Keldrin_1 writes "Researchers Alfredo Ortega and Anibal Sacco, from Core Security Technologies, have discovered a vulnerability in the 'Computrace LoJack for Laptops' software. This is a BIOS-level application that calls home for instructions in case the laptop is ever lost or stolen. However, what the application considers 'home' is subject to change. This allows the creation of malware capable of 'infecting the BIOS with persistent code that survive reboots and reflashing attempts.' Computers from Dell, Lenovo, HP, Toshiba, Asus, and others may be affected."
They have every DV/TC-model of HP Laptop listed - I used to specifically work on all DV/TC/NC/NX models, I've NEVER ONCE seen this in BIOS during any of my repairs. NEVER. Also, this software was never listed in part of HP's troubleshooting guides, and that usually means that feature is not there.
I rebooted my laptop (DV9000, full featured loaded with every possible thing offered) and this 'rootkit' in BIOS is nowhere to be found, at all. Not on my friend's DV2000. Not on the new TC4400 I have in my art room.
Can someone with some knowledge please explain to me why we can't build a machine with simple boot code that does not EVER need to be modified for the life of the hardware?
In case of bug you needed either to move the BIOS chip to a separate flasher, or at least use a hardware switch on the motherboard to switch between 5v and 12v to enable BIOS chip flashing.
Nowadays, even Windows applications can write to the BIOS without any peculiar form of control. No switch at all involved. BIOS rootkits were just bound to happen. What makes it even easier for rootkits, is that 90% of all PC uses the same brands of BIOS and those BIOS are designed in a modular fashion making it easy to add a "rootkit" modules without needing the re-create a whole new BIOS (see example of how to add an embed FreeDOS inside an Award BIOS).
That pretty much stupid : Most motherboard have a couple of bugs fixed during the first couple of months. Then there's mostly no need to reflash the BIOS, except for supporting newer CPUs, etc... which would require opening the case and accessing the motherboard anyway. But for the whole lifetime of the BIOS, it remains completely writeable even from user-space application from within highly insecure OSes.
Hardware "write-protection" switches for BIOSes should be reintroduced. Simple fix for a simple problem. Instead you can stay sure that the manufacturers and Microsoft are going to require several layers of TPM and similar forms of DRM in BIOS which won't even guaranty that BIOSes would be protected from bugs.
That's nice. "Hello, customer. There's a fatal bug in your BIOS. Of course, there's not a damn thing you can do about it, since the BIOS on this model isn't changable, but at least you know about it now."
Once upon a time, I had a 32x Plextor SCSI CD-ROM reader, back when such a thing was still a trendy thing to have for ripping audio CDs, which was generally problematic back then.
It worked pretty well, but eventually Plextor made a new firmware for it that improved a few things. They mailed it out to me for free, via USPS. After the package showed up, I found a small, square EEPROM inside of a static-resistant carrier and, IIRC, a brief instruction sheet.
Damn, I've just wasted 15 years of my life porting BIOSes to different platforms. Thanks for telling me that it was all unnecessary. Hardware manufacturers will also be pleased to know that they can just use a smaller ROM of a few KB instead of the 4MB ROMs that are coming into use now. That will save a few pennies.
I bow before your in depth and vastly superior knowledge of the subject.
Sorry but the BIOS has not been small and simple for about 20 years. It does far more than simply launch a bootloader. New technologies have constantly been added to the BIOS and each one has added to the complexity. APM, PnP, PCI, ACPI, EPP/ECP, BBS, UEFI, PCIe etc etc. The 4MB ROM is not yet full of BIOS code, that's still only about 1.5MB give or take. However Intel boards also have code in there for their manageability engine etc. With a reasonable amount of headroom in the ROM manufacturers are looking
But the context of the discussion was that the object code should be flawless. In that case, whether the tools that turn source code into object code have bugs turns out to be relevant.
And I didn't say int main(void) was wrong or bad; what I intended to imply was that some compiler might have only been properly tested for the more common argc/argv prototype. Heck, it might not have been tested at all; as another poster mentions it might be a bug in all code the compiler generates.
