceeding $350 million as of January 2024, representing a year-over-year increase of over 75%. The company boasts an impressive client roster, with more than 40% of Fortune 100 companies among its customers, and has raised nearly $2 billion in funding to date.

If confirmed, the acquisition would mark Alphabet's largest to date, significantly expanding its footprint in the burgeoning cloud security market. The move follows previous security-focused acquisitions by the tech giant, including the $5.4 billion purchase of Mandiant in 2022 and the $500 million acquisition of Siemplify. Morgan Stanley adds that the potential acquisition could raise questions about Wiz's ability to maintain neutrality across multiple cloud platforms, potentially benefiting competitors such as Palo Alto Networks and CrowdStrike in the near term.

"The latest version of the Linux kernel adds an array of improvements," writes the blog OMG Ubuntu, " including a new memory sealing system call, a speed boost for AES-XTS encryption on Intel and AMD CPUs, and expanding Rust language support within the kernel to RISC-V." Plus, like in all kernel releases, there's a glut of groundwork to offer "initial support" for upcoming CPUs, GPUs, NPUs, Wi-Fi, and other hardware (that most of us don't use yet, but require Linux support to be in place for when devices that use them filter out)...

Linux 6.10 adds (after much gnashing) the mseal() system call to prevent changes being made to portions of the virtual address space. For now, this will mainly benefit Google Chrome, which plans to use it to harden its sandboxing. Work is underway by kernel contributors to allow other apps to benefit, though. A similarly initially-controversial change merged is a new memory-allocation profiling subsystem. This helps developers fine-tune memory usage and more readily identify memory leaks. An explainer from LWN summarizes it well.

Elsewhere, Linux 6.10 offers encrypted interactions with trusted platform modules (TPM) in order to "make the kernel's use of the TPM reasonably robust in the face of external snooping and packet alteration attacks". The documentation for this feature explains: "for every in-kernel operation we use null primary salted HMAC to protect the integrity [and] we use parameter encryption to protect key sealing and parameter decryption to protect key unsealing and random number generation." Sticking with security, the Linux kernel's Landlock security module can now apply policies to ioctl() calls (Input/Output Control), restricting potential misuse and improving overall system security.

On the networking side there's significant performance improvements to zero-copy send operations using io_uring, and the newly-added ability to "bundle" multiple buffers for send and receive operations also offers an uptick in performance...

A couple of months ago Canonical announced Ubuntu support for the RISC-V Milk-V Mars single-board computer. Linux 6.10 mainlines support for the Milk-V Mars, which will make that effort a lot more viable (especially with the Ubuntu 24.10 kernel likely to be v6.10 or newer). Others RISC-V improvements abound in Linux 6.10, including support for the Rust language, boot image compression in BZ2, LZ4, LZMA, LZO, and Zstandard (instead of only Gzip); and newer AMD GPUs thanks to kernel-mode FPU support in RISC-V.
Phoronix has their own rundown of Linux 6.10, plus a list of some of the highlights, which includes:

• The initial DRM Panic infrastructure
• The new Panthor DRM driver for newer Arm Mali graphics
• Better AMD ROCm/AMDKFD support for "small" Ryzen APUs and new additions for AMD Zen 5.
• AMD GPU display support on RISC-V hardware thanks to RISC-V kernel mode FPU
• More Intel Xe2 graphics preparations
• Better IO_uring zero-copy performance
• Faster AES-XTS disk/file encryption with modern Intel and AMD CPUs
• Continued online repair work for XFS
• Steam Deck IMU support
• TPM bus encryption and integrity protection

Long-time Slashdot reader schwit1 shared this report from non-profit libertarian law firm, the Institute for Justice: U.S. District Judge Rita Lin has permanently enjoined the California Bureau of Security and Investigative Services from enforcing its private-investigator licensing requirement against anti-spam entrepreneur Jay Fink. The order declares that forcing Jay to get a license to run his business is so irrational that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment...

Jay's business stems from California's anti-spam act, which allows individuals to sue spammers. But to sue, they have to first compile evidence. To do that, recipients often have to wade through thousands of emails. For more than a decade, Jay has offered a solution: he and his team will scour a client's junk folder and catalog the messages that likely violate the law. But last summer, Jay's job — and Californians' ability to bring spammers to justice — came to a screeching halt when the state told him he was a criminal. A regulator told Jay he needed a license to read through emails that might be used as evidence in a lawsuit. And because Jay didn't have a private investigator license, the state shut him down.
The state of California has since "agreed to jointly petition the court for an order that forever prohibits it from enforcing its licensure law against Jay," according to the article.

