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Bruce Schneier on Security Tradeoffs
Posted by
CowboyNeal
on Sat Sep 06, 2003 08:30 AM
from the price-of-freedom dept.
from the price-of-freedom dept.
Anonymous Smile writes "Business Week has an interview with Bruce Schneier on his new book 'Beyond Fear.' He talks about the tradeoffs we've made in the name of increased security. (hint: we've done a poor job so far) Bruce furthers his tradition of being accessible by the non-technical crowd."
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I like this statement (Score:5, Insightful)
Hopefully some bright men in the EU parliament will consider the laws passed in the USA before they blindly try to copy them into laws applying in European countries..
Re:I like this statement (Score:2, Interesting)
You might be making the assumption that EU parliamentarians aren't in the firing line of lobbyists and corporate moneymen.
At least some of the decisions made in the US were with an eye to the "security industry". There's money to be made in the EU too, and it's unlikely they'll have failed to notice. Laws passed which end up giving those in
Can't help it... (Score:2, Interesting)
Re:Can't help it... (Score:4, Insightful)
"I'd rather accept the slight risk of attack than constantly live in fear."
Parent
Sounds interesting (Score:5, Interesting)
We've all heard the absurd stories like a woman being forced to drink her breastmilk (in bottles) to prove it wasn't some type of explosive or whatever the hell they thought it could have been.
Yet I remember reading on Michael Moore's website about how right after 9/11 he noticed that despite the fact that nail clippers weren't allowed on planes, matches and lighters were because the Tobacco industry had complained to the government that not allowing matches doesn't allow their customers to light up once they get off the plane.
Later they were put back on the list of prohibited items but it's stuff like that which makes the whole security thing seem totally absurd sometimes.
Re:Sounds interesting (Score:2)
Re:Sounds interesting (Score:5, Insightful)
But we're still better off talking and thinking about it, and consciously making those tradeoffs than just sticking our heads in the sand. These domestic security issues are also so fundamentally visible that they _are_ subject to feedback and criticism by the public - unlike obtuse IRS regulations, the absurdity of, for example, flagging every flyer with a one-way ticket for special security treatment, is eminently visible to every frequent business traveler. And thus there are a lot of us to whine, bitch and complain until something gets done about it.
I'm much more worried about the invisible stuff than the visible stuff (like nail clippers being banned from planes). The invisible stuff is the pressure exerted on ISPs, credit card companies, technology organizations, encryption researchers, etc. to "help combat terrorism" by reducing security, or opening and releasing personal information to the government. Because, doncha know, "hackers" are terrorists. What's a hacker? Well, you know, those "cybercriminals". And "identity thieves". And you never know who might be doing those things. And maybe tax evaders are also helping the terrorists - aren't they avoiding funding our fabulous military? And what about drug users - well, clearly, they are supporting terrorists, I mean, we saw the government make those claims in ads on TV.
That "with us or against us" attitude combined with the power of overreaching legislation like the Patriot Act makes me queasy about who or what comes next behind the scenes - the security we don't see at the airport, or in city hall, or on the streets during a festival or parade, and that does give me cause to worry. I don't have a perfect solution, other than that we, the technologically aware and literate, need to push our causes more, be more politically organized, and make sure that some portion of the citizenry is watching what the government is doing, and that we do a better job of getting that word out to the mass media, and to politicians.
Parent
Re:Sounds interesting (Score:5, Insightful)
I remember the days when I travelled via plane to Canada and the US, with my swiss army knife in my pocket. Fat chance of that ever happening again, and I can live with that, I suppose. But nail clippers, matches, and lighters? Does any of this strike anyone as paranoid to the point of absurdity?
The ironic thing is that any determined terrorist will find a way to do what they need, without having to resort to any of the banned items. Do you want to threaten someone with a dangerous object? There's many devices other than metal knives that will do the job. Want to set fire to something on a plane? The whole chemical world abounds with ways to ignite things. Want to clip your nails on a plane? Hey, any smart terrorist can find a way to make sure their nails are decently manicured before they hijack the transport they're on.
