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First Use of RIPA to Demand Encryption Keys
Posted by
samzenpus
on Thursday November 15, @12:22AM
from the tell-us-everything dept.
from the tell-us-everything dept.
kylehase writes "The Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) is being used for the first time to force an animal activist to reveal encryption keys for encrypted files she claims to have no knowledge of. According to the article, she could face up to two years if she doesn't comply."
First Use of RIPA to Demand Encryption Keys
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solution (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.atomjax.com/)
That's why you use an encrypted file system with a duress key. In the event of coercion, you give them a key that *oops* results in the destruction of the data.
Re:solution (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.int64.org/)
Re:solution (Score:5, Funny)
Re:solution (Score:5, Funny)
Let me guess: you're either American, Israeli or Australian.
Re:Duh (Score:5, Insightful)
Business and government are similar in that they are all staffed and run by people (that is, greedy grafty nasty people). They are different in that we elect our government people and there is some oversight of the work and the results - sometimes late, and sometimes shoddy, but the oversight is there.. A business on the other hand, involves no community decision, is run as a dictatorship and there is minimal oversight (less and less every day since the 80's).
I'm not anti-business, just honest. The problems come from the people, not the organizational method. The organizational method is supposed to be a way of compensating for the problems while minimizing the bad side-effects.
Being anti-gov't or anti-teacher is just a way of parroting something you heard from someone else -- it's not a legitimate position to argue from.
Re:solution (Score:5, Funny)
No, but apparently parent's reading comprehension is superior to your own.
Or, to put it a way you might understand: "Whoooosh!"
Re:solution (Score:5, Funny)
(Last Journal: Saturday November 24, @12:04PM)
Re:solution (Score:5, Funny)
(Last Journal: Tuesday January 16 2007, @10:33AM)
Re:solution (Score:4, Informative)
(http://www.talkunafraid.co.uk/ | Last Journal: Thursday May 04 2006, @05:37PM)
Re:solution (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://slashdot.org/)
During normal operation, you mount both the outer container and the hidden container using both the outer and hidden key. This enables truecrypt to see the hidden container and move around hidden data as you write to the outer container.
When you are arrested, you provide the key to the outer container, but not to the hidden one. In this mode, it's as if the hidden container doesn't exist and can of course be overwritten. There's absolutely nothing to prove that the hidden container exists, as long as you have a plausible outer container and can say "Look, this is what I was trying to hide".
Re:TrueCrypt's method is not detectable (Score:5, Interesting)
That's actually pretty much a stretch. Your 'decent' lawyer would have to give some sort of proof that there was a second partition there. Something that TrueCrypt is pretty much designed to prevent. You can easily show the existence of the first truecrypt partition - it's there in the open. You can't prove the existence of the second partition.
I'm not sure a judge will buy 'because we didn't find what we were looking for' as a reasonable showing of proof that a second partition exists, and unfortunately, that's all the proof that exists. The formatting method and the processing method result in random data covering the entire partition block, as data is written to both the shown & hidden partitions, that data changes from random to encrypted. However the whole goal of the crypto data is to make it look random.
So you have potentially 3 blocks of random data each constructed with the same randomizing algorythm. How exactly do you show where one begins & one ends? How do you even show that the 3rd block exists? The whole purpose of the hidden block is to make it almost impossible to prove the existence of that third block. You literally are more likely to brute force the key than you are to prove the existence of the hidden partition.
Re:solution (Score:5, Insightful)
You don't have to prove you're innocent, they have to prove you are guilty.
That kind of thinking is *so* pre 9-11.
Re:solution (Score:4, Informative)
(http://www.crfh.net/ | Last Journal: Tuesday November 14 2006, @02:47PM)
Re:TrueCrypt's method is not detectable (Score:5, Insightful)
(http://127.0.0.1/)
When you initialize your encrypted disk space, you tell Truecrypt how many containers you want. Say that you choose 2. When you mount your Truecrypt drive, you must always mount both containers. In this way, Truecrypt knows and can maintain integrity between the two--they won't start to overwrite or corrupt each other, because they are both known about and available. If you ever only give the first key (you can't just give the second key, as the second container is entirely within the first) then you run the risk of corrupting the second container--in fact, any write operation will probably do it.
Now you can choose more than just two containers, and the same applies. One thing I'm not sure of is whether the third container is fully within the second.
