New Extended SSL Certs Make Online Debut

An anonymous reader writes "The first of the new 'extended validation' SSL certificates went live this week, signaling the latest effort by the browser makers and major Web sites to further verify the identity of SSL applicants and help consumers spot fraudulent Web sites, the Washington Post's Security Fix blog notes. The technology is pretty simple: Visit a login page for a site that uses one of these EV certs and the browser bar turns green; likewise, the browser's anti-phishing filters can turn the URL field red when the user is at a known phishing site. There is still quite a bit of debate over whether this whole scheme isn't just a new money-making racket for the SSL providers, and whether small mom-and-pop shops will be able to afford the pricey new certs."

Interesting problem

[zappepcs]

Do we end up paying for new methods to make the Internet safe (supposedly) or should we spend the money trying to educate people to recognize when they are being sent to a phishing site?

I predict (brave of me, I know) that no matter what efforts are made to protect Internet users, there will still be phishing on the Internet.

I think we're better off with the training.

Re:It isn't whether they can afford them.

[rumith]

As far as I understand, the main trouble for mom'n'pop shops will be the green colored bar [which they will have a hard time obtaining, as opposed to larger companies]. What is the problem of marking connections established with old certificates green too, at least on non-Microsoft browsers? Another point: is the green bar alone enough of customer value so people go buying in 'those green internet shops'? Would things like comfortable product search, navigation and price suddently stop mattering?

The small guy is getting shafted

[truthsearch]

Entrust plans to sell its EV certs at $499 apiece per year (and that's its "intro price")... Verisign, the world's largest and probably most recognizable SSL provider, has set its price for EV certs starting at a hefty $1,300 per year.

The smallest of legit web sites will not pay this, especially when they're just starting up. Add to that the requirements (what type of corporate entity the site belongs to) and you'll have few small takers. This is definitely going to hurt small sites as all of the medium and large sites will eventually sign up. Users will eventually expect the green bar on every site where they might do business. So I see this as merely a money making scheme. If they really wanted to improve security they wouldn't rely on the type of corporation or charge such high fees.

Re:It isn't whether they can afford them.

[mastershake_phd]

That's because sole proprietorships, general partnerships and individuals won't be eligible for the new, stricter security certificates that Microsoft requires to display the color.

Thats because we all know there is no such thing as a shady corporation with enough money for expensive certifications.

Nice gig for the Certificate Authorities

[Anonymous Coward]

The purpose of a Certificate Authority is to verify the identity of the person who requested the certificate.

Since they've done such a bad job of this so far (it was quite strict at first), they've now turned around and offered a more expensive certificate with the promise that this time they'll _really_ do their job.

I've no doubt they'll get away with it when all the big names buy the more expensive certificates and see an opportunity to squeeze out the smaller competition, and/or otherwise help to raise the barrier to entry for their market. Watch this get a lot of media attention and advertising.

Six dumbest ideas...

[jginspace]

"should we spend the money trying to educate people to recognize when they are being sent to a phishing site?"

The Six Dumbest Ideas in Computer Security [ranum.com] - See #5 - 'Educating Users'.

That's really trustworthy!

[wfberg]

I don't know specifically which bit in the certificate makes the address bar green, but the idea of these certificates is that the CA took extra super care to make sure they weren't issued to some bum, but to the people the certificate says it was issued to.

The example in the article immediately points out a failure of this idea. Go to entrust.com and your address bar turns green. And who is the CA that has verified that this site is really operated by entrust? "Entrust or an independent local registration authority has verified that Entrust Inc is an existing business and owns or operates the domain name www.entrust.com".. Yeah. So, this is basically a self-signed certificate, but it turns up green, because you're supposed to trust entrust, because you're supposed to trust entrust, because you're supposed to trust internet explorer.

Meanwhile, their 'extra validation' CPS states that they offer no warranties or guarantees, nor any detail about what they DO do to make extra super sure they don't issue certificates to some random Joe.

Re:It isn't whether they can afford them.

[wfberg]

sole proprietorships, general partnerships and individuals won't be eligible for the new, stricter security certificates that Microsoft requires to display the color

Ironically, it's much easier to establish an individual's identity (many databases that you can look in and merge, require multiple forms of ID, etc.) than the fact whether an individual is actually a proper agent of some huge megacorporation.

