Minnesota Governor Tim Walz has activated the National Guard to assist the City of Saint Paul after a cyberattack crippled the city's digital services on Friday. "The city is currently working with local, state, and federal partners to investigate the attack and restore full functionality, and says that emergency services have been unaffected," reports BleepingComputer. "However, online payments are currently unavailable, and some services in libraries and recreation centers are temporarily unavailable." From the report: The attack has persisted through the weekend, causing widespread disruptions across the city after affecting St. Paul's digital services and critical systems. "St. Paul officials have been working around the clock since discovering the cyberattack, closely coordinating with Minnesota Information Technology Services and an external cybersecurity vendor. Unfortunately, the scale and complexity of this incident exceeded both internal and commercial response capabilities," reads an emergency executive order (PDF) signed on Tuesday.

"As a result, St. Paul has requested cyber protection support from the Minnesota National Guard to help address this incident and make sure that vital municipal services continue without interruption." "The decision to deploy cyber protection support from the Minnesota National Guard comes at the city's request, after the cyberattack's impact exceeded St. Paul's incident response capacity. This will ensure the continuity of vital services for Saint Paul residents, as well as their security and safety while ongoing disruptions are being mitigated. "We are committed to working alongside the City of Saint Paul to restore cybersecurity as quickly as possible," Governor Walz said on Tuesday. "The Minnesota National Guard's cyber forces will collaborate with city, state, and federal officials to resolve the situation and mitigate lasting impacts."

Anthropic will implement weekly rate limits for Claude subscribers starting August 28 to address users running its Claude Code AI programming tool continuously around the clock and to prevent account sharing violations. The new restrictions will affect Pro subscribers paying $20 monthly and Max plan subscribers paying $100 and $200 monthly, though Anthropic estimates fewer than 5% of current users will be impacted based on existing usage patterns.

Pro users will receive 40 to 80 hours of Sonnet 4 access through Claude Code weekly, while $100 Max subscribers get 140 to 280 hours of Sonnet 4 plus 15 to 35 hours of Opus 4. The $200 Max plan provides 240 to 480 hours of Sonnet 4 and 24 to 40 hours of Opus 4. Claude Code has experienced at least seven outages in the past month due to unprecedented demand.

A second, far more recent data breach at women's dating safety app Tea has exposed over a million sensitive user messages -- including discussions about abortions, infidelity, and shared contact info. This vulnerability not only compromised private conversations but also made it easy to unmask anonymous users. 404 Media reports: Despite Tea's initial statement that "the incident involved a legacy data storage system containing information from over two years ago," the second issue impacting a separate database is much more recent, affecting messages up until last week, according to the researcher's findings that 404 Media verified. The researcher said they also found the ability to send a push notification to all of Tea's users.

It's hard to overstate how sensitive this data is and how it could put Tea's users at risk if it fell into the wrong hands. When signing up, Tea encourages users to choose an anonymous screenname, but it was trivial for 404 Media to find the real world identities of some users given the nature of their messages, which Tea has led them to believe were private. Users could be easily found via their social media handles, phone numbers, and real names that they shared in these chats. These conversations also frequently make damning accusations against people who are also named in the private messages and in some cases are easy to identify. It is unclear who else may have discovered the security issue and downloaded any data from the more recent database. Members of 4chan found the first exposed database last week and made tens of thousands of images of Tea users available for download. Tea told 404 Media it has contacted law enforcement. [...]

This new data exposure is due to any Tea user being able to use their own API key to access a more recent database of user data, Rahjerdi said. The researcher says that this issue existed until late last week. That exposure included a mass of Tea users' private messages. In some cases, the women exchange phone numbers so they can continue the conversation off platform. The first breach was due to an exposed instance of app development platform Firebase, and impacted tens of thousands of selfie and driver license images. At the time, Tea said in a statement "there is no evidence to suggest that current or additional user data was affected." The second database includes a data field called "sent_at," with many of those messages being marked as recent as last week.