Been there, had that, in the 80s! Atari 1040ST had TOS (Tramiel Operating System) on EPROMs! Have yet to se a virus or rootkit that carried an EPROM eraser around with it, so as long as you booted up without media in the drives machine was guaranteed clean! God I miss That machine!! GEM was sweet!
by Anonymous Coward writes:
on Friday July 31 2009, @10:50AM (#28897095)
Just like SPTD is not a rootkit when it hides my emulated dvd from copy protection software.
This is a popular piece of software that happens to have a potentially serious bug that the vendors and users should be demanding be fixed, but it doesn't make it a rootkit.
The pair recommended a digital signature scheme to authenticate the call-home process.
How's that going to help? If you can replace the IP address then you can replace the certificate and signature too. If you have access to modify the BIOS flash, it's game over.
Please tell me if I'm missing something, but isn't the real vulnerability that the BIOS can be modified with unsigned code? A BIOS that allows this can be infected with a rootkit regardless of whether the LoJack code was there.
The real vulnerability is the "phone home" part, specially because it dont use strong authentication. What if something in your path redirects that fixed IP it contacts to one with a fake set of instructions? Suddently router hacking, open hotspots, arp poisoning and other things could be lethal to your notebook, or even be used to bypass your well built firewall and make your pc part of an ever growing communit... i mean, botnet.
First off, the 'feature' comes on a lot of laptops. Doesn't mean its enabled. You have to request it to be enabled in order for it to come from factory with it actually turned on.
If you don't turn it on, it doesn't do anything, no phone home, no remote wipe, no tracking.
Guess what, same thing applies to Blackberrys, and iPhones, and cars with LoJack that have remote shutoff. For every feature there is a potential risk, thats the way the world works.
If you want the potential to remotely locate/track and wipe a laptop or PC, then you also get the potential that someone else can do it as well.
Exactly right. The company that made LoJack lobbied for the feature to be installed, but they want you to pay for it to be activated. If you don't give them money, it's dormant.
Now, if somebody hacked or appropriated their activation scheme, or compelled the company to activate it without your knowledge, that would be a cause for concern.
Go into the BIOS setup, you can choose to activate the feature if you paid for the license, or deactivate a previously activated agent. Choosing disable removes the feature completely. it can NEVER come back. TFA is hype. If it is never enabled in the bios NOTHING is installed on windows.
Disable only works if the product was never activated. if the BIOS is set to active, AND the client software on the machine contacts the servers for Computrace, and verifies it should be licensed, then it "flips a switch" in that BIOS setting, and you can NEVER disable it again.
They need to write to the software, or else the software will always try to contact them, and then anyone could track any laptop with a supeana, ruining their business model.. Instead, it has to be "turned on".
Also, this software in the BIOS does not actually contact anyone directly. All the BIOS level crap does is forcibly try to re-install the agent software under windows. This could get ugly, if you update the BIOS, to try to force it to install a different program every time someone reloads windows...
Of course, I wonder what happens if I buy an "off lease" laptop, that was at one point activated...
This BIOS 'switch' - how exactly is that flipped? CMOS is not permanent, NVRAM is not permanent, RAM is not permanent. The only permanent storage are removable devices such as hard drives, and the BIOS itself. The BIOS is usually protected physically (jumper) and isn't a 'volatile' storage means anyways. Also, from my understanding, this isn't something that can be reprogrammed on the fly - it has to be done in "real mode" and is done on a block level, rather than bit lev
You're not missing any clues; it's just impossible.
My Dell Inspiron 6000's last BIOS update (several years ago) came with some Computrace back-end stuff, with the aforementioned options for on, off, and disable. On and disable are both "permanent" options.
Which is really interesting, if you follow the timeline: The feature wasn't wasn't there at all to begin with. And then, I flashed it in. And now, it says its permanent. Uh - yeah, right.
If I set it to "on" or "disable", it'll just flip a bit somewher
And then, I flashed it in. And now, it says its permanent. Uh - yeah, right.
If I set it to "on" or "disable", it'll just flip a bit somewhere, and/or do some magic crypto, and flash that result into a region of BIOS.
