Forgot your password?
typodupeerror
Encryption Security

TLS 1.3 Draft Prepares to Drop Static RSA Key Exchange 51

Posted by Unknown Lamer
from the forward-secrecy-for-all dept.
msm1267 (2804139) writes with a bit of news from last week that seems to have slipped under the radar. The IETF TLS working group has reached consensus on dropping static RSA cipher suites from TLS 1.3, instead requiring the use of Diffie-Hellman Exchange (or the faster ellipitic curve variant). Static DH and not just ephemeral DH key exchange will be supported, so not all connections will have forward secrecy. The consensus is subject to change before the final TLS 1.3 specification is released, and there are still details to be worked out. The changes to the draft are pending as a git pull request.
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.

TLS 1.3 Draft Prepares to Drop Static RSA Key Exchange

Comments Filter:
  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday May 07, 2014 @11:29AM (#46940847)

    I've wondered why there isn't a protocol similar to what was used in SSH 1.x, where every x amount of time (default was ten minutes), there was a set of RSA keys generated and kept in memory, used for transactions (and signed with the permanent set of keys), then tossed.

    In theory, PFS should be the core of TLS... negotiate the protocol, use DH or the elliptic curve variant to hammer out a session key, re-negotiate the session key every so often, and in any case, toss the session key for good. Having a temporary set of RSA keys similar to SSH 1.x provides protection because it make the permanent host keys essentially signing keys only, not used for encryption, so less data would be encrypted by those keys.

You had mail, but the super-user read it, and deleted it!

Working...