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Security Bug Microsoft

Microsoft Worms Crash Ohio Nuke Plant, MD Trains 817

stieglmant writes "For everyone who thought the 'blackout of 2003' was bad, how about this, according to an article at SecurityFocus, and another article at The Register, 'The Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power plant in January and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours.'" Russell writes "Maryland MARC Train Service was shut down most of Wednesday morning due to what sounds like the MS-Blast worm or one of its variants. The local Baltimore news reports that the cause was a signal malfunction but CSX, whose communications system runs the tracks, has an article describing the shutdown as a result of 'a worm virus similar to those that have infected the systems of other major companies and agencies in recent days'. This indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked. Wow, taken to the extreme, the exploitation of their systems could have caused a train collision and injury or death to hundreds of Maryland and Virginia commuters."
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Microsoft Worms Crash Ohio Nuke Plant, MD Trains

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  • by aridhol ( 112307 ) <ka_lac@hotmail.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:00PM (#6755246) Homepage Journal
    ...should be fired. Why was the safety monitoring system on a nuclear power plant exposed, even indirectly, to the internet?
  • by gcaseye6677 ( 694805 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:04PM (#6755285)
    Better yet, why is it running Windows?
  • by chef_raekwon ( 411401 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:04PM (#6755289) Homepage
    true, any admin that doesn't know about packet filter firewalls should be fired...
    --- but imagine when they catch the clown who spread/made the virus...he/she might be locked up for a while...
  • by Ishin ( 671694 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:04PM (#6755293) Journal
    More like why were such uptime critical systems running windows at all?
  • by jocks ( 56885 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:04PM (#6755295) Homepage
    I think the fault here is with the moron that managed and accepted the software in the first place. One of the first disclaimers all software companies make is that they do not gauruntee that they are suitable for life threatening situations. Who accepted this software? Who speced it? Who supervised their work and ensured that they were competent people to manage this type of work?
  • What I don't get (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Trailer Trash ( 60756 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:05PM (#6755323) Homepage
    is why anybody still thinks that Windows is suitable for a production control environment. I can understand the pretty gui for someone's desktop, but (and I'm serious when I ask this) what kind of utter cretin would think to put Windows, or any Microsoft product, in a fucking nuclear power plant, completely un-fucking-protected from this sort of stuff?

    It doesn't make sense. Use a Unix/Linux machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

    Why is this rocket science? Why do people who are building nuke plants and rail lines not know any better?

    Sorry for going off on a rant, but damn it, somebody needs to say it.
  • by IvyMike ( 178408 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:05PM (#6755326)

    This indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked.

    Actually, I suspect that someone unwittingly plugged an infected laptop into the network inside of the firewall.

  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:06PM (#6755337)
    I know that my company was brought down by one careless user on the VPN. The user in question was working from home and had not followed the company instructions/policy for installing zonealarm pro. The result was that they were infected while working at home over the cable modem and the infection then spread rapidly through the company via the VPN.

    -aelfweld
  • more info (Score:5, Insightful)

    by blamanj ( 253811 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:06PM (#6755341)
    I just submitted the same story, it will probably get rejected, so here's some more links:
    The Washington Post is reporting [washingtonpost.com] that the Slammer worm crashed the computerized display panel which monitors the most crucial safety indicators (coolant systems, core temperature sensors, and external radiation sensors) at Ohio's Davis-Besse nuclear power [doe.gov] plant in January. No serious problems occured, primarily because the plant has been offline for more than 1-1/2 years.
    Davis-Besse is run by FirstEnergy [firstenergycorp.com], which many people feel may bear much of the responsibility [forbes.com] for last weeks power blackout.
  • by motorsabbath ( 243336 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:06PM (#6755352) Homepage
    ... and people will stop using Windows in critical systems where failure can have catastrophic results. The only thing Windows does reliably is fail. Whoever decides to run a nuclear plant's safety monitoring system or a civil rail's monitoring and safety system on a Windows platform should be dragged into the street, shot, burned, pissed on, disemboweled and then hanged.

    People are morons.
  • by s20451 ( 410424 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:07PM (#6755364) Journal
    true, any admin that doesn't know about packet filter firewalls should be fired...

    Sometimes that's not enough. At my university, the departmental firewall did just fine in blocking the virus, until somebody got their Windows laptop infected at home and brought it to work, behind the firewall. Once again proving that great network security can be easily defeated by poor physical security.
  • by eyeball ( 17206 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:08PM (#6755384) Journal
    Why was the safety monitoring system on a nuclear power plant exposed, even indirectly, to the internet?

    It doesn't even necessarily take an indirect connection to the internet. If a virus is on a laptop that was connected to a public (or any infected network) like at home, then connected to a completely autonomous network, it can then infect that network.
  • Don't overreact (Score:4, Insightful)

    by stratjakt ( 596332 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:09PM (#6755400) Journal
    Wow, taken to the extreme, the exploitation of their systems could have caused a train collision and injury or death to hundreds of Maryland and Virginia commuters.

