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NIST Condemns Paperless Electronic Voting
Posted by
Zonk
on Fri Dec 01, 2006 04:24 PM
from the they're-not-the-only-ones dept.
from the they're-not-the-only-ones dept.
quizzicus writes "Paperless electronic voting machines 'cannot be made secure' [pdf] according to the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). In the most sweeping condemnation of voting machines issued by any federal agency, NIST echoes what critics have been saying all along, that due to the lack of verifiability, 'a single programmer could rig a major election.' Rather than adding printers, though, NIST endorses the hand-marked optical-scan system as the most reliable."
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Politics: Federal Panel [not NIST] Rejects Paper Trail For E-Voting 191 comments
emil10001 writes "The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has rejected a proposal suggesting that electronic voting have a paper trail. The draft recommendation was developed by NIST scientists, who called out electronic voting machines as being 'impossible' to secure." From the article: "Committee member Brit Williams, who opposed the measure, said, 'You are talking about basically a reinstallation of the entire voting system hardware.' The proposal failed to obtain the 8 of 15 votes needed to pass. Five states — Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland and South Carolina — use machines without a paper record exclusively. Eleven states and the District either use them in some jurisdictions or allow voters to chose whether to use them or some other voting system." So ... accountability in voting will be a joke for the foreseeable future because it costs too much?
Update: 12/11 03:20 GMT by KD : Correction: It was not NIST that rejected NIST's recommendations, it was a federal panel chartered by Congress, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
Update: 12/11 03:20 GMT by KD : Correction: It was not NIST that rejected NIST's recommendations, it was a federal panel chartered by Congress, the Technical Guidelines Development Committee.
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Politics: U.S. To Certify Labs For Testing E-Voting Machines 75 comments
InternetVoting writes "In a clear counter to the recent criticisms of secrecy involving Ciber labs the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has issued recommendations (pdf) to the Election Assistance Commission (EAC). NIST recommends the accreditation of two labs, iBeta Quality Assurance and SysTest Labs. The recommendation, emphasizing the need for transparency, includes on-site assessment reports, lab responses, and on-site reviews for each lab. These reports shed much needed light into the process of voting machine certification. Learn more from the Q&As About NIST Evaluation of Laboratories that Test Voting Systems."
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because without a verifiable paper trail... (Score:5, Funny)
Re: (Score:2)
PS. what happened to the karma bonus?
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Re:because without a verifiable paper trail... (Score:4, Insightful)
When a single programmer can steal the elections, it's because the electronic voting system is poorly designed.
Re:because without a verifiable paper trail... (Score:5, Insightful)
Elections can be stolen with paper ballot elections. However it is far more work to do so than with a fully electronic election. To steal a paper ballot election, especially if it isn't close, you would likely have to create a large number of fake ballots manually, and then selectively replace your victim's ballots. When there are many hundreds of thousands of ballots, this is a huge task, and cannot be done quickly. And to really cover your tracks you might want to shuffle the ballots, so they are not sorted by choice. Scrambling a deck of 52 cards is hard enough. Imagine hundreds of thousands of ballots. And of course all of these changes would have to match with the vote tallies. Any errors will be obvious, and could be considered evidence for voting fraud.
Contrast this with electronic paperless voting, where a single piece of software can replicate itself through many voting machines, as was shown possible [princeton.edu] by two Princeton professors. This code can then invisibly alter votes, and then eradicate itself after use. The fraud in this case would be undetectable.
Hand-marked is the way to go (Score:5, Interesting)
Old paper ballots were fine. (Score:2, Interesting)
Re: (Score:2)
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
Re:Old paper ballots were fine. (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Old paper ballots were fine. (Score:5, Interesting)
Do you actually understand what happened? Do you know how punch ballots work? "Shockingly simple" isn't even funny as a joke. You're given a ballot card with perforations that mark off squares. You're given a round pointy piece of metal. Instructions: Poke out a square hole with a round stick. "Hanging chads" are of course rampant, and for decades, they have been a known problem with a well-established solution for determining whether you voted or not: If the chad is hanging by only one or two corners, you voted whether or not the machine can read your vote. Cue the 2000 election, and Republicans whining about Gore's whining for a hand count for hanging chads. Cue retarded insults like yours that ignores the fact that hanging chads have been around for decades with an established procedure for dealing with them. Cue the supreme court canceling the recount, without any constitutional authority to tell Florida how to run an election or to demand Presidential election results on any particular day prior to the electoral college's ballot.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Re:Hand-marked is the way to go (Score:5, Informative)
One of the things they cover is about the manditory 3% or 4% recount to make sure they don't need a full recount. The problem lies in the fact that the ballots selected are not random. The law specifies that the 3% is "randomly self-selected" by the district/state elections clerk. This means that out of 10,000 ballots, they pick and choose 300-400 ballots to have public volunteers recount.