Otherwise the anti-spam crusader would've had to endure thousands of hours of private investigator training...

ewhac (Slashdot reader #5,844) writes: Friday the hardware review site Gamers Nexus filed a YouTube video report alleging some serious claims: that PC component manufacturer MSI left their internal warranty and RMA processing web site accessible to the open Internet, with no authentication. Virtually the entire history of MSI warranty claims going back to at least 2017 were searchable and accessible for the browsing, including customer names, email addresses, phone numbers, and serial numbers of MSI devices.

This event follows closely on the heels of a video report just a few days earlier alleging PC component manufacturer Zotac left their warranty/RMA and B2B records server open to indexing by Google.

Gamers Nexus posted their reports after informing Zotac and MSI of their open servers and verifying they were no longer accessible. However, the data from MSI's server could have been fully scraped at this point, giving scammers a gold mine of data permitting them to impersonate MSI personnel and defraud customers. Anyone who's filed a warranty or RMA claim with MSI in the past seven years should exercise caution when receiving unsolicited emails or phone calls purporting to be from MSI.

"Signal is finally tightening its desktop client's security," reports BleepingComputer — by changing the way it stores plain text encryption keys for the SQLite database where users' messages are stored: When BleepingComputer contacted Signal about the flaw in 2018, we never received a response. Instead, a Signal Support Manager responded to a user's concerns in the Signal forum, stating that the security of its database was never something it claimed to provide. "The database key was never intended to be a secret. At-rest encryption is not something that Signal Desktop is currently trying to provide or has ever claimed to provide," responded the Signal employee...

[L]ast week, mobile security researchers Talal Haj Bakry and Tommy Mysk of Mysk Inc warned on X not to use Signal Desktop because of the same security weakness we reported on in 2018... In April, an independent developer, Tom Plant, created a request to merge code that uses Electron's SafeStorage API "...to opportunistically encrypt the key with platform APIs like DPAPI on Windows and Keychain on macOS," Plant explained in the merge request... When used, encryption keys are generated and stored using an operating system's cryptography system and secure key stores. For example, on Macs, the encryption key would be stored in the Keychain, and on Linux, it would use the windows manager's secret store, such as kwallet, kwallet5, kwallet6, and gnome-libsecret... While the solution would provide additional security for all Signal desktop users, the request lay dormant until last week's X drama.

Two days ago, a Signal developer finally replied that they implemented support for Electron's safeStorage, which would be available soon in an upcoming Beta version. While the new safeStorage implementation is tested, Signal also included a fallback mechanism that allows the program to decrypt the database using the legacy database decryption key...

Signal says that the legacy key will be removed once the new feature is tested.
"To be fair to Signal, encrypting local databases without a user-supplied password is a problem for all applications..." the article acknowledges.

"However, as a company that prides itself on its security and privacy, it was strange that the organization dismissed the issue and did not attempt to provide a solution..."

Slashdot reader joshuark shared this report from BetaNews: Check Point Research has identified a critical zero-day spoofing attack exploiting Microsoft Internet Explorer on modern Windows 10/11 systems, despite the browser's retirement.

Identified as CVE-2024-38112, this vulnerability allows attackers to execute remote code by tricking users into opening malicious Internet Shortcut (.url) files. This attack method has been active for over a year and could potentially impact millions... Attackers use a sophisticated trick to mask the malicious .hta extension, making use of the outdated security of Internet Explorer to compromise systems running updated Windows operating systems.
From Check Point Research: Even though IE has been proclaimed "retired and out-of-support," technically speaking, IE is still part of the Windows OS and is "not inherently unsafe, as IE is still serviced for security vulnerabilities, and there should be no known exploitable security vulnerabilities," according to our communications with Microsoft.

TechSpot writes: Users of the Linksys Velop Pro 6E and 7 mesh routers should change their passwords and Wi-Fi network names through an external web browser. The two models transmit critical information to outside servers in an insecure manner upon initial installation. New patches have emerged since the issue was discovered, but Linksys hasn't publicly responded to the matter, and it is unclear if the latest firmware leaves sensitive data exposed to interception.
The issue was discovered by Testaankoop, the Belgian equivalent of the Consumers' Association. And they warned Linksys back in November, according to the tech news site Stack Diary. (The practice could leave passwords and other information vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle attacks.) Testaankoop suspects the security issue might stem from third-party software used in the Linksys firmware. However, they emphasize that this does not excuse the vulnerability.
Thanks to long-time Slashdot reader schwit1 for sharing the news.

