Stories
Slash Boxes
Comments

News for nerds, stuff that matters

Slashdot Log In

Log In

Create Account  |  Retrieve Password

Hackers Clone Passports In Driveby RFID Heist

Posted by CmdrTaco on Wed Feb 04, 2009 08:48 AM
from the well-not-exactly dept.
pnorth writes "A hacker has shown how easy it is to clone US passport cards that use RFID by conducting a drive-by test on the streets of San Francisco. Chris Paget, director of research and development at Seattle-based IOActive, used a $250 Motorola RFID reader and an antenna mounted in a car's side window and drove for 20 minutes around San Francisco, with a colleague videoing the demonstration. During the demonstration he picked up the details of two US passport cards. Using the data gleaned it would be relatively simple to make cloned passport cards he said. Paget is best known for having to abandon presenting a paper at the Black Hat security conference in Washington in 2007 after an RFID company threatened him with legal action." Apparently this is a little unfair — he sniffed the data, he didn't actually make a fake passport.
+ -
story

Related Stories

[+] Your Rights Online: South Africa Rolls Out Biometric Passports 60 comments
volume4 writes "The South African Department of Home Affairs has begun rolling out security enhanced passports to new applicants from this week. A facility in Pretoria which prints the new passports was officially opened last week by the minister of home affairs, Nosiviwe Mapisa-Nqakula. The new passports have an embedded RFID chip which stores the owner's biometric information, including personal details, a high-resolution colour photograph and fingerprint information."
This discussion has been archived. No new comments can be posted.
The Fine Print: The following comments are owned by whoever posted them. We are not responsible for them in any way.
 Full
 Abbreviated
 Hidden
More
Loading... please wait.
  • by uncledrax (112438) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:52AM (#26723981) Homepage

    Jules Verne called, he wants his time-machine back.

    Dupe story:
    http://it.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=09/02/02/2224255 [slashdot.org]

    • That's how good these hackers are. Not only did they dupe a passport RFID, but they duped the news of their hack too!! Soon they will duplicate themselves and all kinds of deja vu is going to happen.

    • by Anonymous Coward on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:50AM (#26724613)

      H. G. Wells called. He wants his story back.

  • Why is this unfair? (Score:4, Interesting)

    by jimwelch (309748) <jimwelchokNO@SPAMgmail.com> on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:54AM (#26723993) Homepage Journal

    The RFID is the most important part. Check the rest of the web for more info.

    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      True. Your computer records matching up is becoming increasingly more important than you actually showing up. A matching RFID would make things much easier.
      • this kind of technology makes people and their information LESS secure, rather than more. Because it makes it far too easy to read someone else's information and clone it.

        The RFID Nazis will be quick to tell you that there is also a unique encryption key in the passports, but as has been pointed out elsewhere, only 5 of the 45 signatory nations supply their keys to the international database, and as long as any of those 45 nations fail to do so, the keys are meaningless because it is possible to clone pa
    • Check the rest of the web for more info.

      I've been checking the rest of the web, and so far I've come up with almost nothing but porn. I don't see what that has to do with RIFD's...

      • by orclevegam (940336) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @11:00AM (#26725843) Journal

        That's just not true. Maybe *you* should check the rest of the web for more info. [state.gov] The RFID chip only stores a database key - everything else is grabbed from the database using that key. In other words cloning somebody else's RFID is pointless because then it'll be showing the original owner's photo on the security guy's computer display. If the security guy isn't paying attention, then that's a problem with or without the RFID.

        Ok, so instead of grabbing the RFID of the first guy that walks past, instead they wait around until they see someone that fairly closely resembles them and take that RFID instead.

        Passports aren't even the biggest concern here though, it's more the move to put RFID into all manner if inappropriate items like credit cards, phones (which are then tied to credit cards), clothing (yes really, and not just for inventory tracking), and probably lots of other things we haven't thought of yet. It's one thing for them to clone your passport, it's another entirely for them to clone your credit card.

        Also, the passport card isn't even required.

        ... yet. Pretty soon it will be mandatory, and destroying the RFID chip in your passport will invalidate the passport and earn you a full body cavity search for your trouble no doubt.