Let's face it. Security is not provided, in any way, by banning a whole bunch of little items. It is just a panacea for a nervous public, looking for action after some very troubling events. It is there to bolster confidence by providing a false sense of security. Succinctly, it's a PR exercise.
Parent
Re:Michael Moore (Score:2, Informative)
Schneier speaking (Score:5, Informative)
- designed the popular Blowfish encryption algorithm
- his Twofish was a finalist for the new Federal Advanced Encryption Standard (AES))
(I heard him talk about a year and a half ago)A study in contradictions (Score:2, Interesting)
Well, how would he know the risk of burglary? The risk of burglary is so multifactorial, does he just go on the statistics in his city as a whole? Does he consider taking into account that maybe there's been a rash of burglaries in his
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:3, Insightful)
Well, how would he know the risk of burglary?
He said:
I guess - putting words in his mouth - he would say his estimate of the burglary risk falls into this innate sense. He has a rough idea how often burglaries occur, he knows how accessible his back door is, and so on. It is in the case of exceptional or unfamiliar risks that people are not able to use their innate sense and are more likely to make or accept very
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:5, Interesting)
I used to work for a guy who had a saying on this subject: "Locks are to keep your friends out." That is to say, security measures impose barriers to unauthorized access, but these barriers are only so high -- if you have enemies willing to break down your door, locking it will not help you; if you don't, what function does locking serve?
Well, one function of a lock, or a password, is its social effect: it says, loud and clear, "Keep out -- this place is only for those who have the key." Most people want to think of themselves as nice and respectful people. Most people aren't crackers or thieves, and will respect a security measure simply because someone went to the bother of putting it there. Against these people, you set a password on your account simply so they will realize it is not a public resource. You lock your machine room door so they won't wander in randomly in search of a terminal to check their email.
Securing things against concerted attackers is different from securing them from wandering friends. You rarely need to enact security measures that will keep a concerted attacker out forever -- only ones that will keep him out long enough for you to notice his assault and cuff him. Bank safes are rated in minutes: rather than proclaiming a safe "uncrackable", the rating states how long a certain level of attacker will take, to crack the safe. So as long as the bank has their security guard come by more often than that, it doesn't matter that the safe isn't perfectly uncrackable.
Parent
Yes, absolutely (Score:5, Interesting)
Many home burglaries are done by youths, or people looking for easily-fencable goods (typically to support a drug habit of some kind)... few are done by pros. Some burglars will simply go around a neighborhood, trying doors until they find one that's unlocked. A simple deadbolt would go a long way toward deterring this kind of casual thief.
The professional is a VERY different animal, whether he's a car thief, or a home burglar. The determined car thief will bring along wheel dollies and a panel truck/trailer if he really wants your car... he might even line that trailer with metal screen if he's out to defeat your LoJack transmitter. Bottom line: it's very difficult to guard against a calculating, intelligent, and determined thief.
That said, simple measures will go a long way... to not even take simple measures to secure your home might even open you up to legal liability. If you have a pool, you must provide a secured enclosure or gate, lest a neighborhood kid drown (and you would be sued, likely successfully, for not having taken such a "reasonable" measure). If you own guns, it might be argued that you had the obligation to lock your doors... I certainly wouldn't want to be sued because a gun I owned wound up on the floor of a neighborhood Stop-N-Rob, next to a dead clerk, simply because some crystal-meth user was able to simply wander into my home and steal said gun... I can think of more than a few plaintiffs' attorneys that might argue that angle in a wrongful death suit.
Parent
Re:Yes, absolutely (Score:4, Insightful)
You know, it's interesting to take those comments in a computer-security context. Compromised machines are often used to send spam, conduct DDoS attacks, and otherwise wreak havok on the Internet -- many of them compromised by script kiddies, the "crystal-meth users" of the Internet. It seems odd then that while the average gun owner knows to take at least basic security precautions with his/her weapon, the average computer owner isn't even aware that a broadband internet connection can be used as a weapon.
