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Chrome Security

Chrome's Insane Password Security Strategy 482

Posted by Unknown Lamer
from the passwords-for-password-locker dept.
jones_supa writes "One day web developer Elliott Kember decided to switch from Safari to Chrome and in the process, discovered possibly a serious weakness with local password management in Chrome. The settings import tool forced the passwords to be always imported, which lead Kember to further investigate how the data can be accessed. For those who actually bother to look at the 'Saved passwords' page, it turns out that anyone with physical access can peek all the passwords in clear text very easily with a couple of mouse clicks. This spurred a lengthy discussion featuring Justin Schuh, the head of Chrome security, who says Kember is wrong and that this behavior of Chrome has been evaluated for years and is not going to change."
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Chrome's Insane Password Security Strategy

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  • by briancox2 (2417470) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:33PM (#44498655) Homepage Journal
    I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

    Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.
    • by robmv (855035) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:40PM (#44498763)

      Firefox has the option to protect saved passwords with a master passwords and if you already unlocked the password store, in order to read password from the GUI, you need to unlock it again

      • by 7bit (1031746) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @01:51PM (#44499953)

        Firefox has the option to protect saved passwords with a master passwords and if you already unlocked the password store, in order to read password from the GUI, you need to unlock it again

        Exactly. Mozilla's email client Thunderbird also uses a Master Password to unlock the view-ability of the stored passwords.

        For those who insist on saying that chrome's security method is good enough consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with. This means that both other family members as well as house guests can casually access all those passwords in no time.

        Even if you do use different log-ins consider this type of common scenario: Your son or daughter has a "friend" over and they are cruising the web on her account doing whatever. Say that they are reading some news item or article together when the daughter gets up to go the bathroom. Do you think for one second that she is going to lock the computer and force her friend to wait to finish what she is doing? No. Her "friend" will then be able to casually and quickly access all those passwords and type them into her iphone for safe keeping before your daughter gets back. She now pwns your daughters facebook account, bank account, cellphone account and who knows what else.

        How can anyone with a straight face say that is an acceptable security method? The fact that my open source email client has an easily useable default master password system proves that it is something that chrome could easily implement as well, hell, just copy the open-source code from thunderbird if you need to...

        To be quite frank; when I think of Google or Microsoft "my security" is not something I honestly expect from them, and this newest revelation just further confirms that perception.

        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          by icebike (68054)

          How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine,

          More than you imagine, because teenagers insist upon it.

          And in reality, its by far the easiest thing to set up, and the easiest thing to do.

          Just select the Switch User button, and you are out of your account, ready for the next person to use it,
          and its as secure as your computer's OS is (which might not be all that secure, but that's another issue).

        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          by LordLimecat (1103839)

          Chrome's security tech lead gives a pretty good answer here: [ycombinator.com]

          Consider the case of someone malicious getting access to your account. Said bad guy can dump all your session cookies, grab your history, install malicious extension to intercept all your browsing activity, or install OS user account level monitoring software. My point is that once the bad guy got access to your account the game was lost, because there are just too many vectors for him to get what he wants.

          People worried about the security of this are worried over the wrong things. Firefox's master password would do absolutely nothing to stop a dropped-in extension from monitoring webpages for when passwords are filled, grabbing the filled form-data, and storing it in the extensions own preferences; and that wouldnt even take a background process, admin privileges, or really anything more than the ability to drop a file in the firefox profile.

          I wou

          • by bondsbw (888959) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @05:01PM (#44502409)

            Said bad guy can dump all your session cookies, grab your history, install malicious extension to intercept all your browsing activity, or install OS user account level monitoring software

            This assumes bad guy has access to an account with root/admin access. How about OS accounts that are locked down, for the exact reason of preventing these types of exploits? Obviously Chrome can run on a limited account.

            It is irresponsible to rely on the underlying OS security (or insecurity) as a crutch. So what if someone has physical access? Just because they can type on a keyboard or insert a USB drive, doesn't mean they can run an exploit. What will they do, install a rootkit? What if they can't reboot the computer? What if they can't get past BIOS and full disk encryption?