New submitter Pravetz-82 shares a report from Politico: A cyberattack on Russian state-owned flagship carrier Aeroflot caused a mass outage to the company's computer systems on Monday, Russia's prosecutor's office said, forcing the airline to cancel more than 100 flights and delay others. Ukrainian hacker group Silent Crow and Belarusian hacker activist group the Belarus Cyber-Partisans, which opposes the rule of Belarusian President Alexander Lukashenko, claimed responsibility for the cyberattack. Images shared on social media showed hundreds of delayed passengers crowding Moscow's Sheremetyevo airport, where Aeroflot is based. The outage also disrupted flights operated by Aeroflot's subsidiaries, Rossiya and Pobeda. While most of the flights affected were domestic, the disruption also led to cancellations for some international flights to Belarus, Armenia and Uzbekistan.

Silent Crow claimed it had accessed Aeroflot's corporate network for a year, copying customer and internal data, including audio recordings of phone calls, data from the company's own surveillance on employees and other intercepted communications. "All of these resources are now inaccessible or destroyed and restoring them will possibly require tens of millions of dollars. The damage is strategic," the channel purporting to be the Silent Crow group wrote on Telegram. There was no way to independently verify its claims. The same channel also shared screenshots that appeared to show Aeroflot's internal IT systems, and insinuated that Silent Crow could begin sharing the data it had seized in the coming days. "The personal data of all Russians who have ever flown with Aeroflot have now also gone on a trip -- albeit without luggage and to the same destination," it said. The Belarus Cyber-Partisans told The Associated Press that they had hoped to "deliver a crushing blow." Russia's Prosecutor's Office said it had opened a criminal investigation. Meanwhile, Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov called reports of the cyberattack "quite alarming," adding that "the hacker threat is a threat that remains for all large companies providing services to the general public."

Windows 11 has become indistinguishable from malware because of the way Microsoft has inserted intrusive advertising, AI monitoring features, and constant distractions designed to drive user engagement and monetization to the operating system, argues veteran writer and developer Rupert Goodwins of The Register.

Goodwins contends that Microsoft has transformed Windows 11 into "an ADHD horror show, full of distractions, promotions and snares" where AI features "constantly video what you're doing and send it back to Mother." He applies the term malware to describe software that intervenes in work to advertise and monitors user data, concluding that "for Windows it isn't a class of third-party nasties, it's an edition name."

Security researchers have discovered evidence suggesting the SkyRover X1 drone sold on Amazon for some $750 is a DJI product operating under a different brand name. The findings come at a time when DJI is facing an unofficial ban at US customs.

The drone shares identical specifications and features with the DJI Mini 4 Pro and connects to DJI's online infrastructure, including DJIGlobal, DJISupport, and DJIEnterprise services.

Hacker Kevin Finisterre successfully logged into the SkyRover system using his existing DJI credentials. Security consultant Jon Sawyer found the SkyRover app uses the same encryption keys as DJI software, with the company making only basic attempts to conceal its origins by replacing "DJI" references with "xxx" or "uav." DJI didn't deny to The Verge that the SkyRover X1 is their product.

This week Google's Open Source Security Team announced "a new project to strengthen trust in open source package ecosystems" — by reproducing upstream artifacts.

It includes automation to derive declarative build definitions, new "build observability and verification tools" for security teams, and even "infrastructure definitions" to help organizations rebuild, sign, and distribute provenance by running their own OSS Rebuild instances. (And as part of the initiative, the team also published SLSA Provenance attestations "for thousands of packages across our supported ecosystems.") Our aim with OSS Rebuild is to empower the security community to deeply understand and control their supply chains by making package consumption as transparent as using a source repository. Our rebuild platform unlocks this transparency by utilizing a declarative build process, build instrumentation, and network monitoring capabilities which, within the SLSA Build framework, produces fine-grained, durable, trustworthy security metadata. Building on the hosted infrastructure model that we pioneered with OSS Fuzz for memory issue detection, OSS Rebuild similarly seeks to use hosted resources to address security challenges in open source, this time aimed at securing the software supply chain... We are committed to bringing supply chain transparency and security to all open source software development. Our initial support for the PyPI (Python), npm (JS/TS), and Crates.io (Rust) package registries — providing rebuild provenance for many of their most popular packages — is just the beginning of our journey...

