Quantum Cryptography Broken, and Fixed 118
schliz writes in with research out of Sweden in which researchers showed that, looking at a quantum cryptographic system as a whole, it was possible for an eavesdropper to extract some information about the QC key, thus reducing the security of the overall system. The team then proposed a cheap and simple fix for the problem. "The advanced technology was thought to be unbreakable due to laws of quantum mechanics that state that quantum mechanical objects cannot be observed or manipulated without being disturbed. But a research team at Linköping University in Sweden claim that it is possible for an eavesdropper to [get around the limitations] without being discovered. In a research paper, published in the international engineering journal IEEE Transactions on Information Theory (abstract), the researchers propose a change in the quantum cryptography process that they expect will restore the security of the technology."
Re:Wah? (Score:5, Interesting)
Well the worst thing about an encrypted stream is that you trust it, not really knowing if someone is listening half way down the line. If you get a hint that it's being listened to, you can start sending garbage (or misinformation) down the line so as to confuse the hell out of the eavesdropper, whilst taking up alternative methods of communication or something.
This makes me wonder if cryptography needs to become cleverer. I mean, depending on the type of data you're sending, might there be a role in padding encrypted streams with 'honeypot' data, like random bits of vaguely interesting crap that the expected listener might want to be interested in. Sort of a live equivalent of Truecrypt's plausible deniability.
What do people think about that?
Fundamental Flaw in Quantum[Anything] (Score:1, Interesting)
Re:There is no such thing as absolute security (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Wah? (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Alice and Bob are sick today. We need some answ (Score:4, Interesting)
Re:No, not really (Score:2, Interesting)
As you might expect, the protocol for this case is very different from that used in classical repeaters: one cannot measure the signal and amplify it, because doing so would negate the security you are attempting to establish. Instead, a quantum repeater focuses on the specific task of creating an entangled state at the either end, which can then be used to generate cryptographically secure random bits. Because one can verify the final state at the ends of the system before it is used, and independently of malicious users in the middle, a quantum repeater is no more susceptible to an intercept attack than a short-distance single fiber approach. Again, both are susceptible to a complete man-in-the-middle replacement / redirect.