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FBI Says Military Had Counterfeit Cisco Routers
Posted by
kdawson
on Fri May 09, 2008 01:06 PM
from the who-do-you-trust dept.
from the who-do-you-trust dept.
There are new developments in the case of the counterfeit Cisco routers, which we have been discussing for some time. The NYTimes updates the story after an FBI PowerPoint presentation made its way onto the Web. It seems that experts at Cisco have examined some of the counterfeit routers in detail and proclaimed that they contain no back doors. Others don't believe we can be so sure. "Last month, [DARPA] began distributing chips with hidden Trojan horse circuitry to military contractors who are participating in the agency's Trusted Integrated Circuits program. The goal is to test forensic techniques for finding hidden electronic trap doors, which can be maddeningly elusive... The threat was demonstrated in April when a team of computer scientists from the University of Illinois presented a paper at a technical conference in San Francisco detailing how they had modified a Sun Microsystems SPARC microprocessor... The researchers were able to create a stealth system that would allow them to automatically log in to a computer and steal passwords."
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Technology: Counterfeit Cisco Gear Showing Up In US 182 comments
spazimodo writes to point out a Network World report on the growing problem of counterfeit networking equipment. The article surveys the whole grey-market phenomenon, which is by no means limited to Cisco gear — they just happen to be its biggest target. From the article: "Thirty cards turned out to be counterfeit... Despite repeated calls and e-mails to his supplier, Atec Group, the issue was not resolved... How did a registered Cisco reseller (also a platinum Network Appliance partner and gold partner to Microsoft and Symantec) acquire the counterfeit [WAN interface cards] in the first place?... Phony network equipment [has] been quietly creeping into sales and distribution channels since early 2004... Counterfeit gear has become a big problem that could put networks — and health and safety — at risk. 'Nobody wants to say they've got counterfeit gear inside their enterprises that can all of a sudden stop working. But it's all over the place, just like pirated software is everywhere,' says Sharon Mills, director of IT procurement organization Caucus."
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Feds Seize $78M of Bogus Chinese Cisco Gear 197 comments
Ian Lamont writes "The IDG News Service is reporting that US and Canadian authorities have made more than 400 seizures of counterfeit Cisco hardware from China in an ongoing investigation that started in 2005. The most recent seizure was last Friday in Toronto, where the RCMP charged two people and a company with distributing large quantities of counterfeit network components to companies in the US through the Internet. The RCMP seized approximately 1,600 pieces of counterfeit network hardware with an estimated value of $2 million, says the report. According to another source, bogus Cisco gear from China typically includes network modules, WAN interface cards, gigabit interface converters, and less expensive routers."
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Hardware: FBI Concerned About Implications of Counterfeit Cisco Gear 273 comments
SpicyBrownMustard writes "An FBI PowerPoint presentation provides details about a criminal investigation into counterfeit CISCO hardware originating from China, and sold by Gold/Silver partners to numerous US government, military, and intelligence agencies. The concern of the article's author and the FBI is that the counterfeit equipment may be state-sponsored to aid in accessing otherwise secure systems (slides 46+47). Says the article author: 'The threat is real. Compromised hardware of potentially hostile foreign origin sits within secure networks of the US government, military, and intelligence services. And as you now see, the FBI has been concerned about it.'" We've mentioned the seizure of some of this equipment before, but this presentation adds quite a bit of detail, and highlights the FBI's concern of Chinese government involvement.
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And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Interesting)
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Informative)
Parent
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Interesting)
Parent
Re:free software distributes the effort. (Score:5, Insightful)
Maybe, however, I am missing something about the procedure you are proposing; what parts would be open source?
Parent
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Interesting)
As the NSA already seems to be certifying comm. gear in the military (or might even make the chips for it). Perhaps even for other departments like the FBI. I see one possibility of this that the NSA certifies routers (or makes them itself) or at least makes them in the USA. I don't work with routers nor am I familiar with their manufacturer. I guess my last point, pertaining at least to the FBI investigation, would be invalid if Cisco makes some routers in the USA except, as you indicate, for some chipsets. Though even on chipset in itself could pose a significant risk.
