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Aging Security Vulnerability Still Allows PC Takeover
Posted by
Zonk
on Tue Mar 04, 2008 08:44 AM
from the there-are-issues-here-and-perhaps-they-should-be-investigated dept.
from the there-are-issues-here-and-perhaps-they-should-be-investigated dept.
Jackson writes "Adam Boileau, a security consultant based in New Zealand has released a tool that can unlock Windows computers in seconds without the need for a password. By connecting a Linux machine to a Firewire port on the target machine, the tool can then modify Windows' password protection code and render it ineffective. Boileau said he did not release the tool publicly in 2006 because 'Microsoft was a little cagey about exactly whether Firewire memory access was a real security issue or not and we didn't want to cause any real trouble'. But now that a couple of years have passed and the issue has not resolved, Boileau decided to release the tool on his website."
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Again (Score:5, Informative)
Re:Yes, yes, another anti-windows story (Score:4, Funny)
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Re:Yes, yes, another anti-windows story (Score:4, Funny)
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*listens closely* (Score:5, Funny)
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The hard part is... (Score:3, Insightful)
(The only ones at my workplace are the two I put firewire cards in. Don't ask, it's complicated.)
Re:The hard part is... (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:The hard part is... (Score:4, Informative)
It could be due to the environment you work in, but there's at least 6 laptops in this office that I can think of that have firewire on them. One is a Toshiba, and the others are a mix of Dell and Lenovos. If I think harder about it, I'm pretty sure the laptops that were sent out to our regional managers (all over the U.S.) had firewire as well. It is worth mentioning that all of these laptops are less than 2 years old, as we went through a refresh not that long ago.
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Re:firewire has been around for longer than you th (Score:5, Informative)
That's IEEE 1394 sir. IEEE is an institute.
</technical bitching>
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Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Re:The hard part is... (Score:4, Insightful)
If they could access the firewire port via an internet connection, THEN I'd consider this a leak.
You could also tweak the system by opening the case and removing the hard drive, or just attaching a thumb drive and copying all the data.
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Re: (Score:3, Funny)
Re:The hard part is... (Score:5, Funny)
You must have one sexy PC!
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Re:The hard part is... (Score:4, Insightful)
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host memory! (Score:5, Insightful)
Re:host memory! (Score:4, Interesting)
Actually, what do I know? But I do believe that Firewire doesn't have the concept of host and slave nodes. All nodes on a Firewire network are equivalent AFAIK.
If it were necessary to explictly allow direct memory access on a node whenever it was requested, you would not be able to plug a Firewire cable into a control-less box (for example) and do things with it, without first accessing the control-less box through a non-Firewire method to enable Firewire DMA.
Anyway, that's my ignorance on the subject. And as Adam Boileau says, it is a Feature, not a Bug. It is intended behaviour, so there must be a good reason (even if it is not the above).
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Re:host memory! (Score:4, Insightful)
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Re:host memory! (Score:5, Interesting)
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Physical access (Score:3, Insightful)
-Nick
Up to a point. (Score:3, Interesting)
A lot of workplaces will have physically secured machines but nonetheless with ports open. People might notice if you remove a server from a rack to access its insides, but just plugging in a cable?
Yes offcourse, not that many machines have firewire and servers are even rarer (although my pc has a port) but still, there is a major difference between the access needed to open a PC and gets its HD and just plugging in a cable.
See it as the difference between having to steal secret documents and being able t
Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
That's certainly not true. To use one of a huge multitude of examples, students at my school had physical access to the machines in the computer lab, but it would definitely be a problem if they installed a keylogger to sniff other students' passwords.
Re:Physical access (Score:5, Interesting)
In case of most of hardware with mid-to-high physical security you need some 15 minutes of totally unsupervised access, it involves removing the case (to reset the BIOS password), rebooting the system (sometimes by power cycling) and generally implies very dirty and easy to detect hack - you do gain the access but you're not stealthy at it.
