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Security Power Technology

Staged Hack Causes Generator to Self-Destruct 258

An anonymous reader writes "It has been revealed that in a U.S. Department of Homeland Security exercise codenamed 'Aurora' conducted in March of this year, researchers were able to cause a power generator to self-destruct remotely via a hack which changed the operating cycle of the generator. 'Government sources said changes are being made to both computer software and physical hardware to protect power generating equipment. And the Nuclear Regulatory Commission said it is conducting inspections to ensure all nuclear plants have made the fix. Industry experts also said the experiment shows large electric systems are vulnerable in ways not previously demonstrated.'"
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Staged Hack Causes Generator to Self-Destruct

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  • by arabagast ( 462679 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @08:50AM (#20767091) Homepage
    because the automation system controlling the infrastructure is not connected to a public network, like say, the internet - right ?
    If it is, then someone should probably do some quick patching asap.
  • by drgonzo59 ( 747139 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @08:56AM (#20767155)
    You see they want remote control and monitoring but they also don't want to be on the Internet. They would have to build their own network, unless they are NSA, FBI or AT&T they cannot do that easily. Even then, once there is any remote control, the attacker doesn't have to jump over the fence of the power station, they have a choice to break one window of the building where the point of remote control is.
  • by brucmack ( 572780 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:03AM (#20767247)
    I don't understand why Nuclear power needed to be singled out. The electrical generators are pretty similar regardless of the fuel source. And if it blows up, it's not going to take the nuclear reactor / coal furnace / (insert steam source here) with it, since they tend to be very well separated from each other.
  • by Rosco P. Coltrane ( 209368 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:07AM (#20767285)
    because the automation system controlling the infrastructure is not connected to a public network, like say, the internet - right ?

    You know, the internet isn't the only network out there. The telephone system is another, with wetware acting as clients and servers. For example:

    JOE (technician): *rrring*.. hello?
    JACK (mischievous social engineer): Hey Joe, this is Terry at central control
    JOE: Hi Terry, what can I do for you?
    JACK: I need you to offset the timing on the third generator coil by 20% please.
    JOE: Uh? 20%? That sounds dangerous.
    JACK: It's urgent! the power-grid is not stable, if you don't do this, we'll have New York in the dark!
    JOE: erh.. I really need to talk to my supervisor for this. Who did you say you were?
    JACK: I've already talked to your supervisor. John's gonna be really pissed off if you don't do this!
    JOE: Well ok then. Here goes...
    **KABOOM**

    See? no need for any internet, wetware can be hacked too.
  • by LehiNephi ( 695428 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:14AM (#20767353) Journal
    There's one problem with that: in today's world, data has to flow back to headquarters. Take an oil production facility for example. The plant has to send back a daily report detailing exactly how much gas/oil/water/CO2/H2S/sand/whatever is produced. Gas turbines send data back to the manufacturer for performance evaluation, maintenance scheduling, and troubleshooting. Yes, someone could do it manually, but there are myriad other functions that require network connectivity beyond the control system.
  • by bracktra ( 712808 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:14AM (#20767355)

    "Fast and resolute mitigating action is needed to avoid a national disaster," the letter said. But five years later, there is no such program. Federal spending on electronic security is projected to increase slightly in the coming fiscal year, but spending in the Department of Homeland Security is projected to decrease to less than $100 million, with only $12 million spent to secure power control systems.
    1. Stage PR stunt about an impending 'emergency!!!'.
    2. Complain about lack of funding to solve desperate hole in our nation's security.
    3. ???
    4. Profit!
  • by ExE122 ( 954104 ) * on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:39AM (#20767661) Homepage Journal
    These post are getting ridiculous. Too many people are saying "why don't they just disconnect it from the network?" and getting modded as "insightful".

    It's NOT that simple! If they are connected to the network, there is probably a very good reason for it, and not just cause some engineer wants to check his email and download pr0n while listening to the generators hum.

    These generators more than likely are controlled by self-optimizing systems based on a variety of data that is collected. If they're providing power to various remote sites, they need the internet for gathering data from those sites.

    The internet is more than just a public free-for-all, it is the communication medium for many business/mission-critical systems (see LehiNephi's response above). They really just need to have the right security in place to keep it safe.