            Seriously... I'm getting mad just at the thought that the head of any computer security team can think in this way.

            • A limited account can still install extensions, userland rootkits (which do exist), background startup programs (which would have full access to the user's running program memory and files), and so on.

              Seriously... I'm getting mad just at the thought that the head of any computer security team can think in this way.

              Thats because like so many others you do not have a clear conception of what the actual threats are and the proper way of mitigating them.

              This is really very simple: If the attacker has access to your session, you have lost. If an attacker has access to your machine and you have not used disk encryption, you

        • by pthisis (27352) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @03:22PM (#44501309) Homepage Journal

          Exactly. Mozilla's email client Thunderbird also uses a Master Password to unlock the view-ability of the stored passwords.

          Chrome uses the same core OS key storage that Firefox/Thunderbird does, and encrypts with the same master password--if I save a password in Firefox, it's available in Chrome and vice-versa. Both use kwallet on KDE, gnome-keyring on Gnome platforms, keychain access on the Mac, etc.

          You can lock access to view them however the OS does so (e.g. with gnome, either Applications->Settings->Passwords and Keys, and select "Lock passwords", or from the command line, and gnome automatically locks them when your screensaver locks; on KDE it's the "Wallet Manager", I forget which menu it's under; on the Mac it's Utilities->Keychain Access, and click the little lock at the top of the keychain to lock/unlock). All 3 of those systems default to using your login password and automatically unlocking the keychain when you log in, but you can set the password separately (and be prompted to unlock it when you go to use it) if you want.

          The problem here is that Windows' password management doesn't offer a reasonable alternative, but that's not Chrome's fault.

          For those who insist on saying that chrome's security method is good enough consider this: How many people use separate log-in's for the "Family" computer that stays on most of the time? Not very many I'd imagine, just too much trouble for most to deal with. This means that both other family members as well as house guests can casually access all those passwords in no time.

          a) Lock your passwords when you turn over the computer

          b) You don't actually need to log in and out all the time to use separate accounts on the communal machine. Mine is usually sitting there logged into a guest account that everyone can use, with a browser running as the guest. I'll also use if I'm just looking something up on IMDB or googling/wiki'ing a quick question or whatever. There's a button on the menubar to "Run browser as..." with options for me and each of my family members, which prompts for the user's password and then runs a browser as them--if I need to check email or pay a bill or something, that browser's got my info but it's not available from the guest account/browser.. That covers the vast majority of cases, you just need to remember to close your browser when you're done with it.

          For more complicated stuff, I pop over to VT8, log in, do what I need to do, and pop back. If I'm in the middle of something and someone needs to use the machine briefly, I can lock my terminal and switch back to the guest terminal for a few minutes, then switch back and unlock my screen without really disrupting anything.

    • by gstoddart (321705) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:42PM (#44498791) Homepage

      I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

      I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory. The actual program may not be user specific, but all operating systems have a "home" area specific to users. There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

      This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don't trust a browser to retain passwords for me, and never have. I rank it right up there with giving Facebook my password so they can log into my email and find friends -- not happening, because I don't trust them with my password.

      If this guy is the head of 'security' for Chrome, he's either incompetent at that, or Google as a general rule have a shitty idea about what security should be and he's of the opinion this is "good enough".

      But since Google mostly just wants to collect all of your data, it may not be of value to them to lock it down in any meaningful way.

      • You are aware Chrome's password stores are encrypted, right? This is a non-issue. You need the user's Windows account credentials to decrypt the passwords.
      • by jader3rd (2222716)

        I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory.

        From the Chrome teams response for this issue, I believe that's what they're doing. If someone is logged into your OS session as you, they can see the passwords. Somebody logged into the same computer, but as a different user, can't see the passwords.

        • by Deathlizard (115856) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @01:17PM (#44499385) Homepage Journal

          Chrome stores everything in the cloud if you're logged into Google. That's what makes this even more dangerous than it's being reported.