You plug the inconspicuous cable in the side/back of the PC, stash the laptop under the desk, and walk away whistling quietly. Then you sit down, access your laptop from another one through wi-fi then proceed to download contents of the compromised box, over the firewire cable.
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Done previously (Score:5, Informative)
Re: (Score:3)
Re: (Score:3, Informative)
Also affects OS X and linux (Score:5, Informative)
As well, as Linux, as reported in an earlier 2005 report about this firewire feature: http://www.matasano.com/log/695/windows-remote-memory-access-though-firewire/ [matasano.com]
Probably for lower overhead (Score:5, Interesting)
Well, if Firewire has the same capability, it would explain why it is much lower overhead than USB, but it would also allow for things like this.
In general, DMA is probably something that needs to be looked at being cleaned up/reworked. It is a non-trivial cause of system instability: Hardware goes nuts (or maybe driver orders hardware to so something stupid), craps on memory it shouldn't system goes down. However anything like that is going to take a back seat to performance, at least in regular PCs. As nice as it would be to have the CPU fully in charge of everything, people aren't going to put up with it if it means a 10x drop in performance.
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Re:Probably for lower overhead (Score:5, Informative)
Firewire was built a hot swappable, high speed replacement for SCSI, and is really more analogous to SATA than USB, but people compare them because they're both used as external buses for peripherals. USB was designed explicitly as a low speed, low power, low cost small peripheral handler (e.g. mice and keyboards) to replace a variety of miscellaneous specialized plugs such as game ports, parallel port, serial port, etc, and thus cost was most important and speed least. Firewire put speed first and cost last. As far as Firewire goes, I think a battle may be coming, with SATA's external plug eSATA, as I expect it to make some gains in the peripheral market, especially in storage. eSATA actually has an advantage over Firewire, because the actual device used for storage is often IDE and therefore Firewire has some conversion to do (ATA is the protocol, IDE the device - often they're used interchangeably).
The problem here is gullibility. Think of it like social engineering - someone calls and asks "We are verifying your bank account pin, can you give it to us?" and you saying sure - it's 1234! That's a lot like what this program is doing. In this case, the device at one end is saying can I have access to your memory? And the device on the other end is saying sure, despite the fact that that giving write access to memory is a lot like giving away your bank account pin (which is why it's really an OS issue, not a firewire issue). Some OS's like Linux only give read access, which means you can see what is in the account, but not take anything out, but Linux (and Windows) allow this to be set by the foreign controller, which is a bug.
DMA access should be limited to non-system memory, if allowed. Unfortunately, that isn't very controllable by current computer designs. I believe the solution proposed and implemented (I've heard about this for Windows 8, I believe) is encrypted floating addresses, so even if you have direct access to memory you don't know where to write it.
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"If someone does plug into your port unexpectedly" (Score:4, Insightful)
"You see, this serious security problem was designed in from the start, so therefore... it's not a problem! Ta-da!"
Physical Security (Score:5, Insightful)
In related news... (Score:5, Funny)
Why doesn't MS disable the port on lock? (Score:4, Insightful)
Linux has the same security hole (Score:5, Informative)
Linux has this same bug. It's in "ohci1394.c". I reported this to the Linux kernel mailing list years ago, and the reaction of the kernel developers was to make it a "feature" for "remote debugging" that's enabled by default.
Technically, here's how it works. First, see the OHCI specification [intel.com], section 5.15, "Physical Upper Bound register". This determines the highest memory address into which an external device can store directly by sending a packet. If set to zero, this feature is disabled. That feature is intended for slave devices, like peripherals. On computers with an operating system, it should be zero. It's not.
In the Linux kernel, that security hole was installed in "ohci1394.c" with the comment:
/* Turn on phys dma reception.
*
* TODO: Enable some sort of filtering management.
*/
In early kernels, it was unconditionally enabled [peanuts.gr.jp]. In 2.6, it's enabled by default, but can be turned off.
Also, This patch [in-berlin.de] indicates that this security hole may have been designed into some FireWire controllers, so that the "upper bound register" didn't really do anything, but read back zero.