How can user awareness be raised? Hell if I know. But it needs to be done: right now the Internet is like a row of houses where 90% have a loaded AK-47 lying on the front doorstep.
Parent
Re:A study in contradictions - time and noise (Score:3, Insightful)
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:2)
James
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:2, Funny)
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:4, Interesting)
I agree with you 100%. This response isn't arguing with your post, but your post did remind me of some thoughts i've had on this matter. The vast majority of the expenditures post 9/11 have been made to make people feel safer, rather then to actually increase their mathematical likelyhood of being safe.
In a sense, though, making sure the passengers feel safe is far more important than actually making them safe. I'm not trying to trivialize airline accidents, but we all know that hopping in a car is far more dangerous than hopping in a jet plane. The FAA doesn't have such strict regulations to bring down the number of crashes every year from 4 to 3. Those kind of numbers don't mean anything to the average person. Humans have a fundamental misunderstanding of the statistics involved, and no one would fly if they perceived the industry to be unsafe. I consider myself a rational person, and I know all the statistics, but I still feel less safe in a plane than I do in a car. No amount of improving the 'actual' security will change that. If you've ever taken a decisions sciences course, you'll know that even the brightest people in the workforce don't make perfectly rational decisions, but rather base them on stupid little things like the order that information is presented in.
What will change everyone's fear of flying is "window dressing," and, yes, I'm willing to pay the 9/11 security tax (or whatever it's called) to fool myself into thinking that there's probably not a terrorist on the plane. The government's role isn't just to operate in a vacuum and take actions that improve safety. The US government also has an obligation to maintain confidence in the airline industry. If having armed guards standing around the airport makes people more likely to fly, then it makes sense to have armed guards, regardless of their statistical effect on safety. And yes, I'm aware that all in all those armed guards are a waste of money. But, you have to make decisions within the constraints of your environment, and I truly believe that no amount of statistical understanding will change the way that the average American or non-American makes the decision to fly or drive.
Spending money to change perceptions is sometimes a rational tradeoff. However, reducing freedoms in order to increase perceptions of safety is simply not a reasonable tradeoff.
Parent
Re:A study in contradictions (Score:3, Interesting)
I came home one day from a long business trip. Spouse and kids were out of town. Noticed that the spouse had locked the inside basement door as usual while I was away. Heard a funny noise from the basement, thought "I must get down and
Security and reality (Score:3, Interesting)
Good read... (Score:3, Interesting)
Radical theory from Bruce Schneier: Power corrupts (Score:4, Insightful)
Re:Radical theory from Bruce Schneier: Power corru (Score:2)
This is the long form of "No comment."
Many times, I have seen politicians do this, and when a reporter persists repeatedly for a real answer to the question, the politician just gives him a sour look, as if to say, "Now, at this point, you're supposed to play by the 'rules,' be a good doggie and just go on to the next question, goddammit!"
Re:like duh (Score:2)
Politicians use double-speak when they're trying to evade tough questions without admitting they're evading them. But you would think he'd want give chapter and verse to a question like that, and should have.
Re:like duh (Score:2)
Re:like duh (Score:2)
Of course not. Simply a specific answer to a specific question: "which parts and why". Saying generally that the Patriot Act gives way too much power to law enforcement, is obvious and correct, but simply making a generic negative comment about the Patriot Act is not germane to the specific question. Which powers? The ability to kick in your door at 3am without a search warrant? And why would t
Re:Radical theory from Bruce Schneier: Power corru (Score:2)
It needs to be restated.
Re:Radical theory from Bruce Schneier: Power corru (Score:4, Insightful)
You know, the "power corrupts" comment is fairly common, but I think the issue is more complicated. Power certainly does corrupt a lot of people, but I don't think organizations like the FBI or CIA seek legislation like the Patriot Act because they are power hungry. They do it to make their job easier. Youth curfews, for example, are usually supported/sought by local police departments because it is easier for them if they can just tell a group of kids to go home. Some groups of kids will get into trouble if left unsupervised, but catching them in the act is tricky. So rather than try to catch individual acts of vandalism (or whatever), they would prefer to just keep all juveniles off the street.