          If Chrome is signed into your Google account, and some malicious user gets hold of your Google username and password, then they can retrieve all of your stored passwords simply by installing chrome and logging in. That includes any password on your phone, other systems or otherwise.

          This is why two step authentication, clearing out all stored password, and disabling password storing in sync settings are your friends.

        • Resetting passwords is a hugely complicated process on machines you have physical access to...

      • There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

        Sure there is. It's hard. Or perhaps it's better to say, it has enough moving parts that it gets screwed up pretty frequently. For example, it's secure until your boss sends you AnnualReport.docx, which happens to contain a virus (and actually wasn't sent by your boss).

        This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don'

      • by AmiMoJo (196126) * <.ten.3dlrow. .ta. .ojom.> on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @01:09PM (#44499237) Homepage

        I just checked and Chrome keeps my passwords in a file under "C:\Users\\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\User Data\Default". This directory is permission locked to me only. Even other admins can't access it unless they add permissions manually.

        As far as I can tell Chrome does use filesystem level security to protect individual user's passwords.

        • So someone with admin wouldn't be able to reset your password? or change ownership of the file?

          • by AmiMoJo (196126) *

            Other admins can access it if they change the permissions on the directory, naturally. If you don't trust the other admins on your system you are boned anyway.

      • I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

        I'm sorry, but there is a dedicated area for my stuff -- on Windows it's Documents and Settings, and on UNIX it's the home directory. The actual program may not be user specific, but all operating systems have a "home" area specific to users. There are no valid technical reasons why this can't be made secure, other than either having no interest in doing it, or pandering to users who just want convenience.

        This is just a piss-poor implementation of security, and it's why I don't trust a browser to retain passwords for me, and never have. I rank it right up there with giving Facebook my password so they can log into my email and find friends -- not happening, because I don't trust them with my password.

        If this guy is the head of 'security' for Chrome, he's either incompetent at that, or Google as a general rule have a shitty idea about what security should be and he's of the opinion this is "good enough".

        But since Google mostly just wants to collect all of your data, it may not be of value to them to lock it down in any meaningful way.

        Google's response to everything is "no, we're doing it the best way." I find it best just to avoid talking to Googlers about their jobs.

    • by gQuigs (913879) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:44PM (#44498829) Homepage

      So set a Master Password: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/use-master-password-protect-stored-logins [mozilla.org]
      More here: http://kb.mozillazine.org/Master_password [mozillazine.org]

      Almost no users actually use this: http://monica-at-mozilla.blogspot.com/2013/02/cant-live-with-them-cant-live-without.html [blogspot.com]
      "....can be solved somewhat with master password, but only 1 out of 12K users had master password enabled"

      • by MobyDisk (75490)

        Almost no users actually use this:

        Of course not. Anyone security minded won't let Firefox save the passwords in the first place.

    • by Sigma 7 (266129)

      With Firefox, there's the option of adding a master password.

      It's still substandard - Firefox bleeds login information across sites (e.g. It places 3+ potential usernames, some of which are unique to a specific site), gives sudden "enter master password" prompt when not focusing on a password field, etc.

    • by gmuslera (3436)
      Firefox have also the possibiity of a master password to be able to access those stored passwords. Chrome just didn't saw that as something that would essentially make a difference in the long term. Another different topic is how they are stored here is a comparison between Firefox, Chrome and IE [blogspot.com], where Chome seem to not be very secure in that area, Firefox with master password is the safest, and IE dropped badly the security there in the latest versions.
    • by Spazmania (174582) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:57PM (#44499033) Homepage

      From TFA:

      The simple fact is that you need to lock your user account if you want to protect your information. If you don't do that, nothing else really matters because it's all just theater and won't actually stop anyone willing to invest minimal effort.

      And there it is. The bottom line. Kember demands that Chrome engage in security theater and the Chrome authors said no. As they should.