OSS Rebuild helps detect several classes of supply chain compromise:

- Unsubmitted Source Code: When published packages contain code not present in the public source repository, OSS Rebuild will not attest to the artifact.

- Build Environment Compromise: By creating standardized, minimal build environments with comprehensive monitoring, OSS Rebuild can detect suspicious build activity or avoid exposure to compromised components altogether.

- Stealthy Backdoors: Even sophisticated backdoors like xz often exhibit anomalous behavioral patterns during builds. OSS Rebuild's dynamic analysis capabilities can detect unusual execution paths or suspicious operations that are otherwise impractical to identify through manual review.


For enterprises and security professionals, OSS Rebuild can...

— Enhance metadata without changing registries by enriching data for upstream packages. No need to maintain custom registries or migrate to a new package ecosystem.

— Augment SBOMs by adding detailed build observability information to existing Software Bills of Materials, creating a more complete security picture...

- Accelerate vulnerability response by providing a path to vendor, patch, and re-host upstream packages using our verifiable build definitions...


The easiest (but not only!) way to access OSS Rebuild attestations is to use the provided Go-based command-line interface.
"With OSS Rebuild's existing automation for PyPI, npm, and Crates.io, most packages obtain protection effortlessly without user or maintainer intervention."

In 1995's online world, AOL existed mostly beside the internet as a "walled, manicured garden," remembers Fast Company.

Then along came AOHell "the first of what would become thousands of programs designed by young hackers to turn the system upside down" — built by a high school dropout calling himself "Da Chronic" who says he used "a computer that I couldn't even afford" using "a pirated copy of Microsoft Visual Basic." [D]istributed throughout the teen chatrooms, the program combined a pile of tricks and pranks into a slick little control panel that sat above AOL's windows and gave even newbies an arsenal of teenage superpowers. There was a punter to kick people out of chatrooms, scrollers to flood chats with ASCII art, a chat impersonator, an email and instant message bomber, a mass mailer for sharing warez (and later mp3s), and even an "Artificial Intelligence Bot" [which performed automated if-then responses]. Crucially, AOHell could also help users gain "free" access to AOL. The program came with a program for generating fake credit card numbers (which could fool AOL's sign up process), and, by January 1995, a feature for stealing other users' passwords or credit cards. With messages masquerading as alerts from AOL customer service reps, the tool could convince unsuspecting users to hand over their secrets...

Of course, Da Chronic — actually a 17-year-old high school dropout from North Carolina named Koceilah Rekouche — had other reasons, too. Rekouche wanted to hack AOL because he loved being online with his friends, who were a refuge from a difficult life at home, and he couldn't afford the hourly fee. Plus, it was a thrill to cause havoc and break AOL's weak systems and use them exactly how they weren't meant to be, and he didn't want to keep that to himself. Other hackers "hated the fact that I was distributing this thing, putting it into the team chat room, and bringing in all these noobs and lamers and destroying the community," Rekouche told me recently by phone...

Rekouche also couldn't have imagined what else his program would mean: a free, freewheeling creative outlet for thousands of lonely, disaffected kids like him, and an inspiration for a generation of programmers and technologists. By the time he left AOL in late 1995, his program had spawned a whole cottage industry of teenage script kiddies and hackers, and fueled a subculture where legions of young programmers and artists got their start breaking and making things, using pirated software that otherwise would have been out of reach... In 2014, [AOL CEO Steve] Case himself acknowledged on Reddit that "the hacking of AOL was a real challenge for us," but that "some of the hackers have gone on to do more productive things."

