Researchers Can Generate RSA SecurID Random Numbers Flawlessly

Fluffeh writes "A researcher has found and published a way to tune into an RSA SecurID Token. Once a few easy steps are followed, anyone can generate the exact numbers shown on the token. The method relies on finding the seed that is used to generate the numbers in a way that seems random. Once it is known, it can be used to generate the exact numbers displayed on the targeted Token. The technique, described on Thursday by a senior security analyst at a firm called SensePost, has important implications for the safekeeping of the tokens. An estimated 40 million people use these to access confidential data belonging to government agencies, military contractors, and corporations. Scrutiny of the widely used two-factor authentication system has grown since last year, when RSA revealed that intruders on its networks stole sensitive SecurID information that could be used to reduce its security. Defense contractor Lockheed Martin later confirmed that a separate attack on its systems was aided by the theft of the RSA data."

Re:Suuuuure it's random

[Fwipp]

This attack doesn't actually rely on any of that - it's akin to photocopying all the one-time pads you've given to the user. To say that this is bidirectional cryptography is misleading at best.

Re:Not exactly...

[Fwipp]

Exactly. They're cloning the software token, not breaking the scheme that the hardware uses.

Not so fast

[WaffleMonster]

Key point from TFA "was easy for people with control over the machines to deduce and copy"

If anything is running on a computer it is possible to probe it and figure out what it is doing and duplicate it if you have complete control over it. It does not much matter what it is how fancy an algorithm is being used or how it is configured.

If you want something to stay secret then it needs to self destruct when someone tries to fuck with it or anything it depends on to work.

Reminds me of the outraged cries of those 1337 few over the years who independantly discovered operating system x must be defective since you can bypass password authentication or access controls by mounting an unencrypted hard disk in a different computer. No shit.

What you have

[g0es]

I have never understood why software tokens have been allowed to be considered a "factor" in multi factor authentication. Particulary when it is stored on the same laptop/computer that the user is utilizing to connect to the secure resource. Doesn't it make more sense to have each factor seperated by an air gap or alternate communiation channel? That way if the system where the users is typing a password is compromised only the password is compromissed with possibly the ping from the token which would be a one time key. Even if the one time key and the password are comprimised the attacker basicly has to use it at the same time.

Re:Not exactly...

[Kenja]

The keyfob is fairly tamper proof. You would need to pop it open and use some sort of device to read the memory where the token is kept. Since the fobs are filled with epoxy and go dead if the power source is disconnected, this is difficult.

Re:Not exactly...

[nahdude812]

The hardware versions are the ones used for the more important operations. Their seed is a lot harder to snoop. If the hardware version became fundamentally broken, an awful lot of systems and networks would suddenly be a lot weaker.

All random number sequences produced by computers are reproducible if you know the algorithm and the seed; that's in fact the whole strategy behind the RSA SecureID token - if you know the seed, you know the value fo any given point in time. It's not that they discovered random number generators are actually pseudo random number generators, it's just that they snooped a software key. Snooping a hardware key is a lot harder, and requires physical access since these aren't networked in any way. It's very misleading for the article title to sound like the hardware versions were broken when they weren't.

Re:Not exactly...

[erroneus]

The "hardware token" *IS* running software. Did you think it was not running a processor and running a program???

And in order for that to work, it operates the same way the SOFTWARE system which validates and verifies the numbers on the RSA ID.

The compromise is the same whether it is a hardware or software device... in the end, they are all software devices.

SecurID not broken

[Old Wolf]

I read TFA.. the algorithm is not broken and the seed isn't deducible from the output; all they've done is read the seed out of software auth running on a general purpose computing device.

This has always been possible in theory -- obviously, the computer software has to generate the output so it must have the seed in an accessible form; probably under several layers of obfuscation and encryption (which ultimately adds no security, as the software still has to be able to wade through it to get to the seed). It's very similar in concept to someone being able to obtain your PGP or SSH private keys if they have local access to your system.

There is no risk to people with a hardware auth device, unless the server is compromised (in which case this form of authentication is useless anyway).