Neglecting the Lessons of Cypherpunk History 103
Nicola Hahn writes Over the course of the Snowden revelations there have been a number of high profile figures who've praised the merits of encryption as a remedy to the quandary of mass interception. Companies like Google and Apple have been quick to publicize their adoption of cryptographic countermeasures in an effort to maintain quarterly earnings. This marketing campaign has even convinced less credulous onlookers like Glenn Greenwald. For example, in a recent Intercept piece, Greenwald claimed:
"It is well-established that, prior to the Snowden reporting, Silicon Valley companies were secret, eager and vital participants in the growing Surveillance State. Once their role was revealed, and they perceived those disclosures threatening to their future profit-making, they instantly adopted a PR tactic of presenting themselves as Guardians of Privacy. Much of that is simply self-serving re-branding, but some of it, as I described last week, are genuine improvements in the technological means of protecting user privacy, such as the encryption products now being offered by Apple and Google, motivated by the belief that, post-Snowden, parading around as privacy protectors is necessary to stay competitive."
So, while he concedes the role of public relations in the ongoing cyber security push, Greenwald concurrently believes encryption is a "genuine" countermeasure. In other words, what we're seeing is mostly marketing hype... except for the part about strong encryption.
With regard to the promise of encryption as a privacy cure-all, history tells a markedly different story. Guarantees of security through encryption have often proven illusory, a magic act. Seeking refuge in a technical quick fix can be hazardous for a number of reasons.
"It is well-established that, prior to the Snowden reporting, Silicon Valley companies were secret, eager and vital participants in the growing Surveillance State. Once their role was revealed, and they perceived those disclosures threatening to their future profit-making, they instantly adopted a PR tactic of presenting themselves as Guardians of Privacy. Much of that is simply self-serving re-branding, but some of it, as I described last week, are genuine improvements in the technological means of protecting user privacy, such as the encryption products now being offered by Apple and Google, motivated by the belief that, post-Snowden, parading around as privacy protectors is necessary to stay competitive."
So, while he concedes the role of public relations in the ongoing cyber security push, Greenwald concurrently believes encryption is a "genuine" countermeasure. In other words, what we're seeing is mostly marketing hype... except for the part about strong encryption.
With regard to the promise of encryption as a privacy cure-all, history tells a markedly different story. Guarantees of security through encryption have often proven illusory, a magic act. Seeking refuge in a technical quick fix can be hazardous for a number of reasons.
Re:Yep (Score:5, Informative)
There is no indication PGP/GnuPG can be broken if used right (some minimal care needed, e.g. verifying that you have the right keys for the people you communicate with). Things like BitLocker or current Phone encryption do not deserve much trust though.
You statement is far to generic to resemble the truth in this area. However there has been a consistent push behind your view from some quarters that can only be interpreted as a "don't use encryption, it does not help anyways" disinformation campaign. This is a rather strong indicator that even known-bad encryption like SSL makes things at least more difficult for the surveillance-fascists.
Re:Respuctfully, Greenwald Is Wrong (Score:5, Informative)
Wrong. NSLs are "after the fact". Encryption is before. An NSL is also a _legal_ measure, while encryption is a _mathematical_ one. Guess what has more power to influence reality. If Apple and Google cannot break their encryption, then they cannot break their encryption, and no number of NSLs is going to change that. At the same time they cannot be forced to put backdoors into their products as that decreases product quality. The analogy to Lavabit is faulty, as Lavabit had the keys and could break its encryption.
Re:Strategic vs tactical interception (Score:4, Informative)
Yes it is. Apple, Microsoft and Google both have systems in places so that the data is encrypted at rest where they don't have the keys. Apple is putting things in place so that the data is not stored on their servers at all.