    Thats why trains have human engineers and brakes. It's why people should use good judgement and observation. If you approach an intersection, and see that the traffic lights in all directions are green, use your head and stop, because something's wrong. Of course this is impossible, theres a mechanical failsafe that will make all lights blink red if that happened - making a 4 way stop, similar mechanical fallbacks are employed in the railroads. This is all besides the point.

    Techies tend to overestimate the role of technology in day to day life. MARC was shut down more because the clerks were having a hard time selling tickets, since they cant do simple math in their heads.
  • by Jaguar777 ( 189036 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:09PM (#6755404) Journal
    They don't have to be exposed to the internet. All it takes is one employee with a laptop that is used at work and at home.
  • by GoofyBoy ( 44399 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:10PM (#6755415) Journal
    >Use a Unix/Linux machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

    How is this any different from;

    Use a Windows 2000 machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd or something similar running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.

    If there was a Linux/Unix worm running around, couldn't the exact same situation happen?
  • by aridhol ( 112307 ) <ka_lac@hotmail.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:12PM (#6755442) Homepage Journal
    That brings up a good question. Doesn't software need to be certified before it can be used in nuclear applications? In fact, isn't one of the (many) disclaimers on most software (including Windows) "don't use this in a nuclear facility"?
  • by random_rabbit ( 647072 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:12PM (#6755445)
    I think the control system manufacturers would advocate real-time OS systems to control nuclear plants and the like. They take a bit more than an "apt-get" to update, but at least there's someone to sue, should they fall over (which they do, every now and then)
  • paranoia time (Score:5, Insightful)

    by ed.han ( 444783 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:12PM (#6755450) Journal
    in an environment like a nuclear power plant, why aren't there firewalls on all clients? i mean, network security in such an installation is about as important as it gets.

    it's possible the vulnerability arose through someone accessing internet e-mail. but wall street firms regularly blacklist internet e-mail sites. they do that b/c they're regulated to ensure that proprieties are kept and people aren't defrauded. a nuke though--we're talking more than just dollars and cents here.

    it may not be fully the fault of the admins.

    ed
  • by Prien715 ( 251944 ) <agnosticpope@nOSPaM.gmail.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:13PM (#6755455) Journal
    I don't care if you're running MS, Linux, or FreeBSD. That damn port should've been firewalled and the software should've been patched. What's scary is imagining what could've happened if someone intentionally tried to hack the power plant. Some terrorist cell could cause a nuclear meltdown without ever setting foot in the US.
  • by dbarclay10 ( 70443 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:13PM (#6755462)
    his indicates that the network that the train signaling stations are on is not protected by firewalls, at least to block ports 135 and 444 where the DCOM vulnerability is attacked.

    That is a silly conclusion to come to. Presumably they're also implying the same about the power grid.

    I have first-hand experience with Ontario Hydro's IT nework (now Hydro One's IT network ;) and I gotta say - they have firewalls up the wazoo. And this is the problem. They rely on border security. However, on networks as large as the ones being discussed, border security doesn't cut it. There are too many entry vectors. People reading email, people browsing the web, and oh my god people with laptops - the pain the pain.

    So before you go thinking "they aren't even taking precautions that would have saved them! Fire them!" understand that it's *exactly* that attitude which caused the networks to go down in the first place - the common misconception the a firewall is a magic wand that will solve all their ills.

    Border security does NOT cut it when you run insecure software on the inside, boys and girls. And you can take that to the bank.

  • by InterruptDescriptorT ( 531083 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:13PM (#6755465) Homepage
    I'd love to see what the Linux community would say if some intravenous drug pump running an embedded version of Linux had a bug that caused it to fail and kill a patient?

    They'd probably cry, 'But we already released a fix! They didn't install this patch, and this patch, and this patch, and then recompiled.'

    Don't blame the software companies for the "sh*t quality" of their software, as you say--blame the system administrator who didn't install the already-available fixes or patches. That by far is your guilty party right there.
  • by aridhol ( 112307 ) <ka_lac@hotmail.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:14PM (#6755479) Homepage Journal
    Then why was the safety monitoring system exposed to the office network? In this case, the worm came in on a non-firewalled T-1 line from a contractor's network, and through there to the internet.

    I would have suspected that there would be multiple layers of protection in front of critical systems like that. Even more, I would expect that safety regulations require these layers of protection. Of course, that would hurt the bottom line, so we can't have that happening :(

  • by BigGar' ( 411008 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:15PM (#6755492) Homepage
    is why the control computers for a nuke plant are even hooked up to the same network. I can understand the need for the systems to communicate, but for them to have a physical connection to the outside world, firewalled & patched or not, is just plain stupid.
  • Exactly (Score:5, Insightful)

    by kiwimate ( 458274 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:17PM (#6755526) Journal
    Perhaps the silliest quote from the article:

    CSXT has confronted increasingly sophisticated computer viruses, like ones that have penetrated some of the most secure sites in the country in recent days.

