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Comments: 171 +- IT: 'Vanish' Makes Sensitive Data Self-Destruct on Tuesday July 21 2009, @11:14AM
Posted
by
Soulskill
on Tuesday July 21 2009, @11:14AM
from the also-doesn't-appear-to-be-a-fire-hazard dept.
from the also-doesn't-appear-to-be-a-fire-hazard dept.
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security
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encryption
Hugh Pickens writes "The NY Times reports on new software called 'Vanish,' developed by computer scientists at the University of Washington, which makes sensitive electronic messages 'self destruct' after a certain period of time. The researchers say they have struck upon a unique approach that relies on 'shattering' an encryption key that is held by neither party in an e-mail exchange, but is widely scattered across a peer-to-peer file sharing system. 'Our goal was really to come up with a system where, through a property of nature, the message, or the data, disappears,' says Amit Levy, who helped create Vanish. It has been released as a free, open-source tool that works with Firefox. To use Vanish, both the sender and the recipient must have installed the tool. The sender then highlights any sensitive text entered into the browser and presses the 'Vanish' button. The tool encrypts the information with a key unknown even to the sender. That text can be read, for a limited time only, when the recipient highlights the text and presses the 'Vanish' button to unscramble it. After eight hours, the message will be impossible to unscramble and will remain gibberish forever. Tadayoshi Kohno says Vanish makes it possible to control the 'lifetime' of any type of data stored in the cloud, including information on Facebook, Google documents or blogs."
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Copypaste (Score:5, Insightful)
'Our goal was really to come up with a system where, through a property of nature, the message, or the data, disappears,'
And yet after a copypaste or screenshot it wont disappear anywhere.
Re:Copypaste (Score:4, Interesting)
This could be the next step in actually having secured, signed, digital copies.
I could see a variation of this made available for official documents that need to "phone home" for decription. If the document is somewhere its not supposed to be - scambled.
Of course there are many ways to circumvent this - but I'm tired of faxes being legally more viable than anything digital.
Parent
Re: (Score:2, Funny)
This is actually a good idea. Now just add it to sms's, so I can "cancel" all the text messages I've sent to my ex the night before :)
Re:Copypaste (Score:4, Funny)
Parent
Re: (Score:2)
Just look at the dates in the server headers in the message source if you need to catch somebody trying to fool you. Client headers have been very easy to falsify since the beginning of email. (e.g. From:, Date:, Subject: , etc...)
Re:Copypaste (Score:5, Informative)
That's not what this is intended to prevent. Of course the intended recipiant can read it. They could even write it down on a piece of paper.
The same message however, may have been cached in many other places. This scheme is intended to prevent it's retrieval by other parties at a later date.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
So this is really just a very obfuscated way of achieving what DRM providers have been trying to [favourably] do when they (willfully) allow their authentication services to die or go the companies hosting them plunge into insolvancy.
And to think people thought we were crazy when we warned them that the above DRM 'technique' was a bad idea for consumers from the get go. Pitty "a do over" or repurchase isn't a very good business plan for message encryption -
"Sorry about this, can you send me your email from
Re:Copypaste (Score:4, Insightful)
Parent
scattered across a P2P system (Score:2)
I didn't realize that P2P systems are known for making a piece of information unavailable once it is scattered across that P2P system, especially encryption keys and such. No one gets stuff like that on P2P networks, why would they do that?
Re: (Score:2)
I didn't realize that P2P systems are known for making a piece of information unavailable once it is scattered across that P2P system, especially encryption keys and such. No one gets stuff like that on P2P networks, why would they do that?
I think the authors were thinking of the the issue of where a torrent goes away once people stop seeding it once the original software is obsolete.
I mean can you find a working torrent of Photoshop 5 these days?
Same difference.
