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Bug Encryption Programming Security Apple

Finding More Than One Worm In the Apple 116

Posted by timothy
from the looking-deeper dept.
davecb (6526) writes "At Guido von Rossum's urging, Mike Bland has a look at detecting and fixing the "goto fail" bug at ACM Queue. He finds the same underlying problem in both in the Apple and Heartbleed bugs, and explains how to not suffer it again." An excerpt: "WHY DIDN'T A TEST CATCH IT? Several articles have attempted to explain why the Apple SSL vulnerability made it past whatever tests, tools, and processes Apple may have had in place, but these explanations are not sound, especially given the above demonstration to the contrary in working code. The ultimate responsibility for the failure to detect this vulnerability prior to release lies not with any individual programmer but with the culture in which the code was produced. Let's review a sample of the most prominent explanations and specify why they fall short. Adam Langley's oft-quoted blog post13 discusses the exact technical ramifications of the bug but pulls back on asserting that automated testing would have caught it: "A test case could have caught this, but it's difficult because it's so deep into the handshake. One needs to write a completely separate TLS stack, with lots of options for sending invalid handshakes.""
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Finding More Than One Worm In the Apple

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  • Worth repeating... (Score:5, Interesting)

    by QuietLagoon (813062) on Friday May 16, 2014 @12:28PM (#47018461)
    The ultimate responsibility for the failure to detect this vulnerability prior to release lies not with any individual programmer but with the culture in which the code was produced.

    .
    I've often said that you don't fix a software bug until you've fixed the process that allowed the bug to be created. The above quote is of a similar sentiment.

  • -Wall -Werror (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Megane (129182) on Friday May 16, 2014 @12:59PM (#47018777) Homepage

    Turning on all warnings and forcing them to errors certainly would have caught the bug in Apple's SSL code. Anyone who just lets warnings fly by in C code is an idiot. Even if the warning is mildly silly, getting it out of the way lets the important warnings stand out. Sensible warnings from C compilers are the very reason we don't use lint anymore. Even then you still have to watch out, because some warnings won't appear at low optimization levels, and I recall hearing that there are a few obscure warnings not turned on by -Wall.

    Also, it could have possibly been introduced by a bad merge. One of the things that putting braces on every if/for/while/etc. does is give merges more context to keep from fucking up, or at least a chance to cause brace mismatch.

    As for Heartbleed, just the fact that the code wouldn't work with a compile time option to use the system malloc instead of a custom one should have been enough to raise some red flags. Because rolling your own code to do something "more efficiently" than the system libraries never introduces new problems, right?

  • by radtea (464814) on Friday May 16, 2014 @01:19PM (#47018981)

    And we won't until testing (automated or otherwise) gets better in both places.

    I'm skeptical of testing (automated or otherwise), and I think point in TFS is well-taken: testing that would have caught this bug would have involved creating tests that virtually duplicated the system under test.

    While some code is susceptible to test-driven development and thorough testing, and that should be done where-ever possible, the resources required to test some code effectively double the total effort required, and maintaining the tests becomes a huge headache. I've worked in heavily-tested environments and spent a significant fraction of my time "fixing" tests that weren't actually failing, but which due to changes in interfaces and design had become out-of-date or inappropriate.

    That's not to say that testing can't be done better, but it's clearly a hard problem, and I've yet to see it done well for the kind of code I've worked on over the past 20 years (mostly algorithmic stuff, where the "right" answer is often only properly computable by the algorithm that is supposed to be under test, although there are constraints on correct solutions that can be applied.)

    So I'm arguing that a culture of professionalism, that implements best-practices including coding standards and code reviews (possibly automated) that check for simple things like open if statements and unchecked memory access would be lower cost and at least as effective as heavier-weight testing.

    This is a static-analysis vs dynamic-analysis argument, and while I certainly agree that dynamic analysis is necessary, both these bugs would have been caught with fairly simple-minded static analyzers checking against well-known coding standards from a decade ago.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday May 16, 2014 @03:34PM (#47020319)

    I seem to remember seeing an article on the NASA coding practice, and they do exactly what the summary suggests: every important feature is implemented twice, with two different algorithms, and they are tested against each other to ensure they produce the same result. They also do formal code reviews of every check-in (no matter how minor), and any bug found is treated as a process problem (i.e. how can we fix the process that allowed this bug in), rather than just a software problem.

    As a result they produce code which is as close to perfect as anyone has ever come, and costs about 10x the industry average to develop.

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