      • It isn't security theater, or at least isn't broadway ;-) Obviously if you leave yourself logged in, lots of bad things are possible. But having Firefox not show my encrypted passwords if I happen to forgot to lock up the desktop? That's still better than just letting them out without quibble.
    • by icebike (68054)

      I know it has been discussed many times to password lock access to stored passwords, though because browsers are not user-specific, this has not been done.

      Solution: If security is important to you, don't be lazy.

      But browsers ARE as user specific as any other part of the modern computer.

      With just about every Operating System having the ability to have multiple accounts logged in and to switch accounts easily, browsers, and everything else each user does can be compartmentalized easily.

      And that is probably the best way to handle it in general where what is needed is snoop protection from co-users.

      If you recommend typing in passwords to every websites you have to go with an notebook full of passwords, a single common

    • can peek all the passwords in clear text very easily with a couple of mouse clicks

      it takes at least 3 clicks with Firefox.

  • Firefox is the same (Score:3, Informative)

    by rHBa (976986) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:34PM (#44498671)
    Firefox menu -> Preferences -> Security -> Saved Passwords -> Show Passwords
    • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:42PM (#44498797)

      ../../Set Masterpassword

      face it : chrome sucks at security, but that's no big surprise.

    • Actually, is this any different for ANY browser?
      If the password is available (without being prompted for any master password), then it's accesible one way or another. Period.

      • by Clsid (564627) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:50PM (#44498929)

        You can secure this in Firefox, there is no option to do so in Chrome.

  • Moronic. (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:35PM (#44498687)

    If your browser can read the passwords and use them on the web, so can a local user. No surprise. Unless you set a master password (firefox offers this, not sure about chrome), there's no way to fix this. It's just how computers work.

    • by Clsid (564627)

      Lol this is like Google's AC army all over the comments section now. Computers don't work that way. But to make it simple for you, a password can be encrypted with a public key, and then decrypted with Chrome's private key. It is not advanced technology and please, go tell your coworkers at Google to get their act together.

      • Re:Moronic. (Score:5, Insightful)

        by aardvarkjoe (156801) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @01:03PM (#44499133)

        But to make it simple for you, a password can be encrypted with a public key, and then decrypted with Chrome's private key.

        How do you intend to keep a local user from being able to extract the private key that Chrome is using? (Note that in your scenario, asymmetric key encryption is kind of pointless in the first place.)

        See: why DRM doesn't work either.

      • by Dynedain (141758)

        Which means Chrome's private key needs to be stored in Chrome itself (unless you want to start shipping everything off to Google for server-side processing), and so can be plucked out of the binary for decryption purposes.

    • I believe Chrome uses OS passwords stores on Mac and Linux which both support a master password. Not 100% sure. The Windows mechanism used uses your Windows login information so no master password is needed, it's very convenient and just as secure (unless you leave your computer logged on... but then all the files you encrypted in the exact same way with Microsoft's file encryption will be readable as well).
    • If your browser can read the passwords and use them on the web, so can a local user. No surprise. Unless you set a master password (firefox offers this, not sure about chrome), there's no way to fix this. It's just how computers work.

      Not on OS X/Safari. All my saved passwords are locked by a master password. A user without that master password can see that the entries exist, but they can't decode the passwords without first entering the master password. And, where things get really different, they are sandboxed, so only the original application that entered the password can read it without user intervention.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:35PM (#44498693)

    Saved passwords have always been stored in a way that they can be recovered easily.

    By definition, saving passwords will always be insecure, unless the program has a way to encrypt them using another key provided by the user.

    They MUST be recoverable to be of use, because the plain text password must be available to the program for transmission to the web page.

    • by Clsid (564627)

      There is a software called Keepass and it tackles that issue in a really good way. It might not be perfect but if you find somebody that can crack a Keepass database that uses Twofish or AES, they totally deserve to have your passwords.

  • This functionality has been both in Chrome and Firefox for years now, so I don't see why people make a fuss about it only now..

    Either you don't give other people access to your user account, or you use a 3rd party password-protected keystore like Keepass, Lastpass, 1Password, with a separate (or even 2-factor) authentication.