  • by xfmr_expert ( 853170 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:42AM (#20767701)
    There are easier ways to damage the bulk power grid (or local transmission). Pick up a rifle at your nearest sporting goods store. Go to your nearest transmission substation (or even large generating plant). Take a shot at the porcelain on one of the transformer bushings. Kablam! You just removed a few hundred MW (or perhaps more) or generating capacity or transfer capability and caused millions of dollars in damage. If it's a generating station, the cost of lost revenue could drive the total to 70 or 80 million. Actually, I have seen bushings with bullet holes. Obviously not that common, or something would be done about it, but it does happen. It won't always cause an immediate and catastrophic failure, but it certainly can. Especially if one keeps trying... The bigger danger to this nations power grid is lack of investment and a severe brain drain in engineering personnel.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday September 27, 2007 @09:47AM (#20767747)
    The parent post is profoundly ignorant of how a modern nuclear reactor works.
  • by trybywrench ( 584843 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:07AM (#20768047)
    looks like a thrown rod, maybe they somehow cut off the supply of oil? I don't think the oil pump is usually under any kind of computer control though. ..maybe they over revved the engine and blew a piston that way. Keep the tach red lined long enough and something bad will happen. I don't know about a backfire, wouldn't a backfire cause a stall in the worst case? It looks like something mechanical broke inside the engine (that shudder) and then it slowly ground to a hault.
  • by makapuf ( 412290 ) * on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:13AM (#20768141)
    s/the internet/a private wan

    why do you need internet (the public one, with no QoS) to have remote access from one point (data collecting / stat computer) to the power plant ?

    Yes, the data have to be collected from somewhere, but why not make a private WAN (or a VPN if best-effort QoS is OK for you) for this ? It's not about playing WoW with your neighbour, it's about remote controlling a nuclear core, so maybe it would make sense.

  • by nels_tomlinson ( 106413 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:24AM (#20768321) Homepage
    If they are connected to the network, there is probably a very good reason for it...

    Lazyness? Insanely stupid cost cutting?

    Yes, the components of the system need to get data back to the dispatcher, and receive instructions in return. No, that doesn't require the internet. You can use a modem on a leased line. Yes, it really is possible to send and receive data without the intarweb.

    The internet is a cheap, insecure way to accomplish what should be done on an expensive, secure, private network.

  • Money (Score:3, Insightful)

    by Detritus ( 11846 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:27AM (#20768365) Homepage
    As I've said before, it's all about money. There are almost irresistible forces that lead organizations to connect control systems to the Internet. An isolated private internet is extremely expensive and difficult to maintain. It's so much easier, cheaper, and tempting, to plug that cable into the public internet, perhaps with a crappy firewall to provide an illusion of security. Even if an engineer is willing to stick his neck out and say that it's an unacceptable security risk, he isn't being a team player and will be overruled by someone higher up the food chain.
  • by lluBdeR ( 466879 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:40AM (#20768515) Homepage
    True, but after thinking about how a reactor works, he might have an unintended point: You could have some fun dropping all the control rods. It only takes a few seconds for a modern reactor to scram, but they take hours to get going again. Not destructive, but certainly a nuisance.
  • by arminw ( 717974 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @10:46AM (#20768589)
    .....has to communicate .....

    Really, has to? Electric systems have been around since the days of Edison and worked just fine without networks, specifically the Internet. Sacrificing security for convenience is a bad idea that Microsoft has amply demonstrated. Why can a power plant not be controlled locally, by a human operator, like they were in the past. Remote reading is a lot different than remote control. Much of this remote control pressure comes from bean counters in management. They want to eliminate the cost of hiring workers wherever possible.

    Normally, each generator, transformer and other equipment has safety devices that shut the machine down BEFORE any damage happens. Whatever happened to those? Do they depend on computers for that safety function now, that a simple relay or circuit breaker used to provide? If the setup in that experiment corresponds to the way power systems are run today, perhaps it's time to take a step into the past.
  • by Hatta ( 162192 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @11:25AM (#20769141) Journal
    The control system has to communicate with the "business" network (for record-keeping, among other reasons)

    Use Sneakernet, not Ethernet.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday September 27, 2007 @11:30AM (#20769207)

    ...there is probably a very good reason for it...

    ...more than likely are controlled by self-optimizing systems...

    ...they need the internet for gathering data...
    [Citation Needed]

    I can't believe that was moded insightful.
  • It is mostly bunk (Score:5, Insightful)

    by anorlunda ( 311253 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @11:49AM (#20769497) Homepage
    There is no such thing as an "operating cycle" to change for a generator.