MuckRock is a U.S.-based 501(c)(3) non-profit collaborative news site to "request, analyze and share government documents," according to its web site.

And long-time Slashdot reader schwit1 shared their report about a lecture by Admiral Grace Hopper: In a vault at the National Security Agency lies a historical treasure: two AMPEX 1-inch open reel tapes containing a landmark lecture by Admiral Grace Hopper, a giant in the field of computer science. Titled 'Future Possibilities: Data, Hardware, Software, and People,' this lecture, recorded on August 19, 1982, at the NSA's Fort Meade headquarters, and stored in the video archives of the National Cryptographic School, offers a rare glimpse into the mind of a pioneer who shaped the very fabric of technology. Yet this invaluable artifact remains inaccessible, trapped in an obsolete format that the NSA will not release, stating that the agency is unable to play it back.
"NSA is not required to find or obtain new technology (outdated or current) in order to process a request," states the official response from the agency. But MuckRock adds that on June 25, "responding to a follow-up request, the NSA at least provided an image of the tape labels," leading MuckRock to complain that the NSA "is well-positioned to locate, borrow and use a working VTR machine to access Admiral Hopper's lectures... The NSA, with its history of navigating complex technological landscapes and decrypting matters of national significance, does not typically shy away from a challenge." The challenge of accessing these recordings is not just technical, but touches on broader issues around preserving technological heritage.... It is our shared obligation to safeguard such pivotal elements of our nationâ(TM)s history, ensuring they remain within reach of future generations. While the stewardship of these recordings may extend beyond the NSAâ(TM)s typical purview, they are undeniably a part of Americaâ(TM)s national heritage.

A 2023 red team exercise by the U.S. Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) at an unnamed federal agency exposed critical security failings, including unpatched vulnerabilities, inadequate incident response, and weak credential management, leading to a full domain compromise. According to The Register's Connor Jones, the agency failed to detect or remediate malicious activity for five months. From the report: According to the agency's account of the exercise, the red team was able to gain initial access by exploiting an unpatched vulnerability (CVE-2022-21587 - 9.8) in the target agency's Oracle Solaris enclave, leading to what it said was a full compromise. It's worth noting that CVE-2022-21587, an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) bug carrying a near-maximum 9.8 CVSS rating, was added to CISA's known exploited vulnerability (KEV) catalog in February 2023. The initial intrusion by CISA's red team was made on January 25, 2023. "After gaining access, the team promptly informed the organization's trusted agents of the unpatched device, but the organization took over two weeks to apply the available patch," CISA's report reads. "Additionally, the organization did not perform a thorough investigation of the affected servers, which would have turned up IOCs and should have led to a full incident response. About two weeks after the team obtained access, exploit code was released publicly into a popular open source exploitation framework. CISA identified that the vulnerability was exploited by an unknown third party. CISA added this CVE to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities Catalog on February 2, 2023." [...]

After gaining access to the Solaris enclave, the red team discovered they couldn't pivot into the Windows part of the network because missing credentials blocked their path, despite enjoying months of access to sensitive web apps and databases. Undeterred, CISA managed to make its way into the Windows network after carrying out phishing attacks on unidentified members of the target agency, one of which was successful. It said real adversaries may have instead used prolonged password-praying attacks rather than phishing at this stage, given that several service accounts were identified as having weak passwords. After gaining that access, the red team injected a persistent RAT and later discovered unsecured admin credentials, which essentially meant it was game over for the agency being assessed. "None of the accessed servers had any noticeable additional protections or network access restrictions despite their sensitivity and critical functions in the network," CISA said.

CISA described this as a "full domain compromise" that gave the attackers access to tier zero assets -- the most highly privileged systems. "The team found a password file left from a previous employee on an open, administrative IT share, which contained plaintext usernames and passwords for several privileged service accounts," the report reads. "With the harvested Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) information, the team identified one of the accounts had system center operations manager (SCOM) administrator privileges and domain administrator privileges for the parent domain. "They identified another account that also had administrative permissions for most servers in the domain. The passwords for both accounts had not been updated in over eight years and were not enrolled in the organization's identity management (IDM)." From here, the red team realized the victim organization had trust relationships with multiple external FCEB organizations, which CISA's team then pivoted into using the access they already had.