    Sorry, but they're obviously not "some of the most secure sites in the country". If they were, they wouldn't have been penetrated like this. How can I say this? Because my company didn't get penetrated.

    I'm afraid of sounding like a broken record here, because if anyone looks at my past posting history they'll see I've said exactly the same thing. However, the fact is we have mission-critical 24/7/365 servers running Windows (as well as Linux) that simply can not be vulnerable. So we secure them, and we protect them, and put in safeguards, and work together as a team if there is a particularly nasty threat out there...and we keep running. Funny, that.

    Sod it; plenty of other posters will argue the point about patching, firewalling, etc., and a myriad of rabid MS-bashers will refute and insult. Let my small voice add merely this to the fray -- it doesn't have to be this way, even if you use Windows. All that is required is people who know what they're doing.
  • by gregarican ( 694358 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:19PM (#6755544) Homepage
    Actually I consider myself to be somewhat competent and lately I do think everything from Redmond does suck. It's one story after another. Not all of these anti-M$ stories are 100% the company's fault but in some way, shape or form, they show how inept a company that portrays itself as the only game in town is.

    What major release has Micro$loth put out there that's made everyone's lives better and easier in the last several years? I can't think of any. These published reports just show what a house of cards the Windoze platform is.

  • Re:So many morons (Score:2, Insightful)

    by talon77 ( 410766 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:20PM (#6755553) Homepage
    They are assuming the ports were not blocked. Which is crap, I've been to dozens of companies in the past week who are blocking all incoming ports and still got infected by this virus. These companies also had SAV corporate edition which was configured to update the definations via a FTP script, so they were actually getting their definations updated daily rather than the crappy live update which updates about once a week. Granted, they should have patched their systems when the RPC flaw was first exposed, but you shouldn't be so quick to point fingers.
  • by shoppa ( 464619 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:20PM (#6755564)
    Train Control and Signalling systems are universally designed for Fail Safe == Stop Working. The low-level, safety critical systems are controlled with very low-tech Vital Relays which which will stop train movement and/or make all the signals present a Red Aspect in case of computer failure, and that's what they did.

    Train control has this luxury. Computer systems onboard airplanes do not... simply turning off jet engines in case of computer failure is not an appealing possibility.

  • by aaarrrgggh ( 9205 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:20PM (#6755567)
    It isn't likely that the SCADA or management systems themselves are running on a windows box, but the front end will be. You do see a lot more of ModBus-over-Ethernet these days, which I understand can coexist with TCP/IP. Although this would be a bad design, I can picture how you would end up with a single ethernet backbone, and have multiple protocols and devices running on it.

    If the critical system is on the same physical network as workstations other than the head-end, that could be a problem. Technician plugs his infected laptop into the networ for diagnostics or downloading data, and the network traffic kills the ability for the SCADA nodes to interact.

    This is an easy mistake to make; all it takes is having multiple people need to share the same information, and a lack of money to provide dedicated physical layers for each function and proper gateways between the layers.
  • by Stargoat ( 658863 ) <stargoat@gmail.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:22PM (#6755580) Journal
    I would expect that the problem is not with the network administrators. The problem probably lies with the CIO, who has no idea about computers or firewalls. Trying to save money is what will really screw you.

    Network Administrator: We should get an outsourced firewall and a managed virus system. It will cost 45000 a year, but it will be worth it. We also need to start putting on patches on the servers.

    CIO: Too much money. Just buy something from Best Buy. As for the servers, we cannot pay you overtime to put patches on them. Besides, Microsoft is a big company. There shouldn't be any real problems.

    Network Administrator: But sir....

    CIO: Just do it. I've got an MBA. I know what I'm talking about. If there is a problem, we'll just blame you.

  • by Beryllium Sphere(tm) ( 193358 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:22PM (#6755581) Journal
    You're not just connecting to your business partners, you're connecting to everyone they've ever connected to.

    The Register article says "It began by penetrating the unsecured network of an unnamed Davis-Besse contractor, then squirmed through a T1 line bridging that network and Davis-Besse's corporate network. The T1 line, investigators later found, was one of multiple ingresses into Davis-Besse's business network that completely bypassed the plant's firewall, which was programmed to block the port Slammer used to spread".

    I'd never let a client do that. From a business risk management point of view, you *might* allow a direct connection by a vendor, *if* you had a good contract requiring them to keep good security and be responsible for breaches, and *if* you had secured everything sensitive in your internal network. From a theoretical or technical point of view, you should never trust something you don't control.

    Monitoring systems are just as safety-critical as control systems. After all, the feedback loop is part of a control system. Imagine an intruder changing the readings to show that reactivity was decreasing, core temperature was dropping, and coolant pressure was so high that relief valves should be opened. You'd have a Three Mile Island rerun. That system should never, NEVER have been exposed even indirectly to the Internet.