Let's not kid ourselves (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Let's not kid ourselves (Score:5, Insightful)
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Basically, the only time this will offer protection is when the following conditions are all met:
a) The URLs chosen are not cached anywhere
b) The URLs ch
Re: (Score:2)
Each key fragment should deleted the first time it is accessed. Instead of using pre-existing P2P networks build a special-purpose self-organizing network of all the machines with Vanish running on them which could implement the improvements you suggest.
Re: (Score:2, Troll)
> A fancy "vanish" button?
Yes. The average PHB might just barely have the intellectual capacity to deal with that.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Re: (Score:2)
Even if one of the parties systems are compromised, the hacker won't be able to find some key that will allow them to decode the messages.
Re:Let's not kid ourselves (Score:5, Interesting)
One advantage I see is that after the Alice sends Bob the message and Bob has it stored, then the copies of the message floating around on the Internet become completely non-decryptable after the time limit has expired. Even if a third party manages to decode or obtain Bob's private key, it won't do them any good in obtaining the text; the attacker would have to attack either Alice or Bob's endpoint, which is a lot harder than just passively sifting stuff sitting on a server with unknown security.
Vanish does the same thing that cryptographic tokens do. Both limit the window of attack on something. Where a smart card would limit guesses of a key's PIN to 3-5, Vanish limits the time of attack of a message to 8-12 hours.
Parent
Re:We already have better tools for that (Score:4, Insightful)
True, however, in the many years between the invention of Public Key Crypto and today, no one has come close to being able to come up with a way to easily and automatically distribute the keys that doesn't rely on some third party having all of them on file.
There's a reason that encrypted e-mail is pretty non-existent and it's because key management remains unsolved. Manually passing your self generated keys back and forth is all well and good, but it's not all that scalable, and most folks don't know how to do it. I don't know if this works any better mind you, it's probably really more of a nifty trick/experiment, but pretending that Public Key Encryption has solved the secure communication problem is at best naive.
Parent
Re: (Score:2, Troll)
And now Vanish is the trusted third party .. I'll stick with Public Key Crypto.
Whatever the reasons public key encryption hasn't taken off (too much effort, no perceived threat, ...), it will be those same exact reasons that will prevent Vanish from taking off.
Re: (Score:2)
If the decryption key is ever available to the browser, a modified version of the tool could store it and decode the document forever.
Well, I was thinking about this, and the real idea is to prevent people who never originally saw the message from reading it down the road. If i send you a message, and then it scrambles, no one hacking into your e-mail later will be able to read it (barring cracking the scrambling system itself, obviously). It's not to prevent YOU from copying the message, it's to prevent new people from reading it after the 8 hour window is up.
-Taylor
Re: (Score:2)
I was thinking about this and the only way they could engineer it to work even remotely like they advertise is if someone wanting to read the material forwarded it along with their 1/2 of the key to the 3rd party. The 3rd party then combines their 1/2 of the key with the provided, decrypts the data, and sends it back to the requestor. As long as the requestor does not maintain a copy of the cleartext, (as several have quipped with
"screenshots?") then this would work. Once the 3rd party no longer has thei
Obvious application (Score:5, Funny)
Dear Alice,
Do you want to go to the dance with me?
[ ] YES
[ ] NO
Love,
Bob
(Message will self-desctruct 1 minute after dance starts.)
Re: (Score:2)
More like
(Message will self-destruct 1 minute after someone from the mailing list I sent this to says yes)
(someone?)
(anyone?)
(hello?)
Re:Obvious application (Score:5, Funny)
Dear Bob,
No, but I'm sure that Eve would say yes if you asked her.
Alice
PS: Please don't ever mention this message to me in the future...and if you do, don't be surprised if I, umm, have forgotten receiving it.
Parent
Re:Obvious application (Score:5, Funny)
How about a 3-way with both Alice and Eve?
Oh yeah. I had the balls to ask.
Parent
So that's what's been happening (Score:5, Funny)
I think corporate VPs have been using this tool for years, with the delay trigger set to "0".