The public volunteers suspected that the ballots were picked specifically to match the final percentages so there would be no recount. Most of the ballots were grouped together by party lines as if they picked out a certain number of (R) ballots, a certain number of (D) ballots, and a certain number of (I) ballots but forgot to shuffle them together.
Re: (Score:3, Funny)
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Punchscan.org (Score:4, Informative)
Sleight Of Hand (Score:5, Insightful)
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Note: I'm not saying secure computer-assisted voted is impossible. Just that nothing remotely close has been invented yet.
MOD PARENT DOWN (Score:3, Insightful)
Moderation isn't for squeltching points of view (Score:5, Insightful)
"We" may have been over this before, but that doesn't mean you are correct, and it certainly doesn't mean you should be calling for people to be modded down just because you disagree with them.
Letting the voter verify that their vote was counted as cast, might, as you suggest, make vote buying easier. But it would also, as the GP points out, make stealing an election wholesale much harder. To make a rational choice between the two, you have to consider the relative risks, and doing so does not lead to the conclusion you're advocating. Even with receipts of some sort, vote buying is a very risky proposition, since by its very nature a lot of people would have to know about it before the election. If you want to buy ten thousand votes, at least ten thousand people will have to know about it, including who to vote for and what the payoff or threat is. If even a few of them blab, you're goose is cooked.
Conversely, without receipts, elections can be stolen by a small group of people with no witnesses except for the machines, and they can steal as many votes as they want--a million isn't that much harder than a dozen.
--MarkusQ
Re: (Score:3)
Even then, how do you verify? Go back and ask every single person who they voted for, and compare against the list? How would you know that the recounting process will be more accurate and tamper-proof than the original election?
Nothing is 100% accurate
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
A tiny bit of fuding the numbers, and you have 5% of votes from people who only exist on paper...
They certainly aren't going
And no ID verification to boot (at least in MD) (Score:4, Insightful)
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Re: (Score:2)
Anyone who advocates not having to show ID to vote has another agenda.
Take a real close look at the types of activist groups who cry out the loudest whenever someone floats the "show an ID" concept.
I agree (Score:5, Interesting)
It is a stupid system, and I am proud that someone with more authority than me is saying so. I believe all the politicians who decided that touch screen voting was a "great idea" should be voted out of office ASAP.
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Direct Democracy (Score:4, Insightful)
Representative for hire (Score:2)
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Re:Direct Democracy (Score:5, Insightful)
Politics and governance is no different. Specializing is a good thing, and representative democracy allows people to specialize in governance. We don't even let generalist physicians do surgery, let alone the average layperson. It's too complicated, and too important... so we give the job to a specialist. Same with government. We could let the average person make decisions about long term taxes, economic growth, foreign policy, and the like, but I think it's too complicated.
I'm in California, and we've got more direct democracy than pretty much any other state in the union. And every election we're bombarded with propositions. No one really bothers to read the text of the summaries, let alone the actual text of the proposed legislation. So people vote based on their instincts, the television ads, and what their friends tell them. These aren't well-considered or thought out reasons... just the reasons that people have time for. I try my best to wade through them, but I've got a job and a family, and there often just isn't the time.
If you've got the time to keep up with all the information that *should* go into making these decisions, more power to you. But I think that the vast majority of the population doesn't have the time, interest, or education to do the same.
Duuuuuuuupe (Score:2)
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This link works.
Eh? (Score:2)
"secure"... depends who you're talking to. (Score:2)
Oh, they can be made secure. They can be made to secure the election for whomever you want. That's the whole idea.
Maryland (Score:2)
Savages... (Score:2)
Why trust the scanner? (Score:2)
If the scanner is hooked up to a crooked counting algorithm, how will you know unless you actually count the paper? If you have to count the paper to ensure that the scanner is honest, why bot
NIST also condemned current paper trails! (Score:4, Informative)
"The NIST is also going to recommend changes to the design of machines equipped with paper rolls that provide audit trails.
Currently, the paper rolls produce records that are illegible or otherwise unusable, and NIST is recommending that "paper rolls should not be used in new voting systems."
via http://www.bradblog.com/?p=3860#more-3860 [bradblog.com]
We really should just use optical scan ballots. That is a paper trail voters have to verify, and the ballots can be meaningfully recounted. Then Diebold and the other vendors should be sued for knowingly selling defective products--possibly fraudulently.
Re:NIST also condemned current paper trails! (Score:4, Informative)
If found quickly enough, a faded thermal paper can still be read accurately with specialized equipment, but it is not a simple matter and is completely ineffective after an extended period.
