Schneier's Keynote At Linux.conf.au

Stony Stevenson writes "Computer security expert Bruce Schneier took a swipe at a number of sacred cows of security including RFID tags, national ID cards, and public CCTV security cameras in his keynote address to Linux.conf.au (currently being held in Melbourne, Australia). These technologies were all examples of security products tailored to provide the perception of security rather than tackling actual security risks, Schneier said. The discussion of public security — which has always been clouded by emotional decision making — has been railroaded by groups with vested interests such as security vendors and political groups, he claimed. 'For most of my career I would insult "security theater" and "snake oil" for being dumb. In fact, they're not dumb. As security designers we need to address both the feeling and the reality of security. We can't ignore one. It's not enough to make someone secure, that person needs to also realize they've been made secure. If no-one realizes it, no-one's going to buy it,' Schneier said."

In other words . . .

. . . Bruce has figured out the real money's in security theater, not in security, and he wants a piece of that action.

Re:In other words . . .

No. What Bruce has realized is that, in the boardroom and the lunchroom (where almost nobody knows any better), security theatre often will kick the ass of real security practices because it's marketed by professional sales teams. It also often can be delivered for less (because it can be priced for what the market will bear).

If you want real security to be provided, you have to learn to sell it at least as well as the snake-oil. You have to make it sufficiently visible, but non-impeding, that people feel safe.

It's about understanding the human/political side of the equation that can make the difference between a successful deployment and a perceived failure.

Re:In other words . . .

It's an interesting theory but are you aware of anyone who thinks the bullshit we go through at the airport is for anything other than appearances? It's not just geeks and smart asses who know this, it is everyone.

Re:In other words . . .

Uh huh.. I, unfortunately, spend a lot of time in airports.. I've never once seen someone taking off their shoes with a smile on their face.. there's only one thing you think when they tell you to take your shoes off: "oh my god this is bullshit." If your friend actually thinks there is a sensible reason to scan the shoes of flyers then I suggest you get him some psychological help.

Re:

Remember how that guy was foiled without the help of scanning and so the scanning of the shoes is completely superfluous?

Re:In other words . . .

I think you're laboring under the belief that:

1. the sole of a shoe can contain any significant amount of explosive
2. that walking on such a shoe would not cause the explosive to go off
3. that airport scanner technology can tell the difference between explosives and leather

None of which are the case. The only thing you could maybe fit in the sole of a very hard soled shoe would be a knife.. which hopefully people realize doesn't give a would-be hijacker any more of an advantage than being unarmed - if 50 scared passengers rush you, it doesn't matter that you have a knife. And that's what should have been the lesson of 9/11: if you allow yourself to be victimized you will die.. but if you step up and stop hijackers there is no way to hijack a plane.

All in all, I wish the government would just let the market decide. There should be a "no security" terminal where people can catch a plane much as you catch a bus.. buy your ticket, get on the next available flight. If you want to be harrassed, go to the security theater terminal.

Re:

I think this comes from the Bible (The Old Testament). Its point of origin is known as the Middle East.
I don't know about western traditions - the Gauls or others

Egh. I was feeling lazy, but here is the Wikipedia page [wikipedia.org] about it. While most people may know it first from the Bible, I think it's the Codex Hammurabi that's often credited for having that written down first.

I am not a lawyer or a law student (so whatever

Go *fish!

Yeah, that's why Twofish [wikipedia.org] was one of the 5 finalist algorithms of NIST's AES competition [wikipedia.org].

And Blowfish [wikipedia.org] is still unbroken after 15 years.

I should be such a crappy cryptographer!

love this line...

"tailored to provide the perception of security rather than tackling actual security risks." Isn't this also the mission statement for the TSA?

CCTV - Worth its weight in gold

CCTV almost never captures what you set out to catch. In many organizations, it's a knee-jerk reaction to some kind of incident. ie) Something got pinched, someone received an ass-kicking, etc. Even if you do catch it, you'll never be able to identify/recognize/charge/convict the person based on the video image alone. 4CIF at 30 fps is pretty much as good as it gets right now in most feasible installations. All you'll be able to say is, "Subject is hatless...REPEAT...HATLESS!" (And that's even if he's in the frame). The PTZ will just pan around aimlessly on a tour program, or be pointed at the wrong thing. However, wide-spread deployment of CCTV systems is still not futile; you just usually end up catching something that were never really looking for in the first place. People and vehicular traffic movements, facility useage, or realtime video of an incident in progress that just happens to be going-on in front of the lens. You can establish time frames of entry or exit, or use it to clue-you-in to the right path to finding the real evidence you're looking for. From a security systems perspective, more CCTV is better, but not to mitigate direct and specific threats. Only general ones. Or sometimes you just luck-out and with a good booby shot in the atrium of an office building.