Of course you could disable it. But that's not the point.
There seems to be a prevalent view on/. that because a security system can be disabled, it always will be and is therefore pointless. But anyone who's got enough knowledge to know about the existence of this is probably not a junkie that steals laptops left alone for a minute on the train. And that's what the great majority of petty theft is.
No, I don't think I can disable it. I can only issue an instruction to a computer which is described as disabling the function permanently, but that doesn't exactly mean anything important.
Here's the scenario:
I "disable" it, the appropriate bits are written into the flash ROM on the motherboard, and it appears to be disabled.
Later, something else comes along, and writes different bits into the flash ROM. And then it's not disabled anymore.
(And, whatever the case, the default is "off," which should at leas
Yeah, it's pretty funny that a piece of software that has nothing to do with Microsoft that gets loaded on hardware that Microsoft has nothing to do with by the OEMs themselves through a deal with a completely different company is not mentioned in a Microsoft commercial about Windows. Or actually, it's really not.
It's offered really cheaply on a bunch of Dells. The program calls home and reports its IP address when activated after being stolen. I doubt if the police are going to do anything with the report of an IP address on a stolen used computer that might be worth $1000 (probably less). All the cops are going to tell you to do is a) use a cable lock in the future b) don't leave the machine in your (car, house, office, etc.) in plain sight and c) call your insurance company. In most cities, cops don't even inv
Congrats, there is a Mac version available as well. PC's and Mac's are all the same parts made by the same slaves chained together. there is a few companies in the world that make a basic computer and then Dell, HP, Apple and others add a few things and brand it for themselves.
Actually this could be built into EFI. Apple don't, but if a laptop manufacturer wanted to they could. It's even easier than BIOS - an EFI ROM is a structured filesystem containing all the drivers and commands required to boot.. things like the display and keyboard drivers. Adding this software could be done after the fact without even having to touch the original code.
As do I, but that does not mean that I have any delusions as it relates to security.
There are quite a bits of exploitable code available that, if properly engineered, can do quite a bit of damage to an Apple computer. Simply because there is no Mac version of the "Melissa" virus does not mean that as a Mac user I should assume that there will never be one.
And let's not forget the iLife torrent that had something special added to it. There are plenty of individuals attempting to prove to the general public that a Mac is no more secure than it's Windows counterpart, and it will be not a false sense of security, but a lack of personal responsibility that will assist in that.
We're talking about a BIOS rootkit. The BIOS runs directly on the hardware. It doesn't really care what OS you're loading, unless it has some specific reason to.
There's a mac version of LoJack. Whether or not it is installed on a Macbook would depend on whether Apple chose to preload it, I suppose. A hackintosh, OTOH, might be more likely to have it.
While an attacker would have to already have compromised a system to insert malicious code into the BIOS, the attack prevents a defender from easily deleting an attacker's program or rootkit, the researchers said.
"You can remove the hard drive, trash it, and even reinstall the operating system," Sacco said. "This will still reinstall the rootkit." ...
BIOS attacks can be prevented by using the jumpers on many motherboards to block writing to the chips that store the s
This is a very bad thing. A "security" product should not allow downloading of software. This is even worse. It allows hidden downloading of software not visible to the user.
Supposedly it's delivered "turned off"? But how do you know it's turned off at startup? How do you know it wasn't turned on during operating system loading, or wasn't turned on by any of the preloaded crap that the "major PC manufacturers" preload? How do you know there isn't some way to turn it on remotely?
No computer with this software in ROM should be used for proprietary material, legal documents, medical records regulated by the HIPPA, financial records regulated by the SEC, or anything else that might attract an opponent. If you just play WoW, go ahead.
