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Security Encryption

TrueCrypt Cryptanalysis To Include Crowdsourcing Aspect 131

Posted by samzenpus
from the many-eyes dept.
msm1267 (2804139) writes "A cryptanalysis of TrueCrypt will proceed as planned, said organizers of the Open Crypto Audit Project who announced the technical leads of the second phase of the audit and that there will be a crowdsourcing aspect to phase two. The next phase of the audit, which will include an examination of everything including the random number generators, cipher suites, crypto protocols and more, could be wrapped up by the end of the summer."
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TrueCrypt Cryptanalysis To Include Crowdsourcing Aspect

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  • Re:Crowdsourcing (Score:5, Interesting)

    by NReitzel (77941) on Monday June 02, 2014 @05:29PM (#47149857) Homepage

    Well,

    Since Truecrypt has decided to drop their project, and the project has been opensourced from day one, I'm going to suggest this is a good time for a fork.

    It would (will) be educational to see who goes to court to stop it.

  • Re:Pointless (Score:5, Interesting)

    by dave562 (969951) on Monday June 02, 2014 @06:01PM (#47150137) Journal

    This is what we are seeing in the field. A number of large financial institutions and government organizations who we deal with on a regular basis have already told us that they are no longer going to use TrueCrypt.

    Most of them are moving towards SecureZip from PKware because it supports AES-256 and is FIPS 140 compliant. Others seem to be okay with 7Zip's "encrypted zip" feature (also AES-256). Others are looking at random packages that I have never heard of before last week, like BestCrypt. Of course there are others who want to go with Symantec's PGP.

    This has proven to be a major pain the ass. For all of its warts, TrueCrypt was the de facto standard for secure data exchange. Now we are seeing a Balkanization of encryption software, and organizations are moving in different directions.

    Personally I think that TrueCrypt is good enough for transferring data on an external USB drive and protecting it against accidental or intentional theft (by anyone other than the NSA). However it is going to be impossible to convince others of that, and I cannot state it with 100% certainty so I am not even trying to have that conversation within the business context.

    As long as Client X is demanding encryption tool Z, that is fine. We will use that tool and let them shoulder the risk. After all, they are telling us what to use, not the other way around.

  • Re:Crowdsourcing (Score:5, Interesting)

    by rahvin112 (446269) on Monday June 02, 2014 @06:49PM (#47150507)

    It open source but not FOSS.

    You can't fork it. The license is actually highly restrictive. The only options are a total reimplementation using the GPL or BSD license or to keep using the last version in perpetuity.

  • Re:Pointless (Score:4, Interesting)

    by muridae (966931) on Monday June 02, 2014 @08:37PM (#47151201)
    Would you care to elaborate? The audit is by a third party, their trust could be verified; perhaps easier than trusting the unaudited TrueCrypt. Why is an audited 7.1 a security risk?
  • by Anonymous Coward on Monday June 02, 2014 @10:33PM (#47151881)

    Best Crypt is made by Jetico, a finnish crypto software/hardware company that's been around since the early 90's. Their OTFE is top notch and the linux version is full featured with GUI. Both binary and source code packages for linux can be downloaded for free though they don't advertise it. In fact, Best Crypt was used in the Bill Clinton white house. Check them out: www.jetico.com

  • Re:Crowdsourcing (Score:4, Interesting)

    by WaywardGeek (1480513) on Tuesday June 03, 2014 @06:31AM (#47153355) Journal

    From this security analysis [privacy-cd.org] there is a 64K-ish block in the header that is filled with random data in Windows, but encrypted 0's in Linux. There's no simple way to insure the Windows header is indistinguishable from true random data, but the Linux version should be OK. As for the rest of the unused portion of the volume, I haven't checked the code. If it's using a pseudo-random number generator that isn't cryptographically strong, then it may be distinguishable. However, the entropy argument seems wrong to me. If the unused portion has measurably lower entropy than true random data, then the random number generator in question must have been compromised.

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