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Worms Security Windows

Stuxnet Worm Infected Industrial Control Systems 167

Sooner Boomer writes "ComputerWorld has an article about the Stuxnet worm, which was apparently designed to steal industrial secrets and disrupt operations at industrial plants, according to Siemens. 'Stuxnet has infected systems in the UK, North America and Korea, however the largest number of infections, by far, have been in Iran. Once installed on a PC, Stuxnet uses Siemens' default passwords to seek out and try to gain access to systems that run the WinCC and PCS 7 programs — so-called PLC (programmable logic controller) programs that are used to manage large-scale industrial systems on factory floors and in military installations and chemical and power plants.' If the worm were to be used to disrupt systems at any of those locations, the results could be devastating."
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Stuxnet Worm Infected Industrial Control Systems

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  • deserved (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @06:17PM (#33615894)

    If they still use default password, they deserve to be hacked and face total havoc.

    Industry`s security is still so crappy.

  • Re:Wow (Score:5, Insightful)

    by gmuslera ( 3436 ) on Friday September 17, 2010 @06:24PM (#33615952) Homepage Journal
    Probably the network is behind a firewall, so they think they are safe from outsiders. The problem is when insiders have both windows and no clue.
  • Re:Wow (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Svartalf ( 2997 ) on Friday September 17, 2010 @06:26PM (#33615964) Homepage

    And they USED Windows as the OS... Brilliant!

    Saying that they should airgap the SCADA is obvious- unfortunately, people tend to favor "ease of use" and that airgap is one of the first things that typically tends to get botched in the name of that. So, even if you thought you put it on a standalone, the thing's liable as not to be on the corporate net with all the other machines.

  • Re:Wow (Score:1, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @06:41PM (#33616048)

    you seriously do not want to know how common it is.

    Scary common... On things that would disrupt major cities...

  • Re:Wow (Score:1, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @07:44PM (#33616426)

    > The real problem is NOT the OS, since it is pretty obvious this attack has been specifically designed to hit a very small niche target, which means no matter what OS you were running the malware writers would have simply written to that target.

    Bill? Steve?

    Oh, what a coincidence UK, North America and South Korea is where Windows is stronger. Nah, forget it, correlation is not causation etc. etc.

    > The problem as we are witnessing here is there is NO magic bullet, be it Windows, OSX, or Linux, be it a firewall or other piece of hardware, be it any other piece of tech.

    This is _your_ problem. Ours is getting rid of worms, viruses... and M$.

    I'm sure idiots have a role in this, but M$ somehow acts as amplifier of idiocy.

  • Re:Wow (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @07:59PM (#33616524)
    The OS it runs on is.
  • Re:Wow (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @08:03PM (#33616538)

    Often the system IS airgapped... and then they use a USB key to transfer the reports.

    That's why USB keys were targeted for infection.

  • Re:Wow (Score:5, Insightful)

    by denobug ( 753200 ) on Friday September 17, 2010 @08:03PM (#33616542)
    Our past experience indicate the IT staff does more damage to the stability of the system than anything else could. Most IT and network personnel has zero understanding of reliability of a system. The architecture they design are simply too complex and not robust enough. So before anybody can hack in, the system itself becomes unstable, crashed, and end up causing dangerous situation.

    One of the most common mistake observed is a super complicated VLAN scheme that link multiple network together under the name of "ease of management" or "security", while in fact the first thing they need to do is to completely seperate the control network with corporate network, and then flatten the control network with air-gap from the corporate network. Also make sure you have zero wireless network access to the control network would be a wise choice not only in security but also improves each component's availability in general.

    Again, common sense goes a very long way.
  • Re:Wow (Score:3, Insightful)

    by DarwinSurvivor ( 1752106 ) on Friday September 17, 2010 @08:08PM (#33616562)
    What is the point of a password if it's written in the owners manual of every person that has ever worked on a similar machine? At that point, you may as well call the communications API a "password".
  • Re:Wow (Score:5, Insightful)

    by networkBoy ( 774728 ) on Friday September 17, 2010 @08:39PM (#33616736) Journal

    This is manifested in the door security where I work.
    We have RFID badge readers.
    My boss recently wanted to add one to a lab he controls. When he found out the bill was $10K he balked. We told him it was for the security conduit (intrusion detection conduit, I assume gas charged & detect pressure drop in a leg?).
    His response? We don't need the conduit, just run the wire.

    Luckily security said F off and use a key lock, we're not installing it without the conduit. But that same attitude is why these machines still have the default passwords.

    -nB

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @10:31PM (#33617200)

    Looks like it worked. Boom goes the gas line in California.
    Turned up the pressure on a valve somewhere? Old pipes.
    Just a matter of time with a big gas leak before it finds a flame.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Friday September 17, 2010 @10:43PM (#33617252)

    The Windows-level part of the attack was signed code signed with a Microsoft-issued key. The signing keys involved has been revoked. US-CERT isn't saying who had them.

    Realtek, according to everyone else on the internet. Which might point the finger at China, who would be well placed to acquire keys from Realtek and who have a well-publicised history of industrial espionage and using malware to attack foreign governments.

  • Re:Wow (Score:4, Insightful)

    by ScrewMaster ( 602015 ) * on Saturday September 18, 2010 @12:25AM (#33617636)

    Our past experience indicate the IT staff does more damage to the stability of the system than anything else could

    Agreed, with all your points. Over the past couple decades of doing control systems, one of the most common questions I get asked by engineering is "how can we best keep IT off our control network?" Funny ... the engineers in charge of these things just seem to intrinsically understand the risks of letting IT staff anywhere near a live process control system. Now, before you IT support people get all testy, I'm not saying that you are, as a group, necessarily incompetent within your legitimate purview. However, as Dirty Harry once said, "A man's got to know his limitations" and it's very disturbing to me how many of you are incapable of recognizing where your involvement is a liability. I've been accused of installing "rogue" systems by IT staff, simply because I recommended that a control system not be placed on a company's regular network. Thing is, a failure on an office network is an inconvenience. A failure on an engineering network can be a disaster. Keep that in mind next time you insist that engineering's systems should be under IT's thumb, and subject to whatever corporate "standards" are in force, regardless of their impact.

  • Re:Wow (Score:3, Insightful)

    by MartinSchou ( 1360093 ) on Saturday September 18, 2010 @10:58AM (#33619928)

    Now, is the door more secure or less secure than it would have been if you had run a card lock without the special conduit?

    That's besides the questions. The question that needs asking is:

    Would a physical key entry result in security getting the blame, if something 'bad' happens in the lab?

    The likely answer to that is: "No"
    However, if they simply ran the wire as requested by the boss, and something bad happened, would they get the blame? Yes they would, because they installed and approved it.

    If you want me to take the blame for something, then I want to be in charge of how it can happen. If you just want a scape goat, look elsewhere, as I have no need for a "responsible for break-in to lab due to botched security job" on my resume.

  • Comment removed (Score:2, Insightful)

    by account_deleted ( 4530225 ) on Saturday September 18, 2010 @02:44PM (#33621420)
    Comment removed based on user account deletion

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