Adaptability (Score:4, Funny)
I wonder how I could adapt this to conversations my wife has with me, since she reminds me of stuff I said 20 odd years ago?
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Re: (Score:2)
or a new wife.
depends whats more expensive, the jewelry or the divorce.
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
The only answer to that problem is lots and lots of jewelry.
Let me know how that works for you. Seems to me like you are training your wife to bring up something again every time she wants a shiny new trinket...
Privacy Assurance == DRM (Score:2)
If the software allows the user to view the plain text, then it can be copied, so I don't see how this would really ensure it disappears. While I would love to be able to have social networks or cloud computing that could guarantee privacy by having technological measures to prevent the dissemination of private information, I think that problem is exactly the same one DRM tries to solve. And that is why it is doomed to fail. The only way it could really hope to succeed is in a world of ubiquitous "trust
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
I think that problem is exactly the same one DRM tries to solve.
Actually the authors specifically does not prevent the recipient from copying as it was not their intention. It was to prevent man in the middle attacks of people who were not supposed to be copying in the first place.
Application would be video streaming (Score:2)
Looks like the studios may soon use the peer-to-peer concept against copiers.
As noted above, this isn't really useful for email - it would be easily defeated by copy/paste or screenshot, etc.
But it is viable for things like movies. If you can only decrypt a movie stream while its streaming, it makes it harder to keep a copy of it.
Probably not impossible, but harder.
Not useful for DRM (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Not useful for DRM (Score:4, Insightful)
Parent
What? (Score:3, Funny)
After eight hours, the message will be impossible to unscramble and will remain gibberish forever.
Most of my messages are gibberish to begin with. No scrambling needed!
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
OMFG, my ex-wife is posting at slashdot!
Corporate crimes (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:Corporate crimes (Score:4, Insightful)
Plausible deniability!
The judge and jury get to decide what is plausible.
It won't look good if the erasure violates standard practice or professional guidelines, legal obligations or existing corporate policy.
In criminal law, a guilty verdict demands proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
That does not mean that every piece of evidence has to carry the same weight - only that the evidence when viewed as a whole is damning.
If the state's witness performs credibly on the stand, that will carry over to whatever documents he is asked to describe and identify.
"Plausible denial" is a world of hurt.
Parent
Vanish++ (Score:3, Funny)
If you buy the Vanish++ package, you get an additional package of superglue, to glue the printscreen button stuck.
At last... (Score:5, Funny)
Finally, an article in my area of expertise. Now this is likely to earn me +5 insightful, interesting and everything else.
So, why is Vanish useful to us?
Well... [BEGIN VANISH]u5vw7b658we77kw4657865v87zb68e7y678ctr63or63o7t6ox9587x4ygfiouhx .lwaje .og8unl98nst.oby487rw;zbv5l936tlisd rnzsche.ldnj ekqb;wv4ioa
eo84yre kl76v5los79y6to89xep89x7e4v6eotyl9e84lbvr8xy76ebl9txevl9r8
ygnl8odvr,i8xeyvti8seybvto eby5tli8xevynlr8n776vsot7vnl9xe84nyu
aowpibtulieut,iwvy,o39u dryswrl9uzfna484ytlo8cwjnlv ig78wfp9cnusgl8w
3n4aly8u
ur.,zwjsehg f,vhlfiawvutileuklrla wucbtrqil37ctlasehjctn;laiwuerciluqw3ybt
ow875ntliu awu[9c57st8nzwci4ycrnhseu6go38ny cfukbtw347v6f5o93vsb
y to9y347icr yisuryctw 37bt6l9s38 ucr,ugbvt6o8w 3nyu.oulv87vg[END VANISH]
I think we can all agree with that.
Nick.
Re:At last... (Score:5, Funny)
What?!
How dare you sir! My mother is a saint!