Hmmm (Score:4, Funny)
P.C. Phone Home.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Are Sony Vaio's using this? (Score:5, Insightful)
No,not sony for once, here is a list (Score:5, Informative)
From the Lojack compatibility list [absolute.com] here is a list of company:
ASUS, Dell Fujitsu, GammaTech, Gateway, GD Itronix, Getac, HP, Lenovo,,Motion, Panasonic, Toshiba
You can find a list of models on the "bios compatibility list"
Parent
Something doesn't sound right, here. (Score:5, Informative)
They have every DV/TC-model of HP Laptop listed - I used to specifically work on all DV/TC/NC/NX models, I've NEVER ONCE seen this in BIOS during any of my repairs. NEVER. Also, this software was never listed in part of HP's troubleshooting guides, and that usually means that feature is not there.
I rebooted my laptop (DV9000, full featured loaded with every possible thing offered) and this 'rootkit' in BIOS is nowhere to be found, at all. Not on my friend's DV2000. Not on the new TC4400 I have in my art room.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Maybe it's available "optionally" on all those models?
Or maybe it's really really good at hiding itself from you....
It is time (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:It is time (Score:5, Insightful)
Parent
Once upon a time... (Score:4, Informative)
Well, once upon a time, that was the case :
In case of bug you needed either to move the BIOS chip to a separate flasher, or at least use a hardware switch on the motherboard to switch between 5v and 12v to enable BIOS chip flashing.
Nowadays, even Windows applications can write to the BIOS without any peculiar form of control. No switch at all involved.
BIOS rootkits were just bound to happen. What makes it even easier for rootkits, is that 90% of all PC uses the same brands of BIOS and those BIOS are designed in a modular fashion making it easy to add a "rootkit" modules without needing the re-create a whole new BIOS (see example of how to add an embed FreeDOS inside an Award BIOS).
That pretty much stupid : Most motherboard have a couple of bugs fixed during the first couple of months. Then there's mostly no need to reflash the BIOS, except for supporting newer CPUs, etc... which would require opening the case and accessing the motherboard anyway. But for the whole lifetime of the BIOS, it remains completely writeable even from user-space application from within highly insecure OSes.
Hardware "write-protection" switches for BIOSes should be reintroduced. Simple fix for a simple problem.
Instead you can stay sure that the manufacturers and Microsoft are going to require several layers of TPM and similar forms of DRM in BIOS which won't even guaranty that BIOSes would be protected from bugs.
Parent
Re:It is time (Score:4, Funny)
That's nice. "Hello, customer. There's a fatal bug in your BIOS. Of course, there's not a damn thing you can do about it, since the BIOS on this model isn't changable, but at least you know about it now."
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Which is a lot better than something bad happening with no clue as to why.
Even if it wasn't fixable, I would like to know.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Not everything is flash-based, yaknow.
Once upon a time, I had a 32x Plextor SCSI CD-ROM reader, back when such a thing was still a trendy thing to have for ripping audio CDs, which was generally problematic back then.
It worked pretty well, but eventually Plextor made a new firmware for it that improved a few things. They mailed it out to me for free, via USPS. After the package showed up, I found a small, square EEPROM inside of a static-resistant carrier and, IIRC, a brief instruction sheet.
The process w
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Damn, I've just wasted 15 years of my life porting BIOSes to different platforms. Thanks for telling me that it was all unnecessary. Hardware manufacturers will also be pleased to know that they can just use a smaller ROM of a few KB instead of the 4MB ROMs that are coming into use now. That will save a few pennies.
I bow before your in depth and vastly superior knowledge of the subject.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Sorry but the BIOS has not been small and simple for about 20 years. It does far more than simply launch a bootloader. New technologies have constantly been added to the BIOS and each one has added to the complexity. APM, PnP, PCI, ACPI, EPP/ECP, BBS, UEFI, PCIe etc etc. The 4MB ROM is not yet full of BIOS code, that's still only about 1.5MB give or take. However Intel boards also have code in there for their manageability engine etc. With a reasonable amount of headroom in the ROM manufacturers are looking
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Fire the guy. BIOS do the same function on every computer and are a very simple program of a few K. Bugs in there are totally avoidable.
No, they need to be adapted per chipset, especially for things like ACPI.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Are you sure your compiler doesn't have any bugs that might be exacerbated by, say, a main that doesn't take any arguments?
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
But the context of the discussion was that the object code should be flawless. In that case, whether the tools that turn source code into object code have bugs turns out to be relevant.