    But then, Davis-Besse is the plant where someone thought the way to check for an air leak was to poke around with a lit candle near flammable insulation wrapping critical control cables (1975).
  • by Kombat ( 93720 ) <kevin@swanweddingphotography.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:22PM (#6755592)
    put it on a good old proven UNIX, solaris or something else that is used in the mission critical world.

    Yeah, 'cause Linux could never be compromised in such a way [slashdot.org].

    If the network admins at gnu.org and this power plant had kept up to date with patches, then neither breach would have happened. EVERY OS has its vulnerabilities, and your network security is only as good as your Network Security Administrator. To blame the OS and prescribe a different one is an ignorant and short-sighted red-herring. The real problem is the attitude and the practices of the people in charge of the network.
  • by Havokmon ( 89874 ) <rick.havokmon@com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:22PM (#6755598) Homepage Journal
    Use a Windows 2000 machine, make sure it has only the access level needed from the outside (maybe sshd or something similar running, maybe), and keep the thing patched.
    If there was a Linux/Unix worm running around, couldn't the exact same situation happen?

    While I agree with you in principle, the problem I have with MS patches is that I have NO FSCKING CLUE what other areas of the OS are affected. At least if I see a patch for TFTP for Linux, I KNOW I don't need it.

    My God Man, just running MS Terminal Services requires the MS Client, even though I run a Netware network!

  • by McFly777 ( 23881 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:24PM (#6755630) Homepage
    Next thing you know, the Dept. of Homeland Sec. will issue a regulation requiring the use of Palladium or similar tech. on all computers. After all it is for our 'safety.'

  • No. Unacceptable. (Score:4, Insightful)

    by mrseigen ( 518390 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:24PM (#6755632) Homepage Journal
    First of all, this kind of service should never be connected to the public network, or even better, never to a non-dumb terminal.

    Secondly, Microsoft CLEARLY spells out that their software is never to be used in this kind of implementation. Most software manufacturers do -- Sun, Apple, and most Linux distros IIRC.

    Now, if this is a case of a critical service being overflowed from a remote location simply because it's connected to a public network, that's bad enough. To be running a consumer operating system on those critical services is simply unacceptable and probably worthy of execution. I don't care if the system was offline at the time -- this kind of thing should be definitely ringing warning bells. I hope whatever moron implemented this system gets fired.

    From reading the article the services that went down had analog backups, but it's still unacceptable. Don't connect critical services to the fucking Internet.
  • by AgTiger ( 458268 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:25PM (#6755633) Homepage

    Why was it running Windows? Because a lot of SCADA software like what's available from GE Fanuc [gefanucautomation.com], Citect [jzw.com.au], and Tascomp [tascomp.com], (just to name a few) are designed for Windows.

    The business needs of a company drive the decisions of what to purchase and implement, and many things are taken into account and weighed against each other.

    Security isn't the only concern, because even it is weighed against liklihood of risks happening, and Risk Management isn't perfect. Thankfully, given these incidents, the risk factors just got increased and lit up with a VERY bright spotlight.

    Network Administrators are given the responsibility to keep a variety of equipment, operating systems, and applications running and talking to each other appropriately, without necessarily being given all the authority they need to keep stuff like this from happening. Frankly, I pity them. Everyone remembers the bad incidents without realizing how much good they do, silently and behind the scenes.

  • by Mjlner ( 609829 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:25PM (#6755638) Journal
    Sometimes that's not enough. At my university, the departmental firewall did just fine in blocking the virus, until somebody got their Windows laptop infected at home and brought it to work, behind the firewall. Once again proving that great network security can be easily defeated by poor physical security.

    Same thing happened at my university, but where talking about a nuclear power plant and the OP did say "exposed, even indirectly, to the internet". We're definitely talking about indirect exposure here! Why are there dirty laptops on the same LAN as the safety monitoring system.

  • by Superfarstucker ( 621775 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:25PM (#6755639)
    Who's negligence is it really??? Microsoft's, or the person who used WINDOWS for something that would affect whether or not they breathe tomorrow morning? Only on slashdot do posts like this get modded up... Pure flamebait
  • by david614 ( 10051 ) * on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:26PM (#6755649) Journal
    I agree with this. Given the EULA claim that software is *not* certified for use in applications such as life-threatening situations, why did due-diligence not prevent this application from being approved. I also think, however, that this is not a network administrator problem. It is a legal counsel problem, and a CEO problem. How, after all, did a nuclear powerplant escape segregating its key security functions from a publically connected network. Have they never heard of air-gaps?! These are the same people who never want regulations telling them what to do. No, voluntarism is always to be preferred. How about penalties for dumb mistakes like this one. Fines and public ridicule have a wonderful way of concentrating stubborn minds. D
  • by hackstraw ( 262471 ) * on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:27PM (#6755663)
    If there was a Linux/Unix worm running around, couldn't the exact same situation happen?