        • by techess (1322623) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @03:20PM (#26729163)

          You may not even have to find someone who looks all that similar. My husband and I just got our passports renewed and the new "theft prevention" measures makes id'ing someone by the photo difficult. There are so many wavy multicolored lines over the picture that it is very difficult to make out any distinguishing features. We can barely recognize ourselves.

          • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

            You don't even even seem to know what the passport card is or you would realize why it will never be mandatory. It's a passport replacement for people who live near the border, who frequently need to travel accross the border. It allows you to get into/out of Canada, Mexico, Bermuda, and a couple of Carribean countries. Making it required would just be silly. Get a clue.

            And about regular passports...

            You missed the point entirely. I wasn't saying the passport card would be mandatory, but that they'll try to make having a RFID enabled passport mandatory. That is, there' won't be a "regular passport", only RFID passports.

            Do you have any evidence at all to support the "destroying the RFID chip will invalidate the passport" claim? I think you're just making shit up to scare people.

            I'm not claiming it's currently illegal to do so, or that doing so will invalidate the passport currently, I'm just saying that's the way I think they'll steer it. If it becomes regular practice to destroy the RFID chip they'll pass legislation making it illegal to destroy it, and if it i

          • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

            The passport card is just a stop-gap measure for use until the DHS can bludgeon all the states into implementing the Real ID requirements. Once everyone with a driver's license is Real ID'd, they'll start adding the RFID (they've already specified a lot of information has to be added to the "MRZ" - machine readable zone, they just haven't yet specified that the MRZ has to be implemented with RFID). Once they get the facial recognition stuff working right, they won't need the reader to track you, they'll h
  • by nehumanuscrede (624750) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:58AM (#26724027)

    Recall the man who made his own airline tickets
    not all that long ago?

    Recall the sh*t storm that brought about ?

    Folks are learning the best way to keep the
    lawyers and police off their back is to prove
    the point, but don't go as far as producing any
    thing illegal.

  • by redelm (54142) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:59AM (#26724033) Homepage
    Seriously ... not tinfoil hats but around your wallet. These RFIDs seem to have greater range than advertised and that is a huge security risk for sniffing.

    Some sort of Faraday Cage will block RFID, or at least their power supply. I do not know whether ferromatnetics like iron and steel are more effective than non-magnetics like aluminum.

    • by jo_ham (604554) <joham@j o - h am.com> on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:01AM (#26724051)

      I was going to post this too. A simple solution would be to make a passport holder that blocked the RFID signals, that you could purchase if you wanted to be sure your details weren't being scanned from afar.

      • A simpler solution would be for the U.S. government to stop paying taxpayer money to embed RFID chips into passports. That saves money and eliminates the risks to everyone, not just the tech-savvy.

        I wonder how much money the government would save if they just stopped doing everything that is stupid. (I realize that in order to do that Congress would have to agree on what constitutes stupidity, and agreeing on things ain't their strong suit. Still, I wonder how much money.)

        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          A cellphone has a powered transmitter, and a boosted receiver with a specialised antenna. An RFID chip must rely solely on the radio energy it receives to power itself up and transmit back, so I'm not sure that a cellphone is an adequate test.

          The signal power you're talking about for a phone is going to be so much higher, and likely at totally different frequencies.

          I think the only way to test it effectively would be to see if the RFID reader at the airport still works with the wallet, assuming the person w

    • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

      Thinkgeek actually makes a passport holder that blocks RFID signals. http://www.thinkgeek.com/gadgets/security/910f/ [thinkgeek.com]
      • Just replying to confirm that the ThinkGeek wallets DO, in fact, work as advertised. I realized this after trying to leave my office's parking lot by fruitlessly waiving my newly-acquired RFID-blocking wallet (with parking pass inside) at the entry gate's sensor.

  • How's it unfair? (Score:4, Informative)

    by jc42 (318812) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:59AM (#26724035) Homepage Journal

    The summary clearly says:

    During the demonstration he picked up the details of two US passport cards. Using the data gleaned it would be relatively simple to make cloned passport cards he said.

    Anyone with even minimal English fluency would understand this as saying that he collected the data but didn't do anything with it.

    We don't even need an automotive analogy, since the data was collected from one car by reading passport RFIDs in other passing cars.