I know this because of a horse race -- I left the track before a race, had a winning ticket (printed on thermal paper), and had it fade on me either because it sat in direct sunlight or because it was in my pocket, either of which exposed it to enough heat to render it unreadable to a person. I wasn't too hopeful about redeeming it, but I explained the situation the next time I was at the track, two weeks later. They managed to read the ticket (and pay me my $8 on a $2 bet) but needed a special reader to do so. They also explained that given another month or two they wouldn't be able to read it.
The point is that any given election official who next summer checks the DRE paper trails from the November election may just find a cabinet full of blank rolls. Unreadable in less that half the time that Federal law requires the records be kept. This is a big problem.
Verifiability? (Score:2)
Wow, just when Domecrats win (Score:4, Interesting)
Whatever, it's the right thing to do, finally.
Re: (Score:3, Interesting)
This federal study is a wee bit late (Score:2)
Optical scanning offers significant benefits (Score:4, Insightful)
2 - Inexpensive scaling. Since you mark on paper the polling station can have 20 booths for people which are not much more than a table, curtain, and a pen; yet they can share one or two optical scanners. Touch screen systems require one expensive machine per booth.
Do the math. 20 expensive touch screen machines per polling station, versus 2 less expensive optical scanners.
This cost savings could be used in urban areas where there traditionally have not been enough resources for the election.
3 - Trustable. Any dispute can be settled by the actual piece of paper I wrote on. Optical scanners are based on technology used by schools to grade for decades and require little more than a motor, light sensor, and a very low end CPU. There is little to go wrong and very little which can hide tricks.
4 - Easy to use. I take a pen and fill in a box. Touch screen systems appear to suffer serious "alignment" issues which can cause votes to be mis-registered and which require frequent realignment in the field.
5 - Robust. There is no screen to be scratched, or broken. The voter never interacts with the scanner except to slide a piece of paper into it. There is no printer to jam, or foul, or have other issues.
Instant runoff voting (Score:3, Interesting)
What ballot system would support instant runoff voting? That's the method in which the voter ranks candidates and then, if no candidate attains a majority, the least popular candidates are eliminated and the voters' second choices counted [1 [instantrunoff.com],2 [wikipedia.org]]. It prevents third parties from spoiling elections, like Ralph Nader was accused of taking votes from Al Gore in 2000 or Ross Perot from George Bush in 1992.
With instant runoff voting, it's safe to vote for third parties since you can choose a major party as your second choice. I think the emergence of viable third parties would really improve politics and governance.
But how do you actually collect appropriate ballots? I don't know of a simple way that "connect the arrow" paper ballots would work. One of the advantages of electronic ballots is that they could theoretical handle instant runoff voting elegantly. However, I doubt that the electronic voting system manufacturers are designing for that ability, especially since they seem to be funded by the two major parties.
AlpineR
I call bull puckey (Score:3, Insightful)
I call bull puckey.
The potential for corruption is massively greater when THERE IS NO WAY TO CHECK FOR IT.
When it can be detected (and is routinely watched for), trying to
Re:Electronic Voting (Score:5, Informative)
I have a job reviewing the software that runs the elections. As a result I have several of the packages in question on my machine. The auditing I do has nothing to do with the election security. It is technical. None the less; I have looked at the security issue. I agree with the critics entirely. Electronic Voting without a proper paper trail is a sucking security hole. The Diebold software has several leaks in it including USB drive access. I have reviewed on package I would trust and it does use a paper trail. In general the critics of this methodology of voting without paper trails are more than correct.
Any election even with a paper trail, should have several other controls built in. The development of regionally accessible voting is a good step. This is where you can vote anywhere the election is being held. It makes stuffing boxes kind of hard. Another method needs to be 3 way tally. The voting totals need to be local, reported to a regional and to a central authority and the results compared. The paper ballots should automatically be recounted by machine and a certain number of them sampled for hand recount. The custody of the paper ballots should be under ARMED WITNESSED GUARD at a central location such as the State Agency. It should not be under the control of local officials. In general the election oversight agency of a State should be most carefully constructed with agents who are not subject to political whim for employment.
I have worked as an election official in the past. The number one concern of any citizen in an election should be that the election tally's and results are properly handled. A Former County Commissioner from my district was wrongly not certified for election because of probate Judge who was dishonest and it took a federal suit to over turn his ruling. He was placed in office about 13 months late after the hack the judge certified wrongly had pretty well looted the office. Election stealing is a very real issue and one of the highest concern for people with an elected government. In the election in question, the Probate Judge certified a box as valid when it had 1100 more votes (all cast were for one candidate) cast than the box had voters.
I cannot emphasize enough that any machine voting system that does not track with a proper receipt system and with other major controls is simply a machine to steal elections more efficiently. Such a system makes stealing easy and removes all evidence that it was stolen.
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Actually, there's another problem with paper trails that nobo