    • No it isn't. Firefox has the ability to protect your saved passwords with a Firefox Master Password. From what I'm reading here, Chrome does not have that capability.
  • He missed something (Score:5, Interesting)

    by Lieutenant_Dan (583843) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:38PM (#44498737) Homepage Journal

    How about the fact that Chrome can import passwords stored in Safari to begin with?

    So Safari has some security issues as well. Where is the "master key" to export passwords?

    I guess the underlying message is that if you leave a computer unattended the information is accessible to anyone. E-mail, passwords, documents, MP3s, etc.

    This is a convenience feature and 99% rather have the convenience of a cached web passwords on their personal computer then worrying about something walking by.

    • by Clsid (564627)

      Safari uses the keyring, an OS level service to access passwords. So all you need to provide is your system password when an app wants to access the keyring and that's it.

  • ..okay? And? (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward

    If Chrome is going to enter your password for you, it has to know your password. This simple requirement ultimately means that any attempt to obfuscate the stored password is going to be trivial to overcome by anyone who has physical access to the box, unless you're flat out encrypting them with another password that the user would have to enter to decrypt them, and at that point, we've pretty handily defeated the purpose of storing passwords (because let's face it, it's not like you're going to want to do

    • by pruss (246395)

      It would be less trivial if one had something like the Android model where each application (with some exceptions) stores (some of) its data as a separate user, and without root privileges, one can't access the data for the application except by the methods provided by the application.

    • Actually, the passwords ARE encrypted with another master password, so you already have your best-security scenario. You just never have to enter it (at least on Windows) because Windows uses your session logon information to decrypt the passwords. Not logged on? Your passwords are secured. Yay!
    • Sheesh. Auto-fill is NOT showing you the passwords. Granted with a little work, you could probably capture it as it is moved from browser store to web page password field but that's a serious level of escalation compared with Chrome just saying "here's the unencrypted passwords for all stored passwords". Firefox has the ability to lock down the display of unencrypted passwords with a master password. Chrome doesn't apparently.

      Very very different things.
  • I don't use Chrome much, but is there a master password that you can set?
    If there is no master password, then no matter how the data is stored, it's as safe as plain text anyway. Even with master password, dictionary attacks will get you quite often.
    And you can transfer/import/export the data encrypted with master password between different installations without decrypting it.

    --Coder
  • by vawwyakr (1992390) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:41PM (#44498785)
    I've seen this on several sites, is this news to anyone?? Did you miss it many years ago when this was added? You know what, when someone is physically on my machine while its logged in, they can also send emails from my account!! Its just right there ready to go! We need to do something about this!
    • by gstoddart (321705)

      You know what, when someone is physically on my machine while its logged in, they can also send emails from my account!!

      If it's sitting there in plain text for anybody to get, what's to prevent a malicious web-page from asking for it?

      Or are we meant to believe they made it trivial to access from the machine, but have put in super-duper security around accessing it from with the browser? Because I'm not buying that.

  • by segfault_0 (181690) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:47PM (#44498881)

    Why complain about this. If you're storing your passwords in your browser - im not sure how this qualifies as being significantly worse -- they can already just sit down at your browser and change your passwords - which is worse since it locks you out of your own account.

    Just dont save passwords if you cant secure your workstation i think is common sense.

    • Anyone can secure a workstation. It's easy, there's really no excuse. Press Win+L. Really. Do it now if you haven't done it before and prepare to be amazed at technology.
  • With the recent leaks about how Google cooperates with government surveilence; I almost wonder if blatent weaknesses like this are by design. Sad when what should be outlandish conspiracy theories sound tame compared to what it's revealed they're alerady doing.
    • by gstoddart (321705)

      With the recent leaks about how Google cooperates with government surveilence; I almost wonder if blatent weaknesses like this are by design

      It may not be that way by design, but it's certainly a possibility to be exploited.

      Imagine if the government went to Google and said "you need to add secret code which uploads these user/passwords to us so we have them".