Now, the argument should be whether we should allow them to make their jobs easier, and you have to address this issue on a case by case basis. I think most people would agree that not allowing weapons on board aircraft is a reasonable measure. However, I think most would agree that overarching legislation like the Patriot Act is certainly not reasonable. Both make the jobs of the enforcing agencies easier. But one is simply a deterrant, and the other allows for circumvention of judicial controls, like due process.
The problem is, a lot of enforcement agencies see due process as a hurdle they have to cross to catch criminals. Criminals can get away because you don't have a search warrant, or you don't have a wiretap warrant, or the evidence isn't sufficient.... In other words, you can't just look at somebody and say "I think he might be up to something" and throw him in jail. I think it is important for law enforcement agencies (and legislators) to realize that due process is important because, yes, people do make mistakes, and suspicious looking activity can be legitimate. So as for my original point, no I don't think this is just about a power struggle.
Parent
Secure my ass (Score:3, Insightful)
I don't worry about locking the back door... (Score:2, Funny)
Not anymore....
Merry Christmas to me!!! (Score:4, Funny)
Would somebody google his address and get back to me? I'm in the market for a new television and stereo!
Don't always believe what they say. (Score:3, Funny)
www.eviloverlord.com
Rule #9. I will not include a self-destruct mechanism unless absolutely necessary. If it is necessary, it will not be a large red button labelled "Danger: Do Not Push". The big red button marked "Do Not Push" will instead trigger a spray of bullets on anyone stupid enough to disregard it. Similarly, the ON/OFF switch will not clearly be labelled as such.
Rule #65. If I must have computer systems with publically ava
Re:Merry Christmas to me!!! (Score:2)
"Err, Spuds??...."
the security myth (Score:5, Interesting)
really, the post 9-11 security craze is nothing more than a jobs program for the security industry. sure, the security here still sucks, it sucked before too. we're a (sometimes and mainly in theory) free society, but mostly an open society. we do make social exclusions, but really, we accept anyone as a neighbor (tho neighbor in another city if we don't like you, thanks, and don't forget to mow the lawn on the way out). we play security like its a game. we dodge our own security just to prove it can be done.
face it, security is an illusion. i'm more likely to die crossing the street (especially in my hood) than from a terrorist attack.
Re:the security myth (Score:3, Insightful)
True, but so is the stock market, and the economy as a whole.
As The Onion [theonion.com] so scatalogically pseudo-quoted a leading Democratic Presidential candidate:
FBI Guidelines Value Security Over Privacy (Score:3, Insightful)
St. Cloud Times 26 June 2002: 5B.
At first blush the new FBI guidelines appear harmless and reasonable. When Attorney General John Ashcroft announced on May 29 that agents would be allowed to surf the internet, use commercial databases, visit any public place, or attend any public event, my reaction was disbelief that previous guidelines prohibited such commonplace activities.
As Ashcroft noted, "even a 12-year old" can surf the web, just as any citizen can frequent public events and public places or employ databases to gather information. The FBI should have the same rights to gather information as everyone else. And the need to gather that information is greater in this time of increased threat. As President Bush indicated, "The FBI needed to change. The organization didn't meet the times."
But the first blush doesn't always coincide with the final conclusion. We might decide that the new guidelines are justified and necessary. Before we do that, however, we should examine the premises that undergird this policy change, and we should consider what the new policies imply with regard to our security and our privacy.
The new guidelines are based on two premises. The first is that we have entered a more dangerous era that justifies new investigative procedures. But have we? The threat of future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil is no greater now than it was before September 11. Perhaps, given increased security and awareness, it is less. So one objection is that neither the domestic nor foreign situations have changed enough to justify revisions in FBI policies.
The second premise is that the same standards of information collection should govern FBI agents and ordinary citizens. But significant differences exist between agents and non-agents, so that when an ordinary citizen surfs the web or attends a political meeting it is a fundamentally different activity than when an FBI agent surfs the web or attends a political meeting. The agent is in position to collect data into a file, to build a case, to set the stage for an arrest, and thus to intimidate. The history of the FBI certainly makes this fear credible.