      • by Hyppy (74366) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:42AM (#26725511)
        I'm not sure what your definition of "stealing" is, but he certainly didn't deprive the people of their personal information.

        The RFID chips in the passports are designed to spew forth their data when asked for it. You can't accuse someone of "stealing" information that they read off a billboard, which is effectively how the RFID chips in these passports work. (I said effectively, so don't go down the tired road of debating which perfect analogy fits)
  • Protective Sleeve (Score:5, Informative)

    by Jamie's Nightmare (1410247) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @08:59AM (#26724037)

    The Passport Card comes with a protective sleeve lined with foil on the inside designed to prevent such an intrusion.

    Per usual, security usually fails because of the user.

    • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

      The protective sleeve only works if you never have to open the passport.

      Of course, you might want to open the passport to, say, actually use it as ID. Or maybe just to let something read the RFID chip...

    • by houghi (78078) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:36AM (#26724399) Homepage

      The thing is very small. I have embedded it in a pilots cap, that way I have an alibi that I was elsewhere when I actually am somewhere completely different. The governement things they are smart, but I am one step ahead of them.

      Be explaining more later, but there is a knock on the door.

    • by qazwart (261667) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:44AM (#26724495) Homepage

      Making security difficult and then blaming people for its failure is no solution.

      For example, computers could be much more secure if people change their passwords every month and passwords must be a string of at least 120 random letters. Except that everyone will write down their password or never log out or let their computer go to sleep. You now have your nice super-duper security protocol all set, but your computer is less secure than ever because you've made it impossible to use.

      How many people will use that sleeve if you have to struggle with it every time you have to show your passport? How long will that sleeve last? How vulnerable do people understand their passport to be? Do people even understand that their passport could be read while riding in a taxi?

      A better solution would be to put this "sleeve" inside the passport. The pages where the RFID chip is on should be the sleeve. When the passport is closed, the chip is protected. The chip can only be read when the passport is opened.

      Of course, that's even if this type of security even works.

    • Re:Protective Sleeve (Score:5, Informative)

      by dotancohen (1015143) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:50AM (#26724601) Homepage

      The Passport Card comes with a protective sleeve lined with foil on the inside designed to prevent such an intrusion.

      Per usual, security usually fails because of the user.

      I don't know about the Passport Card, but the US Passport comes with no such sleeve.

      • Re:Protective Sleeve (Score:4, Informative)

        by NeutronCowboy (896098) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @01:07PM (#26727543)

        I believe the foil sleeve is actually built into the binding. My girlfriend got a new passport, and the cover and back are a lot thicker than the old passports. It seems that there is some extra layer in there.

        I haven't tested the efficiency of the new passport design, but I'll be getting a passport carrier that is lined with foil.

    • -1, Wrong (Score:5, Insightful)

      by u38cg (607297) <calum@callingthetune.co.uk> on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:00AM (#26724751) Homepage
      Security doesn't fail because of the user; if the user is getting it wrong then it is bad security. Theoretical security is (in principle) not hard. Practical security is very hard indeed, and easy to get wrong. Is there any reason this card needs RFID as opposed to a standard credit-card style chip which requires physical contact?
      • Is there any reason this card needs RFID as opposed to a standard credit-card style chip which requires physical contact?

        You can't expect government workers to have the motivation to slide a card into a reader. Next to the reader is the best you're gonna get. It's in their contract or something.

        • Quite. And in a more general sense: Can (we) geeks in general PLEASE stop referring to users as "stupid" simply because they are NOT AS DEEPLY INTO THE SAME SHIT WE ARE?! I'm highly intelligent (recorded IQ over 160), and frankly, I HAVE OTHER STUFF ON MY MIND when I'm traveling (like "Where's the freakin WC?", and "After 19 hours in the air, I'm hungry and tired and miserable."). For dear FSM's sake, if there is anything wrong with security design -- or product design in general -- all over the Earth it
    • Re:Protective Sleeve (Score:4, Interesting)

      by Shadow-isoHunt (1014539) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:12AM (#26724989) Homepage
      Actually the sleeve tends to make the passport stay partially open and act as a parabola, amplifying the signal from a distance.
  • by Bearhouse (1034238) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:07AM (#26724115)

    As a very frequent traveller, (including to some fairly scary places), I always keep my passport on me. I've stuck some plastic tinfoil (use an emergency blanket) inside the wallet pocket where I keep the passport. Works a treat. Why do this, well:

    1. FTA:

    Using the data gleaned it would be relatively simple to make cloned passport cards he said. Real passport cards also support a âkill codeâ(TM) (which can wipe the cardâ(TM)s data) and a âlock codeâ(TM) that prevents the tagâ(TM)s data being changed.