      Google may not be directly part of a conspiracy like this, but I see no reason to keep acting like they couldn't be forced to or might not occasionally

  • by Todd Knarr (15451) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @12:49PM (#44498919) Homepage

    Passwords have to be stored in a decryptable form, because the browser needs them decrypted to fill in the password fields or to respond to HTTP authentication responses. That means that any malware with access to the browser can get those passwords in decrypted form too. A master password doesn't help, the malware can just get the passwords after I've entered the master password to decrypt them for use (assuming it can't just get the master password when I enter it). The only thing encrypted password storage really protects against is someone with access to the physical storage media but not the running system, or essentially stolen mobile devices (phones or laptops). On those you probably shouldn't be storing passwords at all, because any reversible encryption is too easy to crack using off-line attacks with modern hardware.

    It's similar to my objection to the old "don't write down your passwords" thing: the risk of a remote attack against easy-to-remember passwords is much higher than the risk of an attacker physically getting into the locked drawer of my desk in the locked area of the secured and patrolled building my office is in, and if the attacker has gotten into the locked drawer in my desk I've got much bigger security worries and the attacker has much juicier targets he can go after.

  • Incorrect title (Score:2, Insightful)

    by LordKaT (619540)

    Title should read: "Elliott Kember's Insane Password Security Strategy"

    Seriously, why are you storing passwords, at all? Unless you're storing them on in an encrypted space of some kind that requires two-factor authentication you shouldn't be storing passwords at all (and even then I really question your sanity).

  • Maybe it's that I've never imported passwords from another browser, going to chrome://settings/passwords as suggested doesn't show any plain text passwords for me. It only shows a few sites anyways on this machines. I'm fairly sure Chrome on my Linux box at home is using a different method since Chrome prompts for my password file password just for opening up the browser because I have the password file password different from my login password.
  • Maemo's messaging app stores passwords in a plaintext file, some users found it and wanted it obfuscated to at least make them non-trivial to retrieve. The Maemo devs argued that obfuscation would be better at lulling users into a false sense of security about what is stored than thwarting those who want to access it maliciously.

  • And this is why storing passwords should only be used for things like blogs. It shouldn't be used for things like banking.

    Start locking your computer when you walk away from it.

  • Google's rationalization that the system is already insecure if someone else has physical access to it is absurd. That's like saying it's ok for a bank to leave everyone's money on the counter overnight because if someone breaks in then that same person can easily break into the vault, which is obviously not the case. Computer systems should have multiple levels of protection as well.
  • ... will be that the user can tamper with the SSL root certificates (or just add her own) and trick Chrome into giving up the password to a locally-hosted web server presenting an apparently-valid cert for the target domain.

    In order to remedy this, Chrome must adopt the policy of asking the server to pinky-swear that they are really the named entity.

  • first off the main first issue is obviously a problem with Safari.
    But in general, that is how all browsers do it. how is this news?

  • ... Chrome is able to use the KDE password wallet if present, which is protected under a master password. (I assume it can use the GNOME equivalent too). If so, Chrome won't save anything itself, so on that count at least, you're safe.

    That said, I would recommend using a service like LastPass anyway, so the problem is taken entirely out of the hands of the browsers.

  • Yea I get the basic argument browser needs to be able to decrypt passwords somehow when needed this means either a password encrypting password thing or punting responsibility down the stack.

    In many operating systems there are secure ways of doing precisely this. Use underlying operating systems keychain where available such as windows credential store (Sorry XP users). The credential store is at least protected by the users security context and syskey if non-default setting is used. On shared computers

  • by brentonboy (1067468) on Wednesday August 07, 2013 @03:09PM (#44501101) Homepage Journal

    Sure, it's shocking for someone who thought their passwords were safe in Chrome to realize that they're visible with four clicks. But the real issue is that Chrome passwords aren't really stored safely. If you get a virus on your system, it has full access to the passwords.

    Honest question: why doesn't Chrome implement something similar to KeePass or LastPass? Is there some technical reason? Is it astoundingly difficult? Does it not actually provide additional security against malware?

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