If I am sending encrypted mail using PGP, I'm using someone else's PGP key. I don't have to have a PGP key myself in order to do this. If someone else is sending me encrypted messages, they could be sending it using anyone's PGP key--it's only obviously my key if it's provable that I've read the messages. For example, Alice could encrypt a message using Bob's public key, and then send that message to Charlie in an effort to frame him. Charlie gets the junk message and deletes it, but the feds who were wiretapping Charlie come in and demand to know what was in the message. Charlie can't answer--he has no idea. So he gets 2 years in prison from the RIPA act.
Re:solution (Score:5, Informative)
cryptsetup --key-file=/dev/random create c1
mkswap
swapon
This reads a cryptogtaphically very good key from
Re:solution (Score:4, Informative)
http://www.truecrypt.org/hiddenvolume.php [truecrypt.org]
Truecrypt is pretty nifty all around.
TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.futurepower.net/)
TrueCrypt works very, very well. I use it with just one volume to protect passwords and other files.
When you don't want to encrypt a volume, but just a file, Gnu Privacy Guard [gnupg.org] is best.
TrueCrypt: Open Source and Free. (Score:5, Interesting)
(http://www.futurepower.net/)
Don't forget to donate if you use TrueCrypt extensively.
The present government corruption in both the U.S. and U.K. started when secret violence was authorized as a way of protecting oil investments of British and U.S. investors. Tending toward outlawing privacy is a way of continuing that corruption. Any government that can act in secret cannot be a democracy, because citizens cannot participate in things that are unknown to them.
This is a good site to read about the corruption, and to contribute links: U.S. Government corruption TimeLines [cooperativeresearch.org]. Example: Complete 911 Timeline, 3895 events.
Re:TrueCrypt: Open Source and Free. (Score:4, Insightful)
(Last Journal: Friday November 10 2006, @02:16PM)
The present government corruption began as soon as our hairy forebears realized that people in positions of power would abuse those positions of power when given gifts. This can probably be traced back to the first time Ogg gave more meat to Oggette and her little Oglodytes simply because she was willing to grab her ankles for him.
It's human nature to try to twist the political structure to one's own ends, and it's a failure of modern society that 'the people' don't insist upon fairer means of government.
Very good point. However, I'd add that far too many people are willing to let this happen -- how many people follow the order, "Pay no attention to the man behind the curtain!" without question?
In addition to a secretive government being undemocratic, a population disinterested in the workings of government cannot produce a democratic government.
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:4, Insightful)
(Last Journal: Saturday September 20 2003, @01:55PM)
If they're the type that need you holding their hand like that, do you really trust them with a system wherein they type a password then any app on the system is free to dump the entire volume? What good will that do when someone (govt or otherwise) sends them an exe in their mail that they happily run that just waits for you to decrypt the volume?
Maybe they're smart enough to not run exes so blatantly, but theres plenty of other potential code execution like software that autoupdates (+ big enough power forcing someone to sign their code so it validates), exploits, backdoors, etc.
Then theres the operating system holes in your security. Filenames and content will still end up in "recently accessed" lists in common software, that alone can be more than enough info. Theres the cleartext copy that ends up sitting in your swap file if the app swaps out. Backup/temp files saved outside the secured drive, etc.
TrueCrypt is useful for what it is, and I certainly use it daily, you just have to be careful with helping people into the world of security as they're looking for a panacea to do everything for them.
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.myside-yourside.net/)
And besides, not entirely true:
A: There is no "back door" implemented in TrueCrypt. However, there is a way to "reset" a TrueCrypt volume password/keyfile. After you create a volume, backup its header (select Tools -> Backup Volume Header) before you allow a non-admin user to use the volume. Note that the volume header (which is encrypted with a header key derived from a password/keyfile) contains the master key with which the volume is encrypted. Then ask the user to choose a password, and set it for him/her (Volumes -> Change Volume Password); or generate a user keyfile for him/her. Then you can allow the user to use the volume and to change the password/keyfiles without your assistance/permission. In case he/she forgets his/her password or loses his/her keyfile, you can "reset" the volume password/keyfiles to your original admin password/keyfiles by restoring the volume header (Tools -> Restore Volume Header).
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:5, Insightful)
I agree. And AFAIK this law does not respect plausible deniability. Which also means that if the data is really random, they can throw you in prison and you cannot defend yourself.
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:5, Funny)
Now I understand that this looks suspicious, but mathematically, there is no difference between random numbers and encrypted data. Given enough time, and access to powerful computers, I could design a tool that would convert the random numbers you see there into any given text. From the Magna Carta, to the complete works of shakespear, to your own biography written in klingon.
