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HSBC Online Banking Security Flaw Analyzed
Posted by
timothy
on Thu Aug 10, 2006 11:33 AM
from the roight-guv'nor-jes-sign-roight-here dept.
from the roight-guv'nor-jes-sign-roight-here dept.
greenechidna writes "The BBC is reporting that a vulnerability has been found in the online banking service of HSBC by researchers at Cardiff University. According to the story the attack would allow an attacker to log on to an account within 9 attempts. The attack relies on a keylogger being installed on the victim's machine. The article doesn't have any further technical details."
David Nicholson adds links to coverage at CNN and at the Guardian, writing
"The attack revolves around the order that customers are requested to enter random security numbers on the site. The main news stories fail to detail the vulnerability but I have provided an analysis of it here."
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Nine attempts? (Score:5, Interesting)
The number of attempts is not given, but the automatic lockout is at least covered at their security page [hsbc.com]
Sorry Cardiff University, no bank hax for you today.
Re:Nine attempts? (Score:4, Informative)
Parent
Re:Nine attempts? (Score:5, Insightful)
Parent
Re:Nine attempts? (Score:5, Informative)
As you know, with HSBC, you are asked to specify 3 digits from your security key (which is 6-8 characters long)
This is fine and stops people shoulder surfing to get it once, but if someone keeps recording you they will have all they need.
I actually had more of a shock in the past when I managed to man in the middle the HSBC login, but after speaking to them (they called me back literally within seconds of me mailing them) it was cleared up and my worries were put to rest (there is a ~2 minute timeout where if you steal the cookies from someones machine who has logged in but not logged out where you can technically get at the information - this might have changed since, but it used to be the case)
Parent
Re:Nine attempts? (Score:3, Insightful)
I'd be interested to hear people's suggestions for a system that will remain secur
Why pick on HSBC? (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Why pick on HSBC? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:Why pick on HSBC? (Score:3, Insightful)
uhhh... (Score:4, Insightful)
Keylogger required (Score:5, Insightful)
no shit sherlock.
Re:Keylogger required (Score:5, Insightful)
The PIN is 6 digits, they ask for three of these six digits at any one login (e.g. type the 1st, 3rd and 4th digits of your pin). Because they always ask in ascending order (i.e. never 4th, 2nd and 1st) then after 9 login events the keylogger can figure out the number. All they had to do (and all they have to do now) is ask for the digits in any order and this problem goes away. The keylogger would eventually know which numbers are in your 6 digit pin but never what order, and as there is a 3 (or 4 ?) tries lockout then they wont be able to get in unless they are very lucky guessers.
I have HSBC internet banking and it never actually dawned on me how obvious this problem is, I don't think I ever noticed that they only ever ask in ascending order, but thats the beauty of it I guess.
Parent
The majority of online systems (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:The majority of online systems (Score:5, Funny)
Parent
So what's the best real solution to the problem? (Score:4, Interesting)
As a vendor of a web-based, access-restricted product, keyloggers are a real issue. I've been considering setting up client-side SSL certificates in order to restrict access to only machines that have been "set up" in order to deal with the problem of keyloggers. Are there better solutions?
Does this bank have something that's: A) Easy to use, B) doesn't require painful machine-by-machine setup, and C) significantly improves security?
If so, I just might be interested!
Re:So what's the best real solution to the problem (Score:3, Interesting)
You type in your account id (keylogger can pick this up obviously), then you are presented with an on screen keypad where you enter your pin number with the mouse. 4 digit pin number ( easy to remember), the numbers are in a different location on the on screen keypad every time. The only way any spyware can capture this would be with screen captures on every mouse click. I am not sure there are many spywares that go to the
Re:So what's the best real solution to the problem (Score:3, Interesting)
Thats the best m
How to trick key loggers (Score:4, Funny)
More so if I screw up the last attempt and have to request a new password.
Another simple solution is to keep your password in a text file and copy / paste it in.
Or your password could just be ******* that would work a treat...
Fud... or at least, way overhyped (Score:4, Informative)
This is the one researchers have probably defeated, that too when they have a keylogger installed on *my* computer.
A similar problem exists in meatspace (Score:4, Interesting)
-BbT
HSBC Security Flaw, 1 login attempt (Score:3, Funny)
Another HSBC Security Flaw has been found. If you are logging into your account, and somebody is looking over your shoulder while you're doing it, odds are they can determine your username & password after only 1 successful login attempt.
How to fix this (Score:3, Interesting)
So who should we look to for an answer? ING Direct [ingdirect.com]! They use a two step process to log in. The first is a non-descript customer number. This step would be defeated by a keylogger or if someone had some mail stolen. Step two is to ask you to answer a pair of personal questions only you know the answer to. Still this could be defeated by a keylogger. The third step is pure genius though. First of all the page displays an image and phrase that you pre-selected. While a keylogger might pick up this phrease during account setup it would not pick up the image. If the image is not present, you are instructed not to enter your PIN number. Then the entering of the PIN number is via a keypad that you click with your mouse. Each number corresponds to a random letter that changes everytime you log in. If you choose you can type in the letter that corresponds to each number for that log in. In this case the data a keylogger might capture would be useless. This is the best security feature on the website and ensures almost nobody except the account owner can ever log in. Of course if the PIN is compromised then the whole system breaks down but a smart user will never have a compromised PIN.
Wierd... (Score:3, Funny)
Google's out to hijack my machine! ; )
Re:What, they can't type? (Score:3)
Re:What, they can't type? (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:security through obscurity? (Score:3, Insightful)
Since when are banks required to protect themselves against people who have keyloggers on their computers? Not really much one can do IMHO if there's a keylogger present...
I guess the only way around it is to have a pin pad and use the mouse to enter in your pin code as well as your pass code.
W00t. Three tiered logins. Fun stuff.