Re:

Check out this article. [bbc.co.uk]

These guys would NEVER have been convicted without CCTV.

Absolute PROOF that CCTV works.

Re:CCTV - Worth its weight in gold

There is a slight difference between keeping a potential thief from doing anything and preventing a terrorist from doing something.

Burglars choose easy targets. CCTV and alarms make the target more difficult so most move on. Experienced thieves require more then just a sign to keep them away but still, they are for the most part looking for the easy target.

Terrorism is not a crime of opportunity. You can make the target appear as difficult as you want, all that does is make them plan a little more. The stupid restrictions at the airport do nothing to deter terrorists.

Re:CCTV - Worth its weight in gold

Sometimes cameras can have a deterrent effect. I don't mean those lame dummy cameras, either.

Just the rumor that we were putting a camera system in our school practically eliminated graffiti

vandalism in a vulnerable area. The vandalism then took other forms, which were actually more of a problem.

Schnier's List

I think that would of been a catchier title...

Sacred Cows?

Around here, they're more like whipping boys. Now, if he'd started in on Linux security...

Electronic Voting Security Theater

For many of the same reasons there is no semblance of a secure electronic voting platform on the horizon. The reason is not that such a platform would be difficult to design. The reason is that it would not be profitable.

To be secure it would have to be open. In the case of voting platforms that means every line of code, every encryption algorithm, and all the hardware has to be open, published, and known. Nobody has yet figured out how to make enough money from such a system to outspend Diebold's lobbyists and earn considered from election officials.

Re:

For many of the same reasons there is no semblance of a secure electronic voting platform on the horizon.

Does its support for using paper disqualify punchscan [punchscan.org] from being "electronic"?

We nerds and geeks need to wake up to theater

As a nerd and geek and long time hacker, it is perfectly clear to me that I've been missing the "theater" aspect of the technology that I love.

Take Linux for instance. I have had varying levels of success getting non-geeks to use it, but what is missing is the warm and fuzzies that make it psychologically comfortable to not be using Windows or a Macintosh.

There are two sides to change of any kind. (1) The actual details of change. (2) The psychological affirmation that it is worth the effort. No matter how valid the argument presented by the first, if it does not provide the second, it will fail.

If we wish to push Linux, we have to create theater around it.

Re:

I guess it might be just me ... but some of those sound like those annoying popups these "security" applications have.

A colleague of mine has something called "Comodo" on some kind of paranoid mode on his computer, and whenever I use his computer (we share

Re:

Linux has its own security theatre ... the idea that "root vs user" DAC is sufficient to stop malware/viruses etc, when in reality it does no such thing (consider the permissions needed to do the things most botnets do). If I had a penny for every time I s

The Reality and Perception of Security

In Bruce Schneier's keynote address at Linux.conf.au, he essentially admonishes that "security theater" is not only a necessity, it's a critical component that needs to accompany real security solutions. In the article, he states

the best security solution will fail if it doesn't cater to both the reality and perceptions to do with security.

He's affirming that sales in the marketplace will be driven when security theater and real security products are matched. That's when end-users will also experience a real sense of security.

It's Still Dumb!

These "perception of security" things are still bad, because they create REAL threats to security, in the name of trying to make people feel more secure.

I will take the reality over a false perception, any day.

Ah...NOW I get it!

I guess this would explain why just about everybody in Canada thinks crime is on the increase, even though the numbers conclusively prove otherwise.

You can't sell security hardware and convince nervous old women to throw away their rights if they know there's a long list of things more important than so-called "security". And a lot of those "nervous old women", by the way, are male, in their 30's, and convinced that everything will be fine if we just forget all that due process nonsense and start trusting the cops to throw the right people in jail.

Re:

This is an argument I have to make with friends when I claim that Bush-Cheney is the most successful administration in US history. I agree with exactly ZERO of what they have done but as far as scaring the shit out of people, robbing us blind, and in gener

Someone has to do it

In other words, he is an expert on publicizing what most serious researches already know about general security flaws and problems.

And the problem with this is what? Given how badly people misunderstand computer security we don't have enough people doing t