And I didn't say int main(void) was wrong or bad; what I intended to imply was that some compiler might have only been properly tested for the more common argc/argv prototype. Heck, it might not have been tested at all; as another poster mentions it might be a bug in all code the compiler generates.
Re:It is time (Score:5, Funny)
Parent
Re:It is time (Score:4, Funny)
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
From Mogwai to Gremlin (Score:3, Funny)
Re:From Mogwai to Gremlin (Score:5, Funny)
LoJack swiftly changes to HiJack with a good meal after midnight
There, fixed that for you. A splash of water would give you more laptops... if only ...
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
LoJack swiftly changes to HiJack with a good meal after midnight
There, fixed that for you. A splash of water would give you more laptops... if only ...
Yeah, but they'd all run windows ME
Not a "rootkit" when I want it (Score:4, Insightful)
Just like SPTD is not a rootkit when it hides my emulated dvd from copy protection software.
This is a popular piece of software that happens to have a potentially serious bug that the vendors and users should be demanding be fixed, but it doesn't make it a rootkit.
Signature (Score:5, Insightful)
The pair recommended a digital signature scheme to authenticate the call-home process.
How's that going to help? If you can replace the IP address then you can replace the certificate and signature too. If you have access to modify the BIOS flash, it's game over.
Unsigned BIOS replacement is the problem (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
FUD FOR THE WIN! (Score:5, Informative)
First off, the 'feature' comes on a lot of laptops. Doesn't mean its enabled. You have to request it to be enabled in order for it to come from factory with it actually turned on.
If you don't turn it on, it doesn't do anything, no phone home, no remote wipe, no tracking.
Guess what, same thing applies to Blackberrys, and iPhones, and cars with LoJack that have remote shutoff. For every feature there is a potential risk, thats the way the world works.
If you want the potential to remotely locate/track and wipe a laptop or PC, then you also get the potential that someone else can do it as well.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Exactly right. The company that made LoJack lobbied for the feature to be installed, but they want you to pay for it to be activated. If you don't give them money, it's dormant.
Now, if somebody hacked or appropriated their activation scheme, or compelled the company to activate it without your knowledge, that would be a cause for concern.
LoJack is now (Score:4, Funny)
Re:60%? Really? (Score:5, Interesting)
I know it's hard to believe. When doing our research (I'm Alfredo, hi!) we couldn't find a notebook *without* the Computrace agent. It's bad.
Parent
Re:60%? Really? (Score:5, Interesting)
Any way to tell if your laptop has this "feature"?
And is there any way to disable it?
Parent
Re:60%? Really? (Score:4, Insightful)
Parent
Re:60%? Really? (Score:5, Informative)
Disable only works if the product was never activated. if the BIOS is set to active, AND the client software on the machine contacts the servers for Computrace, and verifies it should be licensed, then it "flips a switch" in that BIOS setting, and you can NEVER disable it again.
They need to write to the software, or else the software will always try to contact them, and then anyone could track any laptop with a supeana, ruining their business model.. Instead, it has to be "turned on".
Also, this software in the BIOS does not actually contact anyone directly. All the BIOS level crap does is forcibly try to re-install the agent software under windows. This could get ugly, if you update the BIOS, to try to force it to install a different program every time someone reloads windows...
Of course, I wonder what happens if I buy an "off lease" laptop, that was at one point activated...
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Please explain to me how this works.
This BIOS 'switch' - how exactly is that flipped? CMOS is not permanent, NVRAM is not permanent, RAM is not permanent. The only permanent storage are removable devices such as hard drives, and the BIOS itself. The BIOS is usually protected physically (jumper) and isn't a 'volatile' storage means anyways. Also, from my understanding, this isn't something that can be reprogrammed on the fly - it has to be done in "real mode" and is done on a block level, rather than bit lev
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
You're not missing any clues; it's just impossible.
My Dell Inspiron 6000's last BIOS update (several years ago) came with some Computrace back-end stuff, with the aforementioned options for on, off, and disable. On and disable are both "permanent" options.