I wish I could help you, but I'm afraid that mathematically, there is nothing to do."
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:4, Insightful)
The problem is, the law doesn't seem to place the burden of proof on the prosecution when it comes to showing whether there is or isn't any meaningful data present. Any old bits on a hard drive are (unqualified) electronic data.
On your point about circumstantial evidence, we really need not to set a precedent that says use of encryption can be treated as any sort of evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that you are storing data of dubious legality. The implications of giving any legal weight to drawing that conclusion are horrible.
Re:TrueCrypt is the best for Windows and Linux. (Score:4, Insightful)
(http://marcansoft.com/)
Tool = XOR
Key = RandomData XOR Magna Carta
Doesn't take much time, or access to powerful computers.
Re:solution (Score:5, Interesting)
(http://www.geocities.com/zemran | Last Journal: Friday November 07 2003, @06:07AM)
Re:solution (Score:4, Interesting)
Unless they've had a complete turnover of personnel throughout the department in the last 2 years, they're not competent from top to bottom in any of the 4 state's offices I had to deal with then.
Linux? You need a hardware write blocker, period. (Score:5, Informative)
(http://www.zone81.com/)
- Please explain to the court how you made a copy of this piece of evidence...
- I connected the drive to our forensic machine and...
- You mean, you connected this hard disk... to your machine?
- Yes of course, then I...
- Did you use a hardware write block?
- Er... I used Linux and mounted the...
- Please, just answer the question. Did you or did you not use a hardware write blocker device to connect the disk to your machine?
- I did not, but...
- Thank you, no further question. I now call for the evidence to be declared tainted and inadmissible in court, since the forensic team failed to use the proper hardware to ensure that no changes would be made to the disk.
There is a whole range of forensic-specific hardware available: write blockers, hardware disk imagers... Use them, or loose your case.
They're worse than gremlins! (Score:4, Funny)
And it runs around free! Wreaking havoc! Smashing in windows and stealing car stereos! Eating whole bags of Cheetos and vomiting them up into your dress shoes! I'll tell you -- there's nothing worse than a case that has been loosed upon the world. Those things are wild.
Re:solution (Score:5, Informative)
Almost all police departments will image the drive, then present the person with the image to decrypt. If the image gets stung by a self destruct Trojan, then the police will know that its not a forgotten password, and then proceed to use rubber hose decryption to obtain the contents of the drive.
Better solution (Score:5, Interesting)
(http://whineymacfanboy.googlepages.com/ | Last Journal: Thursday April 12 2007, @09:28AM)
One password gives your uber-secret-plans-for-world-conquest, the other password gives a few hundred meg of soft porn (or whatever).
That way, you appear to not be resisting their demands.
Don't just encrypt -- Hide! (Score:5, Insightful)
Encrypting your data and not hiding it is the same as getting a $100k super secure safe, locking your stuff in it, but leaving it in the middle of the living room. Any { law enforcement agency / criminal gang / anyone with more resources and more muscles that you } will just force you to give them the key. In other words, they see the super secure safe and automatically assume there must be at least $1M in there and then they force you to give them the key. The govt will cite all kinds of stupid idiotic laws, the criminals will start cutting of the fingers (yours or your loved ones').
The solution is to use something like steganography and hide the data such that nobody even will suspect anything. The best secrets are the ones that are not even known to exist.
If the adversary is convinced that you do have the data and knows the data type, then create a similar but fake data set to be substituted for the real one.
Re:Better solution (Score:5, Interesting)
I have some disks I wiped with crypto-generated randomness. Indistinguishable from encrypted disks without metadata (as linux dm-crypt can do for example). I cannot prove that there is no data on them. Completely impossible. Am I a criminal according to this law? Or do they need to have some proof that there is data on the disk?
Re:Better solution (Score:5, Interesting)
(http://slashdot.org/ | Last Journal: Saturday November 03, @04:58AM)
Re:Better solution (Score:5, Funny)
(http://www.gjrcomputing.com/)
Re:Better solution (Score:5, Informative)
You never used Truecrypt eh? It's not a zip file. It acts as a virtual hard drive partition that can be mounted as a drive.
When you create the volume it generates random bits throughout the virtual partition. You can copy whatever files you want onto the virtual partition, the rest of it is random noise. You may or may not choose to have additional hidden encrypted partitions within that noise. Adding up the size of know files tells you nothing about what may or may not lurk in the rest of the space on the virtual partition.