The team "kerberoasted" one partner organization. Kerberoasting is an attack on the Kerberos authentication protocol typically used in Windows networks to authenticate users and devices. However, it wasn't able to move laterally with the account due to low privileges, so it instead used those credentials to exploit a second trusted partner organization. Kerberoasting yielded a more privileged account at the second external org, the password for which was crackable. CISA said that due to network ownership, legal agreements, and/or vendor opacity, these kinds of cross-organizational attacks are rarely tested during assessments. However, SILENTSHIELD assessments are able to be carried out following new-ish powers afforded to CISA by the FY21 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), the same powers that also allow CISA's Federal Attack Surface Testing (FAST) pentesting program to operate. It's crucial that these avenues are able to be explored in such exercises because they're routes into systems adversaries will have no reservations about exploring in a real-world scenario. For the first five months of the assessment, the target FCEB agency failed to detect or remediate any of the SILENTSHIELD activity, raising concerns over its ability to spot genuine malicious activity. CISA said the findings demonstrated the need for agencies to apply defense-in-depth principles. The cybersecurity agency recommended network segmentation and a Secure-by-Design commitment.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from 404 Media: John Binns, a U.S. citizen who has been incarcerated in Turkey, is linked to the massive data breach of metadata belonging to nearly all of AT&T's customers that the telecommunications giant announced on Friday, three sources independently told 404 Media. [...] As 404 Media reported in January, Binns has already been indicted for allegedly breaking into T-Mobile in 2021 and selling stolen data on more than 40 million people. Now, he is allegedly connected to the latest breach against AT&T, which the company said it detected in April.

The AT&T data was lifted from a Snowflake instance, a data warehousing tool, AT&T told 404 Media. Snowflake has been at the center of a series of massive and high profile breaches, including Ticketmaster and Santander. In a blog post published in June which covered a threat actor targeting Snowflake instances, cybersecurity company Mandiant said the threat actor, which it dubs UNC5537, "comprises members based in North America, and collaborates with an additional member in Turkey." In its breach announcement, AT&T said authorities had already apprehended one of the people involved in the breach. Binns was recently arrested and detained in Turkey, The Desk reported in May. That report, which is the last public information about his whereabouts, says he was detained following an extradition request from the U.S. Before he was arrested, Binns told 404 Media in January that he had "reasons to not be concerned" about being extradited.

Indonesia said it is beginning to recover data that had been encrypted in a major ransomware attack last month which affected more than 160 government agencies. From a report: The attackers identified as Brain Cipher asked for $8 million in ransom to unlock the data before later apologising and releasing the decryption key for free, according to Singapore-based cybersecurity firm StealthMole. The attack has disrupted multiple government services including immigration and operations at major airports. Indonesian officials have acknowledged that the bulk of the data had not been backed up. Chief Security Minister Hadi Tjahjanto said in a statement late on Thursday that data for 30 public services overseen by 12 ministries had been recovered using a "decryption strategy" without elaborating.

U.S. phone giant AT&T confirmed Friday it will begin notifying millions of consumers about a fresh data breach that allowed cybercriminals to steal the phone records of "nearly all" of its customers. TechCrunch: In a statement, AT&T said that the stolen data contains phone numbers of both cellular and landline customers, as well as AT&T records of calls and text messages -- such as who contacted who by phone or text -- during a six-month period between May 1, 2022 and October 31, 2022. AT&T said some of the stolen data includes more recent records from January 2, 2023 for a smaller but unspecified number of customers.

The stolen data also includes call records of customers with phone service from other cell carriers that rely on AT&T's network, the company said. [...] In all, the phone giant said it will notify around 110 million AT&T customers of the data breach, company spokesperson Andrea Huguely told TechCrunch.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from TechCrunch: A data breach at the phone surveillance operation mSpy has exposed millions of its customers who bought access to the phone spyware app over the past decade, as well as the Ukrainian company behind it. Unknown attackers stole millions of customer support tickets, including personal information, emails to support, and attachments, including personal documents, from mSpy in May 2024. While hacks of spyware purveyors are becoming increasingly common, they remain notable because of the highly sensitive personal information often included in the data, in this case about the customers who use the service. The hack encompassed customer service records dating back to 2014, which were stolen from the spyware maker's Zendesk-powered customer support system.