I'm just surpised that the FBI is even making a "presentation" to anyone on this; regardless of wether the presentation leaked or not.
Parent
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
The outsourcing boogeyman has nothing to do with this - relying on the "USA A-OK" school of thought as some sort of defense against malicious hardware is obviously not a good idea.
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Insightful)
Except connect to a SONNET network. Or a DS3 interface. Or aggregate multiple T1s. Or suport terabit switching and routing speeds.
Parent
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Interesting)
Parent
Re:And outsourcing.... (Score:5, Informative)
Parent
"Counterfeit" not an issue... (Score:5, Interesting)
In this case, if Cisco is comparing the counterfeit routers to their legit ones, they should always be the same.
The question this doesn't answer is this: does the LEGIT Cisco equipment contain back doors? How can Cisco be sure it doesn't? Most of the components are manufactured offshore and the assembly is done offshore. Have they examined each part with an electron microscope to verify it doesn't do anything more than what the spec says it should do?
They can't just watch for network activity; these routers might be filtering and caching data waiting for the eventual physical removal of the router in the next upgrade cycle -- or, they might all have a kill switch built in, so someone can remotely take out ALL routers. There are an infinite number of possibilities to look for, and since Cisco doesn't manufacture everything in-house, they really don't have much hope of detecting that none of the infinite possible modifications have been made.
"Partnership" (Score:4, Interesting)
Parent
Re:"Counterfeit" not an issue... (Score:5, Interesting)
Parent
Re:"Counterfeit" not an issue... (Score:5, Interesting)
If I did purchase a card or Cisco product that did pass the Andover test, then chances are that it was manufactured on the same assembly line, but then you would most likely see a report of a duplicate mac address on a "genuine" Cisco product somewhere. So yes it's a possibility, but highly unlikely IMHO.
Parent
Selling out the back door (Score:5, Informative)
That said, it's pretty low on the list of likely threats. Pretty hard to know exactly what gear will be placed where and what it will give you access to. Plus even with a back door, places with sensitive data are more likely to be monitoring the traffic which is harder to hide.
Parent
Re:"Counterfeit" not an issue... (Score:5, Informative)
Parent
Not a big surprise. (Score:5, Informative)
Fear Fear Fear (Score:4, Insightful)
This seems like a scare tactic to "warn" people about the dangers of fake hardware/software. Expect a big push around these types of "stories" as more bills like PRO-IP go through congress and as the creation of the IP & Copyright Czar in the Whitehouse gets a big push.
It's a concern but seems to point more to incompetence rather than some difficult-to-spot threat. Why are government agencies not buying directly from Cisco? Seems they should have some sort of corporate connection.
"We must protect our precious bodily fluids."
Re:Fear Fear Fear (Score:4, Insightful)
2) It's a concern when you consider the potential effects of this kind of infiltration. Buying directly from Cisco, in no way, protects you from this problem. The hardware is still made overseas in some factory by a bunch of people who may not like the US very much (which is true of 99% of the planet right now).
Apparently you lack the imagination to see how ugly this can get. Fortunately DARPA isn't run by you.
Parent
/Light Bulb Flashes Overhead (Score:5, Funny)
You reap what you sow (Score:4, Interesting)
Technical details of malicious hardware (Score:5, Informative)
-- computer scientists from University of Illinois
it is important to carefully inspected new gear. (Score:5, Funny)
How many back doors? Who has the keys? (Score:4, Interesting)
The question is not whether Cisco routers have back doors. That has to be assumed. If I was running NSA over the last several decades, I would have my people deep inside every communication equipment manufacturer. The manufacturers management might not even know about it.
The NSA surely has arranged to have one or more back doors designed into virtually every kind of communications switch. The only Cisco employees who would know about them would be the NSA people who work inside Cisco, and some regular Cisco employees who have been cleared. If this has not been done, the NSA senior managers should be fired or jailed.
The real questions are: How many back doors are there? and who has the keys? The (assumed) NSA back door might not be the only one. There is a possibility that the Chinese or Indian chip-fab or software contractors have also installed back doors for their own governments.
With billion-gate machines, a few thousand extra gates would be hard to see. If the extra logic looks like instruction-cache, but just has a little extra code, it would be almost impossible.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)