When he first met Mark Zuckerberg, he said, the Facebook founder confessed to Case that "he learned how to program by hacking [AOL]."
"I can't imagine somebody doing that on Facebook today," Da Chronic says in a new interview with Fast Company. "They'll kick you off if you create a Google extension that helps you in the slightest bit on Facebook, or an extension that keeps your privacy or does a little cool thing here and there. That's totally not allowed."

AOHell's creators had called their password-stealing techniques "phishing" — and the name stuck. (AOL was working with federal law enforcement to find him, according to a leaked internal email, but "I didn't even see that until years later.") Enrolled in college, he decided to write a technical academic paper about his program. "I do believe it caught the attention of Homeland Security, but I think they realized pretty quickly that I was not a threat."

He's got an interesting perspective today, noting with today's AI tool's it's theoretically possible to "craft dynamic phishing emails... when I see these AI coding tools I think, this might be like today's Visual Basic. They take out a lot of the grunt work."

What's the moral of the story? "I didn't have any qualifications or anything like that," Da Chronic says. "So you don't know who your adversary is going to be, who's going to understand psychology in some nuanced way, who's going to understand how to put some technological pieces together, using AI, and build some really wild shit."

The vulnerability-watching "Zero Day Initiative" was started in 2005 as a division of 3Com, then acquired in 2015 by cybersecurity company Trend Micro, according to Wikipedia.

But the Register reports today that the initiative's head of threat awareness is now concerned about the source for that exploit of Microsoft's Sharepoint servers: How did the attackers, who include Chinese government spies, data thieves, and ransomware operators, know how to exploit the SharePoint CVEs in such a way that would bypass the security fixes Microsoft released the following day? "A leak happened here somewhere," Dustin Childs, head of threat awareness at Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative, told The Register. "And now you've got a zero-day exploit in the wild, and worse than that, you've got a zero-day exploit in the wild that bypasses the patch, which came out the next day...."

Patch Tuesday happens the second Tuesday of every month — in July, that was the 8th. But two weeks before then, Microsoft provides early access to some security vendors via the Microsoft Active Protections Program (MAPP). These vendors are required to sign a non-disclosure agreement about the soon-to-be-disclosed bugs, and Microsoft gives them early access to the vulnerability information so that they can provide updated protections to customers faster....

One researcher suggests a leak may not have been the only pathway to exploit. "Soroush Dalili was able to use Google's Gemini to help reproduce the exploit chain, so it's possible the threat actors did their own due diligence, or did something similar to Dalili, working with one of the frontier large language models like Google Gemini, o3 from OpenAI, or Claude Opus, or some other LLM, to help identify routes of exploitation," Tenable Research Special Operations team senior engineer Satnam Narang told The Register. "It's difficult to say what domino had to fall in order for these threat actors to be able to leverage these flaws in the wild," Narang added.

Nonetheless, Microsoft did not release any MAPP guidance for the two most recent vulnerabilities, CVE-2025-53770 and CVE-2025-53771, which are related to the previously disclosed CVE-2025-49704 and CVE-2025-49706. "It could mean that they no longer consider MAPP to be a trusted resource, so they're not providing any information whatsoever," Childs speculated. [He adds later that "If I thought a leak came from this channel, I would not be telling that channel anything."]

"It also could mean that they're scrambling so much to work on the fixes they don't have time to notify their partners of these other details.

Since 2010 Stack Exchange has run all its sites on physical hardware in New Jersey — about 50 different servers. (When Ryan Donovan joined in 2019, "I saw the original server mounted on a wall with a laudatory plaque like a beloved pet.") But this month everything moved to the cloud, a new blog post explains. "Our servers are now cattle, not pets. Nobody is going to have to drive to our New Jersey data center and replace or reboot hardware..." Over the years, we've shared glamor shots of our server racks and info about updating them. For almost our entire 16-year existence, the SRE team has managed all datacenter operations, including the physical servers, cabling, racking, replacing failed disks and everything else in between. This work required someone to physically show up at the datacenter and poke the machines... [O]n July 2nd, in anticipation of the datacenter's closure, we unracked all the servers, unplugged all the cables, and gave these once mighty machines their final curtain call...