    Yup. But I havn't heard of them. I've heard of a couple viri/worms/trojans with windows that have taken out significant parts of the internet. My Linux/Solaris machines still get hit daily with code red, a 2 year old exploit.

    If you were interviewing 2 people for a job, and one was a convicted violent self confessed felon, would you hire him over someone without a record?
  • Re:Exactly (Score:3, Insightful)

    by SlamMan ( 221834 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:28PM (#6755679)
    And the money to do it right.
  • Re:bad guys (Score:3, Insightful)

    by The Ape With No Name ( 213531 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:30PM (#6755705) Homepage
    What the hell are you talking about? Who SHOULD we think of? Pol Pot? Itchy and Scratchy? Marilyn Monroe?


    Let me guess... It is the lazy administrator's fault. Well, when the patch is not easily installed most "windows administrators" -- like my mom who settles down in front of her machine to do the puzzle page each day -- just don't do it. When you don't know that the patch is out there, then how the fuck can you install it? Most computer users do not sit and watch bugtraq all fucking day. I don't read m$ EULAs because I don't use their products, but I am sure they indemnify themselves against their own poorly thoughtout piece of shit software.

  • by Kpt Kill ( 649374 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:32PM (#6755721) Homepage
    Most importantly, why wasnt anything updated? Yet another example of a patch being out, and foolish/lazy sysadmins not updating their systems. It doesnt matter what OS is being used, there is no excuse for not updating your systems (especially on critical systems such as these). Upto date (i update daily) Virus scan and automatic updates kept my system clean, while everyone else i knew started falling prey.
  • by molo ( 94384 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:33PM (#6755738) Journal
    Yes, they do. Do a google search on "navy yorktown microsoft".

    -molo
  • by Pup5 ( 543611 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:35PM (#6755762)
    Exactly! The mobile user completely negates any port filtering firewall rules when he/she takes their laptop home and connects it directly to the Internet. These virus specifically waited until it was again connected to a network to reinitiate it's dirty work. One can argue that lack of client firewall software/hardware is then to blame, but this is a BIG hole whose solution requires conscious participation from end users. This scenario is the likely vector for most of the corporate intranet infections today.

    Cringely made this same mistake the first part of his weekly article http://www.pbs.org/cringely/pulpit/pulpit20030814. html [pbs.org]. It's not always the "network" guys that are responsible for system patches and client firewall. Especially not in large companies.

  • by Epistax ( 544591 ) <<moc.liamg> <ta> <xatsipe>> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:39PM (#6755823) Journal
    Are you suggesting people are allowed to connect home computers to networks which run nuclear safety systems? Or are you saying they should be able to?

    I phrase my message this way because what you describe should not exist.
  • by talon77 ( 410766 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755843) Homepage
    I didn't actually see anything in those articles that said it was MS systems that were running the safety at the nuclear plant. All I could see is that the bandwidth had dropped due to the slammer worm and that a display monitor was disabled due to multiple scan attempts. This tells me that there were MS systems that were affected on their network segment, but it never says that the safety systems themselves were MS systems.
  • by letxa2000 ( 215841 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755844)
    I think in the case of a nuclear reactor multiple firewalls would be recommended. One to protect the organization from the Internet, and at least another one to protect all safety/mission critical servers from internal infection. Behind that firewall NOTHING should be connected, certainly not laptops that leave the building.

  • by SgtChaireBourne ( 457691 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755845) Homepage
    These were inexcusable mistakes: using Windows for mission critical equipment and connecting to the Internet, especially Windows.

    With MS systems it's not just a matter of loading a patch, quite often they break something especially third party apps, fail to fix the problem they claim to fix, or open a new vulnerability.

    If a model of car were found to be so defective -- bolts breaking, carbonmonixide in the passenger compartment, split drive shaft when you change gears, works with only one brand of gas, plays only approved radio stations, etc. -- no one would think to blame the user.

  • by BubbleNOP ( 688841 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755848)
    Suppose that a new vulnerability is found and there is *no* patch yet by Microsoft. If you are running an open-source system, you can hire someone to write you a patch. With Windows you don't have that luxury. Also, some services in Windows (e.g. RPC) cannot be shut down. So if there is a new vulnerability in it and simultaneously in the closed-source firewall blocking the port, you are screwed.
  • by CommandNotFound ( 571326 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755850)
    Sure, one could argue that they should have applied patches and that it isn't M$'s fault but tell that to the jury. When surviving relatives see the potential for a profitable liability suit they are going to go after the biggest pockets and that is M$.

    Yes, and then software liability will be mandated by legislation and then everyone in the software industry will be trouble. Be careful what you wish for. If MS goes down for something like this, the whole software industry is in trouble. We don't make as much as doctors in this business, so we can't afford the malpractice/liability insurance.