mSpy is a phone surveillance app that promotes itself as a way to track children or monitor employees. Like most spyware, it is also widely used to monitor people without their consent. These kinds of apps are also known as "stalkerware" because people in romantic relationships often use them to surveil their partner without consent or permission. The mSpy app allows whoever planted the spyware, typically someone who previously had physical access to a victim's phone, to remotely view the phone's contents in real-time. As is common with phone spyware, mSpy's customer records include emails from people seeking help to surreptitiously track the phones of their partners, relatives, or children, according to TechCrunch's review of the data, which we independently obtained. Some of those emails and messages include requests for customer support from several senior-ranking U.S. military personnel, a serving U.S. federal appeals court judge, a U.S. government department's watchdog, and an Arkansas county sheriff's office seeking a free license to trial the app. Even after amassing several million customer service tickets, the leaked Zendesk data is thought to represent only the portion of mSpy's overall customer base who reached out for customer support. The number of mSpy customers is likely to be far higher. mSpy's owners, a Ukraine-based company called Brainstack, have yet to publicly disclose the breach. You can visit Have I Been Pwned to see if your email address was involved in a breach.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica, written by Samuel Axon: In one of the most egregiously unethical uses of AI we've seen, a web advertising company has re-created some defunct, classic tech blogs like The Unofficial Apple Weblog (TUAW) and iLounge by mimicking the bylines of the websites' former writers and publishing AI-generated content under their names. The Verge reported on the fiasco in detail, including speaking to Christina Warren, a former writer for TUAW who now works at GitHub. Warren took to the social media platform Threads yesterday to point out that someone had re-launched TUAW at its original domain and populated it with fake content allegedly written by her and other past TUAW staff. Some of the content simply reworded articles that originally appeared on TUAW, while other articles tied real writers' names to new, AI-generated articles about current events.

TUAW was shut down in 2015, but its intellectual property and domain name continued to be owned by Yahoo. A Hong Kong-based web advertising firm named Web Orange Limited claims to have purchased the domain and brand name but not the content. The domain name still carries some value in terms of Google ranking, so Web Orange Limited seems to have relaunched the site and then used AI summarization tools to reword the original content and publish it under the original authors' names. (It did the same with another classic Apple blog, iLounge.) The site also includes author bios, which are generic and may have been generated, and they are accompanied by author photos that don't look anything like the real writers. The Verge found that some of these same photos have appeared in other places, like web display ads for iPhone cases and dating websites. They may have been AI-generated, though the company has also been caught reusing photos of real people without permission in other contexts.

At first, some of Web Orange Limited's websites named Haider Ali Khan, an Australian currently residing in Dubai, as the owner of the company. Khan's own website identified him as "an independent cyber security analyst" and "long-time advocate for web security" who also runs a web hosting company, and who "started investing in several technology reporting websites" and "manages and runs several news blogs such as the well-known Apple tech-news blog iLounge." However, mentions of his name were removed from the websites today, and the details on his personal website have apparently been taken offline. Warren emailed the company, threatening legal action. After she did that, the byline was changed to what we can only assume is a made-up name -- "Mary Brown." The same goes for many of the other author names on Web Orange Limited's websites.

The company likely tried to use the original authors' names as part of an SEO play; Google tracks the names of authors and gives them authority rankings on specific topics as another layer on top of a website's own authority. That way, Google can try to respond to user queries with results written by people who have built strong reputations in the users' areas of interest. It also helps Google surface authors who are experts on a topic but who write for multiple websites, which is common among freelance writers. The websites are still operational, even though the most arguably egregious breach of ethics -- the false use of real people's names -- has been addressed in many cases.

snydeq shares a report from CSO Online, written by Lucian Constantin: A personal GitHub access token with administrative privileges to the official repositories for the Python programming language and the Python Package Index (PyPI) was exposed for over a year. The access token belonged to the Python Software Foundation's director of infrastructure and was accidentally included in a compiled binary file that was published as part of a container image on Docker Hub. [...] The incident shows that scrubbing access tokens from source code only, which some development tools do automatically, is not enough to prevent potential security breaches. Sensitive credentials can also be included in environment variables, configuration files and even binary artifacts as a result of automated build processes and developer mistakes. "Although we encounter many secrets that are leaked in the same manner, this case was exceptional because it is difficult to overestimate the potential consequences if it had fallen into the wrong hands -- one could supposedly inject malicious code into PyPI packages (imagine replacing all Python packages with malicious ones), and even to the Python language itself," researchers from security firm JFrog, who found and reported the token, wrote in a report.