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
y to9y347icr yisuryctw 37bt6l9s38 ucr,ugbvt6o8w 3nyu.oulv87vg
Ia! Ia! Cthulhu ftagn!!
how is this different from a smart card? (Score:2)
This can be done pretty easily with a smart card: it only gives out the key for a limited amount of time. I suppose you have to trust the manufacturer of the smart card, but you also have to trust the manufacturer of the PC you're reading the message on, and its OS and ...
Hey hey! (Score:2)
Sounds like we would simply need the device listed in paragraph 3, sentence 5 here [wikipedia.org] :-)
in order to decrypt it
50% Tech, 50% Hope (Score:4, Informative)
The core idea behind Vanish, if you dig 6 links deep to the actual technical information, is that nodes on a P2P network come and go. Therefore, if you break up the decryption key, and scatter it on the network, eventually some of those nodes will go away, and the key won't be recoverable. Apparently, the authors have some clever (unmentioned) trick to control the timing on this to a limited extent.
So, obviously, this doesn't work. It relies on the worst kind of trust -- trust of a P2P network. If the network is compromised, the data is permanently decryptable. Better yet, it relies on a P2P network to continue behaving the same -- if all nodes suddenly had 99% uptime, this would entirely stop working. Finally, even if this works, it doesn't make decryption keys "go away" -- it just makes it incredibly difficult for someone who doesn't have the key to obtain it. Anyone who already has the key will have it forever.
Cute. Here's how it works. (Score:5, Informative)
First, as is typical, the Slashdot article is three steps removed from the actual paper [washington.edu], which is worth reading.
It's kind of cute. What makes it work is that the indexing part of the Vuze platform, which is distributed over a few million user machines, has an 8-hour timeout. After eight hours, otherwise unused entries are purged from cache, like DNS cache expiration. So it's possible to use Vuze for unreliable short-term storage of key-value pairs.
(Normally, the Vuze hash is used as a index to BitTorrent blocks, and if there's a block on a server, the server puts it into the hash and refreshes it periodically, so the block stays indexed. But it's possible to put arbitrary key-value pairs into the distributed hash that have no relationship to BitTorrent blocks. If you put info in the hash and don't refresh it, it goes away after eight hours.)
So the sender generates a key, encrypts the message, spreads the key across some number of key-value pairs on random Vuze clients, sends a message telling what key-value pairs in Vuze contain the crypto key, and deletes the local copy of the key. The receiver gets the message, looks up the key-value pairs specified in the Vuze hash, reconstructs the key, decrypts the message, displays it, and deletes the local copy of the key. The receiving client has to do this every time the message is viewed.
This violates the Vuze terms of service [vuze.com], incidentally.
Legal Problem (Score:4, Interesting)
Not to put to fine a point on it, companies are supposed to have an established document retention policy that specifies how long they will retain information like email messages. Most email it won't matter but if the contents in any way can be seen as a legal document - i.e. are business related - then destroying them this way might be seen as a deliberate attempt to cover up information by a court. IANAL, but I worked for some in this area, and its remarkably sensitive.
If someone at a company decides to use this tool, unbeknownst to the company and the other party is also using it, then the email becoming garbled and eventually deleted could become a problem should the company ever go to court. The court might require the company to produce a copy of all emails from the company during a given period (say the last 2 years perhaps), and if emails were destroyed in a manner that was not specified by the company retention policy it could cause the court to penalize the company when it fails to produce said emails.
When a company gets sued, its normal for them to place a hold order on the destruction of all documents, so they can't be seen as potentially covering things up. I hope that a tool like Vanish can be toggled to prevent unwarranted destruction, or someone is going to pay big time down the road.
It may seem like a trivial point, until you read of fines in the millions for companies who are unable to produce correspondence they should have preserved legally speaking. Moreover if the garbled email still exists, then the company might be required by the courts to unencrypt it - and if unable to do so, be penalized for that.
Re: (Score:2)
Seems to be so... how else could you encrypt, for example, a Facebook status and allow "anyone" (anyone on your friends list) to decrypt it within the time window before it "self-destructs"?