We moved Stack Overflow for Teams to Azure in 2023 and proved we could do it. Now we just had to tackle the public sites (Stack Overflow and the Stack Exchange network), which is hosted on Google Cloud. Early last year, our datacenter vendor in New Jersey decided to shut down that location, and we needed to be out by July 2025. Our other datacenter — in Colorado — was decommissioned in June. It was primarily for disaster recovery, which we didn't need any more. Stack Overflow no longer has any physical datacenters or offices; we are fully in the cloud and remote...!

[O]ur Staff Site Reliability Engineer, got a little wistful. "I installed the new web tier servers a few years ago as part of planned upgrades," he said. "It's bittersweet that I'm the one deracking them also." It's the IT version of Old Yeller.
There's photos of the 50 servers, as well as the 400+ cables connecting them, all of which wound up in a junk pile. "For security reasons (and to protect the PII of all our users and customers), everything was being shredded and/or destroyed. Nothing was being kept... Ever have difficulty disconnecting an RJ45 cable? Well, here was our opportunity to just cut the damn things off instead of figuring out why the little tab wouldn't release the plug."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from 404 Media: Users from 4chan claim to have discovered an exposed database hosted on Google's mobile app development platform, Firebase, belonging to the newly popular women's dating safety app Tea. Users say they are rifling through peoples' personal data and selfies uploaded to the app, and then posting that data online, according to screenshots, 4chan posts, and code reviewed by 404 Media. In a statement to 404 Media, Tea confirmed the breach also impacted some direct messages but said that the data is from two years ago. Tea, which claims to have more than 1.6 million users, reached the top of the App Store charts this week and has tens of thousands of reviews there. The app aims to provide a space for women to exchange information about men in order to stay safe, and verifies that new users are women by asking them to upload a selfie.

"Yes, if you sent Tea App your face and drivers license, they doxxed you publicly! No authentication, no nothing. It's a public bucket," a post on 4chan providing details of the vulnerability reads. "DRIVERS LICENSES AND FACE PICS! GET THE FUCK IN HERE BEFORE THEY SHUT IT DOWN!" The thread says the issue was an exposed database that allowed anyone to access the material. [...] "The images in the bucket are raw and uncensored," the user wrote. Multiple users have created scripts to automate the process of collecting peoples' personal information from the exposed database, according to other posts in the thread and copies of the scripts. In its terms of use, Tea says "When you first create a Tea account, we ask that you register by creating a username and including your location, birth date, photo and ID photo."

After publication of this article, Tea confirmed the breach in an email to 404 Media. The company said on Friday it "identified unauthorized access to one of our systems and immediately launched a full investigation to assess the scope and impact." The company says the breach impacted data from more than two years ago, and included 72,000 images (13,000 selfies and photo IDs, and 59,000 images from app posts and direct messages). "This data was originally stored in compliance with law enforcement requirements related to cyber-bullying prevention," the email continued. "We have engaged third-party cybersecurity experts and are working around the clock to secure our systems. At this time, there is no evidence to suggest that current or additional user data was affected. Protecting our users' privacy and data is our highest priority. We are taking every necessary step to ensure the security of our platform and prevent further exposure."

Domain Name System Security Extensions has achieved only 34% deployment after 28 years since publication of the first DNSSEC RFC, according to Internet Society data that labels it "arguably the worst performing technology" among internet enabling technologies. HTTPS reaches 96% adoption among the top 1,000 websites globally despite roughly the same development timeline as DNSSEC.

The security protocol faces fundamental barriers including lack of user visibility compared to HTTPS padlock icons and mandatory implementation throughout the entire DNS hierarchy. Approximately 30% of country-level domains have not implemented DNSSEC, creating deployment gaps that prevent domains beneath them from securing their DNS records.

Microsoft used China-based engineering teams to maintain cloud computing systems for multiple federal departments including Justice, Treasury, and Commerce, extending the practice beyond the Defense Department that the company announced last week it would discontinue. The work occurred within Microsoft's Government Community Cloud, which handles sensitive but unclassified federal information and has been used by the Justice Department's Antitrust Division for criminal and civil investigations, as well as parts of the Environmental Protection Agency and Department of Education.