Re:Interesting problem

[nine-times]

With training, you still have the problem that some people are utterly and incurably stupid and careless. Security (in general) should be a multi-pronged initiative. You should educate people how to be secure and how to spot potential security issues, but you should also, where feasible, make it difficult for people to do insecure things.

Debate? What debate?

[chill]

I thought it was obvious this was nothing more than a money-making scam. You know, like those "Privacy Certificates", where anyone with a privacy policy gets a cert. Even those whose policy says "we'll sell your info to anyone whose check clears"...

Re:The small guy is getting shafted

[b0s0z0ku]

My small retail store pays more than this every month just in power and phone bills. I have -zero- sympathy for a "business" that can't pay $500/year for extra security.

There are plenty of home-based businesses that have essentially zero capital when starting up. Remember that $500 is a lump-sum payment and can equal a month's rent for some people in some places. You could use a payment processor or even only accept money directly face-to-face, but will people start thinking that all companies without a green cert are untrustworthy, even if they don't take money and personal details online? This amounts to a protection racket not much different from the goons that came to brick and mortar stores and said "we need some money to protect you from thugs breaking into your store at night and torching it."

-b.

Re:It isn't whether they can afford them.

[beadfulthings]

Well, it is and it isn't. The cost of filing as a limited liability corporation (LLC) isn't all that bad. Our lawyer (who has handled wills and other family matters) will do it for somewhere between $300 and $500. He actually dissuaded me from setting this up a couple of years ago because, as he points out, there aren't any real advantages for a small retail business. The true cost at this point lies in the price of the EV certificate, which is a real shocker. Verisign, for example [verisign.com] wants $1299 for a one-year period. That's a lot of money, and there's really no way to establish how much credence online buyers are going to put into this new validation. It's also a "special introductory offer" with the regular price being $1499.

What's irritating to me is that I've been a sole proprietorship for almost six years now. I can furnish bank and credit references and tax records to that effect. Seems as though there ought to be a way to verify through those records.

I already ante up extra $$$ for a cert from a well recognized authority. But $1299?

Entrust's SSL certificate, and its problems

[Animats]

OK, here's Entrust's SSL certificate. Let's see what we've got.

Domain: www.entrust.com

Server identity:
CN = www.entrust.com
serialNumber = DOC:19961216
OU = it
O = Entrust Inc
jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName = MD
jurisdictionOfIncorporationCountryName = US
L = Ottawa
ST = Ontario
C = CA
Issuer identity:
CN = Entrust Certification Authority - L1A
OU = (c) 2006 Entrust, Inc.
OU = www.entrust.net/CPS is incorporated by reference
OU = CPS CONTAINS IMPORTANT LIMITATIONS OF WARRANTIES AND LIABILITY
OU = AND ADDITIONAL TERMS GOVERNING USE AND RELIANCE
O = Entrust, Inc.
C = US Certificate has 10 extensions.

• Extension #0: keyUsage = Digital Signature, Key Encipherment
• Extension #1: privateKeyUsagePeriod = Not Before: Jan 12 13:57:28 2007 GMT, Not After: Jan 12 14:17:41 2009 GMT
• Extension #2: extendedKeyUsage = TLS Web Server Authentication, TLS Web Client Authentication
• Extension #3: authorityInfoAccess = OCSP - URI:http://ocsp.entrust.net
• Extension #4: crlDistributionPoints = URI:http://crl.entrust.net/level1a.crl
• Extension #5: certificatePolicies = Policy: 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2 CPS: http://www.entrust.net/cps [entrust.net] User Notice: Explicit Text: The Entrust SSL Web Server Certification Practice Statement (CPS) available at www.entrust.net/cps is hereby inc orporated into your use or reliance on this Certificate. This CPS contains limitations on warranties and liabilities. Copyright (c) 2002 Entrust Limited
• Extension #6: authorityKeyIdentifier = keyid:7E:B7:FC:4C:26:E6:B0:7A:FB:54:E2:3C:45:73:C6 :43:90:5E:28:04
• Extension #7: subjectKeyIdentifier = 10:E0:70:1B:D7:78:17:32:B4:BA:EB:00:6A:E2:25:C3:67 :FC:77:1D
• Extension #8: basicConstraints = CA:FALSE
• Extension #9: UNDEF = None (this is a bug in the cert. viewer)

The CA Browser Forum has published a standard for these certificate. [cabforum.org] So that's what we go by.