    However he believes these are not currently being used and even if they were the radio interrogation is done in plain text so is relatively easy for a hacker to collect and analyse.

    2. What information can they get? Well, depending on the passport type, at least your picture, and sometimes your fingerprints too.
    See:
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biometric_passport [wikipedia.org]

    And all this while you are having a drink at a roadside café with your passport 'safely' in your pocket...

    • How did you test this to make sure?

      • How did you test this to make sure?

        In a link in the old article was the full testing. In a nutshell, they cloned some Washington Drivers licenses into the same chip. Then tested sending the kill command at low power, when there is not enough power to complete the operation, the chip reports a low power comman fail. After the power needed to produce low power fails and kills, it was tested on real licenses to see if the kill was enabled or protected by a PIN. It is unprotected.

        Here is the info;
        PDF alert

    • by swillden (191260) <shawn-ds@willden.org> on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:22AM (#26725135) Homepage Journal

      I always keep my passport on me. I've stuck some plastic tinfoil (use an emergency blanket) inside the wallet pocket where I keep the passport.

      Note that you're talking about something completely different.

      The US passport CARD is different from the passport BOOK which you use in international travel. The passport card only works when traveling between the US and Canada or Mexico; it's not accepted anywhere else.

      If your passport BOOK is a US-issued one, you don't need the tinfoil because it's already built into the cover. Even if it weren't, the BOOK requires a cryptographic authentication using a key derived from data printed on the inside of the book, so someone has to either see the inside of your book or guess the data.

      The CARD does not require cryptographic authentication and has no closeable cover.

      • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

        Although the cover may protect it, data encryption by itself won't protect you from malicious people keeping track of your movements. It's an easy thing to keep track of say everyone's movements at some kind of gate, and later adding a photo to whatever unique encrypted data is read from the chip. I could gather a few months worth of data at a public place, then pinpoint someone in a crowd and see exactly how often they were there, how long, and so on. All it takes is one easy unique way to distinguish a
        • Re: (Score:3, Informative)

          Assuming the document ID (any identifiable string) can be determined at a distance, yes.

          There are two solutions to this. The first is the fact that the RF technology used by these chips does not work well at long ranges. In lab environments it's possible to get distances of up to a meter, but in the real world the limit is around 10 cm, assuming nothing is between card antenna and reader antenna (and assuming reader antenna is a high-gain type). The super long-range stunts you read about use a battery-

  • by brufar (926802) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:30AM (#26724337)

    Apparently this is a little unfair- he sniffed the data, he didn't actually make a fake passport.

    Of course he only sniffed the data and didn't make a fake passport.. If merely sniffing the data proves your point, why would you subject yourself to penalties for forgery ?

    U.S.C. Â 1543 provides:

    Whoever falsely makes, forges, counterfeits, mutilates, or alters any passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, with intent that the same may be used; or

    Whoever willfully and knowingly uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use any such false, forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered passport or instrument purporting to be a passport, or any passport validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition therein prescribed invalidating the same

    Shall be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

    I certainly would have stopped at successfully sniffing the data. besides all a terrorist has to do is rig the bomb so it will automatically go off when it detects a pre-specified number of US RFID passports in the vicinity.. Now, don't you feel that RFID in your passport has made you more secure ?

  • Security threat (Score:5, Interesting)

    by grolaw (670747) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:32AM (#26724347) Journal

    Imagine how easily US Citizens can be found in a crowd. I wonder if the RFID "lighthouse" in my passport will put me at a higher risk than other nation's citizens?

    • Re:Security threat (Score:5, Interesting)

      by vlm (69642) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:50AM (#26724623)

      Imagine how easily US Citizens can be found in a crowd. I wonder if the RFID "lighthouse" in my passport will put me at a higher risk than other nation's citizens?