    Again, the question should be asked why were mission-critical systems connected directly to any network, other than connections to other mission-critical boxes?
  • by plague3106 ( 71849 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:41PM (#6755854)
    I for one DON'T want them to install patches as they are released at a nuclear power plant. I'd like them to install patches on test machines, to be sure the 'fix' doesn't break something else. Installing patches without testing them first is just as senseless (if not more so) then not patching..
  • by GreyPoopon ( 411036 ) <gpoopon@gmaOOOil.com minus threevowels> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:43PM (#6755873)
    It doesnt matter what OS is being used, there is no excuse for not updating your systems...

    Well, yeah there is, although it's a little lame. If this is a "critical" system that has to be running all the time, they are probably loathe to update it until a scheduled maintenance downtime. They can't have automatic updates running on a critical system like this, as an update itself might crash the system.

    Why is this argument lame? Well, they should have (maybe they do) a backup system. They should have been able to switch to backup long enough to perform the upgrade and test it.

  • by letxa2000 ( 215841 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:44PM (#6755882)
    WHY AREN'T THEY FIRED?

    Because "no-one ever got fired for going with Microsoft." Hehehehe.

  • by jridley ( 9305 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:47PM (#6755920)
    "Doesn't encourage" is a happy dream of MS's.
    They think they want 100% market penetration, but they also think they can get away without taking on the responsibility which that implies.

    They're "encouraging" everyone to use MS products excusively, everywhere. When it gets to the point where everything is Microsoft and nobody knows anything else (which is what Microsoft is shooting for) how are they going to deny responsibility for stuff like this?

    This might be compared to a concrete manufacturer coercing the market, becoming the sole supplier of concrete, but all along saying something like "you shouldn't use our product for pre-stressed bridge segments." Once they became the sole supplier for concrete, what the hell else are people who want to build bridges supposed to do?

    Can a supplier reasonably be excused for making crappy product which kills someone because they said to use some other product, even though they themselves were the ones who drove all the other products out of the marketplace?
  • by lambadomy ( 160559 ) <lambadomy AT diediedie DOT com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:50PM (#6755947)
    Ridiculous. Those important systems shouldn't even be on the same network as the office, much less attached to a network that can see the internet. I'm not talking firewalls/seperate vlans/whatever either, I mean physically no kind of connection at all. If they have to be accessible from a vpn, you better have a damned good idea of who will be doing that accessing.

    When it comes to your average office network, sure, you can give the "oh they brought in an infected laptop" excuse, but this is quite a bit different.
  • by Monkelectric ( 546685 ) <[moc.cirtceleknom] [ta] [todhsals]> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @12:57PM (#6756034)
    I agree the admin has some serious explaining to do. But have you ever worked as an administrator?

    The "typical" administration job is exactly what you'd expect -- you're understaffed, underpaid, your budget is abysmal, and you have a gaggle of retarded secretaries calling you up asking the *same questions* constantly because they're too lazy to use the help system!

    Most of your day is spent putting out fires. Fixing critical systems before all hell breaks loose, keeping your web/nfs/mail/compute servers running when they have a load average of *5*, fixing viruses, fixing shitty HP machines because your boss wouldn't listen to you and buy a cheaper machine made of quality parts.

    Luxuries like patching systems, and preemptive security measures are things there aren't time for.

    So my question would be ... is their IT department critically underfunded and that CAUSED the problem, or was someone just lazy?

  • by pease1 ( 134187 ) <bbunge@ladyandtr ... m minus language> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:01PM (#6756074)
    The idea of a MARC train with a few hundred people getting into an accident because CSX's dispatching center is down, is nothing compared to a freight train with hazardous material wrecking in a large city (since railroads grew up at the same time most large cities did... they run THROUGH the cities, not around them). Fire, gas, explosion, you name it, it could have happened.

    And it's not MARC's problem... they only run on CSX's tracks.

  • Idiots (Score:3, Insightful)

    by pmz ( 462998 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:06PM (#6756143) Homepage

    Who are the retarded idiots that let Microsoft within five miles of nuclear safety equipment? Microsoft's software is not quality controlled to any standard suitable for risking human life, and they even admit that in their EULA (no warranty, no liability).
  • Time for a change. (Score:5, Insightful)

    by pair-a-noyd ( 594371 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:07PM (#6756157)
    This will probably get me flamed to no end but think about it..

    One life and death critical systems they should use proprietary hardware, OS and software.

    Not any version of Windows, not any version of Linux, not Intel, not AMD, but something totally alien. Something that is designed from the ground up to be DIFFERENT and CLOSED that can not communicate with the outside world and the system that the outside world run on.

    I'm talking about Air Traffic Control systems, Nuke plant controls, railroad traffic systems, hospitial systems, military systems, power systems, public utilities.

    I mean NEW CPU's and a NEW OS and NEW software that is so different and so tightly closed that nothing can communicate with it but other systems of the same design.

    With every other little dickweed with a Wally World emachine typing "1337" into google and downloading DIY virus labs, and these same little punks having access to the same networks that all the above mission critical systems communicate on, well, it's a disaster waiting to happen.