Doesn't matter (Score:5, Insightful)
The correct solution would be to map the FireWire address space into virtual memory, but this has to be done at the hardware level.
Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:4, Insightful)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
If it doesn't require rebooting, then it's a step above everything else because you don't have to mess with bios boot passwords and hard disk passwords (which my work requires you use).
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
It's all very well to say if someone has physical access all security is compromised. That doesn't mean you need to make it as easy and quick as possible. Now if you lock your computer and pop to the bathroom, a visitor could be in and out of your PC before you get back.
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
How about apathy? They'll wake up when and if they ever lose market share because of their shoddy product. I mean come on, if I can sell a Yugo at Escalade prices, why should I produce a quality product? That would be stupid. And if I could sell Yugos at Escalade prices I think my arrogance would be understandable and forgivable.
They've been selling an insecure OS for as long as PCs have been networked, why should they secure it now?
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Interesting)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Informative)
Some Mac people figured it out early (at least by 2001)
http://rentzsch.com/macosx/securingFirewire
The FreeBSD people were already using it way back in 2002, quote:
"As you know, IEEE1394 is a bus and OHCI supports physical access to the host memory. This means that you can access the remote host over firewire without software support at the remote host. In other words, you can investigate remote host's physical memory whether its OS is alive or crashed or hangs up"
In other words it doesn't matter what OS it is or whether there is even an OS.
Oh yeah there's also "Linux Kernel debugging over Firewire" but that's recent - 2006.
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Firewire Target Disk Mode (Score:4, Informative)
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Insightful)
If you have an IOMMU (e.g. on a decent Sun workstation), you can set up page tables for each device so that they DMA into a virtual address space. Your driver can then define regions which the device can access transparently. On newer AMD chips, you have a Device Exclusion Vector (DEV). The DEV is a sort of IOMMU-lite. It performs access control, but not translation. This means that the host OS (or driver) can mark each page of physical memory as read / write accessible on a per-device basis. On these machines, a well-designed OS or driver could prevent these attacks.
On other systems, it is not possible to prevent this attack. It's also a known problem on FreeBSD and OS X. OpenBSD does not implement FireWire support for the explicit reason that it is impossible to do securely on most systems.
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:4, Insightful)
Did you read the article or did you just check the headline and decide to try get cheap mod points? Ill point out why you dont deserve them.
'Paul Ducklin, head of technology for security firm Sophos, said the security hole found by Boileau was not a vulnerability or bug in the traditional sense, because the ability to use the Firewire port to access a computer's memory was actually a feature of Firewire.'
Now maybe this was just excuses but the fact it came from a third party with no particular connection to MS should have made you pause for thought. Even if you dont know much about firewire it would take you moments to do a quick search and actually realise this is a 'feature' of the actual specification itself. As in _every_ O/S had the same problem. Linux, OSX even BSD were using this exploit even before MS were cracked. There are still reports of new OSX and Linux systems being hacked by firewire right in to 2008. (Though admitedly ive not heard much from BSD, probably because there admins tend to actually have a clue.)
This is a universal flaw in security stemming from naivety with regard to externally connected hardware. You want secure firewire, disable it when you are not using it yourself. That goes for any system, any O/S, any person. End of story.
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Re:Breathtaking Arrogance or Stupidity? (Score:5, Funny)
Which is it?
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Re: (Score:3, Insightful)
Here's the thing though: this requires physical access. That makes it a low-salience attack, because gaining that kind of access is only an iota easier than pointing a gun at someone's head and demanding their password.
Re:Interesting, but (Score:4, Informative)
Plus, if you were to break into an office you could steal all kinds of stuff from the computers without the owner knowing it had been done. Things that come to mind are architecture drawings, patents, and reading all the CEO's emails.
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Re:Who cares? (Score:4, Insightful)
1) The attack effects Linux, Mac, and Windows
2) This is a very interesting hack, very worthy of slashdot. This is why I read slashdot in the first place. 2) I hate reading some guy's baseless rant. Go back to Digg.
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Re:2 Year bug report.. (Score:4, Informative)
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