How do you tell this is an Extended Validation certificate? That's not in the CA Browser Forum's standard. It's dependent on the certificate issuer.

It's documented, on Entrust's web site [entrust.net] "Each EV SSL Certificate issued by the Entrust EV SSL CA to a Subscriber contains an Object Identifier (OID) defined by the Entrust EV SSL CA in the certificate's certificatePolicies extension ... which by pre-agreement with Application Software Vendors, marks the certificate as being an EV SSL Certificate.

The following OID has been registered by the Entrust EV SSL CA for inclusion in EV SSL Certificates: 2.16.840.1.114028.10.1.2"

That OID number appears in the middle of a comment in the certificatePolicies extension. So, for each issuer, you have to look for something different.

The certificate checker has to be really careful. To verify that a certificate is an Extended Validation certificate, it's not enough to find that OID. You have to make sure that the certificate was issued by the issuer entitled to use that OID. Otherwise, it's easy to forge these certificates.

But if you're too thorough in the checking, the certificate bounces. The whole point of an Extended Validation certificate is to validate the company's identity. So we have the new fields "serialNumber", "jurisdictionOfIncorporationStateOrProvinceName", and "jurisdictionOfIncorporationCo

There are many problems - some are legacy problems

[fyngyrz]

As far as I understand, the main trouble for mom'n'pop shops will be the green colored bar

It is far worse than that:

• This encourages people to "trust" Internet Explorer, which has not earned that trust in any meaningful sense
• This encourages people to "trust" Verisign and others, which have also not earned that trust in any meaningful sense
• This discourages customers from checking out an online shop themselves, which is just plain really, really bad
• This certificate is an additional expense not just in obvious costs, but in hoop jumping
• If a legitimate business is unable to obtain the cert, it will be unfairly damaged by the incorrect presumption of unreliability
• Certificates never provide anything more valuable than data security, the "identification" is illusory and worse with these, since they create an "underclass" of nominally "untrusted" sites that have no performance reason to be so classed, which is the very definition of an inaccurate take on who is trustworthy
• The idea that "trust" in one corporation can be settled merely by the endorsement of another is logically and realistically false
• Browsers, by buying into this corporate scam, have been complicit in hurting the Internet's ability to do business, not in helping it; this is because historically, identification of "who is trusted" has been poorly done by underdoing (in other words, give us a check, we'll give you a cert... just a scam, no ID involved) now we have a scam where it will be overdone, so that perfectly legitimate businesses will be left out in the cold. Again, the idea that a corporation can be trusted to do your due diligence on checking out someone you want to do business with is wrong from its very roots.

In the end, the benefit of SSL is that of encrypted traffic. The data goes from the client to the server, and nowhere else. That's what a certificate actually ensures. Nothing else. Not one blessed thing. The people who built this scam were either miserably uninformed and/or confused, or underhanded types who recognized the money to scooped up from people who could not afford to have a browser inaccurately claim that their business "might be a scam."

This is just one more case where superficial thinking about something is being used as an excuse to generate a large and healthy cash cow over and above the current certificate scam. Nothing can legitimately substitute for you checking for complaints, longevity, experience with the product(s) you are interested in, that sort of thing. Which in turn means that by definition, the foisting off on the consumer that the "browser bar turning green" means "shopping or interaction is OK" is outright illegitimate.

And will any of that stop this from happening? Not a chance. Because it isn't only the consumers that are failing to do due diligence here; it is the browser writers as well, and as per usual, we start with Microsoft who does not have the consumer's best interests at heart.

The attempt is being made here to do something that is impossible. Wy? Because an operation that was trustworthy yesterday can become untrustworthy tomorrow. Likewise, an operation that was controlled by scammers can replace those people. It is a matter of people and goals that no one can see through the veil of the Internet. This is aside from the creation of a "ghetto" of untrusted merchants who cannot get certified, or cannot afford to get certified.

I saw a comment elsewhere here by some moron who was pontificating about how "if some business cannot afford $500 for this cert, I would not trust them, etc. ad nauseam." The fact is, some businesses are striving on the edge and that money is important to them. Seeing as how it does nothing for them but keep them from being creamed by this new scam - meaning, it doesn't add value to what they do, just brings them back to a status quo