    And when some script kiddie crashes a 747 full of people from his Wally World emachine on his mommies AOL account, what then? Or the same kiddie opens the floodgates on a dam and kills 200,000 people. Or a million people. Or makes a nuke plant go Chernobyl?

    When burglars keep breaking into your safe every week and robbing you blind you would assume that it's time to get a better safe..

    Before the world went insane and computerized every friggin thing from toasters to pay toilets to the power grid, this sort of thing was IMPOSSIBLE. Time to fix it folks..

    Flame away..
  • Re:Exactly (Score:1, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:09PM (#6756182)
    All that is required is people who know what they're doing. ... well, and a management that allows said people to actually do their job. Unfortunately, all to frequently those PHBs out there get majorly into the way of this, because they're too short-sighted to recognize any "return on investment".
  • by pmz ( 462998 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:11PM (#6756201) Homepage
    This tells me that there were MS systems that were affected on their network segment, but it never says that the safety systems themselves were MS systems.

    The systems shouldn't even have been allowed to mix even on a shared Ethernet. Microsoft belongs nowhere inside the perimeter of a nuclear facility. Period.
  • Re:Exactly (Score:4, Insightful)

    by loconet ( 415875 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:18PM (#6756272) Homepage
    CSXT has confronted increasingly sophisticated computer viruses, like ones that have penetrated some of the most secure sites in the country in recent days.

    Wha the fuck ever. I've heard similar excuses all freaking week. "Viruses are getting smarter" , "Those hackers have no lives", etc etc. They miss the point that it's actually the OS's fault in the first place! The virus comes in through an exploitable service which runs by default. It's not like the virus tricked the user into executing it.

    It's like me leaving the door to my house open, some thief comes in , cleans out my house and then I say .. "Oh that bastard has no life". Well, it's also my fault for being stupid and leaving the door open in the first place.

    This ignorance won't stop until the media stops talking bullshit, tells the whole story and includes _all_ the parties at fault including MS, who well, basically sold me the house without doors!

  • by Anonymous Coward on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:32PM (#6756417)
    I work on a military network that has the policy "one path in; one path out"... and let me say that policy has nothing to do with reality. What was very interesting about the most recent worm was that the communications infrastructure organization (whom we will refere to as CS) got a very vivid lesson in network security... or lack there of.

    The base I'm on is well firewalled (sidewinder) and the ports that the initial variants of Blaster used were blocked. e-mail is virus scanned and the desktops/servers are all patched via SMS (remember, everyone had a full week to patch before the exploit code started showing up).

    Despite all these measures (including MS SMS patching), the worm still got on the network and infected a sizable number of desktops (let's just put the number in the low 5 digit area).

    So, how did the worm get there if the firewall blocked it's propagation from the outside and e-mail was scanned and desktops were (supposedly) patched?

    two words: user entropy.

    How many people within any given org are on laptops? (you know, the people who take their work home with them and connect to the internet via an ISP that doesn't have a firewall) How many rouge modems are there? (and remember, with the advent of NAT and dialing appliacnes, one doesn't have to have administative access to a PC to establish and unauthorized path) How many GoToMyPc enabled desktops are floating around? Haven't run across GoToMyPc yet? You will... and it will traverse your firewall and web proxy quite easily. Think you have all your bases covered? Ask yourself this question: If a users plugs something requesting a DHCP address into a RJ-45 wall plug, will it get a usable address? Probably. Ok, there's 802.3x, but how many laser printers actually have this capability?

    Admins try to make things work. In complex environments with dumb end-users, this means making things simple. Lots of simple systems (remember with the first S in most of the TCP/IP protocols stands for) interacting with one another leaves a lot of room for, well, "Slack".

    The only real way to contol security is to have a closed system with tight control (satellites, power grids, etc.) Then you only move the security threat to insiders (who should be opt-ed in so deeply it's not psychologically possible for them to be a threat).

    What's disturbing is that important systems seem to be going the commoditization route with respect ot IT infrastructure. Whatever happened to completely physically seperate networks (but, oh, you have to get your patches from somewhere and waiting for the technet CD isn't an option)?
  • by Cyno ( 85911 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:43PM (#6756517) Journal
    No firewall will save you from a manager with a laptop.
  • by zumajim ( 681331 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:45PM (#6756534) Journal
    I've often wondered why ANY military branch would continue to have a presence on the internet, with the exception of recruitment sites. Back in the days before public/commercial internet access, I was a network contractor for the Navy, working at Point Mugu naval air station. The installation of a "command LAN" was a top priority, but the mere mention of a link to the internet was greeted with open hostility. (Wasn't my suggestion, either, thank God.) Made 100% sense to me then, even more so now.
  • new headline (Score:4, Insightful)

    by Anonymous Coward on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:47PM (#6756556)
    Dumbasses at nuclear power plant allow systems to be brought down by a bug microsoft and the IT security industry warned people about weeks ago. Management unaccountable for making their lazy IT employees do their job.
  • by dbarclay10 ( 70443 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:52PM (#6756624)
    A) Would be an improvement over the current situation.
    B) Would also be an improvement over the current situation (in my experience), but not as good as A).