Still it seems reasonable to allow FBI agents access to means of observation that are available to other residents of the United States. Recent polls indicate that the public is willing to concede more investigative powers to the FBI, so my hunch is that most citizens will accept the two premises I have presented here.
But even if the new guidelines are justifiable, they are still unnecessary, because the FBI may already engage in these activities. The only requirement is that they establish suspicion of criminal activity. The requirement is not stringent. Indeed, the old guidelines allow preliminary inquiries of 90 days during which the FBI can conduct web searches, engage in surveillance, utilize data collection services, and employ other investigative techniques even without indication of criminal activity. The new guidelines allow the FBI to engage in these activities for a year even if the investigation reveals no criminal activity. In sum, the FBI can now use these procedures not simply to investigate suspicions of criminal conduct, but to generate the suspicion in the first place.
So what does this mean? The FBI can document what you say in internet chatrooms or in religious and political meetings. They can ascertain what magazines you subscribe to or what books you buy. They can access your credit profile, your telephone records (made many international calls lately?), and your travel itineraries. And they can do this without any evidence of a crime or a potential crime. None of these changes in domestic policies increases their abilities to monitor international terrorist organizations. The FBI already has wide latitude to conduct foreign investigations without evidence of criminal activity. The new guidelines apply only to domestic surveillance.
Too much reliance on gov't (Score:3, Insightful)
In other news (Score:3, Funny)
Schneier and Lessig radio show! (Score:3, Interesting)
Geeks would be in their glory.
Rich...
Bruce Schneier and Google? (Score:2)
Does google want to hire Bruce Schneier?
Re:Bruce Schneier and Google? (Score:2, Interesting)
Good thoughts (Score:2, Interesting)
What I appreciate most about his interview was his balanced approach -- that security measures since 9/11 are flawed, but we should try to FIX them rather than throw
after 9/11 (Score:3, Insightful)
We rip on the "knee-jerk" reaction, but that is how it works...it is a reflex. If you don't have reflexes, something is wrong. This is the first time something like this happened here, no one knew how to handle it, we are learning.
On the other hand, we need to keep bitching when these laws go too far. This is how people who will chance things get elected. They listen to the people and their gripes and get the votes. In essence we are watching the process that makes the US a great place. The government goes too far, the people speak out, the government backs off. So keep speaking out.
Re:after 9/11 (Score:5, Insightful)
How confident do you feel about visiting all the mosques in your city to speak with lots of muslim people about their faith? (an activity that's harmless, but may cause you to be added to various agencies' watchlist)
How about participating in non-violent activist groups? (anti-war protestors have been placed on a "no fly list" [progressive.org])
How about being critical of your government in a highish-profile way?
All sorts of groups are being classed as "potential threats" these days. You'd be surprised at some of them.
Also, many of the post-911 laws have been passed with no sunset clause. Legislation generally requires significant effort to be removed from the books when it is no longer needed. Whilst we have (arguably, relatively) benign governments, people are unconcerned ("their power will only be used for good!"), but if an extremist government came to power, all the legislational infrastructure is there to establish a repressive state in no time at all.
--
Parent
Re:after 9/11 (Score:2)
I would feel completely confident in going to a mosque and speaking to Muslims. If it got me on a watch list, I would not really care either, nor would I probably ever know. Now if I were planning on blowing something up, I might care, but I'm
Re:after 9/11 (Score:2)
Cryptography Book (Score:2)
Reading the book (Score:3, Interesting)
An important message I've taken away is that attacks are very rare. Schneier mentions several times how physically safe we are in open, democratic countries, and contrasts this safety to totalitarian (my word) regimes.
He also drives home that you can't spend all of your resources on a plethora of one-in-a-million or once-per-century events. Risk analysis is essential.
Read the book! An interview doesn't nearly do it justice.
Re:Security problems (Score:2)