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Can We Fix Federated Authentication? 65

Bruce Schneier writes in his blog of a "New paper by Ross Anderson: 'Can We Fix the Security Economics of Federated Authentication?': There has been much academic discussion of federated authentication, and quite some political maneuvering about 'e-ID.' The grand vision, which has been around for years in various forms but was recently articulated in the US National Strategy for Trustworthy Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC)."
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Can We Fix Federated Authentication?

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  • by garcia ( 6573 ) on Tuesday March 29, 2011 @09:10AM (#35651754)

    From the article:

    Federated authentication has mostly failed to work because the incentives were wrong Identity providers assumed no liability and were open to traceless coercion; relying parties gained little benefit and had to cope with increased complexity; users rightly feared single points of failure.

    No, it has mostly failed not because of lack of incentive but simply because *I* want to be the controller of my individual identity online--not some third-party or government sponsored gatekeeper.

    We do NOT need this and I wish we'd stop wasting time, money, and effort on something that will always fail. Even if it is adopted it will have been an enormous waste being that those problems it's meant to solve will be circumvented by those who do not want it solved.

  • What is identity? (Score:4, Interesting)

    by anegg ( 1390659 ) on Tuesday March 29, 2011 @11:23AM (#35653388)

    Authentication can be defined as the process of proving an identity. One question to ask is what identity is being proven? Does the concept of identity even have meaning outside of a relationship between two parties?

    We like to believe that we each are ourselves, which is our sense of identity. But who are we, anyway? We could define our identity as being the child of our (presumably two) parents - but this just pushes the problem off one generation - what is the identity of our parents? This could be taken back as far as necessary to establish an identity chain that would make it unlikely to find conflicts. We can also define our identity as being the individual born in a certain location at a certain date/time, and we feel this is probably unique because it is unlikely that there were more than one individual born at the same date/time in the same location (assuming the location is localized enough). But are these identities really meaningful? Are they what is really necessary?

    In most circumstances, its not who you are that is important, but your relationship with another party that matters. For example, my college didn't necessarily care who I was while I was in attendance there, but rather that the person who took all of the courses and exams, building up an academic record, was the same person to whom they granted a degree upon my satisfactory completion of a particular course of study. In some sense, the US IRS doesn't care who you are (the child of Julius and Ethel, for example) but rather that the single individual who made income from a set of income sources paid the taxes that they owe based on current tax law for that income. And the US Social Security system cares mostly that the individual who paid a certain amount on Social Security fees over their lifetime for income earned is the same person to whom they are cutting a Social Security check in retirement. And so on...

    Is it really meaningful to seek a single ID and authentication of that ID for use with numerous parties, who are really only interested in establishing your relationship to a particular credit account, or taxpayer ID, or student it? What risks might be involved in constructing such a singularly important ID?

Two can Live as Cheaply as One for Half as Long. -- Howard Kandel

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