    Come to think of it, A) would only be good if the vast majority of people worked from home. Not just "more". If you have 20,000 people going into offices, and 10,000 at home, you'll still get nailed.

    C) Why outsource? Why not, instead, hire *competent* people who are available over the course of the company's lifetime to deal with changing circumstances? Ontario Hydro has outsourced all its IT stuff to Inergi and New Horizon.

    Outsourcing is an evil part of the IT industry - people pay obscene sums of money for worthless junk (worse than what they'd get in-house, in my experience).

    D) Giving up is not an option :)

    I would, instead, propose a real solution:

    E) Hire competent people. Hire as many as you need. Hire competent managers. Hire as many as you need. LET THEM DO THEIR JOBS. Do not tell them that everybody needs to run Windows. Let them weigh the costs and the needs of the company, and make a decision. Live with that decision knowing that you hired good people and that this is really the best possible solution.

    (I know full well I'm dreaming. I don't expect companies to be competent at hiring competent people for at least another decade. Maybe not even then, maybe it'll be much longer. But I can hope. Christ, the stories I could tell ... it's truly systemic incompetence. Incompetence from the VPs responsible for IT to incompetence at the lowest-level grunt. Outside the IT department the incompetence is in the HR department for hiring these people in the first place.)
  • by nurb432 ( 527695 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @01:56PM (#6756663) Homepage Journal
    We were all lucky the blaster worm really wasn't destructive..

    Sure it was annoying, and a DDOS isn't good, but it COULD have been really malicious and MUCH worse...

    The ability to run arbitrary code on a server opens up your entire infrastructure. But the moron had machines reboot to announce they were infected.. what was he thinking?

    Or was this just a distraction from a much larer and sinister plan?
  • Idiots (Score:5, Insightful)

    by Dalcius ( 587481 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @02:18PM (#6756865)
    Rules of IT:
    1) Do not place a vulnerable system on a critical network unless absolutely necessary.
    2) When configuring a computer/server, always assume that you are hooking up to a hostile, unfiltered network.

    If they'd applied these two rules to their network, routers, servers, etc., this likely wouldn't have happened. These are pretty basic ideas, folks. If you have a Windows box on the same network as a computer controlling nuclear saftey checks, you better have a damn good reason and you better check for patches weekly.
  • by FL180 ( 687894 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @02:40PM (#6757053)
    When will it end?

    "Microsoft Worms Crash Ohio Nuke Plant"

    Ummm...no, it clearly states in the body: disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours.
  • by Tim C ( 15259 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @02:54PM (#6757208)
    yes they actually say they don't guarantee it's suitable for ANY purpose

    And similar language exists in the GPL, and in fact, in pretty much every software licence I've ever read.

    It's very common practice. So what's your point?
  • by mystran ( 545374 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @03:00PM (#6757300)
    This is exactly why I believe that the typical scenario (internet <-> firewall <-> intranet) is pretty much useless for protecting against worms and such.

    Much better idea would be to connect everything to firewall directly, basicly replacing switches with something that can do packet filtering.

    Unfortunately, this.. well.. costs money.

    Another possibility is what MS considers doing, that is, running at least some kind of private, software based firewall on every workstation and server by default, unless there's a better firewall that the server is directly connected to.

    Instead of thinking "connection to Internet should go through a firewall" people to should think "connection to a network should go through a firewall".

    Some kind of central management for all these workstation-firewalls would be preferrable though.

  • Re:Idiots (Score:3, Insightful)

    by hazem ( 472289 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @03:45PM (#6757870) Journal
    And don't forget to apply those patches on a non-production system first to test their effects on your critical system.
  • by dachshund ( 300733 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @03:48PM (#6757926)
    but the brake system will still work

    Unless, I assume, there's a problem with the braking system and nobody knows about it because the monitoring boxes are down. Isn't that precisely why the monitoring boxes exist in the first place?

  • Re:Idiots (Score:2, Insightful)

    by Brad Mace ( 624801 ) on Thursday August 21, 2003 @06:28PM (#6759623) Homepage
    Screw patches. In a nuclear power plant, you simply do not connect a computer to an outside network even indirectly. Its ridiculous to even consider it an option. Then, if the computer's not broken, you don't fix it. CDR's are cheap; chernobyls are not.
  • by Qbertino ( 265505 ) <moiraNO@SPAMmodparlor.com> on Thursday August 21, 2003 @09:02PM (#6760938)
    You've got to be kidding me.
    This can't be true! Please tell me it isn't.
    Who the hell uses MS Windows to monitor a _nuclear__power__ plant_?

    I would've never thought I'd be so happy to live in germany. At least our nuclear plants have their own, customized real time operating systems watching over what's going on.
    Jebus Crickey, I'd suggest you'd get yourself a new set of plants right along with that new powergrid that's due.

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