      RFID passports are the ultimate tool for terrorists. You have to wonder if the government people pushing them are sleeper cell agents or something. Maybe just good ole americans but taking bribes from terrorists.

      In the old days they set off IEDs using switches. Follow the wires back to they hidey hold and shoot them. End of terror threat.

      Then they moved to cell phone (a most impressive "ringtone"). With some cooperation w/ the phone company, you track down the caller and shoot them (only the stupid ones of course, the smart ones smash the caller phone seconds after the callee phone goes boom and both will have clean records)

      Now you just build a mine that waits for a passport RFID. No need to decode fully, just, is there a passport signal, if so kaboom. No way whatsoever to stop them anymore.

      You're doing a heck of a job, american passport design department! Heck of a job stacking up american corpses I mean.

        • Re: (Score:3, Insightful)

          You're missing the point.

          It doesn't need a very large power source. It's still a landmine, and it needs to be very near to its target to have maximum effect. So, use weight or inductance or whatever to trigger the thing, not to explode, but to look for RFID tags. The rest of the time the added parts can be powered completely off.

          The antenna isn't really much of a problem. RFID is generally UHF, which penetrates stuff pretty well, while still high enough in frequency that a surprisingly high amount of an

  • More details (Score:4, Interesting)

    by Muad'Dave (255648) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:51AM (#26724629) Homepage

    The information he read was from an EPC Class1 Gen2 [epcglobalinc.org] encoded UHF tag. It was encoded as a Global Document Type Identifier (GDTI-96) [epcglobalinc.org]. The Company Prefix is 0893599002, and the Document Type is 1. The serial numbers of the documents are there, but I'm not going to post them. I don't have access to the GS1 [gs1us.org] Company Prefix database, and it's not searchable here [gs1.org]. - anyone else have those mappings?

    It is trivial to program an arbitrary tag ID into a blank Gen2 tag - I do it all the time wrt DOD-encoded tags.

  • by Logical Zebra (1423045) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @09:55AM (#26724677)

    What is the point in putting RFID into passports other than to make them easier targets for cracking?

    Why not just use a smart card similar to the Common Access Card (CAC) used by the U.S. Department of Defense [wikipedia.org]? Those things can store a lot of data, are very easy to use, and cannot be hacked remotely via RFID equipment.

    • by swillden (191260) <shawn-ds@willden.org> on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:27AM (#26725253) Homepage Journal

      Why not just use a smart card similar to the Common Access Card (CAC) used by the U.S. Department of Defense [wikipedia.org]? Those things can store a lot of data, are very easy to use, and cannot be hacked remotely via RFID equipment.

      The chips in passport books (not cards) ARE the same sort of device that's in the CAC. The old CAC cards are contact-only, which doesn't work well for a passport book because it would be difficult to build a reader. The CACs are being replaced by PIV cards which are dual-interface (contact and contactless).

      Other than the contact vs RF interface, though, these so-called RFIDs in passport books (not cards) are exactly the same sort of technology as CAC cards. The chips have plenty of storage and provide cryptographic authentication capabilities.

      It appears that a different, longer-range technology with no cryptographic authentication requirements was used for the passport cards.

      Don't get one. Get a passport book. It costs a little more, but it can be used for visiting countries other than Canada and Mexico, and it doesn't have these security issues.

  • by thethibs (882667) on Wednesday February 04 2009, @10:12AM (#26724979) Homepage

    Apparently this is a little unfair- he sniffed the data, he didn't actually make a fake passport

    Perhaps he wanted to avoid going to jail? This is a case where it's sufficient to show that a forgery is possible, without breaking the law and actually doing it.

    • Re: (Score:3, Interesting)

      Is his gear fast enough to sniff passports from cars moving at highway speeds? He could drive on public highways leading to the airport, or just sit in the parking lot of gas stations close to the airport.

      • Dammit, you've just ensured that next time I'm a little early to pick someone up from the airport, I'll be moved on from the nearby gas station's carpark by Homeland Security officers and forced to pay the exhorbitant rates for short term airport parking instead.
    • Depending on the range of the device, he'd just have to drive around a residential neighborhood. But how many Americans actually have passports these days?