    The generator pictured in the video is not the kind used in large power plants. It appears to be a diesel generator similar to the kind that is used for backup power in many buildings. Backup generators are typically 1 MW or lesss, whereas big power plant generators are 1000 MW or more. It is like comparing a RC controlled model airplane with a 747. Besides being bigger, the 747 and the power plant will have much more elaborate systems to protect things from damage and destruction caused by malfunctioning equipment and/or misbehaving control systems. When there are billions of dollars and /or human lives at stake, one invests more in safeguards such as electromechanical relays, breakers and other non digital gadgets.

    The thing that could cause the generator to jump and destroy itself like in the video is to attempt to synchronize it with the grid out of phase or at the wrong speed. Another post in this thread, "This has happened before computer controls" by Maximum Prophet hit on the correct answer. In small, unattended, backup generators synchronization may be automated by computer, but in large power plants nobody trusts the computer enough to allow this critical operation to be automated. It is still typically done by hand with the aid of old fashioned non-digital equipment. Even if one did mis-synchronize a generator (and it does happen) other protective devices shut things down quickly to limit the scope of damage. And yes, mis-synchronization does happen in real life every once in a while, usually in a brand new installation and usually because the instruments are wired up wrong. The result can be damage sometimes, but I never heard of it destroying a whole plant.

    That is not to say that cyberwar is not a threat, nor to say that it is not good policy to isolate all critical control computer from the net. Again its a matter of money. If you are running a $5 billion power plant, your budget is big enough to hire real people to come and maintain systems rather than using remote diagnostics. Or, if you do want remote diagnostics, you can afford to use leased private lines rather than the internet. Power plants and the power grid can afford gold standard security and they should be required to do it. I don't oppose the security thrust, but I do oppose the hyped up scare tactics designed to panic us into unwise government spending.

    I spent most of my life modeling power plants and their control systems to build operator training simulators. As part of training, we inject myriads of simulated malfunctions. As part of debugging of the models, we get to see just about every detail of the plant and its control and its safeguards working incorrectly before we debug them and make them correct. That gave me and others experiences up to our chinny chin chins about what can go wrong and what the consequences might be.

    I'm afraid that what this is about is another naked grab for government money and using scare tactics to get it. Mr. Joe Weiss in the video works for EPRI. He, and the government committee on critical infrastructure protection, were both singing the song in 1999 that no matter what Y2K bugs might exist, they couldn't do any real harm. Get it? Not that the Y2K bugs didn't exist or would be fixed (at proved to be the case) but that they couldn't do any substantial harm no matter what. Now these same people are saying that a few hacks can cause widespread and catastrophic damage. One can not argue both sides of this issue and keep credibility. If a control system misbehaves, it matters not whether the problem is inadvertent or malevolent. Yet these people pooh pooh the risk of inadvertent bugs yet hype the danger of malevolent ones. It's bunk.

    EPRI wants $100 billion to automate everything in the power grid as a massive research project. Next they'll want another $250 billion to secure it from cyberwar threats. DOE wants a national DOE control center for the
  • by maz2331 ( 1104901 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @11:54AM (#20769561)
    Whatever the reason's given for connecting any critical infrastructure to the public Internet, it is far too risky of a proposition to seriously consider it. They absolutely should be using private WANs, preferably encrypted eight ways to Sunday.

    There is absolutely no excuse whatsoever for making this equipment accessable from the public Internet. None. Zero. Zilch.

    Frame Relay T1 lines are cheap nowadays, and they should be using them.
  • by evilviper ( 135110 ) on Thursday September 27, 2007 @12:31PM (#20770153) Journal

    They would have to build their own network, unless they are NSA, FBI or AT&T they cannot do that easily.

    What the hell is happening to /.? Has NOBODY here ever heard of a LEASED LINE?

    Call up Verizon or AT&T, tell them you want a T1 from point A to point B. You pay them a few dollars every month, and you have a direct, and fully-private connection from A to B.

    Public networks aren't the only way to communicate.
  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday September 27, 2007 @01:59PM (#20771423)
    Industry insider here. Here's a little something that'll make your day, slashbot #513215:

    The "fight club" theory is exactly right.
    Industry and utilities are more or less entirely windows based, and normally use whatever programming skills their existing engineer possess.

    The reason you don't see a lot of "accident x causes by windows update" or "loss y caused by buggy VB program" is that:
    a) Most everything "critical" to human or machine safety and security is protected by "dumb" failsafes and interlocks close to the hardware (ie. overflow valves, motion stops, fuses).
    b) That's the cost of doing business "in the real world" to most people. They feel comfortable about a computer that only works 99.9% of the time; that's a nice mesoscopic reliability figure that isn't that much worse than many human or hardware factors.

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