Microsoft employed "digital escorts" -- U.S.-based personnel who supervised the foreign engineers -- similar to the arrangement it used for Pentagon systems. Following ProPublica's reporting, Microsoft issued a statement indicating it would take "similar steps for all our government customers who use Government Community Cloud to further ensure the security of their data." Competing cloud providers Amazon Web Services, Google, and Oracle told ProPublica they do not use China-based support for federal contracts.

A cyber-espionage campaign exploiting vulnerable Microsoft server software has escalated to deploying ransomware against victims, Microsoft said, marking a significant shift from typical state-backed data theft operations to attacks designed to paralyze networks until payment is made. The campaign by a group Microsoft calls "Storm-2603" has compromised at least 400 organizations, according to Netherlands-based cybersecurity firm Eye Security, quadrupling from 100 victims cataloged over the weekend. The National Institutes of Health confirmed one server was breached and additional servers were isolated as a precaution, while reports indicate the Department of Homeland Security and multiple other federal agencies were also compromised.

An anonymous reader quotes a report from The Register: Some customers of Broadcom's VMware business currently cannot access security patches, putting them at greater risk of attack. Customers in that perilous position hold perpetual licenses for VMware products but do not have a current support contract with Broadcom, which will not renew those contracts unless users sign up for software subscriptions. Yet many customers in this situation run products that Broadcom continues to support with patches and updates.

In April 2024, Broadcom CEO Hock Tan promised "free access to zero-day security patches for supported versions of vSphere" so customers "are able to use perpetual licenses in a safe and secure fashion." VMware patches aren't freely available; users must log on to Broadcom's support portal to access the software. Some VMware users in this situation have told The Register that when they enter the portal they cannot download patches, and that VMware support staff have told them it may be 90 days before the software fixes become available. "Because our support portal requires validation of customer entitlements for software patches, only entitled customers have access to the patches at this time," a VMware spokesperson said. "A separate patch delivery cycle will also be available for non-entitled customers and will follow at a later date."

The timing of that "later date" remains uncertain. The Register also notes that "users haven't had access to patches since May."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from Ars Technica: Hacking is hard. Well, sometimes. Other times, you just call up a company's IT service desk and pretend to be an employee who needs a password reset, an Okta multifactor authentication reset, and a Microsoft multifactor authentication reset... and it's done. Without even verifying your identity. So you use that information to log in to the target network and discover a more trusted user who works in IT security. You call the IT service desk back, acting like you are now this second person, and you request the same thing: a password reset, an Okta multifactor authentication reset, and a Microsoft multifactor authentication reset. Again, the desk provides it, no identity verification needed. So you log in to the network with these new credentials and set about planting ransomware or exfiltrating data in the target network, eventually doing an estimated $380 million in damage. Easy, right?

According to The Clorox Company, which makes everything from lip balm to cat litter to charcoal to bleach, this is exactly what happened to it in 2023. But Clorox says that the "debilitating" breach was not its fault. It had outsourced the "service desk" part of its IT security operations to the massive services company Cognizant -- and Clorox says that Cognizant failed to follow even the most basic agreed-upon procedures for running the service desk. In the words of a new Clorox lawsuit, Cognizant's behavior was "all a devastating lie," it "failed to show even scant care," and it was "aware that its employees were not adequately trained."

"Cognizant was not duped by any elaborate ploy or sophisticated hacking techniques," says the lawsuit, using italics to indicate outrage emphasis. "The cybercriminal just called the Cognizant Service Desk, asked for credentials to access Clorox's network, and Cognizant handed the credentials right over. Cognizant is on tape handing over the keys to Clorox's corporate network to the cybercriminal -- no authentication questions asked." [...] The new lawsuit, filed in California state courts, wants Cognizant to cough up millions of dollars to cover the damage Clorox says it suffered after weeks of disruption to its factories and ordering systems. (You can read a brief timeline of the disruption here.)

