Master Diebold Key Copied From Web Site 100
Harrington writes "In another stunning blow to the security and integrity of Diebold's electronic voting machines, someone has made a copy of the key which opens ALL Diebold e-voting machines from a picture on the company's own website. " Update: 02/06 17:40 GMT by Z : We previously discussed this story, early last year.
Déjà vu? (Score:5, Informative)
Oh, that's right, this story was covered -- right here on slashdot, no less -- a year ago [slashdot.org], complete with a link to the very same now-year-old blog post [bradblog.com], which was significantly updated [bradblog.com] at the time, and caused Diebold to remove the photo in question! (A very generic key form [freedom-to-tinker.com] was used.) Might want to update this post...
Archives - January 2007 should be a clue. Or at least one would hope.
While you guys are at it, can you fix your patently incorrect story [slashdot.org] about Iran being "offline", when it clearly and provably isn't [slashdot.org], thereby negating the main premise of the story? You know, since no one seems to care about anything sent to the on-duty editor email [wisc.edu].
Slashdot is really on fire today!
Slashdotted - link to google cache (Score:2, Informative)
Re:Please explain (Score:4, Informative)
With voting, the party that loses due to fraud is the public, and especially if there is no paper trail, there is no way to prove that any fraud did actually take place. It's very easy to make machines that count votes, it's basically impossible to make those machines such that no one involved could manipulate the results from the election officials, executives, programmers, and voters. With a paper election, the fraud-proofness is guaranteed though the fact that votes are opened with representatives of the various parties in place, and tallies are signed and published so that any fraud could be easily detected by the interested parties.
Re:Bad move (Score:3, Informative)
SFX: WAVY FLASHBACK LINES
From Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine [princeton.edu]: A.Feldman, J.Halderman, E. Felten: Princeton University (September 13, 2006).