Which is really interesting, if you follow the timeline: The feature wasn't wasn't there at all to begin with. And then, I flashed it in. And now, it says its permanent. Uh - yeah, right.
If I set it to "on" or "disable", it'll just flip a bit somewher
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
And then, I flashed it in. And now, it says its permanent. Uh - yeah, right.
If I set it to "on" or "disable", it'll just flip a bit somewhere, and/or do some magic crypto, and flash that result into a region of BIOS.
Of course you could disable it. But that's not the point.
There seems to be a prevalent view on /. that because a security system can be disabled, it always will be and is therefore pointless. But anyone who's got enough knowledge to know about the existence of this is probably not a junkie that steals laptops left alone for a minute on the train. And that's what the great majority of petty theft is.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
No, I don't think I can disable it. I can only issue an instruction to a computer which is described as disabling the function permanently, but that doesn't exactly mean anything important.
Here's the scenario:
I "disable" it, the appropriate bits are written into the flash ROM on the motherboard, and it appears to be disabled.
Later, something else comes along, and writes different bits into the flash ROM. And then it's not disabled anymore.
(And, whatever the case, the default is "off," which should at leas
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
60% may be vulnerable, but it is a bald faced lie to say that 60% are preloaded with a rootkit.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
I've never understood the point of this program... (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Problem solved (Score:4, Informative)
http://store.lojackforlaptops.com/store/absolute/DisplayProductDetailsPage/productID.104509100 [lojackforlaptops.com]
Congrats, there is a Mac version available as well. PC's and Mac's are all the same parts made by the same slaves chained together. there is a few companies in the world that make a basic computer and then Dell, HP, Apple and others add a few things and brand it for themselves.
Parent
Re:Problem solved (Score:4, Informative)
Actually this could be built into EFI. Apple don't, but if a laptop manufacturer wanted to they could. It's even easier than BIOS - an EFI ROM is a structured filesystem containing all the drivers and commands required to boot.. things like the display and keyboard drivers. Adding this software could be done after the fact without even having to touch the original code.
Parent
Re:Problem solved (Score:5, Insightful)
I use a Macbook.
As do I, but that does not mean that I have any delusions as it relates to security.
There are quite a bits of exploitable code available that, if properly engineered, can do quite a bit of damage to an Apple computer. Simply because there is no Mac version of the "Melissa" virus does not mean that as a Mac user I should assume that there will never be one.
And let's not forget the iLife torrent that had something special added to it. There are plenty of individuals attempting to prove to the general public that a Mac is no more secure than it's Windows counterpart, and it will be not a false sense of security, but a lack of personal responsibility that will assist in that.
Opinion, obviously. Results may vary.
Parent
Re:Problem solved (Score:4, Insightful)
We're talking about a BIOS rootkit. The BIOS runs directly on the hardware. It doesn't really care what OS you're loading, unless it has some specific reason to.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
So? EFI = not-so-basic basic input/output system.
There's a mac version of LoJack. Whether or not it is installed on a Macbook would depend on whether Apple chose to preload it, I suppose. A hackintosh, OTOH, might be more likely to have it.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
With the rest of the BIOS code, in the special flash-pram on the motherboard designed especially to store just that code.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Where exactly is the code stored, that survives reboots?
Start here [howstuffworks.com]. For more info, you can read the Wiki article [wikipedia.org].
Alternatively, try opening your computer and actually looking at what's inside. ;-)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Mod parent up. This is very bad. (Score:4, Insightful)
This is a very bad thing. A "security" product should not allow downloading of software. This is even worse. It allows hidden downloading of software not visible to the user.
Supposedly it's delivered "turned off"? But how do you know it's turned off at startup? How do you know it wasn't turned on during operating system loading, or wasn't turned on by any of the preloaded crap that the "major PC manufacturers" preload? How do you know there isn't some way to turn it on remotely?
No computer with this software in ROM should be used for proprietary material, legal documents, medical records regulated by the HIPPA, financial records regulated by the SEC, or anything else that might attract an opponent. If you just play WoW, go ahead.
Parent