A cyber-espionage campaign exploiting unpatched Microsoft SharePoint vulnerabilities has breached approximately 400 organizations worldwide, including the US National Nuclear Security Administration, according to Netherlands-based cybersecurity firm Eye Security. The figure represents a four-fold increase from 100 organizations cataloged over the weekend, with researchers calling it likely an undercount since not all attack vectors leave detectable artifacts.

Microsoft identified three Chinese groups -- state-backed Linen Typhoon and Violet Typhoon, plus China-based Storm-2603 -- as exploiting the vulnerabilities in on-premises SharePoint servers to steal authentication credentials and execute malicious code remotely. The campaign began July 7 and was first detected July 18 when Eye Security found unusual activity on a customer's server. Victims include the US Energy Department, Education Department, Florida's Department of Revenue, Rhode Island General Assembly, and European and Middle Eastern governments.

At least 759 US hospitals experienced network disruptions during the CrowdStrike outage on July 19, 2024, with more than 200 suffering outages that directly affected patient care services, according to a study published in JAMA Network Open by UC San Diego researchers. The researchers detected disruptions across 34% of the 2,232 hospital networks they scanned, finding outages in health records systems, fetal monitoring equipment, medical imaging storage, and patient transfer platforms.

Most services recovered within six hours, though some remained offline for more than 48 hours. CrowdStrike dismissed the study as "junk science," arguing the researchers failed to verify whether affected networks actually ran CrowdStrike software. The researchers defended their methodology, noting they could scan only about one-third of America's hospitals, suggesting the actual impact may have been significantly larger.

Alaska Airlines and Horizon Air grounded all flights Sunday night due to a major IT outage, prompting a system-wide FAA ground stop that lasted until early Monday. Although operations have since resumed, passengers are still facing delays and residual disruptions. Gizmodo reports: The airline requested a system-wide ground stop from federal aviation authorities at about 11 p.m. ET on Sunday night. That stop remained in effect until around 2 a.m. ET Monday, when the Federal Aviation Administration confirmed it had been lifted. But disruptions didn't end there. Alaska warned passengers to brace for likely delays throughout the day. [...] The FAA's website listed the stop as applying to all Alaska Airlines aircraft. Gizmodo notes that the incident comes nearly a year after the massive 2024 CrowdStrike crash, which has become known as the largest IT outage in history. "The July 2024 outage brought down an estimated 8.5 million Microsoft Windows systems running CrowdStrike's Falcon Sensor software, disrupting everything from hospitals and airports to broadcast networks."

"There's no word yet from Alaska on whether the outage ties into a broader software problem, but the timing, almost exactly a year after the CrowdStrike crash, isn't going unnoticed on social media, with users wondering if the events are related."

An anonymous reader quotes a report from the BBC: One password is believed to have been all it took for a ransomware gang to destroy a 158-year-old company and put 700 people out of work. KNP -- a Northamptonshire transport company -- is just one of tens of thousands of UK businesses that have been hit by such attacks. Big names such as M&S, Co-op and Harrods have all been attacked in recent months. The chief executive of Co-op confirmed last week that all 6.5 million of its members had had their data stolen. In KNP's case, it's thought the hackers managed to gain entry to the computer system by guessing an employee's password, after which they encrypted the company's data and locked its internal systems. KNP director Paul Abbott says he hasn't told the employee that their compromised password most likely led to the destruction of the company. "Would you want to know if it was you?" he asks. "We need organizations to take steps to secure their systems, to secure their businesses," says Richard Horne CEO of the National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) -- where Panorama has been given exclusive access to the team battling international ransomware gangs. A gang of hackers, known as Akira, broke into the company's system and demanded a payment to restore the data. "The hackers didn't name a price, but a specialist ransomware negotiation firm estimated the sum could be as much as 5 million pounds," reports the BBC. "KNP didn't have that kind